Chief Justice Minton Order Wine Stevens 121815
Chief Justice Minton Order Wine Stevens 121815
avoid disruption in the criminal justice system, and safeguard the dignity of
the courts of the Commonwealth, the Chief Justice deferred ruling on the
disqualification of Judge Stevens and ordered the parties to participate in
mediation.
The mediation occurred on December 4, 2015, and resulted in an
agreement signed by Judge Stevens, the Commonwealths Attorney, and the
four appointed mediators. Among other things, the parties agreed that they
would, in essence, stop using social media as the vehicle to influence public
support for their personal grievances.
In filings since the mediation agreement, the Commonwealths Attorney
asserts that Judge Stevens has breached the mediation agreement to the
extent that its terms are now meaningless. The Commonwealths Attorney also
renews his argument that Judge Stevens must be removed from presiding in
any criminal prosecutions because his continued violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct prove his inability to preside without bias against the
Commonwealths Attorney or his assistants.1
The facts underlying the Commonwealths Attorneys original affidavit
and his later filings are complex. The dispute arose, at least initially, from
Judge Stevenss comments on social media regarding the jury-selection process
In his response, Judge Stevens erroneously argues that there is no longer a KRS
26A.020 affidavit for disqualification pending before the Chief Justice because the
Commonwealths Attorney withdrew the request as a part of the mediation agreement.
But nothing in the record furnished by the Jefferson Circuit Clerk indicates that the
request has been withdrawn, and the Commonwealths Attorneys supplemental
motion and affidavit clearly show that the disqualification request is viable.
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Attorneys motives for filing the request for certification of law, including
statements made on Judge Stevenss personal Facebook page alleging that the
certification is the Commonwealths Attorneys attempt to impanel all-white
juries. Judge Stevens accused the Commonwealths Attorney of calling him a
racist and suggested that if people would stand up and call [the
Commonwealths Attorney] out, he would go right back in the corner. Judge
Stevens further accused the Commonwealths Attorney of trying to deceive the
people.
In later posts and letters allegedly written by Judge Stevens, he again
accused the Commonwealths Attorney of seeking to seat all-white jury
panels. In a November 3, 2015, post on his personal Facebook page, Judge
Stevens accused the Commonwealths Attorney of complaining to the
Kentucky Supreme Court about [his] entitlement to the all-white jury panel the
trial judge set asidea complaint that Judge Stevens claimed made the
Commonwealths Attorneys purpose readily apparent. Judge Stevens again
referred to the Commonwealths Attorney complaining he should have had an
all-white jury panel after losing a trial in a later Facebook comment, noting
that the action was poor form at the very least or, [a]t most, something much
more sinister.
Judge Stevens further questioned the Commonwealths Attorneys
motives by arguing that he requested the certification of law only because he
wants to and because he is seeking to influence a change in my approach and
decisions. Judge Stevens also posted on his personal Facebook page that
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[h]istory will unfavorably judge a prosecutor who loses a jury trial in which a
black man is acquitted and then appeals the matter claiming his entitlement to
an all-white jury panel. No matter the outcome, he will live in infamy.
All of these posts appeared before the parties mediation. The lengthy
mediation produced to the Chief Justice a report, signed by the parties, which
included a provision stating issues concerning the parties should no longer be
addressed by posts or comments on social media.3 The parties signed
mediation agreement further reduced to writing their promise that all
information disclosed during the mediation would be confidential, with the
exception of the written agreement, should they reach one.4
The Commonwealths Attorneys supplemental affidavit and motion to set
aside the mediation agreement alleges that Judge Stevens breached the
mediation agreements provisions on the use of social media. The supplemental
documents reference the Support Judge Olu Stevens Facebook page, which
included a post minutes after the ten-hour mediation session ended that
boasted of victory for Judge Stevens. The post included a photo of Judge
Stevens with the words I am back on the bench Thank You! imposed on top
of his image.
The Commonwealths Attorney further alleges that Judge Stevens
granted several interviews in the days following the mediation during which he
remained silent, nodded affirmatively, and/or failed to correct misinformation
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despite assurances to the contrary given privately to the Chief Justice and
during the course of the mediation.
