BARICUATRO vs CA

G.R. No. 105902. February 9, 2000

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Quieting of Title

FACTS

In 1968, deceased Baricuatro, Jr.,
substituted by his legal heirs, bought 2
lots on installment from Galeos. After the
sale, petitioner introduced improvements
and started to reside in 1970. At the time
the action for quieting of title was filed in
the trial court, petitioner had an unpaid
balance.

However, 2 months from the sale,
respondent sold the entire subdivision,
including the 2 lots to 2nd buyer. After the
sale of the entire subdivision, the 2nd
buyer allegedly took possession and
developed the same for residential
purposes. He registered the deed of sale
covering the subdivision, secured TCT,
subdivided, and acquired individual titles.
In 1974, he sold the 2 lots to 3rd buyers
who caused the TCT and tax declarations
in their names, then demanded from
petitioner to vacate the said lots but the
latter refused.

RTC declared the 3rd buyers as the
owners. CA armed decision.

Petitioner argues that the general
principles on trust must be applied and
not Article 1544. Respondent buyers
assert that Torrens system should be
upheld and that an innocent purchaser for
value, relying solely on an unencumbered
title, should be protected.

ISSUE

Whether or not the 3rd buyers - and
not the petitioner - are the owners who
bought the lots in good faith.

HELD

NO. The petitioners are owners.

Quieting of title is a common law
remedy for the removal of any cloud upon
or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title
to real property; "...not only to place
things in their proper place, to make the

one who has no rights to said immovable

respect and not disturb the other, but also
for the benefit of both, so that he who has
the right would see every cloud of doubt
over the property dissipated (Art 476).

The 3rd buyers are not in good
faith, on the basis of the letter which the
latter sent to the petitioner, reminding the
petitioner of his overdue account and
warning him that if he could not come up
with the proper solution, it would be his
last chance. "ART. 1544. If the same thing
should have been sold to dierent
vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have
first taken possession thereof in good faith
. . Uraca vs. Court of Appeals:

"xxx xxx the prior registration of the

disputed property by the second buyer
does not by itself confer ownership or a
better right over the property. Article 1544
requires that such registration must be
coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence
teaches us that "(t)he governing principle
is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time,
stronger in right). Knowledge gained by
the first buyer of the second sale cannot
defeat the first buyer's rights except
where the second buyer registers in good
faith the second sale ahead of the first.

While 3rd buyers bought the
disputed lots from 2nd buyers in 1974,
they registered the deeds only in 1976. On
cross, 3rd buyer admitted he visited
petitioners residencein 1975. Thus, 3rd
buyers cannot claim good faith. The
registration by them was done in bad faith,
hence, it amounted to no "inscription" at
all.

Phil Stock Exchange vs. CA: [A]
holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is
not entitled to the protection of the law, for
the law cannot be used as a shield for
frauds.

NATIONAL GRAINS AUTH. vs IAC

G.R. No. L-68741 January 28, 1988

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The fact that the exact number of objects

to be delivered has not been determined
does not aect the perfection of the
contract.

FACTS

Leon Sorano (seller), oered to sell
palay grains to NGA (buyer), now NFA
through its provincial manager. Seller
submitted the documents required by the
buyer NFA for pre-qualifying as a seller.
After processing documents, the seller
was given a quota of 2640 cavans of
palay. Seller delivered 630 cavans. They
were not rebagged, classified, and
weighed. When seller demanded payment,
he was informed that it would be held in
abeyance because: (1) manager was still
investigating an information he received
that seller was not a bona fide farmer; and
(2) the palay delivered was not produced
from sellers farmland but was taken from
a warehouse of a rice trader.

Buyer NFA then wrote seller
advising him to withdraw the cavans
because it was found that he is not a

bona fide farmer. Instead of withdrawing,

the seller demanded payment. He then
filed a complaint for specific performance
and/or collection of money with damages.

CFI and CA ruled in favor of the
seller.

Buyer NFA contends:

The
cavans
of palay delivered by the

seller was made for the purpose of

having it oered for sale;

Under the procedures, rebagging is the

initial operative act signifying
acceptance, and acceptance will be
considered complete after preparing the
Warehouse Stock Receipt. Since the
delivered cavans did not undergo such
procedure, there was not acceptance of
the oer. Hence, no consent.

ISSUE

Whether or not there was a
contract of sale.

HELD

YES.

The seller initially oered to sell
palay to NFA. When buyer NFA accepted
the oer by noting in the Farmer's
Information Sheet a quota of 2,640
cavans, there was already a meeting of
the minds between the parties, the object
being the palay grains and the cause is
NFAs payment, depending upon its

quality.

