Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Provisional Remedies Digest
Provisional Remedies Digest
3 - CASE DIGESTS
(1) Castro
(2) THOMAS YANG vs THE HONORABLE MARCELINO R. VALDEZ ET. AL.,
G.R. NO. 73317
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Ricardo and Milagros Morante filed an action in the RTC
Branch 22 of General Santos City to recover possession of two (2) Isuzu Cargo
Trucks against Petitioner Thomas Yang and Manuel Yaphuckon.
The trucks were however registered in the name of petitioner Thomas
Yangand the same were in the possession of Manuel Yaphuckon.
On January 7, 1985, Judge Valdez issued an order of seizure directing the
Provincial Sheriff of South Cotabato to take immediate possession and custody of
the vehicles involved.
On January 10, 1985, Yaphuckon filed a motion seeking repossession of the
cargo trucks and posted a replevin counter-bond of P560,000.00 which was
disapproved on January 18,1985 by the respondent judge.
The respondent spouses amended their complaint on January 13, 1985 by
excluding Manuel Yaphuckon as party defendant. The trial court ordered the release
and delivery of the cargo trucks to respondent spouses.
On January 25, 1985, petitioner put up a counter-bond in the amount of
P560,000.00 which was rejected by the respondent judge for having filed out of
time.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent judge erred in issuing replevin though the trucks
were registered in the name of petitioner?
2. Whether petitioners counter-bond filed out of time?
RULING:
The provisional remedy of replevin is in the nature of possessory action and
the applicant who seeks immediate possession of the property involved need not be
the holder of legal title to the property. It suffices, if at the time he applies for a writ
of replevin, he is, in the words of Section 2, Rule 60, entitled to the possession
thereof.
Section 2. Rule 60. Affidavit and Bond. The applicant must show by his own
affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly
describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the
cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or
a fine pursuant to a law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary
attachment, or otherwise placed under custodial egis, or if so seized, that
it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
After defendant had been duly represented by counsel even at the inception
of the service of summons and a copy of the order of replevin on January 7, 1985,
defendant Thomas Yang had already been duly served, especially so, when counsel
manifested in their comment to the opposition filed by the plaintiffs that Manuel
Yaphuckon was duly authorized to represent Thomas Yang.
From then on defendant should have been on guard as to the provision of
Section 6. Rule 60, the five (5) days period within which to file the counter-replevin
for the approval of the court, counted from the actual taking of the property by the
sheriff on January 7, 1985.
(3) Llacuna
(4) De Guia
(5) SPS. ESTANISLAO vs. EAST WEST BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 178537
February 11, 2008
FACTS:
Sometime in July 1997, petitioners obtained a loan from the respondent in the
amount as evidenced by a promissory note and secured by two deeds of chattel
mortgage dated July 10, 1997 one covering two dump trucks and a bulldozer to
secure the loan amount of P2,375,000.00, and another covering bulldozer and a
wheel loader to secure the loan amount of P1,550,000.00. Petitioners defaulted in
the amortizations and the entire obligation became due and demandable.
On April 10, 2000, respondent bank filed a suit before the RTC of Antipolo for
replevin with damages, praying that the equipment covered by the first deed of
chattel mortgage be seized and delivered to it. Subsequently, respondent moved for
suspension of the proceedings on account of an earnest attempt to arrive at an
amicable settlement of the case.
The trial court suspended the proceedings, and during the course of
negotiations, a deed of assignment was drafted stating that, the ASSIGNOR
The trial court dismissed the amended complaint for lack of merit on the
grounds that the deed of assignment and the petitioners delivery of the heavy
equipment effectively extinguished petitioners total loan obligation.
Upon appeal to the CA by the respondent the decision of the RTC was
reversed.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Petitioner husband filed his opposition to the respondent wife's application for
support pendente lite, setting up as defense the adultery charge he had filed
against the respondent. Judge Luciano granted the support pendente lite.
Petitioner husband filed with respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the aforementioned orders on
the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion. The next day the
respondent court gave due course to the petition and issued a writ of preliminary
injunction to stop Judge Luciano from enforcing said orders.
The respondent court set aside the assailed orders and granted the petitioner an
opportunity to present evidence before the lower court in support of his defense
against the application for support pendente lite. The respondent wife moved to
reconsider so set aside its previous decision and rendered another dismissing the
petition.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether adultery is a good defense against the respondent's claim for
support pendente lite
RULING:
It is suggested that while adultery may be a defense in an action for personal
support, that is, support of the wife by the husband from his own funds, it is not a
defense when the support is to be taken from the conjugal partnership property.
