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Ang Tibay Vs CIR
Ang Tibay Vs CIR
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and
submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the
parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case
shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all
such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth. So ordered.
Present:
Petitioners,
VELASCO, JR.,
DEL CASTILLO,
- versus -
ATTY. ANTONIO F.
MONTEMAYOR,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
June 8, 2011
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RESOLUTION
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated August
25, 2010 setting aside the October 19, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals and
reinstating the Decision dated March 23, 2004 of the Office of the President in O.P.
Case No. 03-1-581, which found the respondent administratively liable for failure
to declare in his 2001 and 2002 Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL)
two expensive cars registered in his name, in violation of Section 7, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019 in relation to Section 8 (A) of R.A. No. 6713. The OP adopted
the findings and recommendations of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
(PAGC), including the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service on
respondent, with all accessory penalties.
The motion is anchored on the following grounds:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Penalties prescribed by the Honorable Court is too harsh and severe on the
alleged offense committed/omitted.1
On the first ground, the Court finds it bereft of merit. Respondent asserts that
since the PAGC charge involving non-declaration in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL was
already the subject of investigation by the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-04-0568LSC, along with the criminal complaint for unexplained wealth, the former can no
longer be pursued without violating the rule on double jeopardy.
1
Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a
competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and
(5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.2 We have held
that none of these requisites applies where the Ombudsman only conducted a
preliminary investigation of the same criminal offense against the respondent
public officer.3 The dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation does not
constitute double jeopardy, preliminary investigation not being part of the trial.4
With respect to the second ground, respondent underscores the dismissal by the
Ombudsman of the criminal and administrative complaints against him, including
the charge subject of the proceedings before the PAGC and OP. It is argued that
the Office of the Ombudsman as a constitutional body, pursuant to its mandate
under R.A. No. 6770, has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, as against the PAGC which is not a constitutional body but a mere
creation of the OP. Under said law, it is the Ombudsman who has disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government, such as
herein respondent.
The argument is untenable.
2
3
4
The same wrongful act committed by the public officer can subject him to
civil, administrative and criminal liabilities. We held in Tecson v. Sandiganbayan5:
[I]t is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or
employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a
wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held
civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such
violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer
may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law violated
attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally,
such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other
administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and distinct from
the penal and civil liabilities. (Italics in the original.)
the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies
only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative
powers.Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal
liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged
misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the
PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over
him. As the PCAGCs investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the
doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar. (Emphasis
supplied.)
9
10
Records reveal that on August 26, 2003, the CA already rendered a decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285 dismissing respondents petition challenging the
jurisdiction of the PAGC. Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied by the CA. Upon elevation to this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari (G.R. No. 160443), the petition suffered the same fate. Under the First
Divisions Resolution dated January 26, 2004, the petition was denied for failure of
the petitioner (respondent) to show that the CA committed any reversible error in
the assailed decision and resolution. Said resolution became final and executory
on April 27, 2004. Thus, at the time respondent submitted his counter-affidavit
before the Ombudsman on May 21, 2004, there was already a final resolution of
his petition challenging the PAGCs investigative authority.
On the other hand, the PAGC submitted to the OP its September 1, 2003
resolution finding respondent guilty as charged and recommending that he be
dismissed from the service, after the expiration of the 60-day temporary restraining
order issued on June 23, 2003 by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285. The OP
rendered its Decision adopting the PAGCs findings and recommendation on
March 23, 2004. As thus shown, a period of ten (10) months had elapsed from the
time respondent was directed to file his counter-affidavit or verified answer to the
administrative complaint filed against him, up to the rendition of the OPs decision.
It cannot therefore be said that the PAGC and OP proceeded with undue haste in
determining respondents administrative guilt.
Still on respondents repeated claim that he was denied due process, it must
be noted that when respondent received a copy of the OP Decision dated March 23,
2004, his petition for review filed in this Court assailing the CAs dismissal of CAG.R. SP No. 77285 was already denied under Resolution dated January 26, 2004.
