In Re: Argosino, 270 SCRA 26

18 Jul

FACTS:
Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking the Lawyers
Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys due to his conviction of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide from a hazing incident. Later in his sentence, he was granted probation by the court.
He filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying that he be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath
and sign the Rolls of Attorneys. As a proof of the required good moral character he now possess,
he presented no less than fifteen (15) certifications among others from: two (2) senators, five (5)
trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious order. In addition, he, together with the others
who were convicted, organized a scholarship foundation in honor of their hazing victim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath, sign the Rolls of
Attorneys, and practice law.
HELD:
YES. Petition granted.
RATIO:
Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent proof that he possessed the required
good moral character as required before taking the Lawyers Oath and to sign the Rolls of
Attorneys, the Supreme Court considered the premises that he is not inherently in bad moral
fiber. In giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Argosino was finally reminded that the Lawyers
Oath is not merely a ceremony or formality before the practice of law, and that the community
assistance he had started is expected to continue in serving the more unfortunate members of the
society.

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A.M. No. 712

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the
crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991.
The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him
in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino
and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such
bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This
plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen
(14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with
the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued
by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2)
years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise
him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the
1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his
then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc
Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however,
allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T.
Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note
that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of
Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed
three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone
who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The
essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following
excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent
to the applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North
Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the
court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is
something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name
which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through
association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself
as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such
character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of
least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it
is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as
counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every
man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient
of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's property,
reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the
Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice.
...
xxx xxx xxx 4
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926
(1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations
to deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of
circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the
wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a
high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of
bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute
examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for
admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive

at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as

to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission
to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source,
and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued
his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult
situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for
disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan: 6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen,
as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar
privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special
fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to
it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate
machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to
separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to
enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are
allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss: 7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair
private and professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to
an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an
examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a
test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they
may not only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to
assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or
assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of
good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which
they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law,
and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not
such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have
fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the
administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned,
than the possession of legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A.

[N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no
person to the practice of the law unless he covered an
upright moral character. The possession of this by the
attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to
the proper administration of justice than legal learning.
Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the
applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral
character the chances are that his character will remain
bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an
ornament to his great calling a curse instead of a
benefit to his community a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap,
instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than
inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his
admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to
the California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral
character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be
cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the
inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and
the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's
character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no
doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of
any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to
the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of
the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the
legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such
a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts
of law and in our legal system as we know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the
required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or

inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who
inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty
to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity
involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be
beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and
mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that
moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the
participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself
of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral
character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of
application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the
time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia,
of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation
for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly
since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court
how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the
deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit
relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for
admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers
and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this
Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
Footnotes
1 There is some indication that clerical error attended the grant of
permission to take the 1993 Bar Examinations. The En Banc Resolution of
this Court dated 24 August 1993 entitled "Re: Applications to Take the
1993 Bar Examinations," stated on page 2 thereof:

"The Court further Resolved to ALLOW the following

candidates with dismissed charges or complaints, to take
the 1993 Bar Examinations:
xxx xxx xxx
3349. Al C. Argosino
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
In fact, applicant Argosino had been convicted and sentenced and then
paroled.
2 G.A. Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics (1949), at p. 13; In Re Parazo,
82 Phil. 230, 242 (1948), reiterated in Tan v. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473,
481 (1992).
3 131 S.E. 661 (1926).
4 131 S.E. at 663.
5 69 Idaho 297, 206 P2d 528 (1949).
6 314 Mass 544, 50 NE 2d 785 (1943).
7 221 NY 81, 116 NE 782 (1917).
8 43 Mich 289, 5 NW 309 (1880).
9 In Re Farmer, supra at 663.
10 15 Cal 2d 71, 98 P2d 489 (1940).
11 174 Cal 467, 163 P 657 (1917).
12 See generally, Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc. (En Banc), 223 SCRA 378,
409 (1993).
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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXT

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH
RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The
Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the
death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September
1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty
to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas
and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11
February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment
of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for
probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6
April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's

discharge from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to
take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the
Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission
to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than
fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators,
five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner
likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been
established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts
of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of
Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the
death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore
was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the
neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of
superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the
accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on
Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees,
crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that
the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his
son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of
his son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped
would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely
demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for
admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion

of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict
intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in
the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this
Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble
profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from
taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers
which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the
reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law.
The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident
absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were
totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior,
[which] makes impossible a finding that the participant [herein
petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to
consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the
obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty.
Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic
experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in
cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but
due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a
struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven
the accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional
for a parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if
petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al
Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and
practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that

Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various
certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic
duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for
the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the
doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or
formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his
actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's
oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance
he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better
position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of
society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby
ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign
the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Resolution, p. 8.
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