"RULINGS IN AGRARIAN CASES"

BY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY AUGUSTO P. QUIJANO
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
HOW TO ESTABLISH TENANCY
The fact that defendants did not at all question the plaintiff's tenancy over their
respective land in question for several years, there is an implied admission or consent
to the establishment of tenancy relationship between the parties. The relationship may
be considered established where the landowner knew of the cultivation of the land by
the farmer and he tolerated the same (PACHECO VS. DESIDERIO, CA G.R. NOS.
SP-06078-CAR, FEBRUARY 25, 1977).
For establishment of tenancy relationship, it is not essential that the landowner
has personal knowledge of the cultivation by another, in the concept of tenant of his
landholding. It is sufficient that he is chargeable with knowledge, through his overseer
or agent of such cultivation and he tolerates the same (LONTOC VS. VDA. DE
ASIS, CA-G.R. NO. 39331-12, JULY 13, 1968).
We emphasize that, it is not necessary that consent be given wholeheartedly, as
consent given out of pity is sufficient (POLIDARIO SR., VS. BROGONIO, ET
AL., CA-G.R. NO. 46702-R, MARCH 9, 1972).
Nor lack of written contract is an obstacle to the establishment of the relation
of landlord and tenant under the Tenancy Law. It is enough that there be mutual
consent for the tenant to cultivate for a consideration, in writing, expressly or
impliedly (JAMORA VS. DIAMCAY, CA-G.R. NO. 47379-R, APRIL 13, 1972).
As long as the legal possession of the land constitutes a person as a tenantfarmer by virtue of an express or implied lease, such an act is binding on the owner of
the property even if he himself may not have given his consent to such arrangement.
(CO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 162 SCRA 392).
The fact that complainant has a hut erected on the landholding shows he is a
tenant since only tenants are entitled to a homelot where he can built his house
thereon as an incident to his right as a tenant (CRUZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
129 SCRA 222).
AGRARIAN DISPUTE
Any controversy relating to terms, tenure or condition of employment, or
concerning an association or representation of persons in negotiating, maintaining,

changing or seeking to arrange terms on conditions to employment, regardless of

whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm employers and
employees (LAW OF AGRARIAN REFORM, BY RECAREDO P. BARTE, 1991
EDITION, P. 26).
ABANDONMENT/MORTGAGE/VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
Herein respondent-appellant had voluntarily abandoned her landholdings in
litigation after she has sublet it without the consent and knowledge of the landowner
(COSCOS VS. ESTATE SIBUGON, ET AL., CA-G.R. NO. 05658, FEBRUARY
28, 1977).
Persons therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered
tenants, and who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land,
ceases to hold and is considered as having abandoned the land as tenant; and ceases to
enjoy the status, right and privileges of one (GABRIEL VS. PANGILINAN, 58
SCRA 590).
The gauge in the determination of whether petitioner-appellant has abandoned
or surrendered the subject landholding, is the simultaneous and subsequent acts
indicative of her intention to do so. There is no such thing as presumptive voluntary
surrender of abandonment by implication, and most certainly, not from vague and
doubtful evidence. If there should be a waiver of a right, public policy demand that
the same be clearly and convincingly established by competent and sufficient
evidence (BARRAMEDA VS. OCA, ET AL., CA-G.R. NO. 07164-SP;
POLICARPIO NISNISAN, ET AL., VS. CA, ET AL., GR NO. 126425).
Abandonment has been invariably construed to include two essential elements:
(1) the intention to abandon, and (2) the physical act or acts of abandonment. The
primary elements of abandonment are the intention to abandon and the external act by
which intention is carried into effect. The intention to abandon is considered the first
and permanent inquiry (MONTEMAYOR, 1ST EDITION 1964, P. 232).
TENANCY EMANCIPATION PATENT
Anyone who wishes to contest the rights of the farmer to land given to him by
the government in accordance with our agrarian laws has the burden of proving that
the farmer does not deserve the government grant.
The above findings notwithstanding and assuming that petitioner really waived
his tenancy rights in favor of private respondent, this case should still be void for
being made in violation of Presidential Decree No. 27 (TORRES VS. VENTURA
G.R. NO. 86044, July 2, 1990).

CLOA/CLT/EP
It being so, We rule that the EPs' previously issued to defendant-appellee
partakes the nature of a "public document which is entitled to full and credit in the
absence of competent evidence that its due execution was tainted with defects and
irregularities that could warrant declaration of its nullity (ANCHUELO VS. IAC,
147 SCRA 434).
The mere issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) does not vest in
the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. It is only after compliance
with the conditions set forth in PD No. 27 which entitled him to an Emancipation
Patent (EP) that he acquires a vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding
(PAGTALUNAN VS. TAMAYO, 183 SCRA 252).
It must be emphasized that once a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) has been
issued to a tenant covering a property under the supervision of and in compliance with
the implementing rules and regulations of the Department of Agrarian Reform, he is
thereby deemed to be the owner of the agricultural land in question. There is no more
landlord and tenant relationship and all that remains is for the Department of Agrarian
Reform to determine the valuation of the land in accordance with existing rules and
regulations for purpose of compensation to the landowner (QUIBAN VS. BUTALID,
189 SCRA 106).
Nullification of a CLT maybe had only in a case directly attacking its validity
but never collaterally (MIRANDA VS. CA, GR NO. L-59730, FEBRUARY 11,
1986).
An Emancipation Patent holder acquires the vested right of absolute ownership
in the landholding a right which has becomes fixed and established and is no
longer open to doubt or controversy (PAGTALUNAN VS. TAMAYO, 183 SCRA
253).
E.P. TORRENS TITLE
1. Certificate of Title cannot be altered, amended or cancelled except in a
DIRECT PROCEEDING in accordance with law (WIDOWS AND ORPHANS
ASSOCIATION ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 210 SCRA 165).
2. Torrens Title is generally a conclusive evidence of ownership of the
land (CHING VS. CA, 181 SCRA 9).
3. When EP is issued then he acquires a vested right of absolute
ownership in the landholding (PAGTALUNAN VS. TAMAYO, 183 SCRA
252).
4. The government recognizing the worthy purpose of the TORRENS
SYSTEM, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder

once the condition laid down by the law are satisfied (REPUBLIC VS. UMALI,
171 SCRA 647).
TORRENS
Lands under Torrens Title cannot be acquired by prescription (Sec. 39, Act No.
196; Rosario vs. Auditor General, L-1187, April 30, 1958).
TENANCY PERSONAL CULTIVATION
For one to be considered a tenant, he must NECESSARILY WORK THE
LAND HIMSELF although he may avail of the labor of his immediate farmhousehold
(SABIDORIO, ET AL., VS. UGAY, C.A.-G.R. No. SP-01495, July 25, 1973).
DCN 0808 = When he went to Saudi Arabia and left farmwork to his wife, he
was clearly no longer taking advantage of the assistance of his farm household
(ESTABILLO VS. RUIZ, CA-G.R. NO. 42019-20-R, January 12, 1972; CRUZ
VS. MARCELO, CA-G.R. NO. SP-05933, May 30, 1977).
In the following cases involving a GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE
(DIMANAWA VS. PLANA, ET AL., CA-G.R. NO. SP-02004, January 7, 1975) a
BUS CONDUCTOR (BALANAY VS. RAFAEL, C.A.-G.R. NO. SP-01746-CAR,
August 2, 1976) a FULL TIME MACHINE OPERATOR (MAGALANG VS. YAP,
C.A.-G.R. NO. SP-03163, April 14, 1977), and a JEEPNEY DRIVER (ESCUETA
VS. GERODIAS, ET AL., CA-G.R. NO. SP-06963, March 30, 1978, the COURT
of APPEALS found it hard to believe that these people could still have the time to
work the land personally.
IF THE LAW ABHORS ABSENTEE OWNERS, MORE SO WITH
ABSENTEE TENANTS (BUENO VS. BASCO, C.A.-G.R. NO. 07644-CAR, May
31, 1978).
Failure to comply with one's obligation as a tenant is tantamount to
abandonment (LIMBO VS. BRAGADO, C.A.-G.R. NO. SP-05891, March 28,
1977).
TENANCY
The six (6) essential requisites for the establishment of tenancy relationship
are:
1.

The parties are the LANDOWNER and the TENANT;

2.

The SUBJECT is AGRICULTURAL LAND;

3.

There is CONSENT;

4.

The PURPOSE is AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION;

5.

There is PERSONAL CULTIVATION;

6.

There is SHARING OF HARVEST.

CABALLES VS. DAR - 168 SCRA 247

QUA VS. CA 198 SCRA 236; GRAZA VS. CA 163

SCRA 39
Unless a person has established his status as a DE JURE tenant, he is not
entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
government under existing tenancy laws (CASTILLO VS. COURT OF APPEAL,
205 SCRA 529).
Tenant is defined as the "person who personally cultivates the same
(landholding) (Sec. 6, R.A. 3844)" Absent the element of personal cultivation, one
cannot be a tenant, (CASTILLO VS. CA) (REYES VS. ESPINELI, 30 SCRA 574)
At most he can be considered a CIVIL LAW LESSEE because the civil law lessee
need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased (GABRIEL VS.
PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
The fact of sharing alone, is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship; . .
. (CABALLES VS. DAR 168 SCRA 247)
Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and
lawful landholder through lawful means and not by imposition or usurpation
(HILARIO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 148 SCRA 573).
Consequently, the mere cultivation of the land by a usurper cannot confer upon
him any legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection of security of
tenure of the law (HILARIO VS. IAC, SUPRA).
The caretaker of the land may be considered as the cultivator of the land and,
hence, a tenant (LATAG VS. BANOG, 16 SCRA 88).
The cultivator is necessarily tasked with duties that amount to cultivation
(COCOMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 164 SCRA 568).
Cultivation is an important factor in determining the existence of tenancy
relationship. However, the mere fact that it was not the plaintiff who had actually
seeded the land does not mean that they are not tenants of the land. The definition of
cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harvesting of the land. It
includes the promotion of growth and the case of the plants or husbanding the ground
to forward the products of earth by general industry (GUERRERO VS. CA, 142
SCRA 136, May 30, 1986; COCOMA VS. CA, 164 SCRA 568).
Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled
to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the

government under existing laws (PRUDENTIAL BANK VS. HON. FILEMON

GAPULTOS, ET AL., 181 SCRA 159).
INTRUDER
It is a settled rule that tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent
of the true and lawful owner and not by the imposition or usurpation by any intruder
or usurper (GRAZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 163 SCRA 41; BERENGUER
VS. COURT OF APPEALS 164 SCRA 432).
Mere cultivation by a usurper cannot confer upon him any legal right to work
on the land as a tenant and thereby involve the protective mantle of security of tenure
under the law (GONZALES VS. ALVAREZ, ET AL., G.R. NO. 77401, February
7, 1990).
Parenthetically, mere cultivation of the land by a usurper cannot confer upon
him any legal right to work on the land as tenant and enjoy the protection of security
of tenure of the land (ANTONIO VS. NATIVIDAD, G.R. NO. L-14631, March 30,
1962; SPOUSES TIONGSON VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 130 SCRA 482
(1984) ).
Indeed, tenancy IS NOT A UNILATERAL RELATIONSHIP deriving
substance only from what an alleged tenant does upon the land. It is basically a legal
relationship of mutual accord by and between him and the owner of the land
(TUAZON VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 118 SCRA 484).
Tenancy is not purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant
does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship the intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and, in this case, their written agreements,
provided, these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more
important (TUAZON VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 118 SCRA 484).
There are no SQUATTERS in agricultural lands, squatters are only found in
URBAN COMMUNITIES, not in rural areas (on PD 772) (PEOPLE VS. HON.
VICENTE ECHAVES, 95 SCRA 663).
The court is aware of the practice of landowners, by way of evading the
provisions of tenancy laws to have their tenants sign contracts of agreements intended
to camouflage the real import of their relationship (CRUZ VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 129 SCRA 224; VDA DE DONATO).
RES JUDICATA
For res judicata to set in, the following requisites should be clearly established:
1.

There is a FINAL FORMER JUDGEMENT;

2.
That the former judgment was rendered by a COURT
HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER and
THE PARTIES;
3.
and

The former judgment is a JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS;

4.
That there is between first and second action, IDENTITY
OF PARTIES, OF THE SUBJECT MATTER and CAUSE OF
ACTION.
Decisions of Administrative agencies has the force and effect of final judgment
within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata (IPEKDJIAN
MERCHANDISING CO., VS. COURT OF TAX APPEALS, 9 SCRA 72; SAN
LUIS VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 174 SCRA 258; YSMAEL, JR. AND CO.,
INC. VS. DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 190 SCRA 672).
IDENTITY OF CAUSE OF ACTION
The TEST for determining whether or not there is IDENTITY OF THE
CAUSES OF ACTION between the first and second action is whether the same
evidence would support and establish both the present and former causes of action
(SANTOS VS. IAC G.R. NO. 66671, October 28, 1986).
The doctrine of RES JUDICATA is a rule pervading a well regulated system of
jurisprudence and is based upon two GROUNDS embodied in various COMMON
LAW MAXIMS = The first based on PUBLIC POLICY AND NECESSITY which
makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation Interest
republicae ut sit finis litium; and the second, on the hardship of the individual that
he should be vexed twice for the same cause nemo debet bix vexari pro una et
eadem causa. (NABUS VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 91670,
February 7, 1991).
Once a ruling or judgment has become final, all the issues therein or implied
thereto should be laid to rest (ZANSIBARIAN RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION VS.
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, 135 SCRA 235; DE BORJA VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, G.R. L-37944, JUNE 30, 1988).
FINAL JUDGEMENT
Final judgment are entitled to respect and should not be disturbed. Otherwise,
there would be a wavering of trust to the courts. In the absence of an appeal from a
trial court decision, the judgment becomes final and executory. It becomes the law of
the case. Having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its
authority, that judgment may no longer be altered even at the risk of legal infirmities
and errors it may contain. They cannot be corrected by a special civil action of

certiorari, filed long after the judgment had become final and executory (SAN JUAN
VS. RALLOS G.R. 45063, 15 April 83, Third Div. Fernan, J.;
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL VS. MINISTER OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT G.R. 54243, 21 JULY 89, Second Div. Paras, J.).
Once a decision has become final, the court can no longer amend or modify the
same, much less set it aside. To allow the court to amend the final judgment will result
in endless litigation. Every litigation must come to an end. Access to the court is
guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it. Once a litigant's right has been adjudicated
in a valid judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled
license to come back for another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by
subsequent suits. For, if endless litigation were to be encouraged, unscrupulous,
litigants, will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of justice
(MARQUEZ VS. CA G.R. 79743, 6 November 1989, Second Div. Sarmiento, J.;
NGO BUN TIONG VS. JUDGE SAYO, G.R. 45825, 30 JUNE 1988, Second Div.
Paras, J.).
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the only jurisdiction left to the
trial court is to order its execution (BACLAYON VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 182
SCRA 761).
A decision no matter how erroneous becomes the law of the case between the
parties upon attaining finality (BALAIS VS. BALAIS, 159 SCRA 37).
An execution is the fruit and end of the suit, and is aptly called the life of the
law (GARCIA VS. ECHIVERI, 132 SCRA 631).
APPEAL
It is a settled rule that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege which
must be exercised only within the time and in accordance with the procedure
prescribed for it. It is also the established rule that the perfection of an appeal within
the period provided by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well. So it has
been held that, unless an appeal is timely taken, the appellate court acquires no
jurisdiction over the appealed case and has power only to dismiss the appeal
(VELASCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 51 SCRA 439; RODRIGUEZ VS.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 47 SCRA 153).
The 30 day period to appeal from decision of Land Registration Court should
be counted from receipt by the Office of the Solicitor General of the decision, NOT
from receipt thereof by the special counsel or fiscal acting for the O.S.G.
(REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 135 SCRA 156).
ART. 13, NEW CIVIL CODE
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day
included.

The protection of an appeal within the reglementary period from the decision is
JURISDICTIONAL (ITALIAN VILLAGE RESTAURANT VS. NATIONAL
RELATIONS COMMISSION, 207 SCRA 04)
Beyond the period to appeal, a judgment is no longer within the scope of the
power of review of any court. (BORILLO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 209 SCRA
130). The filing of appeal within the reglementary period is MANDATORY
(FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY OF THE PHIL. VS.
FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY EMPLOYEES UNION, 212
SCRA 39)
Finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period
of appeal if no appeal is perfected. (ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, 212 SCRA 823)
Public policy and sound practice demand that the risk of occasional errors
judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at same definite date fixed
by law; Litigation must end and terminate something and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment
has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprive of the
fruits of the verdict. Court must, therefore guard against any scheme calculated to
bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts
should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. (LI KIM THO VS. GO SIY KAO,
ET AL., L-2676, Jan. 31, 1949, 82 Phil. 776, 778; MASAGANA TELAMART,
INC. VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, L-69623, May 31, 1985)
(COMPENDIUM OF PHIL. JURISPRUDENCE, SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS FROM 1845-1980). Volume II, By Celso L. Magsino, page 33).
APPEAL PROCEDURE
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.
The rules of procedure are used only to secure not override substantial justice
(GREGORIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 72 SCRA 120). Therefore, we ruled in
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453 that a SIX DAY DELAY in the
perfection of the appeal does not warrant its dismissal. And again in RAMOS VS.
BAGASAO, 96 SCRA 395, this Court held that a delay of FOUR (4) DAYS in filing
a notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal can be
excused on the basis of equity (VELASCO VS. GAYAPA, JR., 152 SCRA 440).
Moreover, rules of procedure are intended to promote, not defeat, substantial
justice, and therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense
(ANGEL VS. INOPIQUEZ, 169 SCRA 129; CALASIAO FARMERS
COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION VS. CA, 106 SCRA 630;
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. ROMAMBAN, ET AL., 131 SCRA 431 [1984]).

PROCEDURE
In the word of the Supreme Court, "The purpose of procedure is not to thwart
justice. It's proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
the contending parties (MANILA RAILROAD CO. VS. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 PHIL. 523, 529).
Consequently, lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure will be
overlooked when they do not involve public policy, when they arose from an honest
mistake or unforseen accident, when they have not prejudiced the adverse party and
have not deprived the court of its authority (CASE and NANTZ VS. JUGO ET AL.,
430 G. Mo. 11, p. 4620; ALIGARBES VS. AGUILAR, ET AL., G.R. NO. L-5736,
JAN. 30, 1954).
It is settled, jurisprudence than an issue which was neither averred in the
complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first
time an appeal (REPARATIONS COMMISSION VS. VISAYAN PACKING
CORPORATION, 193 SCRA 531; MATIENZO VS. SERVIDAD, 107 SCRA
276). In the word of Supreme Court Justice Isagani A. Cruz They must choose one
or the other and stand or fall by whatever choice they make.
Perfection of an appeal within the period prescribed by law is jurisdictional so
that the failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment final and
executory (ANDAYA VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
188 SCRA 253).
SECURITY OF TENURE
Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessee which they value
as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their
only means of livelihood (BERNARDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 168 SCRA
439).
The right to surrender possession of the tenanted land can only be exercised by
the tenant (SEE SEC. 27 (2) R.A. 3844; MANUEL VS. VALENTIN, C.A. G.R.
NO. 03982, MARCH 15, 1976).
Essence of the decision = DARAB
He pointed out that there is no question that he was then sickly even before the
first cropping season of 1987 and so it was natural for him as a tenant to get the
services of others to perform farm activities which he, as the tenant cannot do during
his temporary incapacity.
The right to security of tenure does not only apply to bona fide tenants. It also
applies to ACTUAL TILLERS of the land. Pursuant to Department Memorandum
Circular No. 2, issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform for the implementation
of Presidential Decree No. 27, security of tenure is likewise available to actual tillers

of the land (MEJORADA VS. OHAGAN, ET AL., CA G.R. NO. SP-01665, July 7,
1975).
As long as the legal possessor of the land constitutes a person as a tenantfarmer by virtue of an express or implied lease, such act is binding on the owner of
the property even if he himself may not have given his consent to such an agreement.
This is a settled-jurisprudence. The purpose of the law is to protect the tenant-farmer's
security of tenure which could otherwise arbitrarily terminated by an owner simply
manifesting his non-conformity to the relationship (CO VS. IAC, 167 SCRA 392).
The agricultural tenant's security of tenure in holding has become one of his
most deserved rights under our tenancy legislation, guaranteed by both RA No. 1199
and RA No. 3844, as amended. For without it, a tenant becomes the easy prey of the
landowner's whims and caprices. Without it, he can be deprived of his principal and
sole means of livelihood for no cause at all (ADOLFO, ET AL., VS. CABANSON, 8
CAR 2s 84; IBAN VS. PLANAS, CA-GR. NO. SP-01768).
The DAR has taken cognizance of certain methods employed by landowners to
defeat said policy, such as "forcing their tenants to sign documents implying
voluntary surrender to evade the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which act was
pronounced to be illegal. In PD No. 583, it is made a criminal offense for any
landowner who by any other act, scheme, or strategy shall eject, exclude, remove or
oust and/or cause the ouster, exclusion, removal or ejectment of a tenant-farmer from
his landholding in contravention of decrees, laws and other orders on land reform
(ALCALA VS. AMARANTE, CA-GR NOS. SP-05669-95672, FEBRUARY 4,
1977).
Section 49 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, Republic Act 1199, as amended,
enunciates the principle of security of tenure of the tenant, such that it prescribes that
the relationship of landholder and tenant can only be terminated for causes provided
by law. The principle is epitomized by the axiom in the land tenure that once a tenant,
always a tenant. The law simply provide that the tenancy relationship between the
landholder and his tenant should be preserved in order to insure the well-being of the
tenant and protect him from being unjustly dispossessed of the land (PINEDA VS.
DE GUZMAN and PELICIANO, 21 SCRA 1450).
Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessee which they value
as life itself, and the deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to the deprivation
of their only means of livelihood (BERNARDO VS. CA).
(O)nce a leasehold relations (tenancy) has been established, the agricultural
lessee (tenant) is entitle to security of tenure. He has a right to continue working on
the land and he may not be ejected therefrom except for causes as provided by law
(DE JESUS VS. IAC, 175 SCRA 559; DOLORFINO VS. CA, 191 SCRA 880).
The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by
mere expiration of the term or period in the possession of the landholding. In case the

agricultural lessor sell, alienates or transfer, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall
be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor
(SECTION 10, RA NO. 3844).
A landholder-tenant relationship is preserved even in case of transfer of legal
possession of the subject property. The purpose of the law is to maintain the tenants in
peaceful possession and cultivation of the land and to afford them protection against
unjustified dismissal from their holdings by the transferee or purchaser of the land
(PRIMERO VS. CAR, 101 PHIL. 675).
A tenant can only be ejected by the Court for cause and such cause for
dispossession must be proven and justified (ANCHETA VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 200 SCRA 409).
P.D. 816 LAWFUL EJECTMENT
The appellant has these many years (from 1968 to the present) succeeded in
evading payment of rentals while at the same time holding on the land bespeaks much
louder than words his evident bad faith in trying to enrich himself at the expense of
another, a situation that is unjust when practiced by a landowner. We are not unaware
of the special concern that the state takes over agricultural tenant and/or lessors, the
tillers of the country's economy, for these protection should be meant only to save the
man from harassment and undue advantage; it was certainly not meant to aid and abet
wrongful inroads by the tenant into legitimate rights of landowners/lessors who, too,
deserve equal protection of the law. Otherwise, there would be neither rhyme nor
justification in all of the land reform measures of the government, . . . (PABUSTAN
VS. ANGELES C.A.-G.R. NO. SP-01632, OCT. 11, 1974).
It devolves upon agricultural lessee, as his legal obligation, to pay the lease
rental when it falls due. A lessee cannot be authorized to remain in possession and
cultivation of farmholding without giving the landowner his share in the produce, for
the law recognizes the basic right of the landowner to enjoy his legitimate share of the
produce of his property. Thus, PD 816 has been promulgated in pursuance of the
policy of the government to equalize the rights and obligation of the landowners,
agricultural lessor and agricultural lessee (VILLANUEVA VS. MENDOZA, CAG.R. NO. 06612-SP, JUNE 17, 1977).
The tenant who has been in possession and cultivation of litigated land must be
held liable for rentals which he failed to pay beginning the x x x to the present, since
this is a legal obligation which he cannot evade (Sec. 26, RA 3844 as amended by
RA 6389). Should he fail to pay the same he shall suffer the consequences decreed by
PD 816, Sec. 3. (CANJA VS. BANGOY CA-G.R. NO. 06433-R, MAY 31, 1977).
PD 816 - SEC. 36 (6) RA 3844

R.A. 3844 (Sec. 36 (6)) states does not pay the lease rental. It should not be
meant as does not pay in full the lease rental to justify dispossession.
To hold such view would sanction quasi-judicial legislation frowned upon by
our courts (LORENZO, ET AL., VS. PNB [DAVAO BRANCH] ET AL., VOL. 51
NO. 11, O.G. 5658, NO. 9555-R, MAY 11, 1955).
SEC. 36, RA 3844
An agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that valid grounds
exist for his ejectment therefrom.
Thus, the essential requirement for lawful dispossession are
a)

The court, body or tribunal acquires competent jurisdiction;

b)

There must be hearing on the merits;

c)

The judgment must be final and executory; and

d)
The judgment must be based on valid and lawful ground
provided under agrarian laws.
PERSONAL CULTIVATION AS LEGAL GROUND FOR EJECTMENT
Agrarian Relations; Tenancy; Personal Cultivation by owner lessor, still a
valid ground for dispossession of a tenant; Reason: We are in full agreement with the
holding of the Court of Appeals upholding the Court a quo that insofar as COCONUT
LANDS are concerned, personal cultivation by the owner-lessor, a ground for
dispossession of the tenant-lessee under Section 50 of Republic Act 1199, is still a
valid ground for dispossession of a tenant. This is so because Section 35 of Republic
Act 3844 expressly provides that with respect to lands principally planted to CITRUS,
COCONUTS, CACAO, DURIAN and other similar PERMANENT TREES. The
consideration, as well as the tenancy system prevailing, shall be governed by the
provision of Republic Act 1199, as amended (FRANCISCO BALIGWAT VS. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ALBINO ESTAVAS, NO. L-44678, APRIL 8, 1986,
142 SCRA 34).
NOTE:

Fishponds not included, Also take note of effectivity of CARL

FORUM - SHOPPING
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one
forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion [other than by appeal or certiorari] in
another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts while

an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat

administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling.
This is specially so as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was
brought, has no jurisdiction.
Forum shopping is condemnable and punishment therefore is the dismissal of
all actions pending in different courts (BUAN VS. LOPEZ, JR., 145 SCRA 38).
Pendency of an identical action between the same parties in another is a ground
for dismissal of the second suit (Ibid).
TECHNICALITIES OF LAW
May disregard technicalities in order to resolve the case on its merits based on
evidence (RUIZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 201 SCRA 577).
Technicality when it deserts its proper office, as an aid to justice and becomes
its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts
(ALONZO VS. VILLAMOR, ET AL., 16 PHIL. 315; CITED ON YONG CHAN
KIM VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL., ET AL., 193 SCRA 344).
Following the stand of the S.C., the Board will not allow substantial justice to
be sacrificed at the altar of procedural law.
POINTS TO PONDER IN AGRARIAN CASES
1. Rules of Technicalities must yield to the broader interest of substantial
justice (LAMSAN TRADING INC. VS. LEOGARDO JR., 144 SCRA
571).
2. Technicalities in pleading must be avoided in order to attain substantial
justice (MUTUC VS. AGLORO, 105 SCRA 642).
3. Procedural technicality should not be made a bar to the vindication of
legitimate grievance (FUNTILA VS. CA, 93 SCRA 251).
4. Trial judges should refrain from procedural technicalities in deciding
cases and get down to the business of hearing and deciding cases on their
merits (GERIAN VS. BONCAROS, 93 SCRA 862).
5. Due process is only for the vigilant not those having right to be heard,
choose to be silent, only to complain later that they have not been heard
(BAUTISTA VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT, 196
SCRA 470).
6. Physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more
eloquently than a hundred witnesses (PEOPLE VS. SACABIN, 57 SCRA
707).

