Jeffrey Hudak V State Police
Jeffrey Hudak V State Police
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COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Jeffrey Hudak (Plaintiff), by his undersigned counsel, hereby
complains of the above-named defendants, as follows:
I.
Dickson was murdered, and Pennsylvania State Trooper Alex Douglass was
seriously injured, in a highly publicized shooting which took place at the
Pennsylvania State Police Barracks in Blooming Grove, PA.
3.
saying that every member of the Pennsylvania State Police was highly emotional,
understandably angry and strongly motivated to pursue and apprehend the person
or persons responsible for said attack.
4.
manpower and authority, Plaintiff was unlawfully arrested, without warrant, at his
mothers private residence in Scranton, PA on the morning of September 13, 2014,
less than twelve (12) hours after the attack in question.
6.
As set forth more fully below, the Pennsylvania State Police had
absolutely no legal basis for the warrantless arrest of Plaintiff for the murder of
Trooper Dickson and/or the attempted murder of Trooper Douglass in the morning
hours of September 13, 2014.
7.
and angry with the unspeakable ambush of their fellow troopers, they unfortunately
ignored, trampled and violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights during their zealous
and emotionally driven pursuit of the actual person responsible for same.
II.
PARTIES
8.
who, at all times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State
Police. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Clark acted under color of state
law, in his individual capacity, and within the course and scope of his duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, Defendant
Clark personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or
acquiesced in the misconduct complained of herein.
10.
all times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police.
At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Hnat acted under color of state law, in his
individual capacity, and within the course and scope of his duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, Defendant
Hnat personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or
acquiesced in the misconduct complained of herein.
11.
times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police. At
all times relevant hereto, John Doe #1 acted under color of state law, in his
individual capacity, and within the course and scope of his duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, John Doe #1
personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or acquiesced in
the misconduct complained of herein.
12.
times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police. At
all times relevant hereto, John Doe #2 acted under color of state law, in his
individual capacity, and within the course and scope of his duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, John Doe #2
personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or acquiesced in
the misconduct complained of herein.
13.
times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police. At
all times relevant hereto, Jane Doe #1 acted under color of state law, in her
individual capacity, and within the course and scope of her duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, Jane Doe #1
personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or acquiesced in
the misconduct complained of herein.
14.
times relevant hereto, served as a trooper with the Pennsylvania State Police. At
all times relevant hereto, Jane Doe #2 acted under color of state law, in her
individual capacity, and within the course and scope of her duties as a
Pennsylvania State Trooper. Moreover, at all times relevant hereto, Jane Doe #2
personally participated in, directed, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or acquiesced in
the misconduct complained of herein.
15.
Defendants Clark, Hnat, John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Jane Doe #1 and
This Court possesses jurisdiction over the claims set forth herein
because a substantial part of the events and/or omissions giving rise to the claims
set forth herein occurred in this district.
IV.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
18.
littered with multiple marked and unmarked law enforcement cars and sport utility
vehicles.
20.
enforcement officers, some or all of whom possessed SWAT type weapons and/or
were dressed in SWAT type gear.
21.
response to the doorbell, Plaintiff was stunned when two (2) Pennsylvania State
Police Troopers (one female and one male) confronted and accosted Plaintiff at
gunpoint with the use of what appeared to be a semi-automatic assault rifle. Those
troopers are referenced herein as John Doe #1 and Jane Doe #1.
22.
Plaintiff to come out of the house with his hands up, and then immediately placed
Plaintiff in handcuffs with his hands behind his back.
23.
actions, the troopers then quickly escorted and placed Plaintiff in the back seat of a
State Police cruiser, at which time Plaintiff was transported in a parade of law
enforcement vehicles to the Pennsylvania State Police Barracks in Dunmore, PA.
24.
at all times supervised by another fully armed and currently unidentified female
trooper who sat directly beside Plaintiff. That female trooper is identified herein as
Jane Doe #2, and the driver of the vehicle is identified herein as John Doe #2.
25.
removed Plaintiff from the back seat of the car, and held on to his handcuffed arms
while they walked him into the barracks.
26.
In fact, Plaintiff and his family would also learn that the Pennsylvania
State Police released Plaintiffs identity and disseminated his photograph to the
media and general public prior to his unlawful arrest and interrogation.
28.
Once inside in the barracks, the troopers brought Plaintiff back into a
locked interrogation room, where he was met by Defendants Clark and Hnat.
29.
Prior to his arrival at the barracks, Plaintiff still had absolutely no idea
Defendants Clark and Hnat, and to his utter shock and surprise, it soon became
apparent to Plaintiff that he was being directly accused of the murder of Trooper
Dickson and the attempted murder of Trooper Douglass.
31.
Although the troopers finally allowed Plaintiff to use the restroom and
to call his sister, they only did so after they compelled Plaintiff to provide them
with a DNA sample and undergo gunpowder residue testing.
33.
