Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Labor Relations-Compilation of Doctrines
Labor Relations-Compilation of Doctrines
Part One
Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., 88 SCRA
294(1979)
Constitutional law; Police power; It is not correct to say that exceptional circumstances must exist before
police power can be exercised over and above the non-impairment clause. The test is reasonableness of the
police measure.True it is that, as counsel for the centrals contend, police power cannot be resorted to
just any time the legislature wishes, but it is not correct to say that it is indispensable that exceptional
circumstances must exist before police power can be exercised. As very aptly pointed out by the able
amicus curiae, Attys. Taada, Teehankee and Carreon, gone are the days when courts could be found
adhering to the doctrine that interference with contracts can only be justified by exceptional
circumstances, for the test of validity today under the due process clause, even in the case of legislation
interfering with existing contracts, is reasonableness, as held by this Honorable Supreme Court in the case
of People vs. Zeta. In other words, freedom from arbitrariness, capriciousness and whimsicality is the test
of constitutionality. (p. 17, Brief of Amicus Curiae in Behalf of SilaySaravia Planters Association, Attys.
Taada, Teehankee and Carreon.) And there is not enough showing here of unreasonableness in the
legislation in question.
Same; Same; Social justice; Republic Act 809 is constitutional and justifiable under the social justice
concept of the Constitution.But it is not police power alone that sustains the validity of the statutory
provision in dispute. Having in view its primary objective to promote the interests of labor, it can never be
possible that the State would be bereft of constitutional authority to enact legislations of its kind. Here, in
the Philippines, whenever any government measure designed for the advancement of the working class is
impugned on constitutional grounds and shadows of doubt are cast over the scope of the States
prerogative in respect thereto, the imperious mandate of the social justice ideal consecrated in our
fundamental laws, both the old and the new, asserts its majesty, calling upon the courts to accord utmost
consideration to the spirit animating the act assailed, not just for the sake of enforcing the explicit social
justice provisions of the article on Declaration of Principles and State Policies, but more fundamentally,
to serve the sacred cause of human dignity, which is actually what lies at the core of those constitutional
precepts as it is also the decisive element always in the determination of any controversy between capital
and labor.
Same; Equal protection; Sugar Act; Republic Act 809 does not violate the equal protection clause.Anent
the indictment that the law discriminates between the planters in the big milling districts, on the one hand,
and those in small milling districts, on the other, by providing for bigger shares to the planters in the
former and smaller shares to those in the latter, it appears to Us to be obvious that as the standard used by
the legislature is the amount of production in each district, naturally, the planters adhered to the bigger
centrals should be given bigger shares, considering that the more a central produces, the bigger would be
its margin of profit which can be correspondingly cut for the purpose of enlarging the share of the
planters. Understandably, the smaller centrals may not be able to afford to have their shares reduced
substantially, which is evidently the reason why the law has not been made applicable to centrals having a
production of less than 150,000 piculs a year.
Same; Same; Same; Same.Much less is there substantial basis for the claim that it is within the
constitutional proscription under discussion for the Act to discriminate against the workers in the cen-trals
by not including them among the components of labor in the apportionment of the fruits of their joint
efforts with the planters. We have looked into the corresponding factual premises of this contention of the
Central relative to the equal protection clause with the care they deserve, and We are of the considered
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
opinion that the criterion on which the provisions in issue is predicated precludes the conclusion of
capricious and arbitrary discrimination which the Charter abhors. The laborers in the centrals perform
work the nature of which is entirely different from that of those working in the farms, thereby requiring
the application to them of other laws advantageous to labor, which, upon the other hand, do not
correspondingly favor plantation or purely agricultural manpower. Besides, there is no denying the fact
that as industrial or semi-industrial workers, the laborers in the centrals, even the farmhands therein, are
being more or less sufficiently taken care of under other existing laws and the prevailing terms and
conditions of their employment, for which reason there is no known nor demonstrated demand, much less
perceptible urgent need, to bring them under the coverage of the instant legislative bounty.
Same; Republic Act 809 may be unconstitutional if the inevitable result of applying its pro-labor
provisions is to favor the planters and not the sugar laborers whom it purports to protect.Viewed in this
manner, the Act would appear to be selfdefeating in so far as the laborers are concerned, but efficacious in
providing what the PLANTERS desire for themselves, contrary to its true objective of increasing the share
of the planters only as a means of ameliorating the situation of the laborers. Parenthetically, the Central
insists that this was actually the real scheme of the particular legislators who framed the lawto compel
the centrals to augment the share of the planters, and not really to improve the lot of the laborers. Indeed,
if such is the inevitable result of applying the provisions in question, there is ample ground for considering
them as violative of the Constitution.
Same; Sugar Act; Any increase in the participation given to planters in contracts executed after the
approval of R.A. 809 must be shared with laborers of the planters in the manner provided in Section 9 of
R.A. 809, even if by reason of the number of such contracts, Section 1 would not apply.If We declare
the Act unconstitutional upon the ground that it is an unwarranted invasion of the freedom of contract as
between the millers and the planters, the deplorable condition of the laborers in the sugar farms would
remain as it was before its enactment. On the other hand, if We sustain its validity but at the same time
apply it literally and sanction a construction thereof that would enable the centrals and their planters to
enter into agreements, under which the latter would have to be given increased participation without any
obligation to share the same with their laborers, the Court would be a party to a conspiracy to virtually
defraud labor of the benefits, the grant of which is precisely its sole redeeming feature to save it from
unconstitutionality. For it is clear for anyone to see that without the Act, under the conditions prevailing in
the industry, the planters would have no means of persuading, much less compelling, the centrals or
millers to give them any increase in their respective shares, whereas, with this law, faced with the prospect
of being forced to grant the planters their proportion of sharing prescribed by it, if no written contracts
were to be signed by them with the majority of the planters, naturally, the centrals would readily agree to
give the planters the increase they want,which could be less than that stipulated in the Act and yet be
exactly what the planters would get under it if the majority of them were not to have written contracts with
the central. In which eventuality, and should we uphold the proposed strictly literal construction of the
Act, the laborers would be left holding the proverbial empty bag. In that way, the interests of the capitalist
components of the industry, the millers and planters, would be served by the compulsive effect of the law
but labor would not be assured of receiving even the crumbs, when the truth is that the legislation would
have no reason for being as a constitutional and enforceable statute if it did not include mandatory
provisions designed to lift them from misery. The Court emphatically refuses to have anything to do with
such an unconscionable posture vis-a-vis the fate of labor. x xx [Asociacion de Agricultores de TalisaySilay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., 88 SCRA 294(1979)]
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Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Same; Same; Same; NASECO did not comply with the guidelines in effecting Credos dismissal.
In the case at bar, NASECO did not comply with these guidelines in effecting Credos dismissal. Although
she was apprised and given the chance to explain her side of the charges filed against her, this chance
was given so perfunctorily, thus rendering illusory Credos right to security of tenure. That Credo was not
given ample opportunity to be