DUE PROCESS
The requirement of due process are satisfied when the parties are given the
opportunity to submit their respective position papers and submit any evidence they
may have in support of their defense (MUTUC VS. COURT OF APPEAL, 190
SCRA 43; ODIN SECURITY AGENCY VS. DE LA SERNA, 182 SCRA 472).
The failure of the courts to consider all issues raised in the complaint is a
violation of procedural due process; The issues raised by a party should not be left
undecided, especially, so when such issue have been raised on time and insisted upon
at all stages of the proceeding (GRACILLA VS. CIR, G.R. NO. L-24489,
SEPTEMBER 28, 1968).
EVIDENCE
AFFIDAVITS
Affidavits are often unsatisfactory at best. The affiant swears that what he
started is true, but he does not swear that it is the whole truth, nor has the adverse
party an opportunity to inquire whether it is so . . . . . . Affidavits on the same side are
sometimes uniform in appearance as eggs in the shell, but if one of them be prodded
with the point of cross-question or two, the yolk is at once exposed SALONGA,
PHILIPPINE LAW ON EVIDENCE, p. 373, 1965 ed.).
Such testimony, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely hearsay,
can hardly qualify as prima facie evidence of subversion. It should not have been
given credence by the court in the first place. Hearsay evidence whether objected to
or not, has no probative value as the affiant could not have been cross-examined on
the facts stated therein (SALONGA VS. PAO, ET AL., G.R. NO. 59524, Feb. 18,
1985; J. HUGO GUTIERREZ CITING PEOPLE VS. LABINIA, 115 SCRA 223
and PEOPLE VS. VALERIO, 112 SCRA 661).
He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence (TOP-WELD MANUFACTURING INC., VS. ECED, S.A., 138 SCRA
118; LAGASCA VS. DE VERA, 79 PHIL. 376; RODRIGUEZ VS. VALENCIA,
81 PHIL. 787).
Petitioner or anyone in his right mind for that matter, would not waste his time,
effort and money, especially if he is a poor, to prosecute an unworthy action. If at all,
petitioner is an example of a poor tenant farmer who, due to sheer poverty, was
constrained to mortgage his only land to somebody else a situation which
Presidential Decree No. 27 sought to prevent by providing an explicit prohibition on
transfer (TORRES VS. VENTURA, 187 SCRA 96).

Lastly, it is already settled that, this Board, unfettered by the technical rules of
evidence and procedure, can rule on unassigned errors as long as this will enable it to
arrive at a just solution of the conflict before the court (Board) (DE LEON VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, 205 SCRA 612).
PARTIES IN A CASE
It is generally accepted that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger (ED. A. KELLER & CO. VS. EDLERMAN &
BUCKMALL STRATEMSHIP CO., 38 PHIL. 514, 520; GATCHALIAN VS.
ARLEGUI, 75 SCRA 234 [1977]).
And strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court
(BIEN VS. SUNGA, 117 SCRA 249 [1982]).
An EXECUTION case can be issued only against a party and not against one
who did not have his day in court (GALANG, ET AL. VS. UYTIEPO, 92 PHIL.
344; CASTANEDA VS. DE LEON, 55 O.G. 625; MARTINEZ, ET AL. VS.
VILLACETE, ET AL., G.R. NO. L-18695, AUGUST 31, 1962).
Notice to counsel of record is binding upon the client (DURAN VS.
PAGARIGAN, 106 PHIL. 90).
Recovery of real property is one of the actions that survive against the
decedents' representatives (BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS VS. HEIRS OF KALAW,
L-18805, AUGUST 14, 1967).
L. B. P.
LBP assumed the responsibility of financing the acquisition of agricultural
lands by LESSEES through PRE-EMPTION and REDEMPTION pursuant to Sec. 1112, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389 (LBP CIRCULAR NO. 3, SERIES OF
1980).
V. O. S.
Decisions of the PARAD and RARAD on preliminary determination of just
compensation for landholdings covered by the Agrarian Reform Program are NO
LONGER APPEALABLE to the Board as the remedy is to file an original action
with the Special Agrarian Court (ESTATE OF JUAN MIRANDA VS. LBP DARAB
CASE NO. 0585; LBP VS. DARAB, C.A.-G.R. NO. SP-30325).
LANDOWNERS' RIGHT

Landlords, especially small farmers, deserves protection; Tenants are not to be

solely protected by law (CALDERON VS. DE LA CRUZ, 138 SCRA 173).
The concept of "social justice" was not meant to perpetuate an injustice to
landowner - lessor (CABATAN VS. CA, 95 SCRA 323).
For what he has consented to, he cannot now set up as an injury, Justice
Edgardo Paras one who trifles with the law must suffer the fruits of his scheme
(ONG VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 209 SCRA 350).
Social justice is not for the tenant alone. (NILO VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
128 SCRA 519)
The protective mantle of social justice cannot be utilized as an instrument to
hoodwinks court of justice and undermine the rights of landowners on the plea of
helplessness and heartless exploitation of the tenant by the landowner. False pretenses
cannot arouse the sentiment of charity in compassionate society (DEQUITO VS.
LLAMAS, 66 SCRA 505).
The landowners deserve as much consideration as the tenants themselves in
order not to create an economic dislocation where tenants are solely favored but the
landowners become impoverished (CALDERON VS. DE LA CRUZ, 138 SCRA
173).
VESTED RIGHT
Vested right is some right or interest in property that has become fixed and
established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. Rights are vested when the
right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some person as
present interest (BALBOA VS. FARRALES, 51 PHIL. 498).
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
It is a fundamental rule, that what determined the jurisdiction over the subject
matter is the allegation made in the complaint. Jurisdiction cannot be made to depend
upon the pleas and defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to
dismiss" (CARDENAS VS. CAMUS, G.R. NO. L-17191, JULY 30, 1962, cited in
the new Rules of Court by Martin, Second E.d., Vol. I; MARTINEZ LEYBA VS.
EFREN V. MENDOZA, NO. 43157-R, APRIL 30, 1971; 68, NO. 23, O.G. 4513,
JUNE 5, 1972).
DARAB ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IS PURSUANT TO:
1.

Sec. 17, E.O. No. 229, dated July 22, 1987;

2.

Sec. 13, E.O. No. 129-A, dated July 26, 1987;

3.

Sec. 50, R.A. No. 6657, June 10, 1988, and

4.

Sec. 1-2, Rule II of the Revised Rules of the DARAB

CONTRACT
Well settled that to determine the nature of the contract, courts are not bound
by the name or title given to it by the contracting parties. Contracts are not what the
parties may see fit to call them but what they really are as determined by the principle
of law. (BALURAN VS. NAVARRO, 70 SCRA 309).
The Supreme Court, after construing a "Labor of Contract" as in fact a tenancy
agreement, took notice of some landlords of asking their tenants to sign agreements
that camouflage their real agreement by way of evading the provisions of tenancy
laws (CRUZ VS. CA, 129 SCRA 222).
We agree with petitioner that as a landholder he has full liberty to enter into a
civil lease contract covering his property. What we want to indelibly impress,
however, is that once a landholder enters into a contract lease whereby his land is to
be devoted to agricultural production and said landholding is susceptible of personal
cultivation by the lessee, solely or with help of labor coming from his immediate farm
household, then such contract is of the very essence of a leasehold agreement, and
perforce comes under the direct coverage of tenancy laws. Otherwise, it would be
easy to subvert, under the guise of the liberty to contract, the intendment of law of
protecting the under privilege and ordinary credulous farmer from the unscrupulous
schemes and pernicious practices of the landed gentry (TEODORO VS.
MACARAEG, 27 SCRA 7).
DEEMED OWNER
The law is clear and leaves no room for doubt. Upon the promulgation of PD
No. 27 on October 21, 1972, petitioner was deemed owner of the land in question. As
of that date, he was declared emancipated from the bondage of the soil. As such he
gained the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for himself. Those
rights over that particular property were granted by the government to him and to no
other. To insure his continued possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not,
under the law, make any valid form of transfer except to the government or by
hereditary succession, to his successors (TORRES VS. VENTURA, 187 SCRA 96).
HOMESTEAD
We hold that the more paramount and superior policy consideration is to
uphold the right of the homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally the

land acquired from the State without being encumbered by tenancy relations
(PATRICIO VS. BAYOG, 112 SCRA 41).
LEASEHOLD SYSTEM
While it is true that there have been no presidential proclamations to the effect
that measures have been adopted to insure efficient management of the agricultural
processing phases of crops covered by marketing allotments, it would be nothing
short of regressive to deny sugarland share tenants of their right to elect the leasehold
system. Considering the policy of the government as enunciated in Section 4 of the
Code as amended, which mandates the automatic conversion of share tenants to
leaseholders, individual sugarlands should not be discriminated against. Hence, any
share tenant in sugarlands may, in accordance with law, exercise his option to change
his relationship with the landowner into the leasehold system. However, all sugarland
tenants who do not avail of said option may still be subject to existing lawful
arrangements with the landowner in the absence of the presidential proclamation
adverted to in Section 4 (WILFREDO DAVID VS. CA, ET AL., GR. NO. L-5771921, MAY 6, 1988).
This Courts has time and time again sustained the constitutionality of Section
14, holding that the contested section is a reasonable and valid exercise of the police
power of the State to alleviate the socio-economic situation then prevailing in the
fundamental constitutional mandates providing that "[T]he promotion of social justice
to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern
of the State" and that the State " shall regulate the relations between landowner and
tenant . . . in agriculture". We finds neither cogent reason nor sufficient justification to
heed the petitioner's proposition to revised or later the view we have so far adhered to
on the constitutionality of section 14 (DE RAMAS VS. CAR, 1 SCRA 171;
CAYETANO DE BORJA VS. CAR, 79 SCRA 557).
CERTIORARI
NOTE:

1. Section 1, Rule XIV, DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure;

2. Section 54, RA 6657

From the above rule and provisions of law, the mode of view that the losing
party before this Board should avail of is not a Petition for Review but a special civil
action on Certiorari to the Court of Appeals (DCN 0218).
Under Section 54, RA 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, any decision of the DAR can be brought to this court "BY
CERTIORARI". In this case, what petitioner filed is not by certiorari but a petition for
review. It also appears that the docketing fees of P116.00 have not been remitted as
required under Section 2 (b) of Rule 6, Revised Internal Rules of the Court of

Appeals. For these reasons, petition for review is hereby DISMISSED (ADRIANO
JARDIEL VS. ROSARIO PLANAS, CA G.R. NO. SP-UDK-94, JANUARY 30,
1990).
Basically, for certiorari to prosper, it must be shown in the petition that the
DAR has no JURISDICTION, or acted in excess thereof, or with grave abuse of
discretion. The function of certiorari is to keep an inferior court, Board, tribunal or
officer within its jurisdiction, to relieve persons from arbitrary acts that is, of acts
which they have no authority to perform and not to correct errors of procedure or
mistakes in their findings or conclusions. For certiorari to issue, it must not only be
shown that the board, tribunal or officer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, but also that there is no appeal or other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary cause of law (ARCAYA VS. TELERON, ETC.,
ET AL., L-37446, MARCH 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 367).
And, certainly, QUESTIONS OF FACT CAN NOT be reviewed by certiorari.
Grave abuse of discretion MUST BE SHOWN (PALM AVENUE REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT, 153 SCRA 579).
On matters, where the trial courts are given discretion to grant or deny relief to
a party in an action pending before them, the policy of the Supreme Court is NOT
INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF SUCH DISCRETION UNLESS IT IS
CLEARLY SHOWN THAT IT WAS GRAVELY ABUSED (TRINIDAD, ET AL.,
VS. HON. MOYA, ET AL., NO. L-16886, APRIL 30, 1965).
REDEMPTION
In an action for redemption, CONSIGNMENT OR TENDER OF
REDEMPTION AMOUNT is a jurisdictional requirement (BASBAS VS. ENTENA,
28 SCRA 665).
Timely exercise of the right of legal redemption requires either tender of the
price or valid consignation thereof (CONEJERO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 16
SCRA 775).
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
A compromise is basically a CONTRACT perfected by mere consent (GO VS.
IAC, 183 SCRA 82; ART. 2037, NEW CIVIL CODE).
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution and by law (BACALSO VS.
RAMOLETE, ET AL., 21 SCRA 519).

Jurisdiction of the DARAB is centered by Sec. 14 of E.O. No. 129-A, in

relation to Sec. 17 of E.O. No. 229, and Section 50 of RA 6657.
It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of
the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says
(INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA EMPLOYEES UNION (IBAAEU)
VS. INCIONG, 132 SCRA 663). where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation (SUCALDITO AND DE GUZMAN
VS. HON. MONTEJO, 193 SCRA 556), but only room for application (CEBU
PORTLAND CEMENT CO. VS. MUNICIPALITY OF NAGA, 24 SCRA 708).
Between a general law and a special law, the special law prevails
(NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, XXV,
190 SCRA 477).
Jurisdiction is the authority of the tribunal to try a case (HERRERA VS.
BARRETO, 25 PHIL. 245).
Jurisdiction is fixed by law (VICTORIA BISCUIT CO., INC. VS.
BENEDICTO, 7 SCRA 611).
Jurisdiction may be challenged
(CRISOSTOMO VS. CA, 32 SCRA 54).

at

any

stage

of

the

proceeding

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE

In the judicial review of decisions of administrative bodies or agencies, the rule
of evidence which means more than a mere scintilla or relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise (LANSANG VS.
GARCIA, 42 SCRA 480) (1971).
Substantial evidence rule does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as is
required in an ordinary civil action but such kind of evidence relevant as is reasonable
and may be accepted as an adequate proof of a conclusion (SESARIA VS.
ROSALES, 17 SCRA 368). This is sufficient in agrarian cases (ULPIENDO VS.
CASE, 10 SCRA 825; VILLANUEVA VS. PANGANIBAN, 17 SCRA 368).
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion (ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
69 PHIL. 642).
The settled rule is that the conclusions and findings of fact of a trial court are
entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal unless for strong and
cogent reasons (LEE VS. ROMILLO, 161 SCRA 589; ALBA VS. SANTANDER,

160 SCRA 8; MENDOZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 156 SCRA 597). We find
no such strong or cogent reason in the present case as would warrant Our disturbance
of the foregoing findings of the court a quo. On the contrary, Our examination of the
assailed rulings discloses that the same are supported by substantial evidence
(ROMEO PUJALTE VS. THE PROV'L TREASURER OF PALAWAN, ET AL.,
CA G.R. CY NO. 18833-34).
EXECUTION
The Court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over
its process of execution (Vda. de PAMAN VS. SENERIS, 115 SCRA 709).
CARP COVERAGE
As to whether the lands are CARP covered. The Supreme Court has this to say:
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural land, it is referred to as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in
this act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential commercial or industrial land.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
"Agricultural Lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural
lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
The rule on the liberal construction of social legislation is applicable only
where there is no doubt or ambiguity in the law, and not when the law itself is clear
(TAMAYO VS. MANILA HOTEL CO., 101 PHIL. 810 [1957]).
It is not within the province of judiciary to legislate. It cannot, in the guise of
interpretation, enlarge the scope of the statute and include therein situations not
provided nor intended by the law makers. They should not revise even the most,
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative, nor rewrite the law to conform with what
they think should be the law.
It is noteworthy that the Agricultural Land Reform Code was passed by
Congress to establish owner-cultivatorship and family-size farm as the basis of
Philippine agricultural, to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers to be
more independent, self reliant and responsible citizens and a source of a genuine
strength in our democratic society (DE JESUS VS. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, 175 SCRA 559).
Those who are involved in the execution of agrarian laws that is the farmer
beneficiary's interest must be primarily served. This also hold the Agrarian Laws are

to be liberally construed in favor of farmer-beneficiary. Anyone who wishes to contest

the rights of the farmer to the land given to him by the government in accordance with
our agrarian laws has the burden of proving that the farmer does not deserve the
government grant (TORRES VS. VENTURA, 187 SCRA 97).
Land for the landless, is a slogan that underscore the acute imbalance in the
distribution of the precious resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan.
Through the broaden centuries, it has become a battle cry dramatizing the increasingly
urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the
sun. (ASSOCIATION OF SMALL FARMERS OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DAR
SECRETARY, GR. NO. 78742, JULY 14, 1989).
NON-PAYMENT OF LEASE RENTALS
In GARCHITORENA VS. PANGANIBAN (6 SCRA 339) The Supreme
Court ruled in issue that, the ejectment of tenants is justified if failure to pay rentals is
not attributed to any extraordinary event. Otherwise, said tenants would hold the land
for life; or at least, indefinitely, without giving the owner or landowner any share in
the produce, thus virtually depriving him of one of the main attributes of ownership,
which is the enjoyment of the possession and use of the thing owned, as well as of the
products thereof, in violation of the Constitution. The principle of social justice
cannot and should not be construed as to violate the elementary principles of justice
and bring about a patent injustice.
It devolves upon agricultural lessee, as his legal obligation, to pay the lease
rental when it falls due. A lessee cannot be authorized to remain in the possession and
cultivation of landholding without giving the landowner his share in the produce, for
the law recognizes the basic right of landowner to enjoy legitimate share in the
produce of his property. Thus, PD No. 816 has been promulgated in pursuance of the
policy of the Government to equalize the right and obligations of the landowner,
agricultural lessor and the agricultural lessees (VILLANUEVA VS. MENDOZA,
CA-G.R. NO. 06612-SP, JUNE 17, 1977).
Where person cultivate the land and did not receive salaries but a share in the
produce or cash equivalent thereof, the relationship created between them and the
landowner is one of tenancy and not employment (SINTOS VS. 246 SCRA 223).
The mere failure of a tenant to pay the landholder's share does not necessarily
give the latter the right to eject the former where there is lack of deliberate intent on
the part of the tenant to pay (TANEDO VS. DE LA CRUZ, 1 SCRA 1106).
JURISDICTION; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
JURISDICTION; APPEAL; PERFECTION OF APPEAL; EXECUTION; The
rule is that once appeal is perfected; the trial court loses its jurisdiction over the case

and to issue the writ of execution; The rule does not apply to a tenancy and/or
agrarian case. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that once appeal is perfected, the
trial court loses its jurisdiction over the case and to issue writ of execution
(UNIVERSAL FAR EAST CORPORATION VS. CA. ET AL., 131 SCRA 642
[1984]); MONTELIBANO VS. BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., and C.A.,
136 SCRA 294 [1985]). It should be pointed out , however, that this ruling does not
apply to the case at bar (CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C.
INOPIQUEZ, G.R. NO. 66712, JANUARY 13, 1989, 129 SCRA 169).
Agrarian Relations; Tenancy; Appeal; Perfection of appeal does not necessarily
mean that the lower court loses jurisdiction over the case since the rules of procedure
defined under P.D. 946 apply. This is a tenancy and/or agrarian case. Hence, the
perfection of the appeal does not necessarily mean that the court a quo loses
jurisdiction over the case, since the rules of procedure as defined under Presidential
Decree 946 apply (CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO INOPIQUEZ,
SUPRA).
SEC. 16 of PD 946 precludes the application of the Rules of Court to agrarian
cases while Section 18 thereof provides that appeal shall not stay the decision in
agrarian cases; The decision may be executed despite perfection of appeal except
where the appealed decision directs the ejectment of the tenant. Section 16 and 18
of Presidential Decree No. 946 are too clear and explicit in this respect as to require
interpretation or construction. Section 16. precludes the application of the Rules of
Court to agrarian cases which Section 18 provides that appeal shall not stay the
decision in agrarian cases. Consequently, said decision may be executed
notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal therefrom except where the appealed
decision directs the ejectment of the tenant. (ANGEL VS. INOPIQUEZ, SUPRA)
PD 946 being a special law, it shall have precedence over the Rules of Court
which is of general applicability. Finally, Presidential Decree No. 946. being a
special law, the same shall have precedence over the Rules of Court which is of
general applicability (DE JOYA VS. LANTIN, 19 SCRA 893 [1967]; PAPA VS.
MAGO, 22 SCRA 857 [1968]).
JUST COMPENSATION
I.

DEFINITION

Just Compensation in general has been defined as fair market value. It is the
price which a buyer will pay without coercion and seller will accept without
compulsion. Just compensation cannot be an absolute amount disregarding
particularities of productivity, distance to the trade center. Land valuation is not an
exact science but an exercise fraught with inexact estimates. What is important is that
the land value approximates as closely as possible, what is broadly considered a just.

II.

JURISDICTION

Where the total amount of compensation being offered by the government to

the landowner does not exceed TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00), the
proceeding shall be conducted by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) concerned. Where the compensation so offered is TWO MILLION PESOS
(P2,000,000.00) BUT NOT MORE THAN FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00),
the proceedings shall be handled by the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD). If the amount exceeds FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) the
proceedings shall be deducted at the DARAB Adjudication Board Central Office.
The decision of the PARAD, RARAD and DARAB on preliminary
determination of just compensation shall be final and executory if no original action is
filed by the party-in-interest to the Special Agrarian Court within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the decision pursuant to Section 16, paragraph "e", of Republic Act
No. 6657.
FORMULA: REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657
DAR Adm. Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR Adm. Order No.
11, series of 1994, provides:
There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by VOS or
CA regardless of the date of offer or coverage of the claim:
LV = (CNI X 0.6) + (CS X 0.3) + (MV X 0.1)
Where:
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant
and applicable.
A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When the CNI factor is not present and CS and MV are applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A.3 When both CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = (MV x 2)
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27
Under Executive Order 228
Riceland : LV = AGP x 2.5 x 35*
Cornland: LV = AGP + 2.5 x 31*
Government Support price 1972
Computed Land Value x 1.06 (N)
PAYMENT:
Under Voluntary Land Transfer, the landowner will be paid directly in cash or
in kind by the farmer-beneficiary under terms mutually agreed upon them subject to
DAR approval.
Under Compulsory Acquisition, the Land Bank of the Philippines shall
compensate the landowner in the following mode:
a.

Cash payment which shall vary according to land size;

b.

LBP bonds or other government financial instruments.

Under Voluntary Offer to Sell, the landowner will be paid under the same
mode as CA except that the cash portion is higher by five percent (5%).
Proportion of the total compensation is in cash:
The cash portion shall vary according to the size of the landholdings. The
larger the landholding, the smaller the cash portion. The underlying principle is that
small landowners are presumed to have greater need for cash to aid them in their bid
to shift their capital from agriculture to industry.
Payment shall be under the following terms and conditions.
a.

Lands above 50 has. 25% cash; 75% bonds

b.

Land above 24-50 has. 35% cash; 70% bonds

c.

Land 24 has. & below 35% cash; 65% bonds

Cash portion is increased by 5% for VOS.

The compensation package under CARP is already much approved compared
to the compensation schemes of past land reform programs. This is so, precisely to

make the program more acceptable to landowners and facilitate the shift of their
capital from agriculture to industry.
Full payment in cash in not feasible. This will tremendously increase the
current funding requirements for CARP which the government can ill afford at
present. Furthermore this will infuse a large amount of money into economy which
could result in inflation.
Compared with previous LBP bonds, the present bonds are definitely more
attractive.
a.
Past LBP bonds have a maturity of 25 years. This means, bond holders
can only get the principle at the end of 25 years. On the other hand, the new LBP
bonds matures every year from the date of issue until the tenth year.
b.
The New LBP bonds also bear market rates of interest the same as those
of 91-day treasury bill Old LBP bonds have a fixed six percent (6%) interest rate.
c.
Finally, these bonds have alternative uses. They may be used by the
landowners; his successors, or his assignees, for any of the following:
*
acquisition of land or other real properties of the
government, including assets under the Asset Privatization Trust,
and other assets foreclosed by governments financial institutions;
*
acquisition of shares of stock of government owned or
controlled corporation, or share of stocks owned by the
government in private corporation.
JURISPRUDENCE ON JUST COMPENSATION
LAND BANK VS. CA, PEDRO YAP ET AL.

"the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct

determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but
also the payment of the land within the reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered as just for
the property owners is made to suffer the consequence of being
immediately deprives of his land while being made to wait for a decade
or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his
loss."
"the opening of "trust account" is not within the coverage of the
term "deposit". . . . Thus, recourse to any rule which allows the opening
of a trust accounts as mode of deposit under section 16 (e) of RA 6657

goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore

impermissible.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NAVAL AND BENOSA

"While it is true that the determination of just compensation is an

exclusive domain of the court and that executive and legislative acts
fixing just compensation are by no means conclusive or binding upon
the court, but rather at the very least, merely guiding principles as
pointed out in the case of Republic vs. CA, 159 SCRA 165, the court's
discretion is not unlimited and its prerogative uncanalized within its
banks to keep it from overflowing. To place our imprimatur on
respondents' court ruling that the value of private respondent's land
which was taken in 1972 should be based on the current government
support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay, would be disregard
existing laws and jurisprudence on the matter. The value of the property
at the time of the taking not at the time of payment as respondent court
would suggest, is what controls in this jurisdiction."
SECURITY OF TENURE
Under Art. 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing
without other limitations than those established by law. As an incident of ownership,
therefore, there is nothing to prevent a landowner from donating his naked title to the
land. However, the new owner must respect the rights of the tenant. Sec. 7 of R.A.
No. 3844, as amended (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) gives the
agricultural lessee the right to work on the landholding once the leasehold relationship
is established.
xxx

xxx

xxx

[S]ecurity of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they

value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation
of their only means of livelihood. Also, under Sec. 10 of the same Act, the law
explicitly provides that the leasehold relations is not extinguished by the alienation or
transfer of legal possession of the landholding. (TANPINGCO VS. IAC, G.R. NO.
76225, 207 SCRA 652 [1992], CITED IN PNB VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., G.R. NO. 105760)
At this stage in the country's land reform program, the agricultural lessee's
right to security of tenure must be "firmed-up" and not negated by inferences from
facts not clearly established in the record nor litigated in the courts below. Hand in
hand with diffusion of ownership over agricultural lands, it is sound public policy to
encourage and endorse a diffusion of agricultural land use in favor of the actual tillers

and cultivators of the soil. It is one effective way the development of a strong and
independent middle-class in society (GRACIANO BERNAS VS. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and NATIVIDAD BITO-ON DEITA,
G.R. NO. 85041).
LEGAL POSSESSOR
Property; Agrarian Reform Law; Leases; A Legal possessor may lease the
property by way of agricultural leasehold. There is no dispute, as it is admitted by
the parties in this case, that Benigno Bito-on was granted possession of the property
in question by reason of the liberality of his sister, Natividad (the private respondent).
In short, he (Benigno) was the LEGAL POSSESSOR of the property and, as such, he
had the authority and capacity to enter into an agricultural leasehold relation with
Bernas. Consequently, there is no need to dwell on the contentions of the private
respondent that her brother Benigno was not a usufructuary of the property but
actually a bailee in commodatum. Whatever was the true nature of his designation, he
(Benigno) was the LEGAL POSSESSOR of the property and the law expressly grants
him, as legal possessor, authority and capacity to institute an agricultural leasehold
lessee on the property he legally possessed (GRACIANO BERNAS VS. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL and NATIVIDAD BITO-ON DEITA, G.R.
NO. 85041, AUGUST 5, 1993).
APPEALS
Civil Actions; Parties may not change theories on appeal. The long settled
rule in this jurisdiction is that a party is not allowed to change his theory of the case or
his cause of action on appeal. We have previously held that "courts of justice have no
jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue" and that a judgment going
outside the issues and purporting to adjudicate something upon which the parties were
not heard is not merely irregular, but extrajudicial and invalid. The rule is based on
the fundamental tenets of fair play and, in the present case, the Court is properly
compelled not to go beyond the issue litigated in the court a quo and in the Court of
Appeals of whether or not the petitioner, Graciano Bernas, is an agricultural leasehold
lessee by virtue of his installation as such by Benigno Bito-on, the legal possessor of
the landholding at the time Bernas was so installed and, consequently entitled to
security of tenure on the land. Should grounds for the dispossession of Bernas, as an
agricultural leasehold lessee, subsequently arise, then and only then can the private
respondent (landowner) initiate a separate action to dispossess the lessee, and in that
separate action, she must allege and prove compliance with Sec. 36 (1) of the Code
which consist of among others, a one year advance notice to the agricultural leasehold
lessee (the land involved being less than 5 hectares) and readiness to pay him the
damages required also by the Code.