We do not see that the distinction is material in this case. In the first place
Article 292 is not in itself the source of the legal right to receive support. It merely
states that the support, not only of the spouses but also of the children, shall be
taken from the conjugal property during the pendency of the legal separation
proceeding. It does not preclude the loss of such right in certain cases. In the
second place, the said article contemplates the pendency of a court action and,
inferentially at least, a prima facie showing that the action will prosper. For if the
action is shown to be groundless the mere filing thereof will not necessarily set
Article 292 in operation. This is also the sense of Section 5 of Rule 61, supra, which
requires, among other things, when support pendente lite is applied for, that the
court determine provisionally "the probable outcome of the case."
Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that "the legal separation may be
claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or
consent to the adultery or concubinage ... (and) where both spouses are offenders,
a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them ..."
In a provisional sense at least, within the meaning of Rule 61 (Section 5), the
probable failure of the respondent's suit for legal separation can be foreseen since
she is not an innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery by the Court of
First Instance. It is true that the judgment of conviction is on appeal in the Court of
Appeals, but the same undoubtedly satisfies the standard of provisional showing set
by the aforesaid Rule. If legal separation cannot be claimed by the guilty spouse in
the first place, the fact that an action for that purpose is filed anyway should not be
permitted to be used as a means to obtain support pendente lite, which, without
such action, would be denied on the strength of the decisions of this Court
recognizing adultery as a good defense. Otherwise, as pointed out by the petitioner,
all that an erring spouse has to do to circumvent such defense would be to file a suit
for legal separation no matter how groundless.
The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal
partnership property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the
spouse claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the
Civil Code, which states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the
spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. A petition in bad faith,
such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes
a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be
considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact
under Article 303 of the same Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when
the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to
disinheritance;" and under Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is
"when the spouse has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the substantive
right to support in such a situation is incompatible with any claim for
support pendente lite.
What has been said above, of course, is not meant to be a prejudgment of
either the legal separation proceeding pending in the lower court or the criminal
case for adultery pending in the Court of Appeals. It is to be understood only in the
light of Rule 61, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, which specifically governs the
subject of support pendente lite.
(8) ROSITA VELOSO DE OLAYVAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARISTOTELES
OLAYVAR, Defendant-Appellee.
G.R. No. L-8088. November 29, 1955
FACTS:
Rosita Veloso De Olayvar instituted an action against Aristoteles Olayvar in
the Court of First Instance of Leyte praying that support be given her and her four
children coupled with a petition for support pendente lite. But earlier, defendant
husband filed a case for legal separation in Cebu between the same parties on the
ground of adultery wherein the right of plaintiff to demand support is incidentally
involved.
Defendant husband in his answer to the later case (Leyte) set up as special
defense about their pending case for legal separation in Cebu.
While the separation case in Cebu is pending, the court deemed it proper to
hold in abeyance further action on the case for support for the reason that the case
in Cebu "should have priority in order to ascertain the rights of the parties with
particular reference to support in favor of the plaintiff." The court however modified
later this ruling on the premise that, as the legal separation case might take a long
time before it is finally disposed of, it is imperative that the matter of support be
given
preferential
consideration.
After the failed attempt of the defendant to have this ruling reconsidered, he
filed a motion to dismiss predicated on the same plea that there is between the
same parties a case for legal separation in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
invoking in his favor the rule that a complaint may be dismissed where "there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause." [Rule 8,
section 1(d)] And on March 24, 1954, the court entered an order dismissing the case
in line with the plea of the defendant. This is the order subject of the present
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendants claim that an action for support pendente lite may be
dismissed on the ground that "there is another action pending (legal separation)
between the same parties for the same cause" tenable.
HELD:
YES.
The Supreme Court favoured the defendants claim and dismissed the
present action.
In order that an action may be dismissed on the ground that "there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause" [Rule 8, section 1
(d)], the following requisites must concur:
(1) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in
both actions;
(2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and
(3) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may
be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res adjudicata in the other.
Note that the present action is for support not only of plaintiff but of her
children. The action is predicated on the infidelity of defendant who because of his
propensity towards other women made him neglectful of his marital duties. The
case of legal separation, on the other hand, asserts adultery on the part of plaintiff
which is a valid defense against an action for support.
Our new Civil Code provides that the obligation to give support shall cease
"when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives
rise to disinheritance" [Article 303 (4)], and under Article 921 of the same Code, it
shall be sufficient cause for disinheritance "when the spouse has given cause for
legal separation." It further appears that in the separation case the wife interposed
an answer wherein, repudiating the charge of adultery, she demanded that she and
her children be given the proper maintenance and support to which they are
entitled under the law.
All of the foregoing show that the two cases raise practically the same issues.
There is therefore no need of prosecuting them separately and independently for
that would amount to duplicity of action. And as it appears that the case of legal
separation was instituted earlier than the one for support, it is fair that the latter be
dismissed as was correctly done by the lower court.