However, despite the denial of his petition, respondent still refused to recognize
PAGCs jurisdiction and continued to assail the same before the CA in CA-G.R. SP
No. 84254, a petition for review under Rule 43 from the OPs March 23, 2004
Decision and May 13, 2004 Resolution.16 In any event, respondent was served
with a copy of the OP Decision, was able to seek reconsideration of the said
decision, and appeal the same to the CA.
We also find nothing irregular in considering the investigation terminated
and submitting the case for resolution based on available evidence upon failure of
the respondent to file his counter-affidavit or answer despite giving him ample
opportunity to do so. This is allowed by the Rules of Procedure of the PAGC. The
PAGC is also not required to furnish the respondent and complainant copy of its
resolution.
The dissent of Justice Bersamin assails the OPs complete reliance on the
PAGCs findings and recommendation which constituted a gross violation of
administrative due process as set forth in AngTibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations17. Among others, it is required that [T]he tribunal or any of its judges
must act on its or his own independent consideration of the facts and the law of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision. Justice Bersamin thus concludes that the OP should have itself
reviewed and appreciated the evidence presented and independently considered the
facts and the law of the controversy. It was also pointed out that the OPs
statement that the respondents arguments in his Motion for Reconsideration With
16
17
18
19
It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the
case a[t] bar. Said section applies only to decisions rendered in judicial
proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled Judiciary, and all of its provisions
have particular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of government.
Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that decisions of executive
departments or administrative agencies are oblige[d] to meet the requirements
under Section 14, Article VIII.
The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as
long as the constitutional requirement of due process has been satisfied. In the
landmark case of AngTibay v. CIR, we laid down the cardinal rights of parties in
administrative proceedings, as follows:
1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present
ones case and submit evidence in support thereof.
2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3) The decision must have something to support itself.
4) The evidence must be substantial.
5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected.
6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
7) The board or body should, in all controversial question, render
its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the
decision rendered.
As can be seen above, among these rights are the decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected; and that the decision be rendered in
such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. Note that there is no
requirement in AngTibay that the decision must express clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative
decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently
informs the parties of the factual and legal bases of the decision, the due
process requirement is satisfied.
At bar, the Office of the President apparently considered the Decision of
HLURB as correct and sufficient, and said so in its own Decision. The brevity of
the assailed Decision was not the product of willing concealment of its factual
and legal bases. Such bases, the assailed Decision noted, were already contained
in the HLURB decision, and the parties adversely affected need only refer to the
HLURB Decision in order to be able to interpose an informed appeal or action for
certiorari under Rule 65.
x xxx
Accordingly, based on close scrutiny of the Decision of the Office of the
President, this Court rules that the said Decision of the Office of the President
fully complied with both administrative due process and Section 14, Article VIII
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
The Office of the President did not violate petitioners right to due process
when it rendered its one-page Decision. In the case at bar, it is safe to conclude
that all the parties, including petitioner, were well-informed as to how the
Decision of the Office of the President was arrived at, as well as the facts, the
laws and the issues involved therein because the Office of the President attached
to and made an integral part of its Decision the Decision of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners, which it adopted by reference. If it were otherwise, the petitioner
would not have been able to lodge an appeal before the Court of Appeals and
make a presentation of its arguments before said court without knowing the facts
and the issues involved in its case.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
20
Pursuant to Section 11, paragraph (b) of R.A. No. 6713, any violation of the
law proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for
removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal
prosecution is instituted against him. Respondents deliberate attempt to evade
the mandatory disclosure of all assets acquired during the period covered was
evident when he first claimed that the vehicles were lumped under the entry
Machineries/Equipment or still mortgaged, and later averred that these were
already sold by the end of the year covered and the proceeds already spent.
Under this scheme, respondent would have acquired as many assets never to
be declared at anytime. Such act erodes the function of requiring accuracy of
entries in the SSAL which must be a true and detailed statement. It undermines
the SSAL as the means to achieve the policy of accountability of all public
officers and employees in the government through which the public are able to
monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; [as] a valid check and
balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth.21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the motion for reconsideration is
DENIED WITH FINALITY.
Let entry of judgment be made in due course.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Associate Justice