Property; Agrarian Reform; Leases; Landowner who gives to another legal

possession of his land cannot complain that the latter's agricultural lessee used the
land for a purpose not agreed upon. There was, as admitted by all, no privity or tie
between Natividad and Bernas. Therefore, even if Bernas had improperly used the
lots as ricelands, it was Benigno who could have objected thereto since it was his (the
legal possessor's) landholding that was being "improperly" used. But he (Benigno) did
not. It is not for Natividad (as landowner) to now complain that Bernas used the land
"for a purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon." Bernas had no
agreement with her as to the purpose for which the land was to be used. That they
were converted into ricelands (also for agricultural production) can only mean that the
same (conversion) was approved by Benigno (the undisputed agricultural lessor-legal
possessor). It is thus clear that sec. 36, par 3 of the Code cannot be used to eject
Bernas.
EJECTMENT
Same; Same; Agricultural lessee installed by legal possessor cannot be ejected
by landowner on the land's return to the latter. Clearly, the return of legal
possession from Benigno to Natividad cannot prejudice the rights of Bernas as an
agricultural leasehold lessee. The grounds for ejectment of an agricultural leasehold
lessee are provided for by law. The enumeration is exclusive and no other grounds can
justify termination of the lease. The policy and letter of the law are clear on this point.
INTERVENTION
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Intervention; Intervention is not a matter of
right but may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy
the requirements of the law authorizing intervention. Intervention is not a matter of
right but may be permitted by the courts when the applicants shows facts which
satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention [Gibson vs. Revilla, G.R.
No. L-41432, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 219]. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised
Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or when he is so suited as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer
thereof. The Court has ruled that such interest must be actual, direct and material, and
not simply contingent and expectant [Garcia v. David, 67 Phil. 279 (1939); Batama
Farmer's Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. vs. Rosal, G.R. No. L-30526,
November 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 408; Gibson vs. Revilla, supra.]
CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER

SHARE TENANCY
Tenancy; When share tenancy exists. A share tenancy exists where, as in
this case, a person has physical possession of another's land for the purpose of
cultivating it and giving the owner a share in the crop. Where the contract entered into
by the parties provided that plaintiff would take care of the plants that are planted and
those still to be planted on the lands within a period of five years, giving the
defendant, as owner of the lands, a share in the crop, a tenancy relationship was
established between the parties (MARCELO VS. DE LEON, L-12902, JULY 29,
1959; CITED IN SILVERIO LATAG VS. MARCELO BANOG, 16 SCRA 88).
CARETAKER
Same; Caretaker of the land is considered a cultivator. A caretaker of an
agricultural land is also considered "cultivator" of the land (SILVERIO LATAG VS.
MARCELO BANOG, 16 SCRA 88).
DAMAGES
Same; Courts; Jurisdiction; Agrarian Court has jurisdiction over tenant's claim
for damages. Plaintiff-appellant's claim for damages was based on his having been
allegedly dispossessed unlawfully or unjustifiably by the defendant-appellee of the
two parcels of land under his care and management. The action, therefore, relates to
an incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship which existed before the
filing of the complaint. Under the circumstances, the Court of Agrarian Relations has
the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case, even if the tenancy relationship
no longer existed at the time of the filing of the action (BASILIO VS. DE
GUZMAN, L-12762, APRIL 22, 1959; MILITAR VS. TORCILLERO, L-15065,
APRIL 28, 1961).
CONSENT IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF TENANCY RELATIONSHIP
Agrarian Reform; Agricultural Tenancy; Pres. Decree 27; Tenancy is a legal
relationship between the tenant and the landowner, it cannot be made to depend upon
what the alleged tenant does on the land, consent of the landowner is necessary. It
has been ruled that Tenancy cannot be created nor depend upon what the alleged
tenant does on the land. Consent of the landowner is necessary and tenancy cannot be
formed where the alleged tenant does not pay any rentals or share of harvest to the
landowners (Hilario v. IAC, 148 SCRA 573 [1987]). In the case at bar, it will be
observed that the consent of the landowner was not obtained. As ruled by this Court,
tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful
landholder through lawful means and not by imposition or usurpation (Hilario v.
IAC, supra); so that mere cultivation of the land by a usurper cannot confer upon

him any legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection of security of
tenure of the law (Spouses Tiongson vs. CA, 130 SCRA 482 [1984]; Hilario v. IAC,
supra). Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, which are
complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important (TUAZON V.
C.A., 118 SCRA 484 [1982]; SUZANO F. GONZALES, JR. VS. HON.
HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, BONIFACIO FRANCISCO, EMETERIO REYES,
GENEROSO
SALVADOR,
ALBERTO
LIWANAG,
LEODEGARIO
MADRIGAL and FEDERICO SORIANO, G.R. NO. 77401, FEBRUARY 7,
1990).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondents not being bona fide tenantfarmers cannot avail of the benefits under PD 27. Moreover, the requirements set
by law for the existence of tenancy relationship have not been met by private
respondents in subject case, such as: 1) that the parties are the landholder and tenant;
2) that subject land is agricultural land; 3) that there is consent; 3) that the purpose is
agricultural production; and 5) that there is consideration (Vda. de Donato v. CA,
supra; Hilario v. IAC, supra). Hence, PD No. 27 cannot apply to private
respondents. PD No. 27 and PD No. 316 apply and operate only to bona fide tenantfarmers (Elena Vda. De Reyes v. CA, 146 SCRA 230 [1986]; Geronimo v. CA, 121
SCRA 859 [1983]; Jacinto v. CA, 87 SCRA 263 [1978]).
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Same; Evidence; In agrarian cases, all that is required is submission of
"substantial evidence," not preponderance of evidence. In the case of Evangelista
v. CA, 158 SCRA 141 [1988] this Court ruled that the finding that petitioner was not
a bona fide tenant-farmer on the land based on evidence is final and conclusive. In
addition, in agrarian cases, all that is required is submission of "substantial evidence"
not preponderance of evidence (Bagsican v. CA, 111 SCRA 226 [1986]).
Administrative findings of facts are sufficient if supported by substantial evidence in
the record (Police Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA 737; Antonio v. Estrella, 156
SCRA 68 [1987]; Castillo v. Napolcom Adjudication Board, 156 SCRA 274
[1987]). It is an elementary rule that the findings of administrative agencies are
generally accorded great respect and finality (SSS v. CA, 156 SCRA 383 [1987];
Rosario Bros Inc. v. Ople, 131 SCRA 74 [1984]; Special Events and Central
Shipping Officer Workers Union v. San Miguel, 122 SCRA 557 [1983] except
when such findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence or
constitute grave abuse of discretion (Franklin Baker Company of the Phil. v.
Trajano, 157 SCRA 423 [1988]; Baby Bus Inc. v. Minister of Labor, 158 SCRA
225 [1988]. Such circumstances are however not obtaining in the case at bar.

Furthermore, the concept of "Social Justice" was not meant to perpetuate an injustice
to the landowner-lessor (Cabatan v. CA, 95 SCRA 232 [1980]).
CULTIVATION
Same; Same; Cultivation is an important factor to determine the existence of
share tenancy. Cultivation, defined. Now well-settled is the rule that cultivation is
an important factor in determining the existence of a share tenancy relationship. As to
the meaning of cultivation, this Court has already held that: "x x x. The definition of
cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It
includes the promotion to growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground
to forward the products of the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a
unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike the rice, the planting of coconuts seedlings does
not need harrowing and plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground of sufficient
depth and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the surface thereof covered
by soil. Some coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The
major work in raising coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already fruitbearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or smoking the plantation, taking care of
the coconut trees applying fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby increasing the
produce. The fact that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handless all
phases of farmwork from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra,
although at times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows
that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer (COCONUT COOPERATIVE
MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA) VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
164 SCRA 570).
Same; Same; Same; Sharing of harvests, if taken together with the other factors
characteristic of tenancy, strengthens respondents' claim that they are share tenants of
petitioners. Further supportive of the existence of a share tenancy relationship
between petitioner and respondents is their agreement to share the produce or harvest
on a 1/7 to 6/7 basis in favor of the petitioner COCOMA. Though not a decisive
indication per se of the existence of tenancy relationship, such sharing of the harvests,
taken together with the other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be present in
the case at bar, strengthens the claim of respondents that, indeed, they are tenants
(COCONUT
COOPERATIVE
MARKETING
ASSOCIATION,
INC.
(COCOMA) VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 164 SCRA 570).
TECHNICAL RULES NOT APPLICABLE TO CAR
Same; RA 3844; Procedure; Sec. 155 of RA No. 3844 provides that, except
expropriation cases, the Court of Agrarian Relations shall not be bound strictly by
technical rules. In Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, this Court ruled: "Significantly, the
Court of Agrarian Relations is not restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands

made by the parties to the dispute, but may include in the order or decision any matter
or determination which may be deemed necessary and expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or preventing further disputes, provided said matter for
determination has been established by competent evidence during the hearing.'"
Further, RA 3844, Section 155, provides: "SEC. 155. Powers of the Court; Rules of
Procedure. x x x The Courts of Agrarian Relations shall be governed by the Rules of
Court: Provided, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question
or controversy pending before them, the Courts without impairing substantial rights,
shall not be bound strictly by the technical rules of evidence and procedure, except in
expropriation
cases"(COCONUT
COOPERATIVE
MARKETING
ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA) VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 164 SCRA 571).
LANDHOLDER
Same; Words and Phrases; Landholder, defined. Thus, assuming, without
conceding, that respondents Pedro and Hermogenes Cosico are considered tenants of
the land, petitioner COCOMA submits that, being only an agent of defendants Fule
and Escudero, it can not be held liable for the acts of its principals. Petitioner's
contention is not in accordance with applicable laws, because "A landholder shall
mean a person, natural or juridical, who, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal
possessor lets or grants to another the use or cultivation of his land for a consideration
either in shares under the share tenancy system." In accordance with the above
provision, petitioner COCOMA is the landholder of the subject landholdings for (a) it
is a "juridical person" being a domestic corporation established under the laws of the
Philippines; (b) it is the "legal possessor" of the land for it has the sole management
and administration thereof; (c ) it has authorized or retained the private respondents to
cultivate the land; and (d) it has shared the harvest with the latter, albeit unlawfully,
making it appear that they are laborers instead of tenants (COCONUT
COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA) VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, 164 SCRA 571).
Same; Same; Same; A landholder-tenant relationship is preserved even in case
of transfer of legal possession of the subject property. Further, in several cases, this
Court sustained the preservation if the landholder-tenant relationship, in cases of
transfer of legal possession: ". . . in case of transfer or in case of lease, as in the
instant case, the tenancy relationship between the landowner and his tenant should be
preserved in order to insure the well-being of the tenant or protect him from being
unjustly dispossessed by the transferee or purchaser of the land; in other words, the
purpose of the law in question is to maintain the tenants in the peaceful possession
and cultivation of the land or afford them protection against unjustified dismissal
from their holdings." (Primero vs. CAR, 101 Phil. 675); ". . . that the tenant may
proceed against the transferee of the land to enforce obligation incurred by the former
landholder in relation to said land, for the reason that such obligation . . . falls upon

the assignee or transferee of the land' pursuant to Sec. 9 abovementioned. Since

respondents are in turn free to proceed against the former landholder for
reimbursement, it is not iniquitous to hold them responsible to the tenant for said
obligation. Moreover, it is the purposes of Republic Act 1199, particularly Sec. 9
thereof, to insure that the right of the tenant to receive his lawful share of the produce
of the land us unhampered by the transfer of said land from one landholder to
another" (Almarinez v. Potenciano, 120 Phil. 1154). Therefore, petitioner, being a
landholder, can be held liable to private respondents for their shares in the coconuts
harvested from the landholding in question.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Same; Evidence; Substantial evidence is all that is required in agrarian cases.
As to the fourth issue, i.e., that the computation of the private respondents' thirty
percent (30%) share in the harvest from 1971 to 1975, made by the Court of Agrarian
Relations and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is erroneous, this Court finds no
compelling reason to depart from such computation, as it is a part of the findings of
facts and conclusions drawn therefrom by the respondents appellate court. Such
findings and conclusions should not be disturbed on appeal, in the absence of proof
that they are unfounded or were arbitrarily arrived at or that the Court of Appeals had
failed to consider important evidence to the contrary. In Bagsican vs. Court of
Appeals, it was held that: ". . . in agrarian cases, all that is required is mere substantial
evidence COCONUT COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC.
(COCOMA) VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 164 SCRA 572).
Agrarian Law; Tenancy relationship; Jurisdiction. Private respondent, in her
original complaint before the lower court, alleged that petitioner violated the Land
Reform Code and could be ejected under P.D. 816. Petitioner answered that he was a
tenant of private respondent. There was, at that point in time, no need of referral to the
Department of Agrarian Reform as the landowner-tenant relationship was admitted.
However, when private respondent's amended complaint where she alleged
violation of a civil law lease agreement-was admitted, the issue of actual tenancyraised by petitioner in both his Answer and Amended Answer-had to be referred to the
Department of Agrarian Reform for determination as this was now a genuine issue
(OCIER VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 216 SCRA 510 G.R. NO. 105088,
DECEMBER 11, 1992).
EXECUTIVE ORDER 229 VEST
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER TO DAR
Agrarian Law; Jurisdiction; Executive Order No. 229 vest in the Department of
Agrarian Reform quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters. Executive Order No. 229, which provides for the mechanism for the

implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program instituted by

Proclamation No. 131, dated July 22, 1987, vests in the Department of Agrarian
Reform quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
(QUISMUNDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 201 SCRA 609).
Same; Same; Same; Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946
deemed repealed by Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229. The above quoted
provision should be deemed to have repealed Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential
Decree No. 946 which invested the then courts of agrarian relations with original
exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights granted and
obligations imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian
reform program (QUISMUNDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 201 SCRA 610).
Same; Same; Same; Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the courts of agrarian
relations were integrated into the regional trial court and the jurisdiction of the former
was vested in the latter courts. In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the courts of agrarian
relations were integrated into the regional trial courts and the jurisdiction of the
former was vested in the latter courts (QUISMUNDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
201 SCRA 610).
Same; Same; Same; Same; With the enactment of Executive Order No. 229,
(QUISMUNDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 201 SCRA 610) the regional trial
courts were divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters.
However, with the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which took effect on
August 29, 1987, fifteen (15) days after its release for publication in the Official
Gazette, the regional trial courts were divested of their general jurisdiction to try
agrarian reform matters. The said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of
Agrarian Reform.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 6657 contains provisions
which evince and support the intention of the legislature to vest in the Department of
Agrarian Reform exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. The
foregoing holding is further sustained by the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which took effect on June 15, 1988. The said
law contains provisions which evince and support the intention of the legislature to
vest in the Department of Agrarian Reform exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian
reform matters (QUISMUNDO VS. COURT OF APPEAL, 201 SCRA 610).
Evidence; Rule that factual conclusions by the Appellate Court not reviewable
by the Court admits exceptions. Ordinarily, the Appellate Court's factual
conclusions are not reviewable by this Court, and since here those conclusions are
decidedly adverse to Hernandez, the application of the rule should result in a verdict
against him. The rule admits of exceptions, however, as when facts of substance were
overlooked by the appellate court which, if correctly considered, might have changed

the outcome of the case (HERNANDEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 160 SCRA
821).
LUNGSOD SILANGAN RESERVATION
Agrarian Reform Law; Coverage; Commercial, industrial and residential lands
not included. We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL.
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As
to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land." The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
confirm this limitations. "Agricultural lands" are only those land which are "arable
and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands." Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of
the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as "agricultural
lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural
land upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even
today, the areas in question continue to be developed as a low-cost housing
subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can readily be gleaned from the fact that
SAMBA members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from continuing
with such development. The enormity of the resources needed for developing a
subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact
that these land are still residential land and outside the ambit of the CARL
(NATALIA REALTY, INC. and ESTATE DEVELOPERS and INVESTORS
CORP., VS. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SEC. BENJAMIN T.
LEONG and DIR. WILFREDO LEANO, DAR REGION IV, G.R. NO. 103302,
AUGUST 12, 1993).
SHARE TENANCY
Agrarian Reform; "Share tenancy" defined. The law defines "agricultural
tenancy" as the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture,
belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production through
the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household in
consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay
a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both (Section 3,
Republic Act 1199, The Agricultural Tenancy Act, as amended; Guerrero vs.
Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Same. With petitioner reference to this case, "share tenancy" exist
whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for a agricultural production
wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both

contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the
land with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household,
and the produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in
proportion to their respective contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166 (25) RA 3844,
Agricultural Land Reform Code; Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA
136).
Same, "Farmhand" or "Agricultural worker" defined. In contrast, a
farmhand or agricultural laborer is "any agricultural salary or piece worker but is not
limited to a farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this Code expressly
provides otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of,
or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who
has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment" (Sec. 166 (15)
RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code; Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals 142
SCRA 136).
Same; Statutes; Contracts; An agreement which states that the rights and
obligations of a person allowed by the landowner to cultivate and take care of his
coconut farm, shall be governed by R.A. 1199, is not abrogated by the subsequent
repeal of said law by R.A. 3844, which abolished share tenancy and which does not
include coconut lands, inasmuch as the vested rights of a share tenant to security of
tenure would be adversely affected thereby. On August 8, 1963, Republic Act 3844
abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the agricultural leasehold
system. On September 10, 1971, Republic Act 6389 amending Republic Act 3844
declared share tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy. On the basis of this
national policy, the petitioner asserts that no cause of action exists in the case at bar
and the lower court's committed grave error in upholding the respondent's status as
share tenant in the petitioners' landholding. The petitioners' arguments are regressive
and, if followed, would turn back the advances in agrarian reform law. The repeal of
the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code mark the
movement not only towards the leasehold system but towards eventual ownership of
land by its tillers. The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a
reversion of tenants into mere farmhands or hired laborers with no tenurial rights
whatsoever (Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Same; Same; Same. It is important to note that the Agricultural
Tenancy Act (RA 1199) and the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844) have not
been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian Reform (RA 6389) even if the same
have been substantially modified by the latter. However, even assuming such an
abrogation of the law, the rule that the repeal of a statute defeats all actions pending
under the repealed statute is a mere general principle. Among the established
exceptions are when the vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are
impaired (Aisporna vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 482; Guerrero vs. Court of
Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).

Same; Mere fact that a person was not the one who seeded the land with
coconuts does not mean that he could not be a tenant thereof. Cultivation is
another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy relationships. It is
admitted that it had been one Conrado Caruruan, with others, who had originally
cleared the land in question and planted the coconut trees, with respondent coming to
the landholding only after the same were already fruit bearing. The mere fact that it
was not respondent Benitez who had actually seeded the land does not mean that he is
not a tenant of the land. The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the
tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion of growth and the
case of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by
general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike
rice, the planting of coconuts seedling does not need harrowing and plowing. Holes
are merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed in
the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are planted only
every thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts begins when the
coconut trees are already fruit-bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or smoking
the plantation, taking case of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and
watering, thereby increasing the produce. The fact that respondent Benitez, together
with his family, handless all phases of farmwork from clearing the landholding to the
processing of copra, although at times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby
cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer (Guerrero vs.
Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Added indication of share tenancy is sharing in the harvest. Further
indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondent
is their agreement to share the produce or harvest on a "tercio basis" that is, a 1/3 to
2/3 sharing in favor of the petitioners-landowners. Though not a positive indication of
the existence of tenancy relations per se, the sharing of harvests, taken together with
other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be present in the case at bar,
strengthens the claim of respondent that indeed, he is a tenant (Guerrero vs. Court of
Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Contracts; Use of the word "tenant" in the contract to cultivate a
coconut farm indicates that the cultivators is a "share tenant" and not a "farmhand" or
"worker". The petitioners, however, contend that the word "tenant" in the
aforequoted agreement was used to mean a hired laborer or farm employee as
understood and agreed upon by the parties. The fact that their relationship would be
guided by the provisions of Republic Act 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the
Philippines militates against such an assertion. It would be an absurdity for Republic
Act 1199 to govern an employer-employee relationship. If as the petitioners insist a
meaning other than its general acceptance had been given the word "tenant", the
instrument should have so stated. Aided by a lawyer, the petitioners, nor the
respondent could not be said to have misconstrued the same. In clear and categorical

terms, the private respondent appears to be nothing else but a tenant (Guerrero vs.
Court of Appeals 142 SCRA 136).
Same; Statutory abolition of share tenancy did not end the rights of share
tenants in coconut and sugar land even if leasehold tenancy in these types of lands has
not yet been installed. Before we close this case, it is pertinent to reiterate that the
respondent's right as share tenant do not end with the abolition of share tenancy. AS
the law seeks to "uplift the farmers from poverty, ignorance and stagnation to make
them dignified, self-reliant, strong and responsible citizens . . . active participants in
nation-building", agricultural share tenants are given the right to leasehold tenancy as
a first step towards the ultimate status of owner-cultivator, a goal sought to be
achieved by the government program of land reform. It is true that leasehold tenancy
for coconut lands and sugar lands has not yet been implemented. The policy makers
of government are still studying the feasibility of its application and the consequences
of its implementation. Legislation still has to be enacted. Nonetheless, whenever it
may be implemented, the eventual goal of having strong and independent farmers
working on the lands which they own remains. The petitioners' arguments which
would use the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Code as the basis for setting back or
eliminating the tenurial rights of the tenant have no merit (Guerrero vs. Court of
Appeals, 142 SCRA 136).
UNLAWFUL POSSESSOR CANNOT INSTITUTE A TENANT
Same; An agricultural tenancy relationship cannot be created by one who is not
a true and lawful owner or legal possessor. A judgment by the court of agrarian
relations declaring that a person is a tenant is null and void where based on a wrong
premise because the one who constituted him as such tenant was previously declared
an unlawful possessor by the court (CFI). Happily for private respondents
whose initial action to recover the lot date to August 28, 1958 Paule, at the time he
allegedly constituted Cunanan, petitioner herein, as tenant, was not the landowner or
lessee or usufructuary or legal possessor thereof, and therefore, no tenure relationship
was created between them. As a necessary consequence, the declaration by the CAR
that petitioner was the "tenant" which findings was induced by Paule's confession
of judgment and concealment of his prior ejectment from the holding under the final
and executory judgment of the CFI and, therefore, was a fraudulent imposition upon
the Court. was and should be considered inficacious and unavailing insofar as
petitioner's claim that he became the tenant of the lot is concerned. For the
jurisdiction of the CAR is limited ". . . to cases or actions involving matters,
controversies, disputes . . . arising from agrarian relations . . ." and " . . . such agrarian
relations can arise only where the parties stand in the relation of landholder and tenant
. . . and one of the parties work the land (Cunanan vs. Aguilar, 85 SCRA 47).
Same; Same. Consequently where, as in this case, there was no tenure
relation because the alleged landholder, Paule, has precisely been ordered to surrender

the holding to its rightful owner by final and executory judgment at the time he
constituted petitioner as tenant, the declaration by the CAR to that effect in a
judgment which it was misled to make by the very misrepresentations of Paule
must of necessity be null and void and of no legal effect. Otherwise stated, the CAR
cannot create or recognize a tenure relation between persons, where none exists,
because the alleged landholder is not the owner, lessee or possessor or usufructuary of
the holding (Cunanan vs. Aguilar, 85 SCRA 47).
Appeals; Execution of decision of agrarian court pending appeal; Republic Act
No. 5434 merely provides for uniform procedure for appeal and cannot upturn
fundamental substantive aspects of Republic Act No. 3844. Section 36 of Republic
Act No. 3844, created in favor of the agricultural lessee a substantive right to
"continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when the
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory" and that Republic Act No. 5434, on the other hand, "as its title indicates, is
purely procedural in nature, in that it purports to do no more that prescribe a uniform
procedure for appeals from the bodies and entities enumerated therein. It is easily
comprehensible, then, considering the adjective nature of R.A. 5434, that section 12
of R.A. 1267, as amended, was explicitly and precisely referred to as one of the
procedural provisions to be superseded by R.A. 5434." . . . "Within the context of the
environmental legislative intention directly pertinent to the issue at bar, this Court
cannot construe R.A. 5434 an adjective law, in a manner that will upturn one of the
fundamental substantive aspects of R.A. 3844, although the latter, in terms of endresults, would seemingly operate to constrict the scope of the former (JESUS
SODSOD VS. HON. JUDGE VALERIANO L. DEL VALLE, ET AL., 56 SCRA
612).
Same; Same; Tenant may not be ejected except by final judgment. - Under
the Land Reform Code the tenants are entitled to the enjoyment and possession of
their landholdings except when their dispossession has been authorized by the Court
in a judgment that is final and executory (JESUS SODSOD VS. HON. JUDGE
VALERIANO L. DEL VALLE, ET AL., 56 SCRA 612).
CONSTITUTIONALITY
REFORM PROGRAM

OF

THE

COMPREHENSIVE

AGRARIAN

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ET

AL. VS. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM (G.R. No.
78742, July 14, 1989).
ARSENIO AL. ACUA, ET AL., VS. JOKER ARROYO, ET AL., (G.R. No.
79310, July 14, 1989).