ARTHUR
FACTS:
The parties to this action are husband and wife, married in Manila in 1914,
and the wife has entered suit for separate maintenance. The CFI of Manila granted
certain amounts for maintenance and P1000 for cost of Litigation. Prior to the
resolution of the action for separate maintenance filed by the wife, the court
ordered for support in certain items of debts, advances, and living expenses existing
at the time of the order fixing the monthly allowance. Such order is now the subject
for appeal. Appellee, in her brief, has moved to dismiss the appeal contending that
the order is interlocutory.
ISSUE:
Whether the extent to give support includes payment of certain items debts,
advances, and living expenses.
RULING:
Article 148 of the Civil Code reads in part:
The obligation to give support may be enforced whenever the person having
a right to claim it requires such assistance for his or her maintenance; such
allowance, however, shall only be paid from the date of the filing of the complaint,
and the character and the nature of the support is defined in Article 142. The
pertinent portion thereof reads:
By support is understood all that is necessary for food, shelter, clothing and
medical attendance, according to the social standing of the family.
In the opinion of the court, some of the items are clearly without the rules
laid down in the Code, while others may be partly within the rules. Some, in their
entirety, long precede the date of the filing of this suit.
While the item known as the Manila Hotel is evidently allowable in part,
being for ordinary necessities of life, it covers a period both before and after the
filing of the suit. Others, such as the claim for money loaned to the wife, are not
within the rule (13 R. C. L., 1209; Ramirez and De Marcaida vs. Redfern, 49 Phil.,
849). It is impossible, from the evidence of record, for this court to state how much
should be allowed. It is also noted that no allowance has as yet been made for the
period from the filing of suit to the date of allowance of temporary maintenance two
months thereafter. It is impossible, from the evidence of record, for this court to
state how much should be allowed. It is also noted that no allowance has as yet
been made for the period from the filing of suit to the date of allowance of
temporary maintenance two months thereafter.
It being impossible for this court to state the amount that should be allowed,
the case must be remanded for further proceedings in accord with the views herein
expressed, and it is so ordered. No pronouncement is made regarding costs.
August 7, 1926
G.R. No. 26231
FACTS:
On August 7, 1925, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered
judgment involving respondent Gorgonia Parugao was plaintiff and the herein
petitioner Lorenzo Mendoza defendant, declaring the marriage between the two null
on account of the return of the first husband of the Parugao, who had been
presumed dead after an absence of more than seven years.
In the month of October of 1925, Antonio Buenaventura, the first husband of
the respondent Gorgonia Parugao, died in the municipality of Cabanatuan Nueva
Ecija.
Said judgment annulling the marriage being on appeal, on September 14,
1925, the said respondent Gorgonia Parugao brought an action, in the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, against the petitioner Lorenzo Mendoza in which she
alleged the existence of certain conjugal property acquired during her marriage with
the said petitioner, and asked for a settlement of the same and the sum of P300 as
alimony during the pendency of the suit.
The herein respondent and defendant in said civil case No. 3962 in answering
the complaint on December 14, 1925, denied generally and specifically the facts
alleged therein.
On November 27, 1925, court directed the defendant Lorenzo Mendoza,
during the pendency of the case and from the filing of the complaint, to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P50 monthly and in advance by way of support and
subsequently issued and execution of the order.
On February 8, 1926, the defendant Lorenzo Mendoza filed a motion praying
for the reconsideration of said order of November 27, 1925.
On March 24, 1926, a writ of execution was issued against the property of the
defendant in order to collect the sum of P325 the total amount of the monthly
payments due from September 14, 1925.
Said writ of execution not having been complied with the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, issued an order citing the defendant Lorenzo Mendoza,
together with the herein named defendants to appear and show cause why they
should not be punished for contempt for not having complied with said writ of
execution.
On July 10, 1926, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija issued an order
denying the motion of the defendant praying that the writs of attachment of the
dates of January 20th and March 23rd of 1926, respectively, be cancelled.
In its decision of July 23, 1926, this court affirmed the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija declaring null and of no effect the marriage
contracted by the petitioner Lorenzo Mendoza and the respondent Gorgonia
Parugao on February 14, 1916.
ISSUE:
Summons was served upon petitioner through her personal secretary at her
residence in Paraaque City. Interestingly, however, the writ of replevin was served
upon and signed by a certain Joseph Rejumo, the security guard on duty in
petitioners crushing plant in Sariaya, Quezon contrary to the sheriffs return stating
that the writ was served upon Rivera.
Rivera filed her answer, manifestation, and motion for the acceptance of
petitioners redelivery bond. In her answer, petitioner countered that the rockcrushing plant was ceded in favor of her husband as his share following the
dissolution of the partnership formed between Jan Rivera and respondents wife,
Iluminada Vargas (Iluminada), while the partnerships second rock-crushing plant in
Cagayan was ceded in favor of Iluminada. She further averred that from the time
that the partnership was dissolved until Jan Riveras death, it was petitioners
husband who exercised ownership over the said equipment without any disturbance
from respondent.
