Supreme Court of The United States: Padilla V. Kentucky
Supreme Court of The United States: Padilla V. Kentucky
Syllabus
Syllabus
PADILLA v. KENTUCKY
Syllabus
Syllabus
No. 08–651
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KENTUCKY
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206. The JRAD procedure, codified in 8 U. S. C. §1251(b) (1994 ed.),
applied only to the “provisions of subsection (a)(4),” the crimes-of-moral
turpitude provision. 66 Stat. 208; see United States v. O’Rourke, 213
F. 2d 759, 762 (CA8 1954) (recognizing that, under the 1952 Act,
narcotics offenses were no longer eligible for JRADs).
6 The changes to our immigration law have also involved a change in
nomenclature; the statutory text now uses the term “removal” rather
than “deportation.” See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U. S. 348, 350,
n. 1 (2001).
7 See Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae
II
(La. 2/26/02), 810 So. 2d 1106; Commonwealth v. Frometa, 520 Pa. 552,
555 A. 2d 92 (1989).
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11 As the Commonwealth conceded at oral argument, were a defen
concurring in judgment).
We have given serious consideration to the concerns
that the Solicitor General, respondent, and amici have
stressed regarding the importance of protecting the final
ity of convictions obtained through guilty pleas. We con
fronted a similar “floodgates” concern in Hill, see id., at
58, but nevertheless applied Strickland to a claim that
counsel had failed to advise the client regarding his parole
eligibility before he pleaded guilty.12
A flood did not follow in that decision’s wake. Sur
mounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.
See, e.g., 466 U. S., at 689 (“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s
performance must be highly deferential”); id., at 693
(observing that “[a]ttorney errors . . . are as likely to be
utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be
prejudicial”). Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of
claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision
to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under
the circumstances. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S.
470, 480, 486 (2000). There is no reason to doubt that
lower courts—now quite experienced with applying Strick
land—can effectively and efficiently use its framework to
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12 However, we concluded that, even though Strickland applied to
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13 See Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of
Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, p. 418 (31st ed. 2005) (Table 5.17)
(only approximately 5%, or 8,612 out of 68,533, of federal criminal
prosecutions go to trial); id., at 450 (Table 5.46) (only approximately 5%
of all state felony criminal prosecutions go to trial).
14 See V. Flango, National Center for State Courts, Habeas Corpus in
V
It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure
that no criminal defendant—whether a citizen or not—is
left to the “mercies of incompetent counsel.” Richardson,
397 U. S., at 771. To satisfy this responsibility, we now
hold that counsel must inform her client whether his plea
carries a risk of deportation. Our longstanding Sixth
Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as
a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant
impact of deportation on families living lawfully in this
country demand no less.
Taking as true the basis for his motion for postconvic
tion relief, we have little difficulty concluding that Padilla
has sufficiently alleged that his counsel was constitution
ally deficient. Whether Padilla is entitled to relief will
depend on whether he can demonstrate prejudice as a
result thereof, a question we do not reach because it was
not passed on below. See Verizon Communications Inc. v.
FCC, 535 U. S. 467, 530 (2002).
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quences. Ky. Admin. Office of Courts, Motion to Enter Guilty Plea,
Form AOC–491 (Rev. 2/2003), http://courts.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/
55E1F54E-ED5C-4A30-B1D5-4C43C7ADD63C/0/491.pdf (as visited
Mar. 29, 2010, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Further,
many States require trial courts to advise defendants of possible
immigration consequences. See, e.g., Alaska Rule Crim. Proc.
11(c)(3)(C) (2009–2010); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §1016.5 (West 2008);
Conn. Gen. Stat. §54–1j (2009); D. C. Code §16–713 (2001); Fla. Rule
Crim. Proc. 3.172(c)(8) (Supp. 2010); Ga. Code Ann. §17–7–93(c) (1997);
Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §802E–2 (2007); Iowa Rule Crim. Proc.
2.8(2)(b)(3) (Supp. 2009); Md. Rule 4–242 (Lexis 2009); Mass. Gen.
Laws, ch. 278, §29D (2009); Minn. Rule Crim. Proc. 15.01 (2009); Mont.
Code Ann. §46–12–210 (2009); N. M. Rule Crim. Form 9–406 (2009); N.
Y. Crim. Proc. Law Ann. §220.50(7) (West Supp. 2009); N. C. Gen. Stat.
Ann. §15A–1022 (Lexis 2007); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2943.031 (West
2006); Ore. Rev. Stat. §135.385 (2007); R. I. Gen. Laws §12–12–22
(Lexis Supp. 2008); Tex. Code. Ann. Crim. Proc., Art. 26.13(a)(4)
(Vernon Supp. 2009); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, §6565(c)(1) (Supp. 2009);
Wash. Rev. Code §10.40.200 (2008); Wis. Stat. §971.08 (2005–2006).
18 PADILLA v. KENTUCKY
No. 08–651
_________________
KENTUCKY
I
Under Strickland, an attorney provides ineffective
assistance if the attorney’s representation does not meet
reasonable professional standards. 466 U. S., at 688.
Until today, the longstanding and unanimous position of
the federal courts was that reasonable defense counsel
generally need only advise a client about the direct conse
quences of a criminal conviction. See, e.g., United States v.
Gonzalez, 202 F. 3d 20, 28 (CA1 2000) (ineffective
assistance-of-counsel claim fails if “based on an attorney’s
failure to advise a client of his plea’s immigration conse
quences”); United States v. Banda, 1 F. 3d 354, 355 (CA5
1993) (holding that “an attorney’s failure to advise a client
that deportation is a possible consequence of a guilty plea
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel”); see
generally Chin & Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev.
697, 699 (2002) (hereinafter Chin & Holmes) (noting that
“virtually all jurisdictions”—including “eleven federal
circuits, more than thirty states, and the District of Co
lumbia”—“hold that defense counsel need not discuss with
their clients the collateral consequences of a conviction,”
including deportation). While the line between “direct”
and “collateral” consequences is not always clear, see ante,
at 7, n. 8, the collateral-consequences rule expresses an
important truth: Criminal defense attorneys have exper
tise regarding the conduct of criminal proceedings. They
are not expected to possess—and very often do not pos
sess—expertise in other areas of the law, and it is unreal
istic to expect them to provide expert advice on matters
that lie outside their area of training and experience.
This case happens to involve removal, but criminal
convictions can carry a wide variety of consequences other
than conviction and sentencing, including civil commit
ment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to vote, disquali
fication from public benefits, ineligibility to possess fire
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 3
No. 08–651
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KENTUCKY
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collateral consequences. Whatever the outcome, however, the effect of
misadvice regarding such consequences upon the validity of a guilty
plea should be analyzed under the Due Process Clause.
2 As the Court’s opinion notes, ante, at 16–17, n. 15, many States—