INOCENTES PABICO VS. HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, Secretary of Agrarian

Reform, ET AL., (G.R. No. 79744, July 14, 1989).
NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR. VS. HON. PHILIP
ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 79777, July 14, 1989).
Constitutional Law; Elements of judicial inquiry. In addition, the
Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of
unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members
of the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations by judge-made doctrine, the
Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that
the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied.
Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.
Same; Agrarian Law; Powers of the President; Power of the President Aquino
to promulgate Proclamation No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same authorized
under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The
promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under
martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales vs. Estrella and we find no
reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of the President Aquino
to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 229, the same was authorized under
Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.
Same; Same; Pres. Aquino's loss of legislative powers did not have the effect
of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when she possessed it; Reasons.
The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the
Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power
from her. They are not "midnight" enactment intended to pre-empt the legislature
because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc.
No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to
say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like
any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent
law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative
simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token,
President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all
the measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it.
Same; Same; Same; Appropriation Law, defined; Proc. No. 131 is not an
appropriation measure; Reasons. That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being

questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid
appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not
an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that
is not its principal purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from
the treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the
proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
Same; Same; Same; Section 6 of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of
1988 (R.A. No. 6657) provides for retention limits. The argument of some of the
petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do
not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does not provide for such limits now
in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This
section declares: Retention Limits. - Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no
person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural
land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized
farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as
determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder,
but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3)
hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following
qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually
tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands
have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area
originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or
direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the
approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate
said homestead.
Same; Same; Same; Rule that the title of the bill does not have to be a
catalogue of its contents. The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the
constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its
title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to
be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are
relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title.
Same; Same; Same; Mandamus; Rule that mandamus can issue to require
action only but not specific action. Finally, there is the contention of the public
respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the
performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the
government. That is true as general proposition but is subject to one important
qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to
compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to the discretion to be
exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific
action. Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and
unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by

law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to
compel action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require
action only. For example, if an inferior court, public official, or board should refuse to
great detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of
a cause when the law clearly gave it jurisdiction, mandamus will issue, in the first
case to require a decision, and in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the
cause.
Same; Same; Same; Eminent Domain; Police Power; Property condemned
under Police Power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose is not compensable.
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same
time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio vs. NAWASA, for example,
where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the
NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power
being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome
and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious
or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which
should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be
destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not
expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Cases at bar: The extent, retention limits, police
power, deprivation, excess of the maximum area under power of eminent domain.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of
compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge
merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police
power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But
where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of
whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the
use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical
possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor
of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of
the power of eminent domain.
Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Law; Classification defined;
Requisites of a valid classification. Classification has been defined as the grouping
of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each
other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these

requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and
discriminatory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Definition of Equal Protection. Equal protection
simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as
to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that
they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that
not only landowners but also owners of the other properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those
who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision
is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its
discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; A statute may be sustained under the
police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and method. It is
worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police
power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put
otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a
particular class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be
achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. As the subject and purpose of
agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the
first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of
the method employed to achieve the Constitutional goal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Eminent Domain, defined. Eminent domain is
an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended
for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no
need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to
the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the
parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or
other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come
into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the
property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public
interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the
welfare of the people is the supreme law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements for a proper exercise of power of
eminent domain. But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is
by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the
constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from

the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of
the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Concept of political question. A becoming
courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when
they decide what is known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice
Concepcion in the of Taada v. Cuenco: The term "political question" connotes what
it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Just Compensation, defined. Just compensation
is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the
take's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of
the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements of compensable taking. As held in
Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, there is compensable taking when the
following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2)
the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under
warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the
property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the
measures before us.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Determination of Just Compensation, addressed to
the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other branch. To be sure, the
determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and
may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA v.
Dulay resolved a challenged to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos
providing that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be either
the assessment of the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by
the owner, whichever was lower.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court declares that the content and manner of
the just compensation provided for in the CARP Law is not violative of the
Constitution. With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content
and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore-quoted Section 18 of
the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a
certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all
this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of

society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious
as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the
frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing
decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the
nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach
realization and
Same; Same; Same; Same; CARP Law (R.A. 6657) is more liberal than those
granted by P.D. No. 27 as to retention limits; Case at bar. In connection with these
retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the
petitioners with the Office of the President has already been resolved. Although we
have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude
immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be
examined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not
covered by LOI 474 because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subject
of their petition. Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event,
assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any under
P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided
for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted
by the decree PETITIONS to review the decisions of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Sale; Agrarian Reform; Deed of Sale is valid where there is no indication that
it is simulated; Fairness and regularity in a private transaction is disputably presumed;
Presumption of regularity of notarial document overcome only by clear and
convincing evidence. Public respondents MAR Minister and the Office of the
President, both found in the evidence on record and the applicable laws, that the deeds
of sale in question are valid and legal , not tainted with fraud, and the tenants have
actual knowledge thereof. More importantly, Agrarian Reform Team Leader, Atty.
Amanda V. Cabigao who investigated the petition of herein private respondents for
cancellation of the subject certificates of land transfer, found from the evidence
presented that while the properties left by Clara and Teodora Zafra (the previous
registered owner) who both died after the promulgation of PD No. 27, are covered by
Operation Land Transfer, the same is not true of the portions of said land, transferred
to other persons before the promulgation of said decree on October 21, 1972 whose
documents of sale are in accordance with the formalities of law and the evidence of
ownership presented. Specifically, the disputed deeds of sale were executed on July
13, 1972, as established by the Certification of the Acting Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, and cannot therefore be considered fraudulent
transfers to circumvent the provisions of PD No. 27 which was still non-existent at
the time. Thus, it has been held that a deed of sale is valid where there is no indication
that it is simulated. The disputable presumption that the private transaction has been
fair and regular has not been rebutted. (Par. p. Sec. 5, Rule 131, Rules of Court; San

Luis vs. Negrete, 98 SCRA 95 [1980]). To contradict the facts contained in a notarial
document and the presumption of regularity in its favor, there must be evidence that is
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant (ENRIQUE ANTONIO, ET
AL., VS. HON. CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, ET AL., 156 SCRA 68).
Same; Land Registration; Actual knowledge of the contract by third persons is
equivalent to registration. Petitioners point out that the deeds of sale were
registered only on December 7, 1972 in the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, that is after
the date promulgation of said decree. It is however elementary that "while under the
Torrens System registration is the operative act that binds the land, and in the absence
of record there is only a contract that binds the parties thereto, without affecting the
rights of strangers to such contract, actual knowledge thereof by third persons is
equivalent to registration. In the case at bar the records show that petitioners were
notified by the Zafra sisters of the sale of the parcels of land to private respondents as
evidenced by the Joint Affidavit dated July 12, 1972 (Exhibit "A-6" for appellees) and
that such fact was never controverted at any stage of the proceedings by the
petitioners. Petitioners insist before respondents MAR and the Office of the President,
that private respondents own other lands planted to rice and corn in order obviously to
bring this case within the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27.
The former however failed to adduce evidence to support their allegation.
Accordingly, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation
is not evidence (ENRIQUE ANTONIO, ET AL., VS. HON. CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, ET AL., 156 SCRA 68).
Same; Same; Factual findings of government agencies respected if supported
by substantial evidence. Finally, two agencies of the government, MAR and Office
of the President, examined the evidence and came up with the same findings. It is
therefore without question that such findings supported as they are by substantial
evidence, should be respected. In line with this view, the Court has ruled: "x x x in
reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing court cannot re-examined the
sufficient of the evidence as if originally instituted therein, and receive additional
evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned. The findings
of fact must be respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even
if not overwhelming or preponderant."(Police Commission vs. Lood, 127 SCRA
757, 763 [1984]; ENRIQUE ANTONIO, ET AL., VS. HON. CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, ET AL., 156 SCRA 68).
Same; Same; Generally, compromises are favored and cannot be set aside if the
parties acted in good faith and made reciprocal concessions to each other in order to
terminate a case. Compromise are generally to be favored and cannot be set aside
if the parties acted in good faith and made reciprocal concessions to each other in
order to terminate a case. This holds true even if all the gains appears to be on one
side and all the sacrifices on the other (MARIO V. AMARANTE VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 232 SCRA 104).

Remedial Law; Ejectment; Rent Control Law; Under the Rent Control Law,
the prohibition against the ejectment of a lessee by his lessor is not absolute. Under
the Rent Control Law, the prohibition against the ejectment of a lessee by his lessor is
not absolute. There are exceptions expressly provided by law, which include the
expiration of a lease for a definite period. In the instant case, it was noted that the
rentals were paid on a month-to-month basis. Thus, the lease could be validly
terminated at the end of any given month upon prior notice to that effect on the lessee.
After all, when the rentals are paid monthly, the lease is deemed to be for a definite
period, i.e., it expires at the end of every month (MARIO V. AMARANTE VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 232 SCRA 104).
Same, Judgment; Appeal; Finality of a judgment or order becomes a fact upon
the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected. It may be
worth to note that the petitioners failed to appeal from the order of the then City Court
of Pasay City; instead, he filed a petition for certiorari with the then Court of First
Instance, which was however dismissed for late filing. As a consequence, the order of
the City Court which approved the compromise agreement of the parties had become
final and executory, hence, can no longer be set aside. Finality of a judgment or order
becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is
perfected, and is conclusive as to the issues actually determined and to every matter
which the parties might have litigated and have had decided as incident to or
essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation, and every matter
coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect to matters
of claim and of defense (MARIO V. AMARANTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 232 SCRA 104).
Court of Agrarian Relations; Appeals; Factual finding not reviewable. A
factual finding by the Court of Agrarian Relations, when supported by substantial
evidence, may no longer be reviewed by the Supreme Court (EUGENIO CHAVEZ
VS. THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ET AL., 9 SCRA 412).
Landlord and tenant; Agricultural Tenancy Act (Rep. Act No. 1199); Nonretroactivity of amendment by Rep. Act No. 2263 as to succession to tenancy
relationship. - Since the law in force at the date when the tenant died was Rep. Act
No. 1199, under which the tenancy relationship between him and respondent
landowner was terminated by reason of such death, the subsequent enactment of Rep.
Act No. 2263 did not operate to confer upon petitioner, son of the deceased, any
successional right to continue as tenant. In case of Ulpiedo vs. CAR, L-13891,
October 31, 1960, it was held: "The amendment to Section 9, Republic Act No. 1199
by Republic Act No. 2263, providing for the continuance of the relationship in the
event of the tenant's death or incapacity between the landholder and one member of
the tenant's immediate farm household who is related to the tenant within the second
degree of consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land himself personally x x x'
which took on 19 June 1959, cannot be applied retroactively." To hold otherwise
would lay open this particular provision of the law to the objection of

unconstitutionality, on the ground that it impairs a substantive right that has already
become vested (EUGENIO CHAVEZ VS. THE COURT OF AGRARIAN
RELATIONS, ET AL., 9 SCRA 412).
Same; Same; Right of succession to tenancy under Rep. Act No. 2263;
Exception. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 2263 provides an exception to the right
of succession by a relative of the tenant within the second degree, namely, if the
landholder "shall cultivate the land himself personally or through the employment of
mechanical farm implements" (EUGENIO CHAVEZ VS. THE COURT OF
AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ET AL., 9 SCRA 412).
Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Certiorari; Certiorari cannot be a
substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal. Generally, an order of dismissal,
whether right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper subject of appeal, not
certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive. Accordingly, although the special civil action of certiorari is
not proper when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown
that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a
party from the injurious effects of the order complained of, or where appeal is
inadequate and ineffectual. Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost
or lapsed remedy of appeal, where such loss is occassioned by the petitioner's own
neglect or error in the choice of remedies (Ms. EMILY YU FAJARDO, ET AL., VS.
HON. ODILON I. BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232 SCRA 291).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Instant action was resorted to as a substitute for the
lost or lapsed remedy of appeal. The petitioners admit that they received a copy of
the trial court's order dismissing their complaints on 4 October 1991. The instant
petition was filed on 24 October 1991 or beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the
order. The petitioners have not even attempted to explain why they were unable to
appeal from the challenged order within the reglementary period. This civil action
then was resorted to as a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, and since
none of the exceptions to the rigid rule barring substitution of remedies was alleged to
exist in this petition, or even indicated by the pleadings, this petition must be
dismissed (Ms. EMILY YU FAJARDO, ET AL., VS. HON. ODILON I.
BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232 SCRA 291).
Same; Jurisdiction; Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board; Trial Court
correctly ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter in Civil Case Nos.
1683-91-C, 1684-91-C, 1685-91-C, 1686-91-C and 1688-91-C. Even if we were to
accept this petition in the broader interest of justice, it must still fail for the trial court
correctly ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter in Civil Cases Nos.
1683-91-C, 1684-91-C, 1685-91-C,1686-91-C, and 1688-91-C. Jurisdiction thereon
was originally vested in the National Housing Authority (NHA) under P.D. No. 957,
as amended by P.D. No. 1344. Under E.O. No. 648 of 7 February 1981, this
jurisdiction was transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission

(HSRC) which, pursuant to E.O. No. 90 of 17 December 1986, was renamed as the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (Ms. EMILY YU FAJARDO, ET AL., VS.
HON. ODILON I. BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232 SCRA 291).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court agrees that the complaints do involve
unsound real estate business practices on the part of the owners and developers of the
subdivision who entered into Contracts to Sell with the petitioners. We agree with
the trial court that the complaints do involve unsound real estate business practices on
the part of the owners and developers of the subdivision who entered into Contracts to
Sell with the petitioners. By virtue of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1344 and our decision in
Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, the NHA, now HLRB, has the exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide the matter. In addition to involving unsound real estate business
practices, the complaints also involve specific performance of the contractual and
statutory obligations of the owners or developers of the subdivision. The claims for
annulment of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan" in favor of HABACON and the certificates
of title issued to him and for damages are merely incidental (Ms. EMILY YU
FAJARDO, ET AL., VS. HON. ODILON I. BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232 SCRA 291).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Incidental claims for damages may be resolved by
the HLRB. In CT Torres Enterprises, Inc. Vs. Hibionada, we further declared that
incidental claims for damages may be resolved by the HLRB (Ms. EMILY YU
FAJARDO, ET AL., VS. HON. ODILON I. BAUTISTA, ET AL., 232 SCRA 291).
Civil Law; Mortgage; Right of Redemption; In the foreclosure of real property
by banking institutions as well as in the extrajudicial foreclosure by any other
mortgagee, the mortgagor of the deed of sale in the appropriate Registry of Deeds.
When Presidential Decree No. 27, "Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the
Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to them the Ownership of the Land They Till and
Providing the Instruments and Mechanism therefor," was enacted on 21 October
1972, the parcels of land in dispute were clearly still subject to private respondent's
right of redemption. In the foreclosure of real property by banking institutions, as well
as in the extrajudicial foreclosure by any other mortgagee, the mortgagor could
redeem the property within one year from date of registration of the deed of sale in
the appropriate Registry of Deeds (Santos v. Register of Deeds of Manila, 38 SCRA
42; Reyes vs. Noblejas, 21 SCRA 1027). In Medida vs. Court of Appeals (208 SCRA
887), we ruled that the "title to the land sold under a mortgage foreclosure remains
with the mortgagor or his grantee until the expiration of the redemption of the
redemption period . . . " (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. FILEMON
REMIGIO, ET AL., 231 SCRA 302).
Constitutional Law; Non-impairment of Contracts; Police Power; The
Constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligation of contract is limited by the
exercise of the police power of the state; The reason being that public welfare is
superior to private rights. In passing, the Secretary of the Department of Justice
has himself opined thus: "I am aware that a ruling that lands covered by P.D. No. 27

may not be the object of the foreclosure proceedings after the promulgation of said
decree on October 21, 1972, would concede that P.D. No. 27 had the effect of
impairing the obligation of the duly executed mortgage contracts affecting said lands.
There is no question, however, that the land reform program of the government as
accelerated under P.D. No. 27 and mandated by the Constitution itself (Art. XIV, Sec.
12), was undertaken in the exercise of the police power of the state. It is settled in a
long line of decisions of obligation of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the state (citations omitted). One limitation on the contract clause arises
from the police power, the reason being that public welfare is superior to private
rights (citation omitted). The situation here, is like that in eminent domain
proceedings, where the state expropriates private property for public use, and the only
condition to be complied with is the payment of just compensation. Technically the
condemnation proceedings do not impair the contract to destroy its obligations, but
merely appropriate or take for public use (citation omitted). As the Land Bank is
obliged to settle the obligations secured by the mortgage, the mortgagee is not left
without any compensation." (Opinion No. 92, Series of 1978; Rollo, pp. 88-89;
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. FILEMON REMIGIO, ET AL., 231
SCRA 302).
Same; Same; Same; Police power subordinates the non-impairment clause of
the Constitution. The opinion deserves respect (42 Am. Jur. P. 421, Cagayan Valley
Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 218; Ramon Salaria vs. Hon. Carlos
R. Buenviaj, et al., 81 SCRA 722). This Court, likewise, in a number of cases has
expressed the dictum that police power subordinates the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution (Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust Co., 94
SCRA 533; Kabiling vs. National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623; Anglo-Fil
Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494; Opinion No. 92, Series of 1978;
Rollo, pp. 88-89; PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. FILEMON REMIGIO,
ET AL., 231 SCRA 302).
Civil Law; Mortgage; Right of Redemption; Right of redemption by the
mortgagor could be exercised by paying to the creditor bank all the amount owing to
the latter, "on the date of the sale, with interest on the total indebtedness at the rate
agreed upon in the obligation from said date. In Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Mirang, 66 SCRA 141, we have ruled that the right of redemption by
the mortgagor could be exercised by paying to the creditor bank all the amounts
owing to the latter "on the date of the sale, with interest on the total indebtedness at
the rate agreed upon in the obligation from said date" (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK VS. FILEMON REMIGIO, ET AL., 231 SCRA 302).
Agrarian Relations; Tenancy; Personal Cultivation by owner-lessor, still a valid
ground for dispossession of a tenant; Reason. We are in full agreement with the
holding of the Court of Appeals upholding the Court a quo that insofar as coconut
lands are concerned, personal cultivation by the owner-lessor, a ground for
dispossession of the tenant-lessee under Section 50 of Republic Act 1199, is still a

valid ground for dispossession of a tenant. This is so because Section 35 of Republic

Act 3844 expressly provides that with respect to lands principally planted to citrus,
coconuts, cacao, durian and other similar permanent trees " the consideration, as well
as the tenancy system prevailing, shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act
1199, as amended" (FRANCISCO BALIGWAT VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
ET. AL., 142 SCRA 34).
Same; Same; Supreme Court; Judgments; Minute Resolution; Value of
decision of Court of Appeals in Arambulo vs. Conicon affirmed by minute resolution
of the Supreme Court, lost in Supreme Court's en banc decision of Nilo vs. Court of
Appeals. Petitioner invokes the decision of the Court of Appeals in Arambulo vs,
Conicon, CA-G.R. No. 46727-R dated January 6, 1972 which was affirmed by this
Court in a minute resolution dated March 14, 1972, G.R. No. L-34816 in support of
his contention that personal cultivation as a ground for dispossessing the tenant had
been repealed by Republic Act 6383. Aside from the fact that said case refers to an
agricultural riceland, this Court in Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, 524, a
decision by this Court en banc has in effect reversed the decision in the Arambulo
case when contrary to the ruling in said Arambulo case, it held that Republic Act 6389
abrogating personal cultivation as a ground for the dispossession of a tenant cannot be
given retroactive effect. The value of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
Arambulo case which was affirmed by this Court in a minute resolution has,
therefore, lost its force in view of the en banc decision of this Court in Nilo vs. Court
of Appeals, supra (FRANCISCO BALIGWAT VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
ET. AL., 142 SCRA 34).
Appeals; Execution of decision of agrarian court pending appeal; Republic Act
No. 5434 merely provides for uniform procedure for appeal and cannot upturn
fundamental substantive aspects of Republic Act No. 3844.- Section 36 of Republic
Act No. 3844, created in favor of the agricultural lessee a substantive right to
"continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when the
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory" and that Republic Act No. 5434, on the other hand, "as its title indicates, is
purely procedural in nature, in that it purports to do no more that prescribe a uniform
procedure for appeals from the bodies and entities enumerated therein. It is easily
comprehensible, then, considering the adjective nature of R.A. 5434, that section 12
of R.A. 1267, as amended, was explicitly and precisely referred to as one of the
procedural provisions to be superseded by R.A. 5434." x x x "Within the context of
the environmental legislative intention directly pertinent to the issue at bar, this Court
cannot construe R.A. 5434 an adjective law, in a manner that will upturn one of the
fundamental substantive aspects of R.A. 3844, although the latter, in terms of endresults, would seemingly operate to constrict the scope of the former (JESUS
SODSOD VS. HON. JUDGE VALERIANO L. DEL VALLE, ET AL., 56 SCRA
612).

Same; Same; Tenant may not be ejected except by final judgment. Under
the Land Reform Code the tenants are entitled to the enjoyment and possession of
their landholdings except when their dispossession has been authorized by the Court
in a judgment that is final and executory (JESUS SODSOD VS. HON. JUDGE
VALERIANO L. DEL VALLE, ET AL., 56 SCRA 612).
2.
ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE
PROCESS OF LAW. The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and Commonwealth Act No.
103 requires it to act according to justice and equity and substantial merits
of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may
inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable (Goseco
vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673). The fact,
however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free
from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it
can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character (Ang TIBAY, represented
by TORIBIO TEODORO et al., vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS et al., 69 SCRA 635).
3.
ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS. There are cardinal
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes
the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does simply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not
only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but
the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any
of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of
Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon
it (Ang TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO et al., vs. THE
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS et al., 69 SCRA 635).

2.
ID.; ID.;ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; NEW TRIAL GRANTED.
In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to
observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang
Tibay and the National Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is
barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to
predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of a new trial prayed for by the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice would be
better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing
the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may
be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the
Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to
grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the
parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new
trial should be, and the same is hereby, granted, and the entire record of
this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with
instruction that it re-open the case, receive all such evidence as may be
relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set
forth in the decision (Ang TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO
TEODORO et al., vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
et al., 69 SCRA 635).
JURISDICTION, QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS OF DAR
Agrarian Reform Law; Court agrees with the DARAB's finding that Obrique
et. al, are not tenants. We agree with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are
not tenants. Under the terms of the written agreement signed by Obrique, et al.,
pursuant to the livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program", it was
expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU
and the faculty and staff (participants in the project). The CMU did not receive any
share from the harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the participants. What the CMU
collected was a nominal service fee and land use participant's fee in consideration of
all the kinds of assistance given to the participants by the CMU (CENTRAL
MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR.
LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86)
Same; Same; Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing
prohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiaries and
may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform. A person
entering upon lands of another, not claiming in good faith the right to do so by virtue
of any title of his own, or by virtue of some agreement with the owner or with one
whom he believes holds title to the land, is a squatter. Squatters cannot enter the land
of another surreptitiously or by stealth, and under the umbrella of the CARP, claim

rights to said property as landless peasants. Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons
guilty of committing prohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify
as beneficiaries and may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian
reform. Any such person who knowingly and wilfully violates the above provision of
the Act shall be punished with imprisonment or fine at the discretion of the Court
(CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; Private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be
landless peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP. In view of the
above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be landless peasants,
cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP (CENTRAL MINDANAO
UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A.
CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION
BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657 it is crystal
clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters involving the
implementation of the CARP. Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is
crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters involving
the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases
and controversies involving lands falling within the coverage of the aforementioned
program. It does not include those which are actually, directly and exclusively used
and found to be necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for
setting up experimental farm stations, research and pilot production centers, etc
(CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; DARAB has no power to try, head and adjudicate the case
pending before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site.
Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending
before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the
CMU land reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used
and found by the school to be necessary for its purposes. The CMU has constantly
raised the issue of the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction and has questioned the
respondent's authority to hear, try and adjudicate the case at bar (CENTRAL
MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR.
LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 50 of R.A. 6657 confers on the DAR quasijudicial powers. Section 50 of R.A. 6657 confers on the DAR quasi-judicial
powers as follows: The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine

and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform x x x (CENTRAL
MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT DR.
LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no doubt that the DARAB has jurisdiction
to try and decide any agrarian dispute in the implementation of the CARP; Definition
of agrarian dispute. Section 17 of Executive Order No .129-A is merely a
repetition of Section 50, R.A. 6657. There is no doubt that the DARAB has
jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute in the implementation of the CARP.
An agrarian dispute is defined by the same law as any controversy relating to tenurial
rights whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to
agriculture (CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., 215 SCRA 86).
Agrarian Relations; Agricultural Land Reform Code; Prescription; Suit for
reinstatement as tenant of landholding, fixing of leasehold rentals and damages, not
barred, as the three-year period under the Code within which to enforce any cause of
action has not yet elapsed. Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended, does provide that "an action to enforce any cause of action under this Code
shall be barred if not commenced within three years after such cause of action
accured", respondent Court had overlooked the fact that petitioner had first filed a
Complaint for reinstatement on January 9, 1980, but that the same was dismissed for
non-compliance with the requirments of Presidential Decree No. 1508. The
prescriptive period, therefore, should be reckoned from the filing of that first
Complaint, in which event, only two (2) years and three (3) months from the acrrual
of the cause of action have elapsed (FILOMENA CATORCE, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS et al., 129 SCRA 210).
Same; Same; Same; Barangay; Courts; Jurisdiction; Dismissal of complaint for
reinstatement as tenant of landholding for not having passed the Lupon Pambarangay
Law under PD 1508, is procedural technicality; Better rule that courts under the
principle of equity should not be bound strictly by statue of limitations or doctrine of
laches when to do so manifest wrong and injustice result. Clearly, petitioner had
not slept on his rights, the dismissal of said Complaint having been due to a
procedural technicality. But even assuming that the prescriptive period is correctly
reckoned from the filing of the second Complaint on November 20, 1980, this Court
in Cristobal vs. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175, 185 (1977) held: "x x x In brief, it is indeed
the better rule that courts under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound
strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest
wrong and injustice would result" (FILOMENA CATORCE, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS et al., 129 SCRA 210).