The RTC issued an Order disapproving petitioners redelivery bond application
for failure to comply with the requirements under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 of the
Rules of Court.Without directly saying so, the RTC faulted petitioner for her failure to
file the application for redelivery bond within 5 days from the date of seizure as
provided in the Rules of Court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same
was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Riveras
counter-bond on the ground that it was filed out of time.
HELD:
YES.
Petitioner avers that the writ of replevin was served upon the security guard
where the rock-crushing plant to be seized was located. The signature of the
receiving party indicates that the writ was received by a certain Joseph Rejumo, the
guard on duty in a plant in Sariaya, Quezon, where the property to be seized was
located, and witnessed by Claudio Palatino, respondents caretaker. The sheriffs
return, however, peremptorily states that both the writ of replevin and the summons
were served upon Rivera. Nine (9) days after the writ was served on the security
guard, petitioner filed an answer to the complaint accompanied by a prayer for the
approval of her redelivery bond. The RTC, however, denied the redelivery bond for
having been filed beyond the five-day mandatory period prescribed in Sections 5
and 6 of Rule 60. But since the writ was invalidly served, petitioner is correct in
contending that there is no reckoning point from which the mandatory five-day
period shall commence to run.
Replevin is one of the most ancient actions known to law, taking its name
from the object of its process. It originated in common law as a remedy against the
wrongful exercise of the right of distress for rent and, according to some authorities,
could only be maintained in such a case. But by the weight of authority, the remedy
is not and never was restricted to cases of wrongful distress in the absence of any
statutes relating to the subject, but is a proper remedy for any unlawful
taking. Replevied, used in its technical sense, means delivered to the owner, while
the words to replevy means to recover possession by an action of replevin.
At the outset, petitioners proper remedy should have been to file a motion to
quash the writ of replevin or a motion to vacate the order of seizure. Nevertheless,
petitioners filing of an application for a redelivery bond, while not necessary, did not
thereby waive her right to question the improper service. It now becomes
imperative for the trial court to restore the parties to their former positions by
returning the seized property to petitioner and by discharging the replevin bond
filed by respondent. The trial, with respect to the main action, shall continue.
Respondent may, however, file a new application for replevin should he choose to
do so.
(12) BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROBERTO M. REYES, defendant
GR No. 102998 July 5, 1996
FACTS:
The spouses Reynaldo and Florencia Manahan executed, on 15 May 1980, a
promissory note binding themselves to pay Carmasters, Inc., the amount of
P83,080.00 in thirty-six monthly installments commencing 01 July 1980. To secure
payment, the Manahan spouses executed a deed of chattel mortgage over a motor
vehicle.
Carmasters later assigned the promissory note and the chattel mortgage to
petitioner BA Finance Corporation with the conformity of the Manahans. When the
latter failed to pay the due installments, petitioner sent demand letters. The
demands not having been heeded, petitioner, on 02 October 1987, filed a complaint
for replevin with damages against the spouses, as well as against a John Doe,
praying for the recovery of the vehicle with an alternative prayer for the payment of
a sum of money should the vehicle not be returned.
Upon petitioner's motion and the filing of a bond in the amount of
P169,161.00 the lower court issued a writ of replevin. The court, however, cautioned
petitioner that should summons be not served on the defendants within thirty (30)
days from the writ's issuance, the case would be dismissed to failure to
prosecute. The warning was based on what the court perceived to be the deplorable
practice of some mortgagees of "freezing (the) foreclosure or replevin cases" which
they would so "conveniently utilize as a leverage for the collection of unpaid
installments on mortgaged chattels."
The service of summons upon the spouses Manahan was caused to be served
by petitioner at No. 35 Lantana St., Cubao, Quezon City. The original of the
summons had the name and the signature of private respondent Roberto M. Reyes
indicating that he received, on 14 October 1987, a copy of the summons and the
complaint.
Petitioner, through its Legal Assistant, Danilo E. Solano, issued a certification
to the effect that it had received from Orson R. Santiago, the deputy sheriff of the
RTC Manila, the Ford Cortina seized from private respondent Roberto M. Reyes, the
John Doe referred to in the complaint, in Sorsogon, Sorsogon. On 20 October 1987,
the lower court came out with an order of seizure.
Whether a mortgagee can maintain an action for replevin against any possessor of
the object of a chattel mortgage even if the latter were not a party to the mortgage.
HELD:
NO. The plaintiff was not able to establish the essential conditions to take
possession thereof.
A chattel mortgagee, unlike a pledgee, need not be in, nor entitled to the
possession of the property unless and until the mortgagor defaults and the
mortgagee thereupon seeks to foreclose thereon. Since the mortgagee's right of
possession is conditioned upon the actual fact of default which itself may be
controverted, the inclusion of other parties like the debtor or the mortgagor himself,
may be required in order to allow a full and conclusive determination of the case.
