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rN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

TN AND FOR SEMINOLE COUNTY, fLORIDA

CASE NO. 12-CF- 1083-A
STATE OF FLORJDA,
Plaintiff(s),
vs.
GEORGE ZIMMERMAN,
Defendant(s).

-------------''
ORDER SETTING BAIL

The D~fendant, charged with second-degree murder with a firearm, was granted release on a
$ 150,000 bond on April 20, 2012 . .Based upon information later discovered, the State filed a Motion to
Revoke Bond which wDs heard on .June I, 2012. After an adversarial evidentiary hearing, the Court
revoked the bond pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.13l(b)(S). On June 25, 20 12, the Defendant filed a
motion seeking reinstatement of the bond. The State opposed the Defendant's release. The motion was
hea.rd on June 29, 2012.

At the hearing, the Court heard testimony and received substantial evidence regarding the
Defendant' s finances at the time immediately before the April20, 2012 bond hearing. The Defendant
also presented evidence about his good behavior while on electronic mon itoring after his release on bond.
The Court received substantial evidence regarding the facts of the case itself in an effort to show that the
State's case against him is weak . Finally, the Defendant did not offer any explanatiol' of or justification
for his deception that was subject to cross examination.

As noted, the Defendant spent a substantial portion of the hearing presenting evidence relating to
self-defense in an effort to counter the State 's case because, in the initial order, the Court characterized
the State's case as "strong." Notably, at the initial bond hearing, this Court had only lim ited evidence; to
that point, the State showed the Defendant had shot and killed Trayvon Martin. 1 There was other
evidence presented through the probable cause affidavit and the testimony of Dale Gilbreath, an
investigator with the State Attorney's Office, that the Defendant' s actions were imminently dangerous to
another nnd that he acted with a depraved mind regardless of human life. The Defendant certainly
ind icated through cross-examination that he acted in self-defense, but he put forward no evidence of

This is undi~puted . The Defendant apo logized on the record

for shooting and killing Martin.

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such. 2 As a consequence, this Court found as a preliminary matter that the evidence against the
Defendant was "strong."
Since the June 29, 2012 hearing addressed whether to reinstate the bond was not an Arthur
hearing, the presentation of evidence attacking the State'~ case is of limited relevance at this stage of the
proceedings . Nonetheless, the Court reviewed all ofthe exh ibits and considered the witnesses' testimony
regarding the Defendant's self-defense theory. The actual questions before the Court at this time arc: is
the Defendant entitled to bail when he presents false testimony at a prior bond hearing and what recourse
there is when the Defendant has shown blatant disregard for the judicial system. The Florida Constitution
offers some guidance. Art. I, 14 states:
Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and
the proof of guilt is evident and tbe presumption is great, every person charged with a
crime or a violation of municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release
on reasonable conditions. If no conditions of release can reasonably protect the
community from risk of physical hann to persons, assure the presence of the accused at
trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process, the accused may be detained.

By its plain language, this Court is authorized to detAi.n the Defendant without bail if it is determined that
it is necessary to assure the integrity of the judicial process.
Under any definition, the Defendant has flaunted the system. Counsel has attempted to portray
the Defendant as being a confused young man who was fearful and experienced a moment of weakness
and who may also have acted out of a sense of"betrayal" by the system. Based upon all ofthe evidence
presented, this Court finds the opposite. The Defendant has tried to manipulate the system when he has
been presented the opportunity to do so. He is an adult by every legal definition; Trayvon Martin is the
only male whose youth is relevant to this case. The Defendant has taken courses in criminal justice with
the intention of becoming a police officer, an attorney, a judge, or~ magistrate like his father. He has
been arrested before, having entered and successfully completed a pre-trial intervention program. He has
also obtained an injunction and had an injunction entered against him. The injunction against him has
obviously been dissolved at some point for him to have validly obtained a permit to carry the firearm used
to shoot Trayvon Martin. He also had the wherewithal to set up a website to collect donations to help
defray the costs of his defense. Thus, before this tragic incident, the Defendant had a very sophisticated
knowledge of the criminal justice system over and above that of the average, law-abiding citizen.
Mo~eover,

any sense of "berrayal" would be unreasonable. He was cooperative with the Sanford