The requirement that judges act fairly and impartially is manifest
throughout the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct. Equally plain is the
principle that judges, by the nature of their positions, are subject to greater
public scrutiny and restrictions on their conduct. As noted in the commentary
to Canon 2 of the Code:
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety
and appearance of impropriety. A judge must expect to be the
subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept
restrictions on the judges conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly.5
Judges are required to act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.6 The Code requires
judges to be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses,
lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.7 And a
judge is required, both by the Code and by statute, to disqualify himself in
proceedings where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including
situations where the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party
or a partys lawyer.8
Rules of the Kentucky Supreme Court (SCR) 4.300, Kentucky Code of Judicial
Conduct, commentary to Canon 2(A).
6 Id., at Canon 2(A).
7 Id., at Canon 2(B)(4).
8 Id., at Canon 2(E)(1)(a); see also, KRS 26A.015(a) and (e).
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Id., at Canon 1.
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This is evident by the operation of KRS 26A.020 in para materia with KRS 26A.015,
the general disqualification statute. KRS 26A.015 outlines when a judge should selfdisqualify; KRS 26A.020, on the other hand, operates as a backstop to provide the
Chief Justice the authority to disqualify a judge who may not self-disqualify.
12 See, e.g., John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605 (1947)
(discussing the origin of disqualification and its development from English common
law); Note, Disqualification of Judges Because of Bias and Prejudice, 51 YALE L.J. 169
(1941) (using disqualification and recusal interchangeably); see also, Bryan A. Garner,
Garners Dictionary of Legal Usage (3d. ed. 2011) (equating disqualify with recuse: A
disqualified judge must withdraw from hearing a case when one of the parties is, for
example, a close relative.).
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[n]o justice or judge shall be retired for disability or suspended without pay or
removed for good cause except upon a majority vote of members of the Judicial
Retirement and Removal Commission. Supreme Court Rule 4.020 sets forth
the jurisdiction of the Judicial Conduct Commission, which includes the
authority to impose various remedial and punitive disciplinary actions based
on a variety of offenses, including violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.13
Given the serious implications of imposing discipline on an elected
official, the Judicial Conduct Commission is charged with following specific
procedural rules to protect the due process rights of a judge.14 This includes
the judges right to defend against charges, to be represented by counsel, and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.15 A judge under investigation by the
Judicial Conduct Commission also has the right to subpoena witnesses and
produce evidence in support of the judges defense.16
None of these procedural processes exist under KRS 26A.020. This raises
significant constitutional concerns about the Chief Justices authority under
KRS 26A.020 to take the extraordinary step of disqualifying a judge from all
criminal cases.17 Such action potentially violates the judges due process rights
To the extent that Section 121 and SCR 4.020 can be viewed as conflicting with KRS
26A.020 (that is, if 26A.020 is read to permit the Chief Justice to remove a judge), the
specific controls the general. Section 121 and SCR 4.020 specifically deal with judicial
discipline and removal from office while KRS 26A.020 is a general disqualification
statute.
14 SCR 4.000, et seq.
15 SCR 4.210(1).
16 Id.
17 These concerns are universal, it seems, because no state in the country permits a
Chief Justice, acting alone, to remove a sitting judge. The federal government, of
course, does not give the Chief Justice such authority either. See 28 U.S.C. 455;
U.S. Const. Art. III. To the contrary, the normal procedure for removal involves a
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and limits the judges ability to defend his constitutional authority as a dulyelected state official.18 A motion to disqualify a judge in a specific case that is
limited in both time and scope does not diminish a judges ability to fulfill the
constitutional duties of the judges elected office. But the disqualification of a
judge from potentially hundreds of criminal cases pending now or in the future
amounts to the removal of the judge from a significant portion of the judges
docket and renders the judge unable to satisfy the constitutional obligations of
his elected office.19 The Commonwealths Attorneys request is not properly
before the Chief Justice under KRS 26A.020.
The Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge who receives information
indicating a substantial likelihood that another judge has committed a
violation of [the] Code to take appropriate action. The Chief Justice finds that
the Commonwealths Attorneys motion sufficiently details facts indicating a
substantial likelihood that Judge Stevens has committed violations of the Code
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(2)
(3)
______________________________
CHIEF JUSTICE
Copies to:
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