Same; Same; Failure of respondent to controvert the fact that petitioner is a

bona fide tenant of the landholding; Security of tenure granted to tenants, meaning of.
Petitioner had been adjudged the bona fide tenant of the landholding in question.
Not only did respondent fail to controvert this fact, but he even impliedly admitted the
same in his Answer to petitioner's Complaint when he raised, as one of his defenses,
the alleged voluntary surrender of the landholding by petitioner. Respondent Court
should have taken this fact into consideration for tenants are guaranteed security of
tenure, meaning, the continued enjoyment and possession of their landholding except
when their dispossession had been authorized by virtue of a final and executory
judgement, which is not so in the case at bar (FILOMENA CATORCE, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS et al., 129 SCRA 210).
Same; Same; Purpose and nature of the Agricultural Land Reform Code.
The Agricultural Lnad Reform Code has been designed to promote economic and
social stability. Being a social legislation, it must be interpreted liberally to give full
force and effect to its clear intent, which is "to achieve independent, self-reliant and
responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society"
(FILOMENA CATORCE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al., 129 SCRA 210).
The concept of "social justice" was not meant to perpetuate an injustice to the
landholder-lessor (Cabatan vs. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 323).
Certiorari, Indispensable elements of the indispensable elements of a
petition for certiorari are: (a) that it is directed against a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions; (b) that such tribunal, board or officer has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) that there is no
appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Quite often, this Court has warned that for the extraordinary writ to issue, it must be
clearly established that there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. It, therefore, follows that before a petition of or
certiorari can be instituted, all remedies available in the trial court must have first
been exhausted (Domingo Gelindon, et al., vs. Honorable Jose Dela Rama as
Presiding Judge of RTC, Makati, Br. 139, et al., 228 SCA 322).
Same; Exceptional circumstances where petitions for certiorari entertained
even in the existence of he remedy of appeal. True, we have on certain occasions
entertained petitions for certiorari despite the existence of the remedy of appeal; in
those exceptional cases, however, either public welfare and the advancement of public
policy have dictated or the broader interests of justice have demanded, or when the
orders complained of are found to be patent nullities, or that an appeal is considered
clearly an inappropriate remedy (Domingo Gelindon, et al., vs. Honorable Jose
Dela Rama as Presiding Judge of RTC, Makati, Br. 139, et al., 228 SCA 322).
Same; Courts; As a matter of policy, direct recourse to the Supreme Court
should not be allowed where relief available form lower courts. Let is also be
emphasized that while this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of

Appeals, as well as with the Regional Trial Courts (for writs enforceable within their
respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari, the litigants
are well advised, however, not to disregard the policy that has heretofore been set by
us. In Veragra, Sr. vs. Suelto, the Court, speaking through then Associate Justice, now
Chief Justice, Andres R. Narvasa, said: "We now turn *** to the propriety of a direct
resort to this Court for the remedy of mandamus or other extraordinary writ against a
municipal court, instead of an attempt to initially obtain that relief from the Regional
Trial Court of the district or the Court of appeals, both of which tribunals share this
Court's jurisdiction to issue the writ. As a matter of policy such a direct recourse of
last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned
to it by the fundamental character and immemorial tradition (Domingo Gelindon, et
al., vs. Honorable Jose Dela Rama as Presiding Judge of RTC, Makati, Br. 139,
et al., 228 SCA 322).
POSITION PAPER/AFFIDAVITS
COMPLY WITH DUE PROCESS
Labor Law; Due Process; The requirements of due process are satisfied when
the parties are given opportunity to submit position papers. The petitioner was not
denied due process for several hearings were in fact conducted by the hearing officer
of the Regional Office of the DOLE and the parties submitted position papers upon
which the Regional Director based his decision in the case. There is abundant
jurisprudence to the effect that the requirements of due process are satisfied when the
parties are given an opportunity to submit position papers (Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phil.,
Inc., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 78787, December 18, 1989; Asiaworld Publishing House
vs. Ople, 152 SCRA 224; Manila Doctors Hospital vs. NLRC, 135 SCRA 262). What
the fundamental law abhors is not the absence of previous notice but rather the
absolute lack of opportunity to be heard (Antipolo Realty Copr. Vs. National Housing
Authority, 153 SCRA 399). There is no denial of due process where a party is given
an opportunity to be heard and present his case (Ong, Sr. vs. Parel, 156 SCRA 768;
Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs. Amores, 152 SCRA 237). Since petitioners herein
participated in the hearings, submitted a position paper, and filed a motion for
reconsideration of the March 23, 1988 decision of the Labor Undersecretary, it was
not denied due process (ODIN SECURITY AGENCY VS. HON. DIONISIO C.
DE LA SERNA, ET AL., 182 SCRA 472).
Same; Same; Regional Directors; Jurisdiction by Estoppel; A party cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. The petitioner is estopped from questioning the alleged lack of
jurisdiction of the Regional Director over the private respondent's claims. Petitioner
submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Director by taking part in the hearing

before him and submitting a position paper. When the Regional Director issued his
March 20, 1987 order requiring petitioner to pay the private respondents the benefits
they were claiming, petitioner was silent. Only the private respondents filed a motion
for reconsideration. It was only after the Undersecretary modified the order of the
Regional Director on March 23, 1988 that the petitioner moved for reconsideration
and questioned the jurisdiction of the public respondents to hear and decide the case.
The principle of jurisdiction by estoppel bars it from doing this. In Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 35-36, we held: "It has been held that a party can not
invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and,
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 S.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way
of explaining the rules, it was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not
important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the
reason that such a practice can not be tolerated - obviously for reasons of public
policy. "Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause
and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbunjones, etc., 243 U.S.
273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed.
659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo, 58, the Court said that it is not right for a
party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty. "Sibonghanoy was reiterated in Crisostomo vs. C.A., 32 SCRA 54; Libudan
vs. Gil, 45 SCRA 17; Carculitan vs. De la Cruz, 65 SCRA 7061; and PNB vs. IAC,
143 SCRA 299 (ODIN SECURITY AGENCY VS. HON. DIONISIO C. DE LA
SERNA, ET AL., 182 SCRA 472).
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction once vested continues until the
entire controversy is decided. The fact is, the Regional Director and the
Undersecretary did have jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint which
was originally for violation of labor standards (Art. 128[b], Labor Code). Only later
did the guards ask for backwages on account of their alleged "constructive dismissal"
(p. 32, Rollo). Once vested, that jurisdiction continued until the entire controversy
was decided (Lee vs. MTC, 145 SCRA 408; Abadilla vs. Ramos, 156 SCRA 92;
and Pucan vs. Bengzon, 155 SCRA 692; ODIN SECURITY AGENCY VS. HON.
DIONISIO C. DE LA SERNA, ET AL., 182 SCRA 472).
Actions; Ejectment; The only issue to be resolved in ejectment cases is the
question as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or
possession de facto. In ejectment cases, the only issue to be resolved therein is the
question as to who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or
possession de facto (De Luna vs. CA, 212 SCRA 276 [1992]). It has for its purpose
the restoration to the aggrieved party the possession of the premises from which he

had been forcibly ejected or which had been detained from him. This relief is
available to a landlord, vendor, or vendee or any party after the detainer's right to hold
possession of the subject property, by virtue of a contract express or implied, has
expired or has been otherwise terminated (Lim Kieh Tong, Inc., vs. CA, 195 SCRA
398 [1991]; UNIVERSITY PHYSICIANS SERVICES, INC., ET AL., VS. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 86).
Same; Same; Damages; Litis Pendentia; Private respondent cannot deny that
the complaint for damages was meant to prevent petitioners from ejecting her.
Private respondent cannot deny that the complaint for damages, taken in its full
context, was meant to prevent petitioners from ejecting her from Unit No. 1166 of the
Victoria Apartment. Indeed, a careful examination of the complaint reveals that it
demanded, as private respondent's main relief, that petitioners be permanently
enjoined from doing any act to force out and/or cause her ejectment from said
apartment unit. Private respondent's complaint for damages bears unmistakable
earmarks that show off its true nature and character touching as it does, on her alleged
right to continued possession of the premises (UNIVERSITY PHYSICIAN
SERVICES, INC., ET AL., VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA
86).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the issue is the right of the lessee to occupy
the subject apartment unit, the same should be properly threshed out in an ejectment
suit and not in an action for damages where the question of possession is likewise the
primary issue to be resolved, even if the unlawful detainer suit was filed later than the
one for damages. The issue of whether private respondent had the right to occupy
subject apartment unit should therefore be properly threshed out in an ejectment suit
and not in action for damages where the question of possession is likewise the
primary issue to be resolved. We cannot simply ignore the fact that private
respondent, after her unjustified refusal to vacate the premises, was aware that an
ejectment case against her was forthcoming. It is therefore evident that the filing of
the complaint for damages and preliminary injunction was but a canny and
preemptive maneuver intended to block the action for ejectment which petitioner was
to take against private respondent. The matter raised in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila may be properly determined in the ejectment suit before the Metropolitan
Trial Court, in consonance with the rule prohibiting multiplicity of suits. And the
mere fact that the unlawful detainer suit was filed later than the one for damages does
not change the situation of the parties (Rosales vs. CFI, 154 SCRA 153 [1987];
UNIVERSITY PHYSICIAN SERVICES, INC., ET AL., VS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 86).
Civil Law; Contracts; Contract to Sell; Contract of Sale; In a contract of sale,
the title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; whereas in a contract
to sell, by agreement the ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass until
the full payment of the price. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot
recover ownership until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas in a

contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until the full payment of the price. In
view of the extended disquisition thereon by respondent court, it would be worthwhile
at this juncture to briefly discourse in the rationale behind our treatment of the alleged
option contract as a contract to sell, rather than a contract of sale. The distinction
between the two is important for in a contract of sale, the title passes to the vendee
upon the delivery of the thing sold; whereas in a contract to sell, by agreement the
ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass until the full payment of the
price. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and
unless the contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell, title is
retained by the vendor until the full payment of the price, such payment being a
positive suspensive condition and failure of which is not a breach but an even that
prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective. Thus, a
deed of sale is considered absolute in nature where there is neither a stipulation in the
deed that title to the property sold is reserved in the seller until the full payment of the
price, nor one giving the vendor the right to unilaterally resolve the contract the
moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period (ADELFA PROPERTIES,
INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; An implied agreement that ownership shall not pass to the
purchaser until he had fully paid the price is valid and therefore, binding and
enforceable between the parties. A contract which contains this kind of stipulation is
considered a contract to sell. In effect, there was an implied agreement that
ownership shall not pass to the purchaser until he had fully paid the price. Article
1478 of the Civil Code does not require that such a stipulation be expressly made.
Consequently, an implied stipulation to that effect is considered valid and, therefore,
binding and enforceable between the parties. It should be noted that under the law and
jurisprudence, a contract which contains this kind of stipulation is considered a
contract to sell (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Irrefragably, the controverted document should legally be
considered as a perfected contract to sell. Irrefragably, the controverted document
should legally be considered as a perfected contract to sell. On this particular point,
therefore, we reject the position and ratiocination of respondent Court of Appeals
which, while awarding the correct relief to private respondents, categorized the
instruments as "strictly an option contract" (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; The important task in contract interpretation is always the
ascertainment of the intention of the contracting parties. The important task in
contract interpretation is always the ascertainment of the intention of the contracting
parties and that task is, of course, to be discharged by looking to the words they used
to project that intention in their contract, all the words not just particular word or two,
and words in context not words standing alone. Moreover, judging from the
subsequent acts of the parties which will hereinafter be discussed, it is undeniable that

the intention of the parties was to enter into a contract to sell. In addition, the title of a
contract does not necessarily determine its true nature. Hence, the fact that the
document under discussion is entitled "Exclusive Option to Purchase" is not
controlling where the text thereof shows that it is a contract to sell (ADELFA
PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Option Contract; Sales; An option is not a sale of property but a
sale of the right to purchase. It is simply a contract by which the owner of property
agrees with another person that he shall have the right to buy his property at a fixed
price within a certain time. He does not sell his land; he does not then agree to sell it;
but he does sell something, that is, the right or privilege to buy at the election or
option of the other party. An option, as used in the law on sales, is a continuing
offer or contract by which the owner stipulates with another that the latter shall have
the right to buy the property at a fixed price within a certain time, or under, or in
compliance with, certain terms and conditions, or which gives to the owner of the
property the right to sell or demand a sale. It is also sometimes called an "unaccepted
offer". An option is not of itself a purchase, but merely secures the privilege to buy. It
is not a sale of property but a sale of the right to purchase. It is simply a contract by
which the owner of property agrees with another person that he shall have the right to
buy his property at a fixed price within a certain time. He does not sell his land; he
does not then agree to sell it; but he does sell something, that is, the right or privilege
to buy at the election or option of the other property. Its distinguishing characteristic
is that it imposes no binding obligation on the person holding the option, aside from
the consideration for the offer. Until acceptance, it is not, properly speaking, a
contract, and does not vest, transfer, or agree to transfer, any title to, or any interest or
right in the subject matter, but is merely a contract by which the owner of property
gives the optionee the right to or privilege of accepting the offer and buying the
property on certain terms (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Same; An option is an unaccepted offer. It states the terms
and conditions on which the owner is willing to sell his land, if the holder elects to
accept them within the time limited. A contract of sale, on the other hand, fixes
definitely the relative rights and obligations of both parties at the time of its
execution. The offer and the acceptance are concurrent. The distinction between an
"option" and a contract of sale is that an option is an unaccepted offer. It states the
terms and conditions on which the owner is willing to sell his land, if the holder elects
to accept them within the time limited. If the holder does so elect, he must give notice
to the other party, and the accepted offer thereupon becomes a valid and binding
contract. If an acceptance is not made within the time fixed, the owner is no longer
bound by his offer, and the option is at an end. A contract of sale, on the other hand,
fixes definitely the relative rights and obligations of both parties at the time of its
execution. The offer and the acceptance are concurrent, since the minds of the

contracting parties meet in the terms of the agreement (ADELFA PROPERTIES,

INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Except where a formal acceptance is so required, it
may be made either in a formal or an informal manner, and may be shown by acts,
conduct, or words of the accepting party that clearly manifest a present intention or
determination to accept the offer to buy or sell. A perusal of the contract in this
case, as well as the oral and documentary evidence presented by the parties, readily
shows that there is indeed a concurrence of petitioner's offer to buy and private
respondent's acceptance thereof. The rule is that except where a formal acceptance is
so required, although the acceptance must be affirmatively and clearly made and must
be evidenced by some acts or conduct communicated to the offeror, it may be made
either in a formal or an informal manner, and may be shown by acts, conduct, or
words of the accepting party that clearly manifest a present intention or determination
to accept the offer to buy or sell. Thus, acceptance may be shown by the acts, conduct,
or words of a party recognizing the existence of the contract of sale (ADELFA
PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The test in determining whether a contract is a
"contract of sale or purchase" or a mere "option" is whether or not the agreement
could be specifically enforced. The test in determining whether a contract is a
"contract of sale or purchase" or a mere "option" is whether or not the agreement
could be specifically enforced. There is no doubt that the obligation of petitioner to
pay the purchase price is specific, definite and certain, and consequently binding and
enforceable. Had private respondents chosen to enforce the contract, they could have
specifically compelled petitioner to pay the balance of P 2,806,150.00. This is
distinctly made manifest in the contract itself as an integral stipulation, compliance
with which could legally and definitely be demanded from petitioner as a
consequence (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Same; An agreement is only an "option" when no
obligation rests on the party to make any payment except such as may be agreed on
between the parties as consideration to support the option until he has made up his
mind within the time specified. This is not a case where no right is as yet created
nor an obligation declared, as where something further remains to be done before the
buyer and seller obligate themselves. An agreement is only a "option" when no
obligation rests on the party to make any payment except such as may be agreed on
between the parties as consideration to support the option until he has made up his
mind within the time specified. An option, and not a contract to purchase, is effected
by an agreement to sell real estate for payments to be made within a specified time
and providing for forfeiture of money paid upon failure to make payment, where the
purchaser does not agree to purchase, to make payment, or to bind himself in any way
other than the forfeiture of the payments made. As hereinbefore discussed, this is not

the situation obtaining in the case at bar (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Earnest Money; It is a statutory rule that whenever
earnest money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be considered as part of the price
and as proof of the perfection of the contract. It constitutes an advance payment and
must, therefore be deducted from the total price. In other words, the alleged option
money of P50,000.00 was actually earnest money which was intended to form part of
the purchase price. The amount of P50,000.00 was not distinct from the cause or
consideration for the sale of the property, but was itself a part thereof. It is a statutory
rule that whenever earnest money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be considered
as part of the price and as proof of the perfection of the contract. It constitutes an
advance payment and must, therefore, be deducted from the total price. Also, earnest
money is given by the buyer to the seller to bind the bargain (ADELFA
PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Earnest Money; Option Money; Distinction Between Earnest
Money and Option Money. There are clear distinctions between earnest money and
option money, viz. (a) earnest money is part of the purchase price, while option
money is the money given as a distinct consideration for an option contract; (b)
earnest money is given only where there is already a sale, while option money applies
to a sale not yet perfected; and (c ) when earnest money is given, the buyer is bound
to pay the balance, while when the would-be buyer gives option money, he is not
required to buy (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; In a perfected contract to sell, Article 1590 would properly
apply. To justify its failure to pay the purchase price within the agreed period,
petitioner invokes Article 1590 of the Civil Code which provides: "ART 1590. Should
the vendee be disturbed in the possession or ownership of the thing acquired, or
should he have reasonable grounds to fear such disturbance, by a vindicatory action or
a foreclosure of mortgage, he may suspend the payment of the price until the vendor
has caused the disturbance or danger to cease, unless the latter gives security for the
return of the price in a proper case, or it has been stipulated that, notwithstanding any
such contingency, the vendee shall be bound to make the payment. A mere act of
trespass shall authorize the suspension of the payment of the price." Respondent court
refused to apply the aforequoted provision of law on the erroneous assumption that
the true agreement between the parties was a contract of option. As we have herein
before discussed, it was not an option contract but perfected contract to sell. Verily,
therefore, Article 1590 would properly apply (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Sales; In Article 1590, the vendor is bound to make payment
even with the existence of a vindicatory action if the vendee should give a security for
the return of the price. Petitioner was justified in suspending payment of the

balance of the purchase price by reason of the aforesaid vindicatory action filed
against it. The assurance made by private respondents that petitioner did not have to
worry about the case because it was pure and simple harassment is not the kind of
guaranty contemplated under the exceptive clause in Article 1590 wherein the vendor
is bound to make payment even with the existence of a vindicatory action if the
vendee should give a security for the return of the price (ADELFA PROPERTIES,
INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; It is consignation which is essential in order to extinguish
petitioner's obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price. A contract to sell
involves the performance of an obligation, not merely the exercise of a privilege or a
right. Consequently, performance of payment may be affected not by tender of
payment alone but by both tender and consignation. The mere sending of a letter
by the vendee expressing the intention to pay, without the accompanying payment, is
not considered a valid tender of payment. Besides, a mere tender of payment is not
sufficient to compel private respondents to deliver the property and execute the deed
of absolute sale. It is consignation which is essential in order to extinguish petitioner
petitioner's obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price. The rule is different in
case of an option contract or in legal redemption or in a sale with right to repurchase,
wherein consignation is not necessary because these cases involve an exercise of a
right or privilege (to buy, redeem or repurchase) rather than the discharge of an
obligation, hence tender of payment would be sufficient to preserve the right or
privilege. This is because the provisions on consignation are not applicable when
there is no obligation pay. A contract to sell, as in the case before us, involves the
performance of an obligation, not merely the exercise of a privilege or a right.
Consequently, perfomance or payment may be affected not by tender of payment
alone but by both tender and consignation (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary
where the contract provides for automatic rescission in case of breach. By reason
of petitioner's failure to comply with its obligation, private respondents elected to
resort to and did announce the rescission of the contract through its letter to petitioner
dated July 27, 1990. That written notice of rescission is deemed sufficient under the
circumstances. Article 1592 of the Civil Code which requires rescission either by
judicial action or notarial act is not applicable to a contract to sell. Furthermore,
judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides
for automatic rescission in case of breach, as in the contract involved in the present
controversy (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
240 SCRA 565).
Same; Same; Same; Resolution of reciprocal contracts may be made
extrajudicially unless successfully impugned in court. If the debtor impugns the
declaration, it shall be subject to judicial determination. Otherwise, if said party does
not oppose it, the extrajudicial rescission shall have legal effect. We are not

unaware of the ruling in University of the Philippines vs. De los Angeles, etc. that the
right to rescind is not absolute, being ever subject to scrutiny and review by the
proper court. It is our considered view, however, that this rule applies to a situation
where the extrajudicial rescission is contested by the defaulting party. In other words,
resolution of reciprocal contracts may be made extrajudicially unless successfully
impugned in court. If the debtor impugns the declaration, it shall be subject to judicial
determination. Otherwise, if said party does not oppose it, the extrajudicial rescission
shall have legal effect (ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 240 SCRA 565).
Squatting; Presidential Decrees; Pres. Decree 772 on squatting; Decree does
not apply to pasture lands but to squatting in urban communities. We hold that the
lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its
preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or
more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do
individuals. The squatting complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas (THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., VS. HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES,
ET AL., 95 SCRA 663).
Same; Same; Same; Squatting on public agricultural lands punishable by Rep.
Act. 947. On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural
lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act. No.
947 which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation or association to forcibly
enter or occupy public agricultural lands (THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ET AL., VS. HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, ET AL., 95 SCRA 663).
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Rule of ejusdem generis merely a
tool of statutory construction resorted to when legislative intent is uncertain; Rule
does not apply to Pres. Decree 772 where intent of decree is unmistakable. The rule of
ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not
apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to
apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of
ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when
the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax
Appeals, 104 Phil. 615, 618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50; THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ET AL., VS. HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, ET AL., 95 SCRA
663).
Civil Law; Obligation and Contracts; The various stipulations of a contract
shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may
result from all them taken jointly. As in statutes, the provisions of a contract should
not be read in isolation from the rest of the instrument but, on the contrary, interpreted
in the light of the other related provisions. It is a canon of construction that "the whole
and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole". This is also the injunction in

Article 1374 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the various stipulations of a
contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which
may result from all of them taken jointly" (SPOUSES VICENTE and SALOME DE
LEON VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA 612).
Same; Same; Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Power of review of the Supreme
Court on issues not raised in the lower court; The Supreme court may review an issue
in the interest of substantial justice even if it has not been properly raised. The
private respondents also contend that the matter of the correct computation of the
consideration for the sale cannot now be raised because it was not assigned as an error
in the Court of Appeals. The petitioners deny this and insist that the matter was
properly raised and argued at length in their appellants' brief, which they have quoted
in their Reply. The issue is not that crucial. Whatever the merits of their respective
contentions, we have held that, in any case, we may review an issue in the interest of
substantial justice even if it has not been properly raised in the lower court. Thus:
And although this issue may not have been squarely raised below, in the interest of
substantial justice this Court is not prevented from considering such pivotal factual
matter that had been overlooked by the Courts below. The Supreme Court is clothed
with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision. At any rate, the Court is
clothed with ample authority to review matters, even of they are not assigned as
errors in their appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a
just decision of the case, and We find it unfair and unjust to deprive the petitioner of
the rentals on her property due to a mere technicality (SPOUSES VICENTE and
SALOME DE LEON VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA 612).
Remedial Law; Evidence; Parol Evidence; Spoken words could be notoriously
unreliable as against a written document that speaks a uniform language. As for the
testimony of De Leon earlier quoted, it is appropriated to recall the observation in Air
France v. Carrascoso that spoken words could be "notoriously unreliable" as against
"a written document (that) speaks a uniform language." The parol evidence rule
forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written contract, the purpose
being to give it stability and to remove the temptation or occasion for possible perjury
to falsify the intention of the parties. Considering the factual circumstances attending
this case, we are disposed to dismiss the said declaration as an unguarded and honest
mistake that was not really intended to modify the written agreement (SPOUSES
VICENTE and SALOME DE LEON VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
205 SCRA 612).
Civil Law; Obligations & Contracts; Contract; The interpretation of obscure
words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.
It is significant that, as the trial court noted, it was the private respondents' lawyer
who prepared the Contract to Sell which Manuel Franco and Vicente de Leon signed
at the hospital. According to Article 1377 of the Civil Code, "the interpretation of
obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the

obscurity." Any ambiguity in the contract prepared at the instance of the private
respondents and by their lawyer should therefore be interpreted to the prejudice not of
the vendors but of the vendees, who were responsible for such ambiguity (SPOUSES
VICENTE and SALOME DE LEON VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
205 SCRA 612).
Administrative Law; Agrarian Law; Judgments; Where land certificates
ordered distributed were marked "Under Protest" the order does not become final.
The first and fourth grounds of the petition for review are not well-taken. The orders
for the issuance of Certificates of Land Transfer to the petitioners had not become
final and executory because the certificates had been marked "under protest" on
orders of Secretary Estrella (THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE
SISON, represented by FERNANDO CAYABYAB VS. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 210 SCRA 545).
Agrarian Law; An heirs does not have to cultivate personally the 7-hectare
retention area. There is no merit in the petitioners' contention that the Heirs of Dr.
Sison are disqualified to retain their shares of the agricultural lands of the estate for
failure to comply with the requirement that "such landowner is cultivating such area,
or will now cultivate it" (p. 23, Rollo). The Secretary interpreted that provision to
mean "that the tenants in the exempted and retained riceland areas of the concerned
Heirs of Sison, the petitioners-tenant, as agricultural lessees, shall remain as such and
cultivate the same. The concerned Heirs of Sison therefore, do not have to cultivate
the retained and exempted areas, unless the petitioners, as agricultural lessees, would
voluntarily relinquish the task of cultivation and vacate and surrender the said areas to
the Heirs" (p. 23, Rollo; Italics ours) (THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR.
JOSE SISON, represented by FERNANDO CAYABYAB VS. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 210 SCRA 545).
Same; Secretary of Agrarian Reform may recall Certificates of Land Transfer
which violate the law on retention scheme. Petitioners' contention that the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no more authority or jurisdiction to cancel the
Certificates of Land Transfer after they had been issued to the tenants-beneficiaries, is
not correct. The issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer fall
within the Secretary's administrative jurisdiction as implementor of P.D. 27. Having
found that certain heirs of Dr. Sison were entitled to retain their ricelands (which did
not exceed seven [7] hectares) and had been illegally denied that right, Secretary
Juico properly ordered the cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer which had
been erroneously issued to the petitioners (THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF
DR. JOSE SISON, represented by FERNANDO CAYABYAB VS. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 210 SCRA 545).
Civil law; Lease; Agricultural Tenancy Act; Civil law lease distinguished from
agricultural tenancy. There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy
and a civil law lease. The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural

land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and
cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate
the agricultural land, where as the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or
work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted
to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful
pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code,
whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS.
EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
Agricultural Tenancy Act; A fishpond is an agricultural land. There is no
doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the
Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically mentions
fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. Thus Section 46 (c ) of
said Act provides that "the consideration for the use of sugar lands, fishponds saltbeds
and of lands devoted to the raising of livestock shall be governed by stipulation
between the parties." This Court has already ruled that "land in which fish is produced
is classified as agricultural land" (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO
PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
Same; Words and phrases; Meaning of phrase "immediate farm household."
Only the members of the family of the tenant and such other persons, whether related
to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help
him to operate the farm enterprise are included in the term "immediate farm
household" (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA
590).
Same; To fall under the Agricultural Tenancy Act, land must be worked by
tenant or immediate farm household. The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and
his immediate family to work the land. Thus Section 5 (a) of Republic Act 1199, as
amended, defines a "tenant" as a person who, himself with the aid available from
within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed
by, another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production sharing the produce
with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a
price certain in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
Section 8 of the same Act limits the relations of landholder and tenant to the person
who furnishes the land and to the person who actually works the land himself with the
aid of labor available from within his immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of
the same Act requires for the existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his
immediate farm household work the land (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO
PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
Same; A person who hires others to do work ceases to be a tenant. A person,
in order to be considered a tenant, must himself with the aid available from his
immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually
work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he pays

for doing cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as abandoned, the
land as tenant within the meaning of section 5 and 8 of Republic Act 1199, and ceases
to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS.
EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 58 SCRA 590).
Agrarian relations: Agricultural lease; In determination of annual lease rental,
if direct evidence on normal harvest of one of three preceding agricultural years prior
to establishment of leasehold not available, circumstantial evidence may be
considered; Case at bar. While is true as a general rule that it is incumbent on the
lessee challenging the reasonableness of the rentals to prove that the same are
excessive, in the peculiar circumstance of the case, it is believed that the lessee has
sufficiently discharged such burden by showing by evidence which may be
considered circumstantial, the improbability that the normal harvest for the
agricultural year 1959-1960 could have exceeded 100 cavans. It would have been
pointless for the agrarian court to require the lessee to prove the normal harvest of that
agricultural year, since it is a fact found by both the agrarian court and the Court of
Appeals, that respondent lessee only commenced working on the land during the
agricultural year 1959-1960 at the commencement of the leasehold, as prior thereto
the land was cultivated by other tenants. There is no question that proof of collateral
facts and circumstances may be allowed provided the existence of the main fact may
be reasonably inferred therefrom according to reason and common experience
(INECETA ALFANTA, VS. NOLASCO NOE, ET AL., 53 SCRA 76).
Constitutional law; Republic Act 1199, as amended, enacted to improve lot of
sharecropper; Social justice defined. It must be observed that Republic Act 1199,
as amended, has been enacted by Congress pursuant to the constitutional mandate that
the "promotion of social justice to ensure the well-being and economic security of all
the people shall be the concern of the state" and of the obligation of the state to accord
protection to labor and to regulate the relations between landowner and tenant. Social
justice, in the words of Justice Laurel in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) means
the "humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in the rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated." The statute was, therefore, designed to improve the lot of the
sharecropper by granting to him a more equitable participation in the produce of the
land which he cultivates (INECETA ALFANTA, VS. NOLASCO NOE, ET AL., 53
SCRA 76).
Same; Under New Constitution, property ownership impressed with social
function. Under the new Constitution, property ownership has been impressed
with social function. This implies that the owner has the obligation to use his property
not only to benefit himself but society as well. Hence, it provides under section 6 of
Article II thereof, that in the promotion of social justice, the State "shall regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equity
diffuse property ownership and profits." The Constitution also ensures that the
workers shall have a just and living wage which should assure for himself and his

family an existence worthy of human dignity and give him opportunities for a better
life (section 7 and 9, Article II) (INECETA ALFANTA, VS. NOLASCO NOE, ET
AL., 53 SCRA 76).
Statutory construction; In interpretation of tenancy and labor legislation,
doubts resolved in favor of tenant and worker. Viewed within the context of the
constitutional mandate and obvious legislative intent, the provisions of the law should
be construed to further their purpose of redeeming the tenant from his bondage of
misery, want and oppression arising from the onerous terms of his tenancy and to
uplift his social and financial status. Under the established jurisprudence of this Court,
in the interpretation of tenancy and labor legislation, "it will be guided by more than
just an inquiry into the letter of the law as against its spirit and will ultimately resolve
grave doubts in favor of the tenant and worker (INECETA ALFANTA, VS.
NOLASCO NOE, ET AL., 53 SCRA 76).
Court of Agrarian relations; In hearing and determination of cases, court not
bound strictly by technical rules of evidence. Section 10 of Republic Act 1267, as
amended by Republic Act 1409, creating the Court of Agrarian Relations, provides
that "in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy
and in exercising any duty and power under this Act, the Court shall, in the hearing
and determination of cases pending before it, not be bound strictly by the technical
rules of evidence." Complementary to this provision is section 155 of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code, which provides that "in the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy pending before them, the Courts without
impairing substantial rights, shall not be bound strictly by the technical rules of
evidence and procedure, except in expropriation cases" (INECETA ALFANTA, VS.
NOLASCO NOE, ET AL., 53 SCRA 76).
Moot and academic; Dismissal of case as moot and academic; When a decision
on the merits in a case is rendered and the same has become final and executory,
action on procedural matters or issues is rendered moot and academic. This Court
ruled in Muoz vs. Bagasao, et al., (44 SCRA 526 [1972]) that "where a decision on
the merits in a case at bar, the action on procedural matters or issues is thereby
rendered moot and academic." Therefore, an adjudication of the procedural issue
presented for resolution (similar to this case with respect to the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal) would be futile exercise in exegesis (CALIXTO ANGEL
VS. HON. PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ, ET AL., 169 SCRA 129).
Same; Same; Legal Issues; The nature and importance of the legal question
raised in the petition makes it necessary to discuss and resolve the same with finality.
Considering, however, the nature and importance of the legal question raised in
this petition, it is necessary to discuss and resolve the same with finality (De la
Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 [1971]; Salonga v. Pano, 134 SCRA 438 [1985];
Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25 [1985];

CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ, ET AL., 169 SCRA

129).
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeal; Perfection of appeal; Execution; The
rule is that once appeal is perfected, the trial court loses its jurisdiction over the case
and to issue the writ of execution; The rule does not apply to a tenancy and/or
agrarian case. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that once appeal is perfected, the
trial court loses its jurisdiction over the case and to issue writ of execution (Universal
Far East Corporation v. C.A., et al., 131 SCRA 642 [1984]; Montelibano v. BacolodMurcia Willing Co., and C.A., 136 SCRA 294 [1985]. It should be pointed out,
however, that this ruling does not apply to the case at bar (CALIXTO ANGEL VS.
HON. PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ, ET AL., 169 SCRA 129).
Agrarian Relations; Tenancy; Appeal; Perfection of appeal does not necessarily
mean that the lower court loses jurisdiction over the case since the rules of procedure
defined under P.D. 946 apply.
This is a tenancy and/or agrarian case. Hence, the perfection of the appeal does
not necessarily mean that the court a quo loses jurisdiction over the case, since the
rules of procedures as defined under Presidential Decree 946 apply (CALIXTO
ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ, ET AL., 169 SCRA 129).
Same; Same; Same; Sec. 16 of PD 946 precludes the application of the Rules
of Court to agrarian cases while Sec. 18 thereof provides that appeal shall not stay the
decision in agrarian cases; The decision may be executed despite perfection of appeal
except where the appealed decision directs the ejectment of the tenant. Section 16
and 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946 are too clear and explicit in this respect as to
require interpretation or construction. Section 16 precludes the application of the
Rules of Court to agrarian cases while Section 18 provides that appeal shall not stay
the decision in agrarian cases. Consequently, said decision may be executed
notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal therefrom except where the appealed
decision directs the ejectment of the tenant (CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON.
PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ, ET AL., 169 SCRA 129).
Same; Same; Same; Rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid
technical sense. Moreover, "rules of procedure are intended to promote, not to
defeat substantial justice, and therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and
technical sense" (Calasiao Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association v. C.A.
106 SCRA 630 [1981]; Director of Lands v. Romamban, et al., 131 SCRA 431
[1984]; CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C. INOPIQUEZ, ET AL.,
169 SCRA 129).
Same; Same; Same; PD 946 being a special law, it shall have precedence over
the Rules of Court which is of general applicability. Finally, Presidential Decree
No. 946 being a special law, the same shall have precedence over the Rules of Court
which is of general applicability (De Joya v. Lantin, 19 SCRA 893 [1967]; Papa v.