Police Department in that he did give numerous statements upon request. The State notes that his stories
changed each retelling, but on the surface he should be deemed to have been cooperative. However, he
clearly understood that he was being investigated for committing a homicide and. while he believes that
he was justified in. his actions, there has been nothing presented which ind ica.tes that he was misled into
z Argument by coun~el is not evidence. See e.g Wheeler v. Stare, 311. So. 2d 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (noting that
counsel's opening statement is not evidence).

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believing that he would not be charged with a crime. Contrary to being betrayed, the Defendant received
normal , reasonable lreatment and was granted reasonable bail.
Contrary to the image presented by the Defendant not by evidence but only by argument of
counsel, it appears to this Court that the Defendant ill manipulating the system to his own benefit. The
evidence is clear that the Defendant and his wife acted in concert. but ,Primarily at the Defendant's
direction, to conc'eal their cash holdings. They spoke in rudimentary code to conceal the true amount of
money they were dealing with. Adam Magill, the Defendant's forensic accounting expert, did not dispel
this Court's concern that the Defendant was seeking to hide assets. He admitted that one interpretation of
the Defendant's actions was to hide money, but he also stated that it was not a very effective way to do so
because all of the bank transactions were traceable. The Defendant also neglected to disclose that he had

n valid second pa5sport in his safe deposit box. Notably, together with the passport, the money only had
to be hiddell for a short time for him to leave the country if the Defendant made a quick decision to flee .l
It is entirely reasonable for this Court to find that, but for the requirement that he be placed on electronic

monitoring, the Defendant and his wife would have fled the United States with at least $130,000 of other
people's money. The fact that they have spent the money "responsibly" (i.e. without going out to
expensive dinners or splurging on nonessentials) is of no consequence in this analysis. The Defendant
didn't present any witness to affinnatively state that the Defendant has not received funds from any other
source.
His lack of candor was not limited to representations made to the Court. The Defendant is
rcpre~ented

by Mark O'Mara, a very well-respected criminal defense attorney in the Central Florida area.

At the initial bond hearing. Mr. O'Mara indicated that he would be representing the Defendant without
taking a fee. Attorney O' Mara also indicated that he would be filing an affidavit of indigency for costs.
The Defenqant did not correct his attorney's representations to the court on these issues. The failure to

correct these representations meant that for a considerable period of time the Defendant misled his
attorney as to his !lbility to pay counsel . No member of the Defendant's fam ily who had knowledge of the
Defendant hiding funds alerted the court.
While not exactly the same, this Court finds that deceiving the Court at a bond hearing is akin to
violating a bond condition. There is linlc authority establishing what "assure the integrity of the judicial
process," as set forth in Art. I, 14 of the Florida Constitution, actually means in operation. Williams v.

Spears, 814 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) appears to offer some guidance. There, the Third District
Court of Appeal noted that, "(t)he integrity of the judicial process is undercut if the courts do not have
effective tools rouse where a defendant free on bail commits a new crime.'' !d. at 1170. The Court
quoted with approval the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, which stated that "we do not think our

~ It appears that the Defendant also requests that this Coun assume that there are no undisclosed sources of income
or money with which the Defendant could Abscond if released again.

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96o54o82

Constitution must be read as providing a continuing, renewable right to bail on the same charge where a
bail condition has been breached. The State need not keep freeing the defendant while upping the ante."