Moreover, Plaintiff was not allowed to use the restroom without being
detained and accompanied by one of the troopers, who stood directly beside
Plaintiff the entire time, and even refused to allow Plaintiff to wash his hands.
34.
And while Plaintiff was eventually allowed to call his sister, he was
not allowed to do so in private but, again, only while still detained in the presence
and under the supervision of the troopers.
35.
To make matters worse, Plaintiff would learn from his sister that, after
being taken away by the state police, she immediately contacted and arranged for
an attorney, Bernard J. Brown, Esquire, to represent and protect Plaintiffs interests
in this matter.
36.
In fact, Plaintiff learned from his sister that Attorney Brown was on
site at the Dunmore Barracks for several hours waiting to see and counsel Plaintiff.
37.
went to the front desk, presented his business card, and alerted those present to his
representation of, and demand to see, Plaintiff.
38.
Not only did the troopers deny Attorney Brown access to Plaintiff, but
they also intentionally failed and/or refused to even notify Plaintiff of Attorney
Browns presence.
39.
Due to his ongoing concern for Plaintiffs rights and the troopers
intentional refusal to even notify Plaintiff of his presence, Attorney Brown had
separate counsel, Robert M. Buttner, Esquire, prepare and fax a letter to the Pike
County District Attorney, Raymond Tonkin, Esquire.
41.
In that letter, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and
Attorney Browns presence in violation of Plaintiffs rights under both the United
States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.
42.
Attorney contact said troopers and immediately advise them to alert Plaintiff to
Attorney Browns presence. (See Exhibit A).
43.
It was only late that afternoon after the District Attorney finally
intervened at the insistence of Plaintiffs counsel that Defendants Clark and Hnat
finally discontinued their relentless, unjustified and/or unlawful seizure and/or
interrogation of Plaintiff.
44.
At no point prior thereto was Plaintiff told or given any indication that
he was free to leave, or that he could refuse any of law enforcements demands or
instructions or otherwise terminate the encounter and/or interrogation.
45.
would believe that he was free to leave. On the contrary, Plaintiff would have been
physically restrained if he had refused to accompany Defendants or try to escape
their custody.
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47.
to follow Plaintiff everywhere for a period of days after his unlawful arrest and/or
interrogation.
COUNT I
42 U.S.C. 1983
Unlawful Seizure/Wrongful Arrest/False Imprisonment
Plaintiff v. Defendants
48.
more fully above, the actions of Defendants on September 13, 2014 constitute a
seizure and arrest of Plaintiff within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
50.
for the murder of Trooper Dickson and/or the attempted murder of Trooper
Douglass on September 13, 2014.
53.
cause in that the facts and circumstances available to the Defendants at that time
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and arrest Plaintiff under the facts and circumstances available to them at the time.
If they did, Defendants would have prepared an affidavit of probable cause and
secured an arrest warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate judge following
the proper process and procedure.
55.
Defendants took this unlawful action against Plaintiff based solely on,
at best, the mere suspicion that Plaintiff must have committed these brutal acts
because Plaintiffs wife, who was separated from Plaintiff for approximately a year
and a half, was in an alleged relationship with Trooper Douglass. This wholly
conclusory accusation, gross innuendo and/or rank speculation -- bereft of any
supporting fact, evidence and/or detail whatsoever -- does not, and cannot, form
the basis for probable cause for Defendants actions.
56.
probable cause as aforesaid was clearly established and known by Defendants at all
times relevant to the conduct giving rise this action and, therefore, Defendants are
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not entitled to qualified immunity. Clearly, an arrest without probable cause is,
and has been, a constitutional violation actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
57.
aforesaid was willful, wanton, malicious and taken with a reckless or callous
disregard for Plaintiffs clearly established constitutional rights.
58.
acted in their individual capacities and under color of state law. Moreover, each of
the Defendants personally directed, participated, assisted, knew of, ratified and/or
acquiesced in said conduct.
59.
aforesaid, Plaintiff has suffered an unlawful seizure and restraint of his liberty in
violation of his civil rights under the Fourth Amendment, as well as severe
emotional distress, mental anguish, inconvenience, personal humiliation,
embarrassment and/or damage to his name and reputation.
60.
and arrest of Plaintiff were highly and widely publicized by the national and
international print and/or news media. To make matters worse, Plaintiffs name
and photograph quickly appeared on social media, in multiple newspaper articles
and/or televised news broadcasts for the whole world to see.
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61.
and other relevant search criteria, the story surrounding the false accusations
against Plaintiff in connection with the murder of Trooper Dickson and the
attempted murder of Trooper Douglass still appear.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment in this action in his favor and
against Defendants, jointly and/or severally, together with compensatory and
punitive damages, interest, costs of suit, attorneys fees and such other and further
relief to which this Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
WRIGHT & REIHNER, P.C.
By: /s/ George A. Reihner
George A. Reihner
148 Adams Avenue
Scranton, PA 18503
(570) 961-1166
(570) 961-1199 fax
Dated: February 18, 2016
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