Art 1349 provides: "The fact that
the quantity is not determinate shall not be
an obstacle to the existence of the
contract, provided it is possible to
determine the same, without the need of a
new contract between the parties."

In this case, there was no need for
NFA and seller to enter into a new
contract to determine the exact number

to be sold. The seller can deliver so much

of his produce as long as it does not
exceed 2,640 cavans.

The contention that there was no
acceptance, therefore consent is absent

is incorrect. Sale is a consensual contract;

there is perfection when there is consent
upon the subject matterand price, even if
neither is delivered. This is provided by Art
1475. The acceptance referred to by Art
1475 which determines consent is the
acceptance of the one party by the other
and not of the goods delivered as
contended by petitioners.

From the moment the contract of
sale is perfected, it is incumbent upon the
parties to comply with their mutual

obligations or may reciprocally demand

performance.

HEIRS OF UBERAS vs. CFI of Negros

Occidental
G.R. No. L-48268
October 30, 1978
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Imprescriptibility of an action to Quiet

FACTS
Uberas siblings inherited a parcel of
land from their parents. Petitioners
(children and successors in interest of
Segundo and Albino) filed a complaint
against respondents (surviving spouse and
children of Pedro and Alejandra Uberas)
for quieting of title, recovery of possession
and ownership, partition, and
reconveyance with damages of the
property in suit.
Defendants sought for dismissal on
the ground that the action is barred by
prescription. But plaintiffs argued that the
action is imprescriptible because it is to
quiet the title to the property in question,
for partition, and for declaring heirship and
deed of sale executed by defendants as
void ab initio.
RTC dismissed the case on the
ground of prescription, holding that the
action is essentially for reconveyance
based upon an implied trust resulting from
fraud. In this case, plaintiffs aver that
Pedro Uberas executed the declaration of
heirship with malice and bad faith to
deprive the compulsory heirs.
ISSUE
Whether or not the case at bar is
one for quieting of title and therefore
imprescriptible.
HELD
YES.
This case is an action for quieting of
title which is imprescriptible. Faja vs. CA
applies, that is, an action to quiet title to
property in the possession of plaintiff is
imprescriptible and that where there are
material facts to be inquired into and
resolved on the basis of evidence adduced
by the parties which will determine the
legal precepts to be applied, as in this
case, the complaining party should be

given full opportunity to prove his case.

RTC should not have summarily
dismissed the case on the alleged ground
of prescription notwithstanding contrary
factual averments in the complaint which
would clearly rule out prescription.
The SC set aside respondent
courts order of dismissal and remanded
the case to respondent court for trial and
determination on the merits.

GALLAR vs HUSAIN
G.R. No. L-20954 May 24, 1967

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Imprescriptibility of an action to Quiet

FACTS

Teodoro Husain sold the land under
dispute for 30 pesos to Serapio Chichirita
with the right to repurchase within 6 years.
Teodoro transferred his right to his sister,
Graciana Husain. Graciana paid the
redemption price and later sold the land to
Elias Gallar for a cattle. Possession of the
land, together with the owner's duplicate
of the certificate of title of Teodoro Husain,
was delivered on the same occasion to
Gallar, who since then has been in
possession of the land.

A couple of years after, Gallar filed
this suit in CFI in 1960 to compel
Hermenegilda and Bonifacio Husain, as
heirs of Teodoro Husain, to execute a
deed of conveyance in his favor so that he
could get a TCT. He also asked for
damages. The Husains countered by
saying that Graciana already paid the
redemption price thus their father had
already reacquired ownership over the
same. They also claim that the action of
Elias has already PRESCRIBED.

ISSUES
(1) Whether or not ownership was
transferred to Gallar.

(2) Whether or not the action has

already prescribed.

HELD
(1) YES.

The ownership has been
transferred to Gallar. The right of
repurchase may be exercised only by the
vendor in whom the right is recognized by
contract or by any person to whom the
right may have been transferred. Graciana
Husain must, therefore, be deemed to
have acquired the land in her own right,
subject only to Teodoro Husain's right of
redemption. As the new owner she had a
perfect right to dispose of the land as she
in fact did when she exchanged it for a
cattle with Gallar.

(2) NO.

The action is imprescriptible. This
action is not for specific performance; all it
seeks is to quiet title, to remove the cloud
cast on appellee's ownership as a result of
appellant's refusal to recognize the sale
made by their predecessor. And, as
plainti-appellee is in possession of the
land, the action is imprescriptible.

Appellant's argument that the
action has prescribed would be correct if
they were in possession as the action to
quiet title would then be an action for
recovery of real property which must be
brought within the statutory period of
limitation governing such actions.