Jd. at 1171 (quoting Mello v. Superior Court, 370 A.2d 1262, 1264 ( 1977)). Moreover, the Court

distinguished the concept of preventive detention to protect the public from

rev~cation of bail

for

violating a condition ofthat bail by stating "[t]he authority of the court to revoke bail in certain situations
ought not to be construed as authority to exercise preventive detention . The former is a sanction for past
acts, the latter a prophylactic for the future. We are concerned with the former." Williams, 814 So. 2d at
1171 (quoting Mello , 370 A .2d at 1265). Thus, the Third District indicated that a violation of a bond

condition could justify continued detention.

However, Williams specifically addressed the constitutionality of Fla. Stat. 907.0471. Fla. Stat.
~907 . 0471,

which became effective in 2000, reads

Notwithstanding 907.041, a court may, on its own motion, revoke pretrial release and
order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant
committed a new crime while on pretrial release.
Although the above language seems to apply to the violation of general bond conditions, this Court is not
presented with an allegation that the Defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release, so Fla.
Stat. 907.0471 does notapply.d
This Court must therefore rely on the holding in State v. Paul, 783 So. 2d l 042 (Fla. 200 I). In
Paul, the court resolved a confl ict between the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal regarding the

consequences of viola.ting the conditions of release. The Third District had detennined that a court had
the inherent authority to hold a defendant in pretrial detention, whereas the Fourth District ruled that the
violation ofa bond condition, without more, would not justify permanent revocation ofthe bond if the
defendant is constitutionally entitled to a bond . The Court would still be required to conduct an analysis
under Fla. Stat. 907 .04 1 to determine whether a defendant is entitled to be re-releascd on a new bond.
l11e Florida Supreme Court sided with the Fourth District. It held that "although the breach of a

bond condition provides the basis for revocation of the original bond, the trial court's discretion to deny a
subsequent application for a new bond is limited by the terms of [Fla. Stat. 907.041]." Jd. at 1051. The
Court was "influenced by (its) concern that adopting the Third District's view would leave the judiciary,
the State, and defendants without.a.<~certainab lc criteria, precise standards, and procedural protections
presently existing in the comprehensive statutory scheme and rules, and thus potentially run afoul of a
defendant's consti\\Jtional rights.'' Id. This Court disagrees with that legal conclusion; there are very
ascertainable criteria, namely the specified bond conditions, and willful violation of these conditions
would subject a defendant to continued detention or release on new bond conditions at the trial court's
discretion . Appellate courts routinely review trial court decisions under an abuse of discretion standard,
~ There: is probable: cause to believe that the Defendant comm itted a violation ofFia. Stat. 903.035(1), a thirddegree felony, but that crime was not committed while the D~:fendant was on pretrial release.

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96o545B2

and this Court has confidence that they would be able to continue to competent ly do so under
circumstances like those presented in the instant case. However, this Court recognizes that ''it is free to
disagree and to express tts disagreement with an appellate court ruling, [but) it is duty-bound to follow it."
State v. Washington , _

So. 3d_, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D1535a, *2 (Fla. 3d DCA June 27, 20 12).

This Court's discretion is, therefore, limited by Paul. According to Paul,

the trial court was not without recourse to address a defendant's willful violation of bond
conditions. For example, upon a violation of bond, the trial court had authority pursuant
to Florida Rule o:f Criminal Procedure 3.131(g) to direct the arrest and commitment of a
defendant. Tf recommitment is ordered, nothing in either the 1997 statute or the rules
prevented the court from setting harsher conditions of pretrial rtlease for defendants who
seek readmission to bail. Similarly, the court could increase the amount of the bond or
prevent further release of the defendant on pretrial recognizance pursuant to rule
3.131 (c)(! )-{2). Further, a defendant previously released on bail could become subject to
pretrial detention if the trial court found that the defendant qualifies for pretrial detention
based upon the statutory criteria. In addition, the State could have attempted to establish
that the defendant meets the criteria for pretrial detention for the newly charged offense.
Finally, if the concern was that a defendant's conduct evinced disregard of the court's
authority, a defendant's conduct for violation of the court's order could be addressed as an
indirect or direct criminal contempt of court as long as the protections afforded a
defendant for criminal contempt are followed.