When the mortgagee seeks a replevin in order to effect the eventual
foreclosure of the mortgage, it is not only the existence of, but also the mortgagor's
default on, the chattel mortgage that, among other things, can properly uphold the
right to replevy the property. The burden to establish a valid justification for that
action lies with the plaintiff. An adverse possessor, who is not the mortgagor,
cannot just be deprived of his possession, let alone be bound by the terms of the
chattel mortgage contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up an action for
replevin.
Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a
provisional relief. It may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession
of personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to
the provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the
pendency of the action and hold it pendente lite. The action is primarily possessory
in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession.
Replevin is so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and
partly in personam in rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is
concerned, and in personam as regards to damages involved. As an "action in rem,"
the gist of the replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of
specific personal property by reason of his being the owner or of his having a
special interest therein. Consequently, the person in possession of the property
sought to be replevied is ordinary the proper and only necessary party defendant,
and the plaintiff is not required to so join as defendants other persons claiming a
right on the property but not in possession thereof. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court
allows an application for the immediate possession of the property but the plaintiff
must show that he has a good legal basis, i.e., a clear title thereto, for seeking
such interim possession.
Where the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the specific property
is so conceded or evident, the action need only be maintained against him who
so possesses the property. There can be no question that persons having a special
right of property in the goods the recovery of which is sought; such as a chattel
mortgagee, may maintain an action for replevin therefor. Where the mortgage
authorizes the mortgagee to take possession of the property on default, he may
maintain an action to recover possession of the mortgaged chattels from the
mortgagor or from any person in whose hands he may find them.In effect then, the
mortgagee, upon the mortgagor's default, is constituted an attorney-in-fact of the
mortgagor enabling such mortgagee to act for and in behalf of the owner.
In case the right of possession on the part of the plaintiff, or his
authority to claim such possession or that of his principal, is put to great
doubt (a contending party might contest the legal bases for plaintiffs cause of
action or an adverse and independent claim of ownership or right of possession is
raised by that party), it could become essential to have other persons involved and
accordingly impleaded for a complete determination and resolution of the
controversy
In a suit for replevin, a clear right of possession must be established. A
foreclosure under a chattel mortgage may properly be commenced only once there
is default on the part of the mortgagor of his obligation secured by the mortgage.
The replevin in the instant case has been sought to pave the way for the foreclosure
of the object covered by the chattel mortgage.
The conditions essential for that foreclosure would be to show, firstly, the
existence of the chattel mortgage and, secondly, the default of the mortgagor.
These requirements must be established since the validity of the plaintiffs exercise
of the right of foreclosure are inevitably dependent thereon. (Servicewide
Specialists, Inc.,vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 103301, 08 December 1995,)
(13) SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., petitioner, vs. REGINA M.
ASTORGA, respondent.
G.R. No. 148132
FACTS:
Regina M. Astorga (Astorga) was employed by respondent Smart
Communications, Incorporated (SMART) as District Sales Manager of the Corporate
Sales Marketing Group/ Fixed Services Division (CSMG/FSD). Astorga enjoyed
additional benefits, one of which is a car plan.
SMART launched an organizational realignment to achieve more efficient
operations. Part of the reorganization was the outsourcing of the marketing and
sales force. Thus, SMART entered into a joint venture agreement with NTT of Japan,
and formed SMART-NTT Multimedia, Incorporated (SNMI). Since SNMI was formed to
do the sales and marketing work, SMART abolished the CSMG/FSD, Astorgas
division.
To soften the blow of the realignment, SNMI agreed to absorb the CSMG
personnel who would be recommended by SMART. SMART then conducted a
performance evaluation of CSMG personnel and those who garnered the highest
ratings were favorably recommended to SNMI. Astorga landed last in the
performance evaluation, thus, she was not recommended by SMART. SMART,
nonetheless, offered her a supervisory position in the Customer Care Department,
but she refused the offer because the position carried lower salary rank and rate.
Despite the abolition of the CSMG/FSD, Astorga continued reporting for work.
SMART issued a memorandum advising Astorga of the termination of her
employment on ground of redundancy,The
termination
of
her
employment
prompted Astorga to file a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries
and other benefits with prayer for moral and exemplary damages against SMART
SMART responded that there was valid termination and also sent a letter to
Astorga demanding that she pay the current market value of the Honda Civic Sedan
which was given to her under the companys car plan program, or to surrender the
same to the company for proper disposition. Astorga, however, failed and refused to
do either, thus prompting SMART to file a suit for replevin with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati (RTC).
ISSUE:
Whether RTC was correct when it assumed jurisdiction over the action for
Replevin filed by SMART.
HELD:
YES.
Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of
goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully
distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed
to permit one having right to possession to recover property in specie from one who
has wrongfully taken or detained the property. The term may refer either to the
action itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy
traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be
obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action.
Contrary to the CAs rationale, the RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over
the suit and acted well within its discretion in denying Astorgas motion to dismiss.