Mago, 22 SCRA 857 [1968]; CALIXTO ANGEL VS. HON. PONCIANO C.

INOPIQUEZ, ET AL., 169 SCRA 129).
COMPROMISE
Action; Suit between members of the same family; Requisite before suit is
filed; Article 222, New Civil Code construed. Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines requires that before a suit between members of the same family this case
between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made. The only way to make it so appear is by a proper
averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the law forbids a suit being filed or
maintained unless such efforts at compromise appear, the showing that such efforts
had been exerted is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action.
Hence, the failure of the complaint to plead that the plaintiff previously tried in
earnest to reach a settlement out of court renders it assailable for lack of cause of
action. It may be so attacked at any stage of the case on appeal (CECILIO
MENDOZA VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 19 SCRA
756).
Same; Compromise; Support; Validity of marriage; Article 222 is not
applicable to a suit to claim future support or to the validity of a marriage. A claim
for future support cannot be subject of a valid compromise. It is, therefore, outside the
sphere of application of Article 222. The validity of a marriage is also a noncompromisable issue. Since no valid compromise is possible on these issues, a
showing of previous efforts to compromise them would be superfluous (CECILIO
MENDOZA VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 19 SCRA
756).
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
Labor Law; Agrarian Relations; Tenancy Relationship; Jurisdiction;
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over both agrarian and non-agrarian litigation.
The jurisdictional issue raised by the petitioner has no merit. Nowhere in the decision
of the agrarian court did it rule that it had no jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, a
finding by a Court of Agrarian Relations that no tenancy relationship is involved does
not bring a case beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. In truth, the appellate
court has jurisdiction over both agrarian and non-agrarian litigation. To sustain the
petitioner's first arguments would result in most agrarian decisions favoring
landowners brought out of the reach of the Court of Appeals. It is precisely these
appeals, where the agrarian courts have ruled that no tenancy relationship exists,
which deserve full and careful consideration from the Court of Appeals (LEA PAZ
TUAZON VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTH DIVISION, ET AL., 118
SCRA 484).

Same; Same; Same; Concept of tenancy. Tenancy is not a purely factual

relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed,
and, as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied with and
are not contrary to law, are even more important (LEA PAZ TUAZON VS. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTH DIVISION, ET AL., 118 SCRA 484).
Same; Same; Same; Intention of agrarian reform program; Farmer and spouse
who themselves cultivated a riceland they inherited cannot be forced to enter into a
permanent tenancy relationship with a person who worked temporarily over the land
for 3 crop years. And finally, it was never the intent of the agrarian reform program
that a poor farmer and his wife who inherited a small farm of one and a half hectares
of riceland which they cultivated themselves must be forced to enter into a permanent
tenancy relationship with another man whom he hired temporarily simply because a
major operation forced the farmer to rest for three crop years (LEA PAZ TUAZON
VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTH DIVISION, ET AL., 118 SCRA 484).
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
Agrarian Law; Contracts; Court of Appeals; Finding of the Court of Appeals
on a question of fact whether or not petitioner voluntarily surrendered his
landholding by means of a document entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagsasauli ng Karapatan
will not generally be disturbed. We are in accord with the finding of the Court
of Appeals that the document designated as "Kasulatan ng Pagsasauli ng Karapatan"
was voluntarily executed by the petitioner. It is supported by the evidence. The issue
as to whether petitioner voluntarily surrendered the landholding is clearly factual.
Being a question of fact, it is for the Court of Appeals to decide and its findings will
not be disturbed by this Court unless clearly baseless or irrational (ROMAN
JACINTO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA 263).
Same; Voluntary surrender of landholding is one of the recognized grounds for
severance of tenancy relationship. The fact that petitioner could have exercised his
option as provided but did not do so is a potent Circumstance to show the intent of
petitioner to surrender the landholding. This notwithstanding, if petitioner had not
exercised his option, under the Code, their share tenancy relation would eventually
have ceased to be operative and become converted into leasehold, by virtue of the
afore-quoted statutory provision. There is no question that one of the means of the
extinguishment or severance of tenancy relationship is the voluntary surrender of the
landholding by the tenant. Thus, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199 permits
voluntary surrender of the landholding by a share tenant. And even in Cases of
leasehold, Section 8 of Republic Act 3844 provides as one of the causes of the
extinguishment of agricultural leasehold relation the "voluntary surrender of the
landholding by the agricultural lessee * * *." Pursuant to Section 28 of the same law,
the agricultural lessee may terminate the leasehold during the agricultural year by

voluntarily surrendering the landholding due to circumstances more advantageous to,

him and his family (ROMAN JACINTO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 87 SCRA 263).
Same; Extinguishment of tenancy relationship by means of voluntary surrender
of the landholding does not require court approval. This mode of extinguishment
or severance of the tenancy relation does not require the authorization of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, since it proceeds either from causes outside the control of the
parties or arises from the volition of the tenant, and is distinct from dispossession or
ejectment of a tenant (ROMAN JACINTO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL., 87 SCRA 263).
Same; The Tenancy Act 1199 prohibited surrender of his landholding by the
tenant to take effect in the future. Neither can he invoke the provisions of Section
49, in relation to Section 50, of Republic Act No. 1199. What Section 49 prohibits is
the stipulation by the agricultural tenant and the landowner on the date of the tenant
should leave or surrender the land in the future. Thus, it has been held that an
agreement between a tenant and a landholder whereby the former shall return his
landholding to the latter after one crop year cannot justify the tenant's dispossession
because said agreement is expressly prohibited by law. But as explained by this Court
in Datu, et al., v. Cabangon, supra, it is different if the tenant voluntarily surrenders
his landholding because the voluntary surrender of his landholding by a tenant is a
ground sanctioned by law for terminating the tenancy relationship (ROMAN
JACINTO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA 263).
Same; Fact that tenant did not immediately vacate portion of his landholding
does not make the surrender thereof by means of contract less voluntary. The fact
that petitioner did not at once vacate the other one-half portion of the landholding
after the execution of the contract does not make the stipulations thereof any less
voluntary. His continued possession of one-half of the property (until the issuance of
the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in 1967) became possible only because
he was entitled, under the terms of the contract, to harvest the "extra" crop as part of
the consideration, and once said harvest was completed, his possession became that of
a mere squatter (ROMAN JACINTO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
87 SCRA 263).
Same; P.D. 27 does not apply retroactively. In the case at bar the Court of
Appeals already rendered judgment finding that tenancy relationship between
petitioner and respondent was extinguished and said judgment was rendered prior to
the effectivity of P.D. 27 on October 21, 1972. Neither can We find merit in
petitioner's claims that with the advent of Presidential Decree No. 27, he has become
the owner of the land. Firstly, said decree applies only in favor of bona fide tenants. It
cannot be denied, however, that at the time of the promulgation of Presidential Decree
No. 27 (October 21, 1972), the Appellate Court had already rendered its judgment
finding that the tenancy relationship between petitioner and private respondent had

been extinguished. Secondly, the decree cannot operate retroactively in favor of

petitioner who had surrendered one-half of the land in July 1966 and, by virtue of a
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued by the Court of Agrarian Relations,
was dispossessed of the other half in February 1967 (ROMAN JACINTO VS. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA 263).
Same; P.D. 316 in relation to P.D. 583 prohibiting and penalizing the ejectment
of agricultural tenants do not apply to the petitioner who was no longer in possession
of the land when said Decrees took effect. Nor does Presidential Decree No. 316,
prohibiting the ejectment of tenant-tillers from their farmholdings, in relation to
Presidential Decree No. 583, prescribing penalties for the unlawful ejectment,
exclusion, removal or ouster of tenant-farmer, apply to petitioner's case. In the first
place, at the time the aforesaid decrees were promulgated, petitioner was no longer in
possession of the land. If at all, the said decrees must operate in favor of the present
tenant (ROMAN JACINTO VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 87 SCRA
263).
ABANDONMENT
Tenancy; Tenancy relationship is extinguished by tenant's abandonment of the
land; Findings of Agrarian Court, supported by substantial evidence, will not be
disturbed. A tenancy relationship is extinguished by the "abandonment of the land
by the tenant" (Sec. 9 Rep. Act 1199). Because a tenant has possession of the land
only through personal cultivation, his leaving the land amounts to his abandonment
thereof. Where the tenancy relationship was terminated by the tenant, through his own
voluntary act, he cannot invoke the protection of the principle of security of tenure.
The finding of the Court of Agrarian Relations, that the tenant abandoned the land,
will not be disturbed if it is supported by substantial evidence (SEVERINO
GAGOLA VS. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ET AL., 18 SCRA 992).
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
Remedial Law; Action; An action must be brought against the real party-ininterest or against a party which may be bound by the judgment to be reversed
therein. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every action must be
prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest. A corollary proposition to this rule
is that an action must be brought against the real-party-interest, or against a party
which may be bound by the judgment to be rendered therein (Salonga v. Warner
Barnes and Co., Ltd. Supra citing Salmon and Pacific Commercial Co., v. Tan
Cuenco, 36 Phil. 556 [1917]). The real party-in-interest is one who stands to be
benefited or be injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit
(Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800 [1989] citing Samahan ng mga
Nangungupahan sa Azcarraga Textile Market, Inc., et al., v. Court of Appeals, 165

SCRA 598 [1988]). If the suit is not brought against the real-party-interest, a motion
to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action
(ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET
AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner should have impleaded the Ministry of
Education, Culture and Sports as the party defendant. We agree with the
contentions of the private respondent. The petitioner should have impleaded the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the party-defendant for as stated in
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA 300 [1991], a
donation, as a mode of acquiring ownerhip, results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the donee and once a donation is accepted, the donee
becomes the absolute owner of the property donated (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO
VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Civil Law; Ownership; The owner has the right to dispose of a thing without
other limitations than those established by law. Under Article 428 of the New Civil
Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than
those established by law. As an incident of ownership therefore, there is nothing to
prevent a landowner from donating his naked title to the land (ESPIRIDION
TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA
652).
Same; Tenancy Law; The law explicitly provides that the leasehold relation is
not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding. As elucidated in the case of Bernardo v. Court of Appeals (168 SCRA
439 [1988]), security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they
value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation
of their only means of livelihood. Also, under Section 10 of the same Act, the law
explicitly provides that the leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or
transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. The only instances when the
agricultural leasehold relationship is extinguished are found in Section 8, 28 and 36 of
the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines. The donation of the land did not
terminate the tenancy relationship. However, the donation itself is valid
(ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET
AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Same; Same; Court rules that the Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports as the new owner cannot oust the petitioner from the subject riceland and build
a public high school thereon until after there is payment of the disturbance
compensation in accordance with Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended.
Considering that the tenant in the case at bar is willing to accept payment of
disturbance compensation in exchange for his right to cultivate the landholding in
question, the real issue is who should pay the compensation. We rule that the Ministry
of Education, Culture and Sports as the new owner cannot oust the petitioner from the

subject riceland and build a public high school thereon until after there is payment of
the disturbance compensation in accordance with Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as
amended (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court is of the opinion and so hold that the trial
court correctly dismissed the complaint for payment of disturbance compensation
because the private respondent is not the real party-in-interest. In view of the
foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that the trial court correctly dismissed
the complaint for payment of disturbance compensation because the private
respondent is not the real party-in-interest. And having arrived at this conclusion, we
do not deem it necessary to pass upon the other errors assigned by the petitioner for as
stated in Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 485 [1990]), a
person who was not impleaded in the complaint could not be bound by the decision
rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a
stranger. The remedy then of the petitioner is to claim his disturbance compensation
from the new owner or whatever agency, local or national, is in a position to for it
(ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET
AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Actions; Res Judicata; Justice and Equity of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the
rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, the Supreme
Court is empowered to suspend its operation. Petitioners raised before the
respondent court that inasmuch as the judgment award in favor of the La Torre
spouses had already been fully satisfied when the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
21846 was sold to them as the highest bidder in the execution sale, the La Torre
spouses no longer have any right to levy upon TCT No. 60152 registered in the name
of the Buan spouses. Regrettably, respondent court did not pass upon this issue. It
implied, however, that the issue is no longer a tenable subject for resolution inasmuch
as the Court of Appeals' decision in C.A.-G.R. No. 14768 from which the order of
execution stemmed had already become final and executory, and as such, is already
beyond question. . . . Taken in this light, the respondent court apparently did not err in
leaving the issue unresolved, a final decision being unreviewable and conclusive. But
judging from the facts presented by the present case, it beyond doubt that serious
injustice will be committed if strict adherence to procedural rules were to be followed.
It should be remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules would
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial injustice, this Court is empowered to
suspend its operation. . . . . In the present appeal, rather than dismissing the issue of
overpayment as not within the scope of the power to review, this Court deems it best
to decide the same on the merits (SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA
BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 424).

Same; Writs of Execution; A writ of execution should conform to the

dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed. It is axiomatic that a writ
of execution in any case should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision
sought to be executed (Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 156 SCRA 740 [1987]), such that where the judgment is for a sum of
money, the writ of must state the exact amount thereof (Zamora vs. Medran, 90
Phil. 339 [1951]; SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA BUAN VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 424).
Same; Same; Where two parcels of land are levied upon pursuant to a writ of
execution and the proceeds from the sale of one satisfies in parcel of land should be
cancelled. In the civil action for a sum of money between the La Torre spouses and
G.L. Mejia Enterprises, Inc., the judgment award in favor of the former amounted to a
total sum of P20,729.00 exclusive of legal interest. It is undisputed that pursuant to
the writ of execution issued by the court, two parcels of land then registered in the
name of the judgment debtor were levied upon, the first one covered by TCT No.
21846 having been sold at the auction sale to the La Torre spouses themselves for
P33,958.54. It is therefore mathematically conclusive that by reason of this sale, the
judgment award in favor of the La Torre spouses in the total sum of P20,729.00 had
already been satisfied in full. Correspondingly, the notice of levy annotated on the
other parcel of land now covered by TCT No. 60152 should have been cancelled
(SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 424).
Same; Same; The levy and execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the
original judgment award. However, instead of cancelling the annotation, the La
Torre spouses pursued the execution of the remaining property levied upon despite the
apparent satisfaction of the judgment debt. This property was by then already
registered in the name of the Buan spouses who resisted the attempted execution. It is
beyond question that as per the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter, the
levy and attempted execution of the second parcel of land is void for being in excess
and beyond the original judgment award granted in favor of the La Torre spouses. For,
as this Court held in the case of Mutual Security of Insurance Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals (153 SCRA 678 [1987], "where the writ of execution is not in harmony
with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the writ has pro tanto no validity"
(italics supplied). Stated categorically, an execution has been regarded as void when
issued for a greater sum than is warranted by the judgment (Windor Steel
Manufacturing Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 275 [1981]; SPOUSES
LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
235 SCRA 424).
Same; Same; Writs of execution cannot be equated with judgments which are
final and conclusive. At this point, it is proper to emphasize that writs of execution
cannot be equated with judgments which are final and conclusive (Manila Trading &
Supply Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 28 SCRA 1033 [1969], such that although the

decision of the lower court in the action for a sum of money is conclusive, the part of
the writ issued which went beyond the money award is not valid at all (SPOUSES
LORENZITO BUAN and AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
235 SCRA 424).
Same; Same; Unjust Enrichment; The judgment creditors having received what
is due them, should not seek nor be granted anything more, not even by a final and
executory judgment, for to do so would be to sanction unjust enrichment. On the
basis of the foregoing, it is quite clear that the levy on TCT No. 60152 is invalid and
should be cancelled accordingly. Not only is it the legal and moral direction that
should be taken, but the just and equitable solution as well to this long-standing
controversy. If the La Torre spouses were allowed to take the property covered by
TCT No. 60152 on the basis of an excessive levy, they would be unjustly enriched at
the expense of the Buan spouses. That the La Torre spouses were able to sell the
property which they bought at the auction sale for P280,000.00 to the David spouses,
which fact is undisputed, is already beside the point. What matters is that the judicial
award of P20,729.00 has already been fully satisfied. The La Torre spouses having
received what is due them, should not seek nor be granted anything more, not even by
a final and executory judgment. To do so would be to sanction unjust enrichment and
cause unlawful deprivation to the Buan spouses (SPOUSES LORENZITO BUAN
and AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 424).
Same; Courts; Injunction; Trial courts have no power to interfere by injunction
with the orders or judgment issued by another court of concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction. With respect to the preliminary injunction set aside by the respondent
court, the statute books are replete with jurisprudence to the effect that trial courts
have no power to interfere by injunction with the orders or judgments issued by
another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction (Republic vs. Reyes, 155 SCRA
313 [1987]; Mariano vs. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 59 [1989]; Prudential Bank vs.
Gapultos, 181 SCRA 159 [1990]). As applied to the present case, it would appear that
Branch 56 of the RTC of Angeles City has no power nor authority to enjoin the order
of execution issued by Branch 58 of the same court (SPOUSES LORENZITO
BUAN and AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA
424).
Same; Same; Same; Judgments; Where the Court of Appeals set aside only the
preliminary injunction, missing the fact that a permanent injunction was also issued
by the lower court, logic dictates that the Court of Appeals' decision also intended the
inclusion of the permanent injunction; A judgment is not so confined to what appears
on the face of the decision but also those necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto. It appears however that the respondent court missed altogether the fact that
a permanent injunction was issued by the lower court (Branch 56) in its decision
dated August 8, 1990 such that it set aside only the preliminary injunction earlier
issued. Logic dictates however that owing to the nature of the order being set aside, it
is a necessary consequence that the Court of Appeals' decision also intended the

inclusion of the permanent injunction in its questioned resolution. For if not, the
appellate court would be rendering for naught its own reversal of the May 8, 1990
Order. Besides, although the decision of the respondent court did not so state explicit
terms, it is beyond cavil that a judgment is not so confined to what appears on the face
of the decision but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto
(Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 595 [1992]; SPOUSES LORENZITO
BUAN and AMELIA BUAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA
424).
RES JUDICATA TO A NON-PARTY TO A CASE
Civil Procedure; Res Judicata. The case at bench presents an exceptional
instance where an inflexible application of the doctrine of res juridicata will not serve
ours constitutional policy favoring fairness, the heart of due process. Petitioner was
not a party in Civil Case No. 3022 and was not given any chance to contest the claim
of Guerero. Her children, then in the United States, were the ones sued. They failed to
answer, and were declared in default. Thus, the late Clemente Guerrero, husband of
private respondent, obtained a favorable judgment by default from the trial court
pursuant to which he was given the right of preemption over the contested lots.
Petitioner attempted to intervene in the case but unfortunately, her motion for
intervention was denied. The late Guerero, therefore, prevailed primarily because his
claim was not disputed. In contrast was the result in Civil Case No. 3023 where
Guerero claimed the same right of preemption against the other children of petitioner.
In this case, however, one of the children of petitioner sued by Guerero, was in the
Philippines and he answered the Complaint. The case was tried on its merits and the
trial court dismissed the Complaint of Guerrero. It found that the right of preemption
of Guerrero was not yet in esse (ISIDORA SALUD VS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 384).
Same; Same; Doctrine of res judicata is a rule of justice and cannot be rigidly
applied where it will result in injustice. The difference in the results of Civil Case
No. 3022 and 3023 accentuates the necessity not to give res judicata effect to the
default judgment in Civil Case No. 3022 where petitioner was a non-party. The
demands of due process present a weightier consideration than the need to bring an
end to the parties' litigation. For more important than the need to write finis to
litigation is to finish it justly, and there can be not justice that satisfies unless the
litigants are given the opportunity to be heard. The constitutional right to due process
of petitioner cannot be defeated by the argument that petitioner is a privy of her
children in Civil Case No. 3022, and hence is bound by its judgment. x x x Petitioner
does not fall in any of the above categories. She is not a successor-in-interest of her
children in Civil Case No. 3022. Petitioner's children were not sued in Civil Case No.
3022 in a representative capacity. It is also clear that petitioner did not control or
participate in Civil Case No. 3022 for her motion to intervene was denied. Petitioner's

interest, therefore, was not at all represented in Civil Case No. 3022 where judgment
was obtained by default. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule of justice and cannot be
rigidly applied where it will result in injustice (ISIDORA SALUD VS. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 384).
Actions; Ejectment; Judgments in ejectment cases are immediately executory;
Requisites to stay the execution of judgments in ejectment cases. Judgments in
ejectment cases which are favorable to the plaintiff are immediately executory. They
can be stayed by the defendant only by: a) perfecting an appeal; b) filing a
supersedeas bond; and c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property during the pendency of the
appeal. These requisites must concur. Thus, even if the defendant had appealed and
filed a supersedeas bond but failed to pay the accruing rentals, the appellate court
could, upon motion of the plaintiff with notice to the defendant, and upon proof of
such failure, order the immediate execution of the appealed decision without
prejudice to the appeal taking its course. Such deposit, like the supersedeas bond, is a
mandatory requirement; hence, if is not complied with, execution will issue as a
matter of right. The only exceptions are the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence which prevented the defendant from making the monthly
deposit, or the occurrence of supervening events which have brought about a material
change in the situation of the parties and would make the execution inequitable
(CATALINO SAN PEDRO, ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235
SCRA 145).
Same; Same; Pendency of an action questioning the ownership of property will
not abate ejectment suits or bar the execution of the judgments therein. Firmly
settled is the rule that the pendency of an action questioning the ownership of
property will not abate ejectment suits or bar the execution of the judgment suit
involves only the issue of material possession or possession de facto while an action
for annulment of title, such as the case at bar, involves the question of ownership.
There may be identity of parties and subject matter but not of the cause of action or
the relief prayed for (CATALINO SAN PEDRO, ET AL., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 145).
Same; Same; Certiorari; In a petition for certiorari, the court must confine itself
to the issue of whether or not the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction
or committed grave abuse of discretion. The instant petition being one for
certiorari, this Court must confine itself to the issue of whether or not the respondent
court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City authorizing the
execution of the decision in the ejectment suit is still pending with the Regional Trial
Court. The question of whether or not the action for unlawful detainer was the proper
remedy of the private respondent should be addressed in that appeal, not in this
certiorari proceeding (CATALINO SAN PEDRO, ET AL., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 145).