Paul, 783 So. 2d at 1052. This Court has, thus far, declined to exercise its contempt powers a.nd the State

failed to prove that the Defendant may be held without bond. Further action by this Court, therefore, is
limitecl to his already.effected arrest, the subsequent release on new bond conditions and the possibifity of
future conte'mpt proceedings.
This Court must, then, determine the appropriate bond amou.nt based upon the criteria set forth in
Fla. Stat. 943.046(2). Those nre as follows :
(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged: The Defendant is charged with seconddegree murder with a firearm of an unanned 17 year old juvenile. If convicted as charged,
the Defendant faces the possibility of life in prison with a minimum mandatory tenn of25
years to life;
(b) The weight of the evidence against the Defendant: That the Defendant shot and killed the
victim is virtUally undisputed. The only issue is the viability of the Defendant's selfdefense/Stand Your Ground claim;
(c) The Defendant's family tics, length of residence in the community. employment hist.Q!Y....
financial resources and mental condition: The Defendant has lived in Central .Florida for
approximately eight years. Since this case has been pending, the Defendant, when free on
bail, lived outside the county in a confidential location. He has held several jobs for short
periods of time and was attending Seminole State College. However, he no longer works or
goes to school in Seminole County. Moreover, none of his family members currently reside
in Seminole County. He does not own property in Seminole County. As noted .above, he

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does have conditional access to substantial sums of money. At the bond hearing of April 20,
2012, the Court gave great weight to the evidence presented with respect to the Defendant's
family tics in determining an appropriate bond amount. At this time, the Court gives little
weight to Defendant's family ties as assurance that the Defendant will appear for subsequent
proceedings. A fnmily member, Shellie Zimmerman, the Defendant 's wife, provided the
Court direct false testimony concerning funds available to the Defendant. Additional family
members had personal knowledge and were directly involved in the transfer offunds, which
ultimately resulted in the funds being converted to cash or "parked" in a nominee's accounl.
Family members were either ignorant ofthe false testimony that was nationally televised or
became knowledgeable of the false testimony and did not report the fraud to the Court. At
the most recent bond hearing, neither the Defendant nor any family member provided sworn
testimony or a sworn explanation to negate the Court's impression that the movement of
funds and the false testimony was to aid and assist the Defenda.nt in fleeing the jurisdiction of
the Court. There has been no evidence relating to the Defendant's mental condition;
(d) The Defendant's past and pre~ent conduct, including-!.!D: record of convictions. previous
flight to a.void prosecution. or failure to appear at court proceedings: Other than the case
which was dismissed after completion of pre-trial intervention program, there is no record of
convictions or failure to appear. The Court must additionally consider the Defendant's
participation in the presentation offalse testimony at the initial bond hearing. The Defendant
chose as a matter of strategy, after consultation with his attorney, to not personally take the
stand and testifY under oath to give an explanation concerning the presentation offalse
testimony. The Defendant requested special treatment to carve out an exception as to when a
Defendant is allowed to exercise the right of allocution. The Defendant, through counsel,
requc~tcd

the right to make a statement but not be subject to cross examination. 111e Court

denied the Defendant's request and the Defendant chose not to testify rather than be subject
to cross examination. Defense counsel chose not to present any testimony as to matters
associated with why the financial transactions were structured as they were. Instead, defense
counsel argued for the Court's consideration that the Defendant's youth as a 2& year old man
and his fear/confusion were the explanation for the Defendant' s participation in the
presentation of false testimony. The Court has considered the defense argument. The Court
still has yet to hear any swom testimony as to the circumstances associated with the fraud
upon the Court. The forensic accountant was merely a recapitulation not an explanation.
AIthough there is no record of flight to avoid prosecution, thi s Court finds that circumstances
indicate that the Defendant wa.s preparing to flee to avoid prosecution, but such plans were
thwarted ;
6

