Phoenix v. Dionisio

G.R. No.
L-65295: Phoenix Construction v IAC and Dionisio

FACTS:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975 at about 1:30 a.m. private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his
way home he lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his
boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had
taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of
General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down
General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on
"bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck,
owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right
hand side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward
which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to
the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There
were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear.
The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver,
with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following
morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his
car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including
some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
ISSUE:
1.
WON Carbonels negligence or Dionisios negligence is the proximate cause of the accident
2.
Is last clear chance applicable?
3.
WON Phoenix is liable
HELD:
1.
Carbonel
a.
It is Carbonels negligence. the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an
indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an
probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices.
The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna
Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence,
although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause. What the Petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a
foreseeable consequent manner which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck
driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the
truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were,
the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris
vinculum of liability.
b.
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause"
of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover
damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts
2.
No. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence the plaintiff's or the
defendant's was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in
chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The
relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of
the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or
omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the
community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility
for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become
necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To accept this
proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable
consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of
living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to
weaken the very bonds of society.
3.
Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix 16 in
supervising its employees properly and adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in our
opinion, that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence. The circumstance that Phoenix had
allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following
morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the
dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of
Phoenix.
Doctrine:
Forseeable intervening cause: If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be
negligence among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason

Phoenix v. Dionisio

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Phoenix v. Dionisio

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G.R. No.

L-65295: Phoenix Construction v IAC and Dionisio

Is last clear chance applicable?

WON Phoenix is liable

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