VOID CONTRACTS CANNOT BE RATIFIED

Civil Law; Contracts; Void contracts cannot be ratified. In this light, the
reliance of the petitioners on the sketch of July 9, 1961 signed by private respondent
Jose Seradilla allegedly confirming the Consolidation and Partition Agreement dated
November 6, 1959 is hardly of any moment. As Article 1409 of the Civil Code, op.
Cit., expressly states that void contracts cannot be ratified. Needless to state, the July
5, 1963 Agreement of the heirs of Patricio Seradilla revoking the void Consolidation
and Partition Agreement dated November 6, 1959 cannot be faulted (HEIRS OF
LEANDRO OLIVER, REPRESENTED BY PURITA OLIVER and PEDRO
REMOQUILLO VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., 234
SCRA 367).
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Petition for Review; Jurisprudence forbids
entertaining questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Obviously, petitioners are grasping on questions of fact in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule finds
stronger application in the petition at bench considering that it involves facts
established in administrative proceedings and confirmed by both trial court and the
respondent court (HEIRS OF LEANDRO OLIVER, REPRESENTED BY
PURITA OLIVER and PEDRO REMOQUILLO VS. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., 234 SCRA 367).
NATURAL RESOURCES; LAND REGISTRATION; CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE
Natural Resources; Land Registration; Confirmation of Imperfect Title; It
matters not whether the vendee/application has been in possession of the subject
property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for
confirmation of title has been complied by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period
being tacked to his possession. It must be noted that with respect to possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the law
employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his predecessorin-interest." Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession
of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements
for confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the
said period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessor-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does
not deny this except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of
the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required length
of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by private
respondents through their predecessor-in-interest, who in turn, have been in open,

continued possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes
of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights
necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title
(REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
235 SCRA 567).
Same; Same; Same; Occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an
applicant and his predecessor-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate
the land from the mass of public land. Subsequent cases have hewed to the above
pronouncement such that open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30
years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to private property (Director
of Land v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]. This
means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his
predecessor-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from
the mass of public land (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993];
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
235 SCRA 567).
Same; Same; Same; Torrens System; When the conditions set by law are
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a
grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued;
The Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to
private land, as it merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. The Public
Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public
land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v.
Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions set by law are complied with, the
possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power
Corporation c. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain
and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. In other words,
the Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to
private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely
confirms, but does not confer ownership (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 567).
Same; Same; Same; The Constitution allows natural-born citizens who have
lost their Philippine citizenship to acquire private lands; BP 185 governs the
disposition of private lands in favor of natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
their Philippine citizenship. But what should not be missed in the disposition of
this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register
the contested parcels of land in their favor. Section 7 and 8 of Article XII of the
Constitution contain the pertinent provisions. Section 8 is similar to Section 15,
Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution. Pursuant thereto, B.P. 185 was passed into
law. From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has

been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition
of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine
citizenship remains to be BP 185 (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 567).
Same; Same; Same; A foreign national may apply for registration of title over a
parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines
from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the law.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied
for registration of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were
already private lands; consequently there could be no legal impediment for the
registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The
parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They
are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under
claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his maximum area of 1,000 sq. m.,
if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence
(BP 185). It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were
natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition
of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no
longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in
question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born
citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the
Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite
period and character of possession of their predecessor-in-interest over the subject
lots, their application for registration of title must be approved (REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 567).
Same; Same; Same; The requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 are primarily
directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be
submitted. The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do
not apply in the instant case since said requirements are primarily directed to the
register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in
the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the requirements must likewise be
submitted before the land registration court prior to the approval of an application for
registration of title. An application for registration of title before a land registration
court should not be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register
of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the
application for registration has become final that a decree of registration is issued.
And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6 BP 185, before the register of
deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This decree of registration is the one
that is submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of

title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the
register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration
of title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued (REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 235 SCRA 567).
TITLE VENUE
Actions; Civil Procedure; Venue; Where the language used in the contract
clearly evinces the parties' intent to limit the venue of all suits between them, this
means a waiver of their right to institute action in the courts provided for in Rule 4,
sec. 2(b). In the case at bar it is clear from the parties' contract that the venue of
any action which they might bring are the courts of competent jurisdiction in Pasay
City, whether the action is for "breach [of the lease agreement] or damages or any
other cause between the LESSOR and LESSEE and persons claiming under each."
The language used leaves no room for interpretation. It clearly evinces the parties'
intent to limit to the "courts of appropriate jurisdiction of Pasay City" the venue of all
suits between the lessor and lessee and those between parties claiming under them.
This means a waiver of their right to institute action in the courts provided for in Rule
4, sec 2(b) (VIRGILIO B. GESMUNDO, ET AL., VS. JRB REALTY
CORPORATION, ET AL., 234 SCRA 153).
Same; Same; Same; By laying in Pasay City the venue for all suits, the parties
made it plain that in no other place may they bring suit against each other. This
case, therefore, differs from the cases cited by petitioner. It is true that in Polytrade
Corporation v. Blanco, a stipulation that "The parties agree to sue and be sued in the
City of Manila" was held to merely provide an additional forum in the absence of any
qualifying or restrictive words. But here, by laying in Pasay City the venue for all
suits, the parties made it plain that in no other place may they bring suit against each
other for "breach [of their lease contract] or damages or any other cause between
[them] and persons claiming under each [of them]" (VIRGILIO B. GESMUNDO,
ET AL., VS. JRB REALTY CORPORATION, ET AL., 234 SCRA 153).
Same; Same; Same; It is irrelevant that neither party resides in Pasay City
since parties do stipulate concerning the venue of an action without regard to their
residence. Petitioners contend that neither they nor the private respondent Jaime
Blanco reside in Pasay City. This fact is, however, irrelevant to the resolution of the
issue in this case since parties do stipulate concerning the venue of an action shall be
in the City of Manila. It was held that it was reasonable to infer that the parties
intended to fix the venue of their action, in connection with the contract sued upon, in
the proper court of the City of Manila only, notwithstanding that neither one was a
resident of Manila (VIRGILIO B. GESMUNDO, ET AL., VS. JRB REALTY
CORPORATION, ET AL., 234 SCRA 153).
Same; Same; Same; Parties; Inclusion of the spouses of lessee and the
President of the lessor is not necessary in action based on an alleged breach of lease

contract. It is nonetheless contended that the stipulation as to venue is inapplicable

because (1) only one of the petitioners (Virgilio B. Gesmundo) and only one of the
private respondents (JRB Realty) are parties to the lease contract and (2) their cause
of action is not based on the lease contract. The contention is without merit. Petitioner
Edna C. Gesmundo is the wife of the lessee Virgilio B. Gesmundo, while Jaime R.
Blanco is the president of the lessor JRB Realty Corporation. Their inclusion in this
case is not necessary. What is more, as already noted, by its terms the stipulation
applies not only to the parties to the contract but to "any persons claiming under each"
(VIRGILIO B. GESMUNDO, ET AL., VS. JRB REALTY CORPORATION, ET
AL., 234 SCRA 153).
Same; Same; Same; Technicalities and Procedural Rules; Procedural rules are
not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have
resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights since, like all rules, they are
required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they be
relaxed. Nor is there any warrant for petitioners' view that a motion to dismiss on
the ground of improper venue is based on a "mere technicality" which "does not even
pretend to invoke justice " and, therefore, must not be sustained. As we have in other
cases held, "procedural rules are not be belittled or dismissed simply because their
non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all
rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons
when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed."
Here what is involved is no less than the parties' agreement to limit the venue of any
action between them and those claiming under them the contract. Petitioners must
abide by that agreement (VIRGILIO B. GESMUNDO, ET AL., VS. JRB REALTY
CORPORATION, ET AL., 234 SCRA 153).
Civil Procedure; Default; Affidavit of Merit; Grounds for a motion for new
trial. We agree that the verified motion of petitioner could be considered as a
motion for new trial. The grounds alleged by petitioner in his motion are the same as
the grounds for a motion for new trial under Rule 37, which are (1) that petitioner's
failure to file his answer was due to fraud, mistake, accident or excusable negligence;
and (2) that he has a meritorious defense. Petitioner explained that upon receiving the
summons, he immediately saw private respondent and confronted him with the receipt
evidencing his payment. Thereupon, private respondent assured him that he would
instruct his lawyer to withdraw the complaint. The prior payment of the loan sought to
be collected by private respondent is good defense to the complaint to collect the
same loan again. The only reason why respondent court did not consider the motion
of petitioner as a motion for new trial was because the said motion did not include an
affidavit of merit. The allegations contained in an affidavit of merit required to be
attached to a motion to lift an order of default or for a new trial need not be embodied
in a separate document but may be incorporated in the petitioner itself. As held in
Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975): "Stated otherwise, when a motion to lift an

order of default contains the reasons for the failure to answer as well as the facts
constituting the prospective defense of the defendant and it is sworn to by said
defendant, neither a formal verification or a separate affidavit of merit is necessary"
(AUGUSTO CAPUZ VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 471).
Same; Same; Same; Appeal; Remedy against an order of default. Speaking
for the Court in Circle Financial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 166
(1991), Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa opined that the affidavit of merit may either
be drawn up as a separate document and appended to the motion for new trial or the
facts which should otherwise be set out in said separate document may, with equal
effect, be alleged in the verified motion itself. Respondent court erred when it held
that petitioner should have appealed from the decision, instead of filing the motion to
lift the order of default, because he still had two days left within which to appeal
when he filed the said motion. Said court must have in mind paragraph 3 of Section 2,
Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that: "a party who has been
declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment rendered against him as
contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for relief to set aside the
order of default has been presented by him in accordance with Rule 38". Petitioner
property availed of the remedy provided for in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court because the appeal under Section 2, Rule 41 was not, under the
circumstances, a "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
In an appeal under Section 2, Rule 41, the party in default can only question in the
light of the evidence on record. In other words, he cannot adduce his own evidence,
like the receipt to prove payment by petitioner herein of his obligation to private
respondent (AUGUSTO CAPUZ VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233
SCRA 471).
Civil Procedure; Judgments; Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
considered final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme
Court; Exception in the present case since the findings of the Court of Appeals is
contrary to that of the trial court. The question in the case at bench is one of fact:
whether or not, based on the evidence submitted, respondent appellate court erred in
concluding that both decedent's Last Will and Testament, and it is Codicil were
subscribed by the instrumental witnesses in separate occasions. As a general rule,
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are considered final and conclusive, and
cannot be reviewed on appeal to this court. In the present instance, however, there is
reason to make an exception to that rule, since the finding of the respondent court is
contrary to that of the trial court, viz: ". . . (Private respondents) pointed out however,
that the assertions of the petitioner's witnesses are rife with contradictions,
particularly the fact that the latter's signatures on the documents in issue appear to
have been written in ballpens of different colors contrary to the statements of said
witnesses that all of them signed with only one ballpen. The implication is that the
subscribing witnesses to the Will and Codicil, and the testatrix did not simultaneously
sign each of the documents in one sitting but did it piecemeal a violation of Art.

805 of the Code. This conclusion of the (private respondents) is purely circumstantial.
From instance, considering the time interval that elapsed between the making of the
Will and Codicil, and up to the filing of the petition for probate, the possibility is not
remote that one or two of the attesting witnesses may have forgotten certain details
that transpired when they attested the documents in question. . . . " (Rollo, pp. 36-37.)
A review of the facts and circumstances upon which respondent Court of Appeals
based its impugned finding, however, fails to convince us that the testamentary
documents in question were subscribed and attested by the instrumental witnesses
during a single occasion (CLEMENTE CALDE VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL., 233 SCRA 376).
Civil Law; Succession; Forms of Wills; Evidence; Contradiction between the
autoptic preference and the testimonial evidence. As sharply noted by respondent
appellate court, the signatures of some attesting witnesses in decedent's will and its
codicil were written in blue ink, while the others were in black. This discrepancy was
not explained by petitioner. Nobody of his six (6) witnesses testified that two pens
were used by the signatories on the two documents. In fact, two (2) of petitioner's
witnesses even testified that only one (1) ballpen was used in signing the two
testamentary documents. It is accepted that there are three sources from which a
tribunal may properly acquire knowledge for making its decision, namely:
circumstantial evidence, testimonial evidence, and real evidence or autoptic
proference. . . . In the case at bench, the autoptic proference contradicts the
testimonial evidence produced by petitioner. The will and its codicil, upon inspection
by the respondent court, show in black and white or more accurately, in black and
blue that more than one pen was used by the signatories thereto. Thus, it was not
erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to disbelieve petitioner's claim that both
testamentary documents in question were subscribed to in accordance with the
provisions of Art. 805 of the Civil Code. Neither did respondent court err when it did
not accord great weight to the testimony of Judge Tomas A. Tolete. It is true that his
testimony contains a narration of how the two testamentary documents were
subscribed and attested to, starting from decedent's thumbmark thereof, to the alleged
signing of the instrumental witnesses thereto in consecutive order. Nonetheless,
nowhere in Judge Tolete's testimony is there any kind of explanation for the differentcolored signatures on the testaments (CLEMENTE CALDE VS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 376).
Ejectment; Damages; Forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only
damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the leased property and not the damages which may
have been suffered but which have no direct relation to the loss of material
possession. The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the
only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is
that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful

possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the
plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the
use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which the he may have
suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession
(TEODORO ARAOS, ET AL., VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 232
SCRA 770).
Same; Same; Although the Rent Control Law allows unilateral increases in
rentals by the lessor within the period and the maximum rates provided therein, still
the demand for such increase must be made upon the lessee himself since the courts
have no authority to fix the same for the parties where no valid demand for an
increased rent has been made by the lessor. It should be borne in mind that
although the rent control laws allow unilateral increases in rentals by the lessor within
the period and the maximum rates provided therein, still the demand for such increase
must be made upon the lessee himself. The courts have authority to fix the same for
the parties where no valid demand for an increased rent has been by the lessor. Hence,
in the case of Orlino vs. Court of Appeals, we reversed the MTC's award of increase
in rental in accordance with Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 877, after finding that the award
was merely based on the prayer in the complaint, although no previous demand was
made on the defendant-lessee. In the present case, the demand letters to vacate sent to
the petitioners only mentioned the purchase of the apartment units by the private
respondent. Nothing in the record shows that there were prior disputes on the rentals
or that there was a demand for increased rentals made by the private respondent or its
predecessor on the petitioners. Hence, the MeTC did not have the authority to decree
the increase in rental rates (TEODORO ARAOS, ET AL., VS. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 232 SCRA770).
Agrarian Reform; Tenancy Relationship; Evidence Required in Agrarian
Cases; "Substantial evidence" Defined; In agrarian cases, all that is required is mere
substantial evidence; Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant
evidence, it refers to such relevant evidence as a reasonable man might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. In the case of Bagsican v. Court of Appeals (141
SCRA 226, 229-230, January 30, 1986), we hold in no uncertain terms that: ". . . in
agrarian cases, all that is required is mere substantial evidence'. That has been the
consistent ruling of this Court in a long line of cases (Ulpiendo v. CAR, L-13891, Oct.
31, 1960; Villaviza v. Panganiban, 10 SCRA 824; Gagola v. CAR, 18 SCRA 992;
Beltran v. Cruz, 25 SCRA 607). This substantial evidence rule was later incorporated
in P.D. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976 and has been expressly made
applicable to agrarian cases. . . . Substantial evidence does not necessarily import
preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil case. It has been defined to
be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on
record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own
judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of

evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief (Picardal v. Lladas, supra;

ANTONIO J. CASTRO VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 169 SCRA
383).
Agrarian Law; Tenant, defined; Agricultural tenancy, defined. Under
Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 1199, a tenant is "a person who by himself, or with the aid
available from within his immediate household, cultivates the land belonging to or
possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing the
produce with the landholder or for a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in
money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system" (Matienzo vs. Servidad, 107
SCRA 276). Agricultural tenancy is defined as "the physical possession by a person of
land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the
purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his
immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the
harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable; whether in produce or
in money, or both" (Sec. 3, R.A. No. 1199; 50 O.G. 4655-56; Miguel Carag vs. CA,
et al., 151 SCRA 44; VICTORIANO ZAMORAS VS. ROQUE SU, JR., ANITA
SU HORTELLANO and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
189 SCRA 248).
Same; Same; Same; Requisites of tenancy relationship. The essential
requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landholder and the
tenant; (2) the subject is the agricultural holding; (3) there is consent between the
parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by
the tenant; and (6) there is sharing of harvests between landholder and tenant
(Antonio Castro vs. CA and De la Cruz, G.R. L-34613, January 26, 1989;
Tiongson vs. CA, 130 SCRA 482; Guerrero vs. CA, SCRA 138; VICTORIANO
ZAMORAS VS. ROQUE SU, JR., ANITA SU HORTELLANO and NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 189 SCRA 248).
Same; Same; Same; Elements of personal cultivation. The element of
personal cultivation of the land, or with the aid of his farm household, essential in
establishing a landlord-tenant or lessor-lessee relationship, is absent in the
relationship between Su and Zamoras (Co vs. IAC, 162 SCRA 390; Graza vs. CA,
163 SCRA 39), for Zamoras did not cultivate any part of Su's plantation either by
himself or with the help of his household (VICTORIANO ZAMORAS VS.
ROQUE SU, JR., ANITA SU HORTELLANO and NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, 189 SCRA 248).
Same; NLRC, Jurisdiction; It is the NLRC, not the Court of Agrarian
Relations, that has jurisdiction to try and decide Zamoras' complaint for illegal
dismissal. Since Zamoras was an employee, not a tenant of Su, it is the NLRC, not
the Court of Agrarian Relations, that has jurisdiction to try and decide Zamoras'
complaint for illegal dismissal (Art. 217, Labor Code; Manila Mandarin
Employees Union vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 368; Jacqueline Industries Dunhill Bags

Industries, et al., vs. NLRC, et al., 69 SCRA 242; VICTORIANO ZAMORAS

VS. ROQUE SU, JR., ANITA SU HORTELLANO and NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, 189 SCRA 248).
Civil law; Lease; Agricultural Tenancy Act; Civil law lease distinguished from
agricultural tenancy. There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy
and civil law lease. The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural
land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and
cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate
the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or
work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted
to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful
pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code,
whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS.
EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 38 SCRA 391).
Agricultural Tenancy Act; A fishpond is an agricultural land. There is no
doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the
Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically mentions
fishpond and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. Thus Section 46 ( c) of
said Act provides that "the consideration for the use of sugar lands, fishponds,
saltbeds and of lands devoted to the raising of livestock shall be governed by
stipulation between the parties." This Court has already ruled that "land in which fish
is produced is classified as agricultural land" (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS.
EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 38 SCRA 391).
Same; Words and phrases; Meaning of phrase "immediate farm household."
Only the members of the family of the tenant and such other persons, whether related
to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help
him to operate the farm enterprise are included in the term "immediate farm
household" (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 38 SCRA
391).
Same; To fall under the Agricultural Tenancy Act, land must be worked by
tenant or immediate farm household. The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and
his immediate family to work the land. Thus Section 5 (a) of Republic Act 1199, as
amended, defines a "tenant" as a person who, himself and with the aid available from
within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed
by, another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production sharing the produce
with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a
price certain in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
Section 8 of the same Act limit the relation of landholder and tenant to the person who
furnishes the land and to the person who actually works the land himself with the aid
of labor available from within his immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the
same Act requires for the existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his

immediate farm household work the land (TRINIDAD GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO
PANGILINAN, 38 SCRA 391).
Same; A person who hires others to do work ceases to be a tenant. A person,
in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his
immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually
work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he pays
for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having
abandoned, the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act
1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one (TRINIDAD
GABRIEL VS. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, 38 SCRA 391).
NOTARIAL LAW
Evidence; Notarial Law; When the evidence as to the validity or nullity of a
notarial document is conflicting, the document should be upheld in the absence of a
clear, strong and convincing evidence showing such falsity. We are in full
conformity with appellate court's reversal of the trial court's decision. The disputed
deeds of sale, namely: (a) "Bilihang Tuluyan" dated 29 July 1963 between petitioner
Erlinda and respondent Eusebio; (b) "Bilihang ng Lupa na Walang Titulo" dated 26
October 1966 between respondents Eusebio and Renato; and (c ) "Kasulatan ng
Bilihang Tuluyan" dated 17 July 1967 between respondents Renato and spouses de
Guzman, were all duly notarized. In this connection, we have held that when the
evidence as to the validity or nullity of a notarial document is conflicting, in the
absence of a clear, strong and convincing evidence showing such falsity, the
document should be upheld (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Same; Contracts; Rescission; The remedy of rescission only applies to
contracts validly agreed upon by the parties in the cases established by law.
Petitioners sought rescission of those documents on two grounds: first, Erlinda "never
executed nor signed any document or any deed of sale whatsoever transferring or
selling her share on the real property . . . to defendants or to any person for that
matter," second, she was still a minor at the time she allegedly executed the deed of
sale in favor of respondent Eusebio. It should be pointed out that petitioners' prayer
for rescission is erroneous because this remedy only applies to contracts validly
agreed upon by the parties in the cases established by law. Anyway, the error appears
to concern terminology only because petitioners are actually assailing the validity of
said documents (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Same; Same; Forgeries; An accurate examination to determine forgery should
dwell on both the differences and similarities in the questioned signatures. The trial
court resolved the first ground in this wise: ". . . on close observation, the signature of
Erlinda appearing on the alleged Deed of Sale to Eusebio, which of course denied, is

very different from her signature appearing in the verification of her complaint in the
instant case, and even in the Deed of Sale from Alberto Causapin to the de Guzmans
which Erlinda signed as Administratrix." This is a loose end which the lower court
failed to settle. An accurate examination to determine forgery should dwell on both
the differences and similarities in the questioned signatures (ERLINDA B.
CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Same; Same; Same; The passage of time and a person's increase in age may
have decisive influences in his writing characteristics, thus, in order to bring about an
accurate comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison must be as close as
possible in point of time to the suspected signature. A comparison of Erlinda's
signature in the "Bilihang Tuluyan" with her signatures on the other documents
reveals that the slight differences in strokes are overshadowed by the significant
similarities. These similarities suffice to convince us that the signature of petitioner
Erlinda on the deed of sale between her and respondent Eusebio in genuine; a fortiori,
the deed of sale between them is valid. Moreover, it is highly noticeable that the
signatures of Erlinda that were analyzed by the trial court are on documents executed
several years apart, to wit, 29 July 1963, 17 August 1967 and 20 June 1986. The
passage of time and a person's increase in age may have decisive influences in his
writing characteristics. Thus, authorities are of the opinion that in order to bring about
an accurate comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison must be as close as
possible in point of time to be suspected signature (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET
AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Contracts; Action for Annulment of Contracts; Prescription; An action for
annulment of a contract entered into by minors or other incapacitated persons shall be
brought within four years from the time the guardianship ceases. As regards the
second ground, Art. 1391 of the Civil Code is specific that the action for annulment of
a contract entered into by minors or other incapacitated persons shall be brought
within four years from the time the guardianship ceases. Conformably with this
provision, Erlinda should have filed a complaint for annulment within four (4) years
from 1966 when she turned 21. Her claim of minority has undoubtedly prescribed
when the complaint was filed in 1986 (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Same; Same; Land Titles; Public Lands; Homestead; Sec. 101 of the Public
Land Act vests in the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead the authority
to institute the action on behalf of the Republic for cancellation of title and for
reversion of the homestead to the Government. Furthermore, petitioners' action for
the cancellation of OCT No. P-1796 was not property was a public land. We have held
in a multitude of cases, among which are Lopez v. Padilla and Maximo v. CFI of
Capiz, that Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act vests only in the Solicitor General or the
officer acting in his stead the authority to institute the action on behalf of the Republic
for cancellation of title and for reversion of the homestead to the Government. A
recognized exception is that situation where plaintiff-claimant seeks direct

reconveyance from defendant public land unlawfully and in breach of trust titled by
him, on the principle of enforcement of a constructive trust, but such principle is in no
way applicable nor even invoked in this case (ERLINDA B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL.,
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An original certificate of title issued on the
strength of a homestead patent is equivalent to a certificate issued in a judicial
proceeding and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible after one year from the
date of issuance thereof. In addition, an original certificate of title issued on the
strength of a homestead patent is equivalent to a certificate issued in a judicial
proceeding and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible after one (1) year from the
date of issuance thereof; in this case, one year from 28 April 1977. The exception is
where an action for the cancellation of a patent and the certificate of title pursuant
thereto is instituted on the ground that they are void because the Bureau of Land had
no jurisdiction to issue them at all, the land in question having been withdrawn from
the public domain prior to the subsequent award of the patent and the grant of a
certificate of title to another person, which does not obtain in this case (ERLINDA B.
CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Equity; Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice outside legality," is
applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of
procedure. As aforestated, the trial court granted relief to petitioner Erlinda based
on equity since it found that respondent-spouses de Guzman acted in bad faith when
they acquired the land. Equity, which has been aptly described as "a justice outside
legality," is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
rules of procedure. The pertinent positive rules being present here, they should preempt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. Besides,
respondent-spouses de Guzman did not act in bad faith because there was no evidence
of impropriety in the sale made by respondent Renato Manalo to them (ERLINDA B.
CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 615).
Remedial Law; Entry of Judgment; In civil and criminal cases, unless a motion
for reconsideration is filed or an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court, judgments and
final resolutions of the Court of Appeals shall be entered upon the expiration of
fifteen (15) days after notice to the parties. Rule 11 of the Revised Internal Rules
of the Court of Appeals provides guidelines to be observed by the Division Clerks of
Court and the Archives Section in entry of judgments and remand of the records.
Section 5 thereof provides that after promulgation of the decision or final resolution,
it shall be the study of the Division Clerks of Court to see to it that the entry of
judgment is made in due time without undue delay. As to when final judgments and
resolutions should be entered, Sec. 1 provides the general rule that in civil and
criminal cases, unless a motion for reconsideration is filed or an appeal is taken to the
Supreme Court, judgments and final resolutions of the Court of Appeals shall be
entered upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days after notice to the parties (ERLINDA
B. CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 128).

Same; Same; Same; The Division Clerks of Court shall determine the finality
of the decision by making allowance for delay of the mails. However, Sec. 6
requires that in making entries of judgments, the Division Clerks of Court shall
determine the finality of the decision by making allowance for delay of the mails,
computed from the last day of the period of appeal from the decision or final
resolution, as follows: forty five days, if the addressee is from Luzon, except Metro
Manila; and ten days if the addressee is from Metro Manila (ERLINDA B.
CAUSAPIN, ET AL., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 128).
APPEAL DISMISSED BECAUSE OF ABSENCE OF APPELLANT BRIEF
Remedial Law; Appeals; Appeal correctly dismissed when no appellant's brief
was filed. As Navarro filed only a notice of appeal and not an appellant's brief, her
appeal was correctly dismissed for lack of interest in prosecuting it (MERCEDES D.
NAVARRO VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 234 SCRA 639).
Same; Same; The dismissal of an appeal becomes a final judgment of the
appellate court after the lapse of 15 days from service of a copy thereof upon the
accused or his counsel. In the present case, the motion for new trial was filed with
the Court of Appeals after the dismissal of the appeal for non-filing of the appellant's
brief. The dismissal of an appeal becomes a final judgment of the appellate court after
the lapse of 15 days from service of a copy thereof upon the accused or his counsel
unless the period is suspended by a motion for new trial (MERCEDES D.
NAVARRO VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 234 SCRA 639).
Same; Same; A lost appeal could not be retrieved by a motion for new trial.
Neither did she move to have her appeal reinstated after it was dismissed, nor did she
offer any explanation for her failure to file her brief. It was only on March 1, 1993, or
more than 60 days after the lapse of the 90-days extension granted by the appellate
court, the she filed her motion for new trial. The petitioner probably hoped that her
lost appeal could be retrieved by a motion for new trial. It was not (MERCEDES D.
NAVARRO VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 234 SCRA 639).
Criminal Law; BP 22; Evidence; Elements of the offense punished in BP 22.
The elements of the offense punished in B.P. 22 are: (1) the making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the knowledge
of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment (MERCEDES D.
NAVARRO VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 234 SCRA 639).
Same; Same; Same; Payment of the value of the check either by the drawer or
by the drawee bank within five banking days from notice of the dishonor given to the

drawer is a complete defense. Payment of the value of the check either by the
drawer or by the drawee bank within five banking days from notice of the dishonor
given to the drawer is a complete defense. The prima facie presumption that the
drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds or credit at the time of the
issuance and on its presentment for payment is rebutted by such payment. This
defense lies regardless of the strength of the evidence offered by the prosecution to
prove the elements of the offense (MERCEDES D. NAVARRO VS. THE COURT
OF APPEALS, ET AL., 234 SCRA 639).
UNLAWFUL DETAINER
Remedial Law; Unlawful Detainer; The rule is that the one year period
provided for in section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court within which a complaint for
unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the last letter of demand to
vacate. Petitioners correctly cite our ruling in Sy Oh v. Garcia upholding the
established rule that the one (1) year period provided for in section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be
counted from the LAST letter of demand to vacate, the reason being that the lessor has
the right to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee
remain meanwhile in the premises (SPOUSES NAZARIO P. PENAS, JR.,
represented by ELPIDIO R. VIERNES, ATTORNEY-IN-FACT VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 744).
Same; Same; Notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the increased
rental or otherwise vacate the land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules of
Court in unlawful detainer cases. "The notice giving the lessee the alternative
either to pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is not the demand
contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases. When after such
notice, the lessee elects to stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot
be ejected until he defaults in
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5( c), P.D. 902-A specifically provides SEC
original and exclusive jurisdiction over matters concerning the election or
appointment of officers of a corporation. In intra-corporate matters concerning the
election or appointment of officers of a corporation, Section 5, PD 902-A specifically
provides: "SEC. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the
Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms
of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees,
it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: . . .
(c ) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or
managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations" (LESLIE W. ESPINO
VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240
SCRA 52).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Generally speaking, the relationship of a person to

a corporation, whether as officer or as agent or employee, is not determined by the
nature of the services performed, but by the incidents of the relationship as they
actually exist. The matter of petitioner's not being elected to the office of
Executive Vice-President Chief Operating Officer thus falls squarely within the
purview of Section 5, par. (c ) of P.D. 902-A. In the case of PSBA v. Leano, supra,
which involved an Executive Vice-President who was not re-elected to the said
position during the election of officers on September 5, 1981 by the PSBA's newly
elected Board of Directors, the Court emphatically stated: "This is not a case of
dismissal. The situation is that of a corporate office having been declared vacant, and
that of TAN's not having been elected thereafter. The matter of whom to elect is a
prerogative that belongs to the Board, and involves the exercise of deliberate choice
and the faculty of discriminative selection. Generally speaking, the relationship of a
person to a corporation, whether as officer or as agent or employee, is not determined
by the nature of the services performed, but by the incidents of the relationship as
they actually exist." (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; A corporate officer's dismissal is always a corporate
act. A corporate officer's dismissal is always a corporate act and/or an intra-corporate
controversy and that nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom which the Board of
Directors may have in taking such action. Furthermore, it must be noted that the
reason behind the non-election of petitioner to the position Executive Vice PresidentChief Operating Officer arose from, or is closely connected with, his involvement in
the alleged irregularities in the aforementioned cases which, upon investigation and
recommendation, were resolved by the PAL Board of Directors against him and other
senior officers. Evidently, this intra-corporate ruling places the instant case under the
specialized competence and expertise of the SEC (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The principal function of the SEC is the
supervision and control over corporation, partnership and associations with the end in
view that investment in these entities may be encouraged and protected, and their
activities pursued for the promotion of economic development. The jurisdiction of
the SEC has likewise been clarified by this Court in the case of Union Glass and
Container Corporation, et al., thus: "This grant of jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the nature and function of the SEC under the law. Section 3 of PD No. 902-A
confers upon the latter absolute jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all
corporations, partnerships or associations, who are grantees of primary franchise
and/or license or permit issued by the government to operate in the Philippines x x x.'
The principal function of the SEC is the supervision and control over corporations,
partnerships and associations with the end view that investment in these entities may
be encouraged and protected, and their activities pursued for the promotion of

economic development (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites in order that SEC can take cognizance of
a case. It is in aid of this office that the adjudicative power of the SEC must be
exercised. Thus the law explicitly specified and delimited its jurisdiction to matters
intrinsically connected with the regulation of corporations, partnerships and
associations and those dealing with the internal affairs of such corporations,
partnerships or associations. Otherwise stated, in order that the SEC can take
cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain to any of the following
relationships: (a) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public;
(b) between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners,
members, or officers; (c ) between he corporation, partnership or association and the
state in so far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned, and (d)
among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS.
HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA
52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The affirmative reliefs and monetary claims sought
by petitioner in his complaint reveal that they are actually part of the perquisites of his
elective position; hence, intimately linked with his relations with the corporation.
The fact that petitioner sought payment of his backwages, other benefits, as well as
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in his complaint for illegal
dismissal will not operate to prevent the SEC from exercising its jurisdiction under
PD 902-A. While the affirmative reliefs and monetary claims sought by petitioner in
his complaint may, at first glance, mislead one into placing the case under the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, a closer examination reveals that they are actually
part of the perquisites of his elective position; hence, intimately linked with his
relations with the corporation. In Dy v. NLRC, et al., the Court, confronted with the
same issue ruled, thus: The question of remuneration, involving as it does, a person
who is not a mere employee but a stockholder and officer, an integral part, it might be
said, of the corporation, is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within
the area of corporate affairs and management, and is in fact a corporate controversy in
contemplation of the Corporation Code" (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is still within the competence of and expertise of
the SEC to resolve all matters arising from or closely related with all intra-corporate
disputes. The Court has likewise ruled in the case of Andaya v. Abadia that in
intra-corporate matters, such as those affecting the corporation, its directors, trustees ,
officers and share-holders, the issue of consequential damages may just as well be
resolved and adjudicated by the SEC. Undoubtedly, it is still within the competence
and expertise of the SEC to resolve all matters arising from or closely connected with
all intra-corporate disputes (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).