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(c) The nature and probability of danger which the Defendant's release poses to the community:
This Court does not fear that the Defendant would pose a threat to other8 in the community if
released. Furthermore, there ts some concern that his release on bond will provoke anger
within the community, but all demonstrations to this point have been non-violent and
peaceful. Therefore, this factor carries little weight;
(t) The source of funds used to post bail or procure an appearance bond: Although the language

following this clause in the statute indicates that the purpose of this criterion is to ensure that
the funds a.re legally obtained, this Court finds that it is relevant to this case. There is no
evidence that the money is ill-gotten or has been squandered. However, the money that is
available to post bond was obtained through 'online donations. As such, it can be deemed
almost as "found money." It is not money which the Defendant has earned through his hard
work and savings, so forfeiting it for failing to appear would not impact the Defendant's life
in the same manner as a similarly-situated defendant who puts his house up as collateral to
obtain a surety bond;

(g) Whether the Defendant is already on release pending resolution of another criminal
BrOCFedin.&,...O.LO.Jl.P.)"Ob~ti on...Jlarole,

or other release pending completion of a sentence: This

does not apply to the Defendant;

(h) The street value of any drug: This does not apply to the Defendant;
(i) The nature and probabilitY of intimidation qnd danger to the victims: This Court finds no
evidence that the Defendant will pose any threat of intimidation or danger to the victim's
fam ily or other witnesses;
U) Whether there is probable cause to believe that the Defendant committed a new crime while
on pretrial release: This is a matter of interpretation. There is certainly probable cause to
bel ieve that the Defendant violated Fla. Stat. 903 .035(3), which would ben third-degree
felony, or committed contempt of court by providing such false statements. However, he has
not been charged with either of those offenses and they did not technically occur while on
pretrial release. Therefore, this Court finds these facts relevant to the question of the
suitability of bond, but cannot treat these potential offenses, standing alone, as a basis to hold
order pretrial detention as authorized in Fla. Stat. 903 .04 71 ;
(k) AnY. other facts that the Court finds relevant: The Court must set bail that the Defendant can
afford to pay, for setting an excessive bail is tht functional e:quivalent of setting no bail at all.
Best v. State, 28 So. 3d t 34, 13 5 (Fla. 5th DCA 20 l 0). The evidence before the Court is that
the Defendant received donations of almost $200,000 and on April 20, 2012, he had
approximately $130,000 available to him.

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At the bond hearing on April 20, 2012, the State requested that bond be denied, or in the
alternative, that it be set at $1,000,000. Had the State known of the Defendant's financial resources, this
Court suspects that the State might have requested a higher monetary amount. It is also likely that this
Coun would have set the higher bail, as the $150,000 was set to ensure the Defendant could meet his bail
obligation. See id. Based upon the changed circumstances, this Court finds that the bail should be set at
$1,000,000. The Defendant has the ability to post such bail. The increased bail is not a punishment; it is
meant to allay this Coun's concern that the Defendant intended to flee the jurisdiction and a lesser
amount would not ensure his presence in court.
ORDERED AND ADJVDGED :

I. The Defendant's bail shall be set at $1,000,000 with the following conditions:
a.

The Defendant shall refrain from criminal activity of any kind;

b. The Defendant shall not ha.ve any contact with the victim's family, directly or
indirectly, except as necessary to conduct pretrial discovery through his attorneys;
c. The Defendant shall be subject to electronic monitoring at his own expense;
d. The Defendant shall not leave Seminole County without prior authorization by this
Court:
c. The Defendant shall check in with the Pre-trial Release Department every 48 hours:

f. The Defendant shall not enter the property of the Orlando-Sanford International
Airport;

g. The Defendant shall not open or maintain a bank account;

h. The Defendant shall not consume any alcohol;
i.

The Defendant shall obey a curfew between 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.

j.

The Defendant shall not apply for or obtain a passport.

?.1

DONE AND ORDERED in chambers nt Sanford. Seminole County, Florida this_ day of
July, 20\2.

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