SMARTs demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative,
the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the
relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations. As
such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante, this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC
over the replevin suit, explained:
Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in
the plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein is the return of the property in
specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory
proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property.
The question of whether or not a party has the right of possession over the
property involved and if so, whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully
taken and detained said property as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside
the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the field of
specialization of Labor Arbiters.
filed for corporate rehabilitation with the rehabilitation court. The court issued an
Order (stay order) which states that the enforcement of all claims whether for
money or otherwise, and whether such enforcement is by court action or otherwise,
against Advent, its guarantors and sureties not solidarily liable with it, is stayed.
Young claimed among others, several employee benefits allegedly due him as
Advents former president and chief executive officer. Advent's rehabilitation plan
was approved which included in its assets the subject car which remained in Young's
possession at the time. The trial court issued a Writ of Seizure directing the Sheriff
to seize the subject car from Young. Young filed an Answer alleging that as a former
employee of Advent, he had the option to purchase the subject car. The trial court
dismissed the replevin case and Young's counterclaim. The CA ruled in favor of
Young and directed the returning the car to him.
Issue:
WON the CA committed reversible error in directing the return of the seized car to
Young
Ruling:
The petition is partially meritorious.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in directing the trial court to return the seized
car to Young since this is the necessary consequence of the dismissal of the replevin
case for failure to prosecute without prejudice. Upon the dismissal of the replevin
case for failure to prosecute, the writ of seizure, which is merely ancillary in nature,
became functus officio and should have been lifted. There was no adjudication on
the merits, which means that there was no determination of the issue who has the
better right to possess the subject car. Advent cannot therefore retain possession of
the subject car considering that it was not adjudged as the prevailing party entitled
to the remedy of replevin.
The dismissal of the replevin case for failure to prosecute results in the restoration
of the parties status prior to litigation, as if no complaint was filed at all. To let the
writ of seizure stand after the dismissal of the complaint would be adjudging Advent
as the prevailing party, when precisely no decision on the merits had been
rendered. Accordingly, the parties must be reverted to their status quo ante. Since
Young possessed the subject car before the filing of the replevin case, the same
must be returned to him, as if no complaint was filed at all.
(17)
EUFEMIA ALMEDA vs. BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES
Facts: Respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, represented by its
president renewed its Contract of Lease with Almeda, as lessor, husband of
petitioner Eufemia and father of petitioner Romel Almeda. Under the said contract,
Ponciano agreed to lease a portion of the Almeda Compound. The contract of lease
stated that in case of extraordinary inflation, the value of Philippine peso at the time
of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment.
During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter, respondent dealt
with petitioners. Petitioners advised respondent that the former shall assess and
collect VAT on its monthly rentals. Respondent opposed petitioners' demand and
(18)
G.R. No. 181303
that respondents Benigno Tappa, et al. continued to occupy the subject property
even after Consuelos death, building their residences thereon using permanent
materials. Danaos heirs also learned that Tappa, et al. were claiming ownership
over the subject property. Averring that they already needed it, Danaos heirs
demanded that respondents vacate the same. The call was unheeded. Meanwhile,
Danaos heirs referred their land dispute to the Lupong Tagapamayapa. During the
conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the subject
property and presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership.
The heirs opposed this, saying that the documents were falsified and highly
dubious. This notwithstanding, Tappa, et al. created a cloud upon the heirs title to
the property. Thus, the heirs filed a case for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and
Damages in the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the judge commit grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio
dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction?
RULING: No. Petition is dismissed. RTC should remand the records to the MTC.
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed,
a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a
statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under
this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the
written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties
thereunder. Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63. Section 1 states
that an action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title, and to consolidate
ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase may be brought under the RTC.
These remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they result in
the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of
execution. Whereas the Rules of Court uses may, the amended Judicial
Reorganization Act uses the word shall in determining jurisdiction. JRA explicitly
requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions
which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does
not exceed P20,000 (OMM) or P50,000 (MM).
In this case, the assessed value of the subject property is only P410.00; therefore,
the jurisdiction is with the MTC, not the RTC. Further, an action for declaratory relief
presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of
rights arising thereunder. The purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure
an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a
statute, deed or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, and not to
settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof. Where the law or contract has
already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the
courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In the present case, the
case for quieting of title was filed after Danao heirs already demanded, and Tappa
refused to vacate the subject property. Since the heirs had already been deprived of
the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an
accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An
accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the
occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of
the realty. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the
property involved. Given that the property is only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the
RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same.
(19) Ababa
(20) Castro
(21)
GAMBOA vs TEVES
(G.R. NO. 176579 June 28, 2011)
FACTS:
PLDT was granted a franchise to engage in the telecommunications business
in 1928 through Act No. 3436. During the Martial Law 26 percent of the outstanding
common shares were sold by General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE
an American Company) to Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation
(PTIC), who in turn assigned 111,415 shares os atock of PTIC (46 percent of
outstanding capital stock) to Prime Holdings Inc. (PHI). These shares of PTIC were
later sequestered by PCGG and adjudged by the court to belong to the Republic.