Same; Same; Same; Same; The issue of jurisdiction is unavailing because

estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction upon a tribunal that has none over the
cause of action. It is well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law and the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime
even on appeal. The principle of estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent this Court
from taking up the question of jurisdiction, which has been apparent on the face of the
pleadings since the start of the litigation before the Labor Arbiter. In the case of Dy v.
NLRC, supra, the Court, citing the case of Calimlim v. Remirez reiterated that the
decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void. Again,
the Court in Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department
v. NLRC reiterated the rule that the invocation of estoppel does not apply to confer
jurisdiction upon a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The instant case
does not provide an exception to the said rule (LESLIE W. ESPINO VS. HON.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL., 240 SCRA 52).
Labor Law; Agrarian Reform; Homestead; Right of homesteader or his heirs to
own a piece of land for their residence and livelihood prevail over the right of tenants
to security of tenure over the landholding; Reason; Intention of Code of Agrarian
Reform. This is a case where two competing interests have to be weighed against
each other: the tenant's right to security of tenure as against the right of the
homesteader or his heirs to own a piece of land for their residence and livelihood. We
hold that the more paramount and superior policy consideration is to uphold the right
of homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally the land acquired from
the State without being encumbered by tenancy relations. This holding is consistent
with the intention of the Code of Agrarian Reform to abolish agricultural share
tenancy, "to establish owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the
basis of Philippine agriculture" and "to achieve a dignified existence for the small
farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices" (LUCRECIO
PATRICIO, ET AL., VS. ISABELO BAYOG, ET AL., 112 SCRA 42).
Same; Same; Homestead Act, purpose of enactment of. The Homestead Act
has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy
citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and
plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs.
The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their
subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain
degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the
welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this
vital right (LUCRECIO PATRICIO, ET AL., VS. ISABELO BAYOG, ET AL.,
112 SCRA 42).
Certiorari; Appeals; Proper mode of appeal from judgments of the Regional
Trial Court on pure questions of law is a petition for review on certiorari to the
Supreme Court in the form and manner provided for in Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Petitioner is correct that the proper mode of appeal from judgments of

the Regional Trial Court on pure questions of law is a petition for review on certiorari
to the Supreme Court in the form and manner provided for in Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The Court, in Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 51 (1991) had occasion to pass upon the
issue at hand, as follows: "Under Section 5, subparagraph (2) (e), Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which only an error
or question of law is involved. A similar provision is contained in Section 17, fourth
paragraph, subparagraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic
Act No. 5440. And, in such cases where only questions of law are involved, Section
25 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in
conjunction with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5440, provides that the appeal to the
Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The rule, therefore, is that direct appeals to this Court
from the trial court on questions of law have to be through the filing of a petition for
review on certiorari. . . . By way of implementation of the aforestated provisions of
law, this Court issued on March 9, 1990, Circular No. 2-90, paragraph 2 of which
provides: 2 Appeals from Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court. Except in
criminal cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua,
judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in
relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being the clear
intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to the Supreme Court
shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.' "(SOUTHERN NEGROS DEVELOPMENT BANK, INC. VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 460).
Same; Same; Same; An erroneous application of the law or rules is not an
excusable error. It is incumbent upon private respondent qua appellants to utilize
the correct mode of appeal of the decision of trial courts to the appellate courts. In the
mistaken choice of their remedy, they can blame no one but themselves (Jocson v.
Baguio, 179 SCRA 550 [1989]; Yucuanseh Drug Co. v. National Labor Union,
101 Phil. 409 [1957]; SOUTHERN NEGROS DEVELOPMENT BANK, INC.
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 233 SCRA 460).
APPEAL FEE
Civil Procedure; Appeal, Perfection of; Mere fact that one party has already
filed his notice of appeal does not mean that the appeal has already been perfected;
The perfection of the appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by
any party. The mere fact that one party has already filed his notice of appeal does
not mean that the appeal has already been perfected because the adverse party still has

the reglementary period within which to perfect his appeal. There can be several
reasons for this, but one will suffice for purposes of this case, namely, the latter party
since presumably, they received the decision also on October 5, 1985, (the same date
it was received by petitioner herein), respondents still had fifteen (15) days within
which to appeal. They filed a motion for execution pending appeal on October 11,
1985, (note that they had up to October 20, 1985 within which they could still appeal,
before the judgment as to them would be final) therefor before the appeal is deemed
perfected as to themselves. (See Universal Far East Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 131
SCRA 642). Note that under the law (Sec. 23 of the Interim Rules, See Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129) The perfection of the appeal shall be upon the expiration of
the last day to appeal by any party (ALEJANDRO MAGTIBAY VS.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 168 SCRA 177).
APPEAL FEE
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Rule that date of mailing is date of filing, not
applicable in the instant case, as the records reveal that the petition for review was
filed, not by mail but by personal service. The procedural aspect of this case is the
issue of the timeless of the petition for review. Petitioner claimed that on July 14,
1986, he posted with the Central Post Office of Manila his petition, under Registry
Receipt No. 1608, which was received by respondent Court of Appeals, through its
authorized representative Dever Catindig, on July 17, 1986. In support thereof, he
submitted Registry Receipt No. 1608 and a certification of Postmaster Wilfredo R.
Ulibarri (Rollo, p. 68). He therefore avers that as held in the case of NAWASA v.
Secretary of Public Work and Communications, 16 SCRA 536 [1966], that the date of
mailing by registered mail is considered the date of filing of any petition to pleading,
therefore he filed his petition on time. The contrary is however, shown by the record
which reveals that petitioner filed his petition for review with the Court of Appeals
not by mail but by personal service on July 15, 1986 at 3: 25 p.m. as stamped on the
front page of the petition (Annex "3", Rollo, p. 101). As against the certification of the
postmaster which is not conclusive to prove that the registered letter alluded to is the
subject petition for review, coupled with the lack of registry return card that would
have shown the receipt thereof by the authorized representative of the Court of
Appeals, the evidence of receipt by personal delivery is more persuasive as it tallied
with the records of said court (RICARDO MEDINA, SR., VS. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL, ET AL., 181 SCRA 837).
Same; Same; Failure to perfect appeal in the manner and with the period
provided for by law rendered the judgment final and executory. Hence, the Court
of Appeal did not err when it ruled that it is bereft of jurisdiction to pass upon the
assailed decision of the trial court which has become final and executory as of July
14, 1986 (Rollo, p. 99). This Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal
the manner and within the period laid down by law is not or mandatory but also

jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal required by the rules has the effect of
rendering judgment final and executory (Quiqui v. Boncaros, 151 SCRA 417 [1987];
RICARDO MEDINA, SR., VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL, ET
AL., 181 SCRA 837).
Same; Unlawful Detainer; Courts; Jurisdiction; An ejectment suit filed within
one year from termination of the right of possession is one of unlawful detainer,
hence, it falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Court. Petitioner would have this Court. Petitioner would have this Court
consider, the instant case as an accion publiciana, cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court and not by the Metropolitan Trial Court. An action of unlawful detainer is
defined as "witholding by person from another for not more than one year, of the
possession of a land or building to which the latter is entitled after the expiration or
termination of the former's right to hold possession by virtue of a contract express or
implied." (Spouses Medina and Bernal v. Valdellon, 63 SCRA 282 [1975]). However,
should the action be filed more than one year after such deprivation or unlawful
witholding of possession, even if the plaintiff decides to raise the question of illegal
possession only, the case is accion publiciana or recovery of the right to possess and
is a plenary action in an ordinary proceeding in the Court of First Instance (Banayos
v. Susana Realty Inc., 71 SCRA 558 [1976]; Bernabe v. Dayrit, 125 SCRA 423, 425
[1983]). In the case at bar, the ejectment suit having been filed within the one (1) year
period, the proper action is one of Unlawful Detainer which necessarily falls within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the lower court (Bernabe v. Luna, 148 SCRA
114 [1987]), or the Metropolitan Trial Court (RICARDO MEDINA, SR., VS. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL, ET AL., 181 SCRA 837).
DUE PROCESS
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Right to be heard; Due process is not
violated where a person is not heard because he has chosen, for whatever reason, not
to be heard; If he opts to be silent where he has a right to speak, he cannot later
complain that he was unduly silenced. The Court cannot agree. The argument
assumes that the right to a hearing is absolute and may not be waived in any case
under the due process clause. This is not correct. As a matter of fact, the right to be
heard is as often waived as it is invoked, and validly as long as the party is given an
opportunity to be heard on his behalf. The circumstance that the chance to be heard is
not availed of does not disparage that opportunity and deprive the person of the right
to due process. This Court has consistently held in cases too numerous to mention that
due process is not violated where a person is not heard because he has chosen, for
whatever reason, not to be heard. It should be obvious that if he opts to be silent
where he has a right to speak, he cannot later be heard to complain that he was unduly
silenced (STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., VS. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA 605).

Labor Law; Surety Bond; It is too late now for the petitioner to challenge the
stipulation. If it believed then that it was onerous and illegal what it should have done
was object when its conclusion as a condition in the surety bond was required by the
POEA. At any rate, it is too late now for the petitioner to challenge the stipulation.
If it believed then that it was onerous and illegal, what it should have done was object
when its inclusion as a condition in the surety bond was required by the POEA. Even
of the POEA had insisted on the condition, as now claimed, there was still nothing to
prevent the petitioner from refusing altogether to issue the surety bond. The petitioner
did neither of these. The fact is that, whether or not the petitioner objected, it in the
end filed the surety bond with the suggested condition. The consequence of its
submission is that is cannot now argue that it is not bound by that condition because it
was coerced into accepting it (STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA 605).
Same; Same; Purpose of surety bond; The purpose of the surety bond is to
insure that if the rights of overseas workers are violated by their employers, recourse
would still be available to them against the local companies that recruited them for the
foreign principal. The surety bond required of recruitment agencies is intended for
the protection of our citizens who are engaged for overseas employment by foreign
companies. The purpose is to insure that if the rights of these overseas workers are
violated by their employers, recourse would still be available to them against the local
companies that recruited them for the foreign principal. The foreign principal is
outside the jurisdiction of our courts and would probably have no properties in this
country against which an adverse judgment can be enforced. This difficulty is
corrected by the bond, which can be proceeded against to satisfy that judgment
(STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., VS. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA 605).
Same; Same; Same; Social Justice; The technicalities raised by petitioner do
not impair the rudiments of due process or the requirements of the law and must be
rejected in deference to the constitutional imperative of justice for the worker.
Give this purpose, and guided by the benign policy of social justice, we reject the
technicalities raised by the petitioner against its established legal and even moral
liability to the private respondent. These technicalities do not impair the rudiments of
due process or the requirements of the law and must be rejected in deference to the
constitutional imperative of justice for the worker (STRONGHOLD INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., 205 SCRA 605).
P.D. 772
Land Titles; Anti-Squatting Law; P.D. 772; Purpose for which the land is
intended and not the place where it is located that is material. We find the Solicitor
General's contention well taken. That it is the purpose for which the land is intended
and not the place where it is located that is material is clear from the text of the

statute. Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 772 provides: Section 1. Any person who, with the use of
force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his
will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an
imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one
thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency (ALEX JUMAWAN, ET AL., VS.
HON. DIOMEDES M. EVIOTA, ET AL., 234 SCRA 524).
Same; Same; Same; So long as it is for residential, commercial or any other
purposes, comes within the purview of the Decree. Thus, a piece of land may be
found in a barangay. So long as it is for residential, commercial, or any other
purposes, it comes within the purview of the Decree, and any person, who, with the
use of force, intimidation or threat or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of
the landowner, occupies or takes possession of such property against the will of the
latter is guilty of squatting (ALEX JUMAWAN, ET AL., VS. HON. DIOMEDES
M. EVIOTA, ET AL., 234 SCRA 524).
Same; Same; Same; Squatting on public agricultural land is punishable under
another statute, R.A. 947. It is true that in People v. Echavez it was stated that the
Decree was intended to apply to squatting in "urban communities or more particularly
to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals." The
statement, however, is only a dictum, because the lands in that case were pasture
lands. As this Court noted, squatting on public agricultural lands is punishable under
another statute, Republic Act No. 947 (ALEX JUMAWAN, ET AL., VS. HON.
DIOMEDES M. EVIOTA, ET AL., 234 SCRA 524).
Same; Same; Same; P.D. 772 is not limited to squatting in urban communities.
Indeed, the preamble of P.D. No. 772, on which this Court relied for its dictum in
the two cases, does not support the view that the law is limited to squatting in urban
communities. The preamble reads: WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite
the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the
Secretaries of National Defense, Public Works and Communications, Social Welfare
and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential
Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal
Mayors, and City and District Engineers, to remove all illegal constructions including
buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those
built without permits on public and private property, squatting is still a major problem
in urban communities all over the country; WHEREAS, many persons or entities
found to have been unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the
affluent class; WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive
against this illegal and nefarious practice (ALEX JUMAWAN, ET AL., VS. HON.
DIOMEDES M. EVIOTA, ET AL., 234 SCRA 524).

Same; Same; Same; Elements of squatting. Indeed, the function of a

preamble is to state the reason or occasion for making a law or to explain in general
terms the policy of the enactment. It may, therefore, be resorted to only when the
statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of interpretation. In the case at bar the
Decree is unambiguous. It requires as element of squatting (1) that there be
occupation or a taking of possession of property for residential, commercial or any
other purposes, and (2) that in occupying or taking possession of the property, the
offender did so by force, intimidation or threat or by taking advantage of the absence
or tolerance of its owner and against his will. To require that the land be in an urban
community or center of population would, therefore, be not to clarify but to add to the
elements of the crime as these are enumerated in the Decree (ALEX JUMAWAN, ET
AL., VS. HON. DIOMEDES M. EVIOTA, ET AL., 234 SCRA 524).
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Real Party in Interest; The real party
in interest is the party who stands to benefit or be injured by the judgement or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. The Court has defined the real party-ininterest in the recent case of Samahan ng mga Nangungupahan sa Azcarraga Textile
Market, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 68357, Sept. 26, 1988), as follows:
The real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgement or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. `Interest' within the meaning
of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. . . . (Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Phil., Vol. I, p.
126 cited in House International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 705). Furthermore, the Court in Walter Ascona Lee, et al.
v. Hon. Manuel Romillo, Jr., et al. (G.R. No. 60937, May 28, 1988) said; . . . ". . . A
real party in interest plaintiff is one who has a legal right while a real party in interest
defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation whose act or omission violates
the legal rights of the former" (CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO ET AL.,VS.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., 170 SCRA 800).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Service of Summons; The dissolved Pepsi-Cola is
the real party in interest for purposes of valid service of summons. For purposes of
valid summons, the dissolved Pepsi Cola was the real party in interest defendant in
the civil case filed by the petitioners not only because it is the registered owner of the
truck involved but also because, when the cause of action accrued, Pepsi Cola still
existed as a corporation and was the party involved in the acts violative of the legal
right of another (CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO ET AL., VS. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., 170 SCRA 800).
Same; Same; Same; Cause of Action; A cause of action is an act or omission of
one party in violation of the legal rights of the other. The petitioners had a valid

cause of action for damages against Pepsi Cola. A cause of action is defined as "an act
or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are a legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendants and an act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right"
(Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 248 [1986] citing Ma-ao Sugar
Central Co. v. Barrios, et al., 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; See also Republic Planters Bank v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 131 SCRA 631 [1984]; CRISOSTOMO
REBOLLIDO ET AL., VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., 170
SCRA 800).
Same; Same; Service of Summons; Corporation Law; Dissolved Corporations,
Liabilities of; A defendant corporation is subject to suit and service of process even
though dissolved. On the second and main issue of whether or not the service of
summons through Ms. Nenette C. Sison, upon Pepsi Cola operates to vest jurisdiction
upon private respondent, it is important to know the circumstances surrounding the
service. At the time of the issuance and receipt of the summons, Pepsi Cola was
already dissolved. The Court is of the opinion that service is allowed in such a
situation. In the American case of Crawford v. Refiners Co-operative Association,
Incorporation (71 NM 1, 375 P 2d 212 [1962], it was held that a "defendant
corporation is subject to suit and service of process even though dissolved
(CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO ET AL., VS. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ET AL., 170 SCRA 800).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It has been held in some cases that there is
substantial compliance with the rules on service of summons when it appears that the
summons and complaint are actually received by the corporation through its clerk,
though the latter is not authorized to receive the same. A liberal interpretation of
Section 13, Rule 14 has been adopted in the case of G & G Trading Corporation v.
Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 466 [1988]: Although it may be true that the service of
summons was made on a person not authorized to receive the same . . ., nevertheless
since it appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the
corporation through its said clerk, the Court finds that there was substantial
compliance, with the rule on service of summons. Indeed the purpose of said rule as
above stated to assure service of summons on the corporation had thereby been
attained. The need for speedy justice must prevail over a technicality"
(CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO ET AL., VS. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ET AL., 170 SCRA 800).
Corporation Law; Dissolution of Corporation; Assumption of Liabilities; By
virtue of the assumption of debts, liabilities, and obligations of Pepsi Cola by
PEPSICO, Inc., any judgement rendered against the former after its dissolution is a
liability of the PEPSICO, INC. it is clear that private respondent is aware that the
liabilities of Pepsi Cola are enforceable against it upon the dissolution of Pepsi Cola.
As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, by virtue of the assumption of the debts,
liabilities and obligations of Pepsi Cola, "any judgement rendered against Pepsi Cola

after its dissolution is a 'liability' of PEPSICO, Inc., within the contemplation of the
undertaking". Hence it was incumbent upon respondent PEPSICO, Inc., to have
defended the civil suit against the corporation whose liabilities it had assumed. Failure
to do so after it received the notice by way of summons amounts to gross negligence
and bad faith. The private respondent cannot now invoke a technical defect involving
improper service upon Pepsi Cola and alleged absence of service of summons upon it.
There is the substantive right of the petitioners to be considered over and above the
attempt of the private respondent to avoid the jurisdiction of the lower court
(CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO ET AL., VS. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ET AL., 170 SCRA 800).
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Agrarian Relations; tenancy; Judgements; General rule that the findings of
facts of the Court of Agrarian Relations, are accorded respect; Substantial evidence,
concept of. This Court has consistently held that the findings of facts of the Court
of Agrarian Relations will not be disturbed on appeal where there is substantial
evidence to support them and all that this Court is called upon to do insofar as the
evidence is concerned, in agrarian cases, is to find out if the conclusion of the lower
court is supported by "substantial evidence" (Bagsican vs. Court of Appeals, 141
SCRA 226).
Substantial evidence in support of the findings of the Court of Agrarian
Relations does not necessarily import preponderant evidence as is required in ordinary
civil cases. Substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and its absence is
not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, "direct or
circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criterion
for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what
evidence is entitled to belief. (Picardal vs. Lladas, 21 SCRA 1483).
Same; Same; Same; Leasehold Tenancy; Finding that private respondents are
considered leasehold tenants of petitioner over the riceland portion of her hacienda,
are supported by substantial evidence. It cannot be said therefore that the finding
of the Court of Agrarian Relations that Cresenciano Prado and Orlando de la Guison
are leasehold tenants of petitioners Maria Luisa Vda. de Donato over the riceland
portion of the hacienda Mercedes which finding was affirmed by respondent Court of
Appeals in its now assailed decision, is not supported by substantial evidence
(MARIA LUISA VDA. DE DONATO VS. COURT OF APPEAL 154 SCRA 119).
Agrarian Relations; Certificate of Land Transfer, Tenancy; Court of Agrarian
Relations; Jurisdiction Actions for forfeiture of certificates of land transfer for failure
to pay lease rentals for more than two (2) years fall within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. There is no question that an action
for forfeiture falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the CAR as

provided for by Section 5 of P.D. 816. . . . The related Section 2 of P.D. 816 has been
quoted previously. A subsequent law, P.D. 946, which took effect on 17 June 1976,
similarly vested the CAR with exclusive and original jurisdiction over violations of
P.D. Nos. 815 and 816 (ARTURO CURSO ET. AL., VS. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS ET. AL.,128 SCRA 567).
Same; Same; Same; Sanctions of forfeiture of certificates of land transfer, not
imposable, where agricultural lessees did not deliberately refuse to pay the lease
rentals but acted in accordance with circular of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and
in good faith. Presidential Decree No. 816 imposes the sanction of forfeiture where
the "agricultural lessee x x x deliberately refuses and/or continues to refuse to pay the
rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) year".
Petitioners cannot be said to have deliberately refused to pay the lease rentals. They
acted in accordance with the MAR Circular, which implements P.D. 816, and in good
faith. Forfeiture of their Certificates of Land Transfer and of their farmholdings as
decreed by the CAR and affirmed by the Appellate Court is thus unwarranted
(ARTURO CURSO ET. AL., VS. HON. COURTS APPEALS ET. AL., 128 SCRA
567).
Administrative Law; Status; R.A. No. 6758; Allowances; Under R.A. 6758,
incumbents who were receiving RATA as of July 1, 1989 are entitled to continue
receiving the same. Under the second sentences of the aforementioned provision,
such other compensation includes the RATA. Hence, RATA being received by
incumbents as of July 1, 1989 are entitled to continue to receive the same. Republic
Act No. 6758 has therefore, to this extent, amended LOI No. 97. By limiting the
benefit of the RATA granted by LOI No. 97 to incumbents, Congress has manifested
its intent to gradually phase out this RATA privilege under LOI No. 97 without
upsetting its policy of non-diminution of pay (Philippine Ports Authority v.
Commission on Audit, 214 SCRA 653 [1992]; MANILA INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs COMMISSION ON AUDIT 238 SCRA 714).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The date July 1, 1989 does not serve as a cut-off
date with respect to the amount of RATA but becomes crucial only to determine those
who may be entitled to its continued grant. With regard to the question as to what
is the basis of the RATA to be given to incumbents after July 1, 1989, petitioners
contend that according to LOI No. 97 they are entitled to RATA equivalent to 40% of
their basic salary. With the effectivity of R.A. No. 6758, the 40% must be adjusted
based on the standardized salary. Respondent COA, however, alleges that starting July
1, 1989, the RATA is no longer based on 40% of the basic salary but on the highest
amount of RATA received by the incumbents as of June 30, 1989. The issue has been
answered in Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on Audit, 214 SCRA 653
(1992), where we held: "* * * The date July 1, 1989 does not serve as a cut-off date
with respect to the amount of RATA. The date July 1, 1989 becomes crucial only to
determine that as of said date, the officer was an incumbent and was receiving the
RATA, for purposes of entitling him to its continued grant. The given date should not

be interpreted as fixing the maximum amount of RATA to be received by the official"

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT 238 SCRA 714).
Courts; Judgements by Default; Courts can only award in a judgement by
default the relief specially prayed for in the complaint. A court is bereft of
jurisdiction to award, in a judgement by default, a relief other than that specifically
prayed for in the complaint. Observe that this Court's decision of 29 November 1988
accords with the prayer of private respondent in it complaint (LUMEN
POLICARPIO VS. RTC ET AL., 235 SCRA 314).
Same; It is settled that final decisions are no longer open to amendments or
modifications. The decision has long since become final and executory. It is settled
that final decisions are no longer open to amendments or modifications; otherwise, we
will see no end to litigations (LUMEN POLICARPIO VS RTC ET AL., 235 SCRA
314).
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
Civil Law; Compromise; Court gives its sanction to the compromise agreement
found to be in order. We find the compromise agreement of be in order. In
consonance with the policy of encouraging the settlement of disputes amicably and
finding the compromise not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
and public policy, the Court gives its sanction to the agreement. (HEIRS OF
GABRIEL CAPILI VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND HON. GUALBERTO
J. DE LA LANA ET. AL., 234 SCRA 110).
Same; Same; Same; The compromise agreement entered into by and between
the parties is approved. WHEREFORE, the compromise agreement entered into by
and between the parties is hereby APPROVED. The parties are ENJOINED to
faithfully comply with the covenants, terms and conditions therein expressed (THE
HEIRS OF GABRIEL CAPILI VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LANA, ET AL., 234 SCRA 110).