Fifity four (54) percent shares were sold to Hong Kong-based firm First Pacific,
and the remaining 46 percent was sold through public bidding by the Inter-agency
Privatization Council, and eventually ended up being bought by First Pacific
subsidiary Metro Pacific Assets Holdings Inc. (MPAH) after the corporation exercise
its first refusal. The transaction was an indirect sale of 12 million shares or 6.3
percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT, making First Pacifics common
shareholdings of PLDT to 37 percent and the total common shareholdings of
foreigners in PLDT to 81.47 percent. Japanese NTT DoCoMo owns 51.56 percent of
the other foreign shareholdings/equty.
Petitioner gamboa, alleged that the sale of 111,415 shares to MPAH violates
Sec. 11 of Art. XII of the Constitution, which limits foreign ownership of the capital of
a public utility to not more than 40 percent.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners choice of remedy was proper?
RULING:
NO. However, since the threshold and purely legal issue on the definition of
the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has far-reaching
implications to the national economy, the Court treats the petition for declaratory
relief as one for mandamus. It is well settled that this Court may treat a petition for
declaratory relief as one for mandamus if the issue involved has far-reaching
implications.
(22) Llacuna
(23)
LUCIANO VELOSO, ABRAHAM CABOCHAN, JOCELYN DAWIS-ASUNCION AND
MARLON M. LACSON, PETITIONERS,
VS.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
RESPONDENT
FACTS:
On December 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 8040 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of Exemplary Public
Service Award to Elective Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been Elected for Three
(3) Consecutive Terms in the Same Position. Section 2 thereof provides:
SEC. 2. The EPSA shall consist of a Plaque of Appreciation, retirement and
gratuity pay remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in the
position for three (3) consecutive terms, subject to the availability of funds as
certified by the City Treasurer. PROVIDED, That [it] shall be accorded to qualified
elected City Officials on or before the first day of service in an appropriated public
ceremony to be conducted for the purpose. PROVIDED FURTHER, That this
Ordinance shall only cover the Position of Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Councilor:
PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, That those who were elected for this term and run for
higher elective position thereafter, after being elected shall still be eligible for this
award for the actual time served: PROVIDED FINALLY That the necessary and
incidental expenses needed to implement the provisions of this Ordinance shall be
appropriated and be included in the executive budget for the year when any city
official will qualify for the Award.[4]
Atty. Gabriel J. Espina (Atty. Espina), Supervising Auditor of the City of Manila, issued
Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2005-100(05)07(05) [6] with the following
observations:
1. The initial payment of monetary reward as part of Exemplary Public Service
Award (EPSA) amounting to P9,923,257.00 to former councilors of the City
Government of Manila who have been elected for three (3) consecutive terms
to the same position as authorized by City Ordinance No. 8040 is without
legal basis.
2. The amount granted as monetary reward is excessive and tantamount
to double compensation in contravention to Article 170 (c) of the IRR of RA
7160 which provides that no elective or appointive local official shall receive
additional, double or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by
law.
3. The appropriations for retirement gratuity to implement EPSA ordinance was
classified as Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses instead of
Personal Services contrary to Section 7, Volume III of the Manual on the
New Government Accounting System (NGAS) for local government units and
COA Circular No. 2004-008 dated September 20, 2004 which provide the
updated description of accounts under the NGAS. [7]
After evaluation of the AOM, the Director, Legal and Adjudication Office COA issued
Notice of disallowance No. 06-010-100-05[8] dated May 24, 2006.
The former councilors filed a Motion to Lift the Notice of Disallowance which was
favored by the Legal and Adjudication Office, the pertinent portion of the decision:
Citing Article 170 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) the Legal and
Adjudication Office held that the monetary reward given to the former councilors
can be one of gratuity and, therefore, cannot be considered as additional, double or
indirect compensation. Giving importance to the principle of local autonomy, the
LAO-local upheld the power of local government units (LGUs) to grant allowances.
More importantly, it emphasized that the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) did not disapprove the appropriation for the EPSA of the City which indicate
that the same is valid.[12]
Upon review, the COA rendered the assailed Decision No. 2008-088 sustaining
Notice of Disallowance No. 06-010-100-05 - The motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. The COA opined that the monetary reward under the EPSA is
covered by the term "compensation." Though it recognizes the local autonomy of
LGUs, it emphasized the limitations thereof set forth in the Salary Standardization
Law (SSL). It explained that the SSL does not authorize the grant of such monetary
reward or gratuity. It also stressed the absence of a specific law passed by
Congress which ordains the conferment of such monetary reward or gratuity to the
former councilors. In response to the question on its jurisdiction to rule on the
legality of the disbursement, the COA held that it is vested by the Constitution the
power to determine whether government entities comply with laws and regulations
in disbursing government funds and to disallow irregular disbursements. ]
Petitioners insist that the power and authority of the COA to audit government funds
and accounts does not carry with it in all instances the power to disallow a
particular disbursement.[20] (Citing Guevara v. Gimenez ) and that that the COA has
no discretion or authority to disapprove payments on the ground that the same was
unwise or that the amount is unreasonable. The COA's remedy, according to
petitioners, is to bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer such
expenditures that, in its opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant
Aggrieved, petitioners through special civil action for certiorari alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COA claiming that The respondent
Commission on Audit did not only commit a reversible error but was, in fact, guilty
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled
that the monetary award given under the EPSA partakes of the nature of an
additional compensation prohibited under the Salary Standardization Law, and other
existing laws, rules and regulations, and not a GRATUITY "voluntarily given in return
for a favor or services rendered purely out of generosity of the giver or grantor.
Apart from being totally oblivious of the fact that the monetary award given under
the EPSA was intended or given in return for the exemplary service rendered by its
recipient(s), the respondent COA further committed grave abuse of discretion when
it effectively nullified a duly-enacted ordinance which is essentially a
judicial function.
ISSUE
whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
disallowance of P9,923,257.00
HELD:
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of
administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created not only
on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.
Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality
when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that
would amount to grave abuse of discretion. [
It is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court
entertains a petition questioning its rulings.
(24)
Brenda L. Nazareth vs. Hon. Reynaldo A. Villar
G.R. No. 188635
January 29, 2013
FACTS:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law. A violation of this constitutional edict warrants the disallowance of the
payment. However, the refund of the disallowed payment of a benefit granted by
law to a covered person, agency or office of the Government may be barred by the
good faith of the approving official and of the recipient.
Being assailed by petition for certiorari on the ground of its being issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is the decision
rendered on June 4, 2009 by the Commission on Audit (COA) in COA Case No. 2009045 entitled Petition of Ms. Brenda L. Nazareth, Regional Director, Department of
Science and Technology, Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City, for review of Legal
and Adjudication Office (LAO)-National Decision No. 2005-308 dated September 15,
2005 and LAO-National Resolution No. 2006-308A dated May 12, 2006 on
disallowances of subsistence, laundry, hazard and other benefits in the total amount
of P3,591,130.36, affirming the issuance of notices of disallowance (NDs) by the
Audit Team Leader of COA Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City against the
payment of benefits to covered officials and employees of the Department of
Science and Technology (DOST) for calendar year (CY) 2001 out of the savings of
the DOST.
The petitioner DOST Regional Director hereby seeks to declare the decision dated
June 4, 2009 "null and void," and prays for the lifting of the disallowance of the
payment of the benefits for CY2001 for being within the ambit of Republic Act No.
8439 (R.A. No. 8439), otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Scientists, Engineers,
Researchers, and other Science and Technology Personnel in the Government
(Magna Carta, for short), and on the strength of the Memorandum of Executive
Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora dated April 12, 2000 authorizing the use of the
savings for the purpose.
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari, with the petitioner insisting that the
COA gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
affirming the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 despite the
provisions of R.A. No. 8439, and in ruling that the Memorandum of April 12, 2000 did
not cover the payment of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001.
ISSUE:
Whether the special civil action for certiorari is meritorious?
HELD:
The Court held in the negative. The COA is endowed with sufficient latitude to
determine, prevent, and disallow the irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It has the power
to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purposes for which they had
been intended by law. The "Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public
funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government
revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property, including the
exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, to establish the
techniques and methods for such review, and to promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations"
Only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court
entertain and grant a petition for certiorari brought to assail its actions. Section 1 of
Rule 65, Rules of Court, demands that the petitioner must show that, one, the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or
nullifying the proceeding. Inasmuch as the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner should establish that the
COA gravely abused its discretion. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which
means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such
judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ.
Section 7 of R. A. No. 8439 confers the Magna Carta benefits consisting of additional
allowances and benefits to DOST officers and employees, such as honorarium, share
in royalties, hazard, subsistence, laundry, and housing and quarter allowances,
longevity pay, and medical examination. But the Magna Carta benefits will remain
merely paper benefits without the corresponding allocation of funds in the GAA.
As we see it, the COA correctly ruled on the matter at hand. Article VI Section 29 (1)
of the 1987 Constitution firmly declares that: "No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." This constitutional
edict requires that the GAA be purposeful, deliberate, and precise in its provisions
and stipulations. As such, the requirement under Section 20 of R.A. No. 8439 that
the amounts needed to fund the Magna Carta benefits were to be appropriated by
the GAA only meant that such funding must be purposefully, deliberately, and
precisely included in the GAA. The funding for the Magna Carta benefits would not
materialize as a matter of course simply by fiat of R.A. No. 8439, but must initially
be proposed by the officials of the DOST as the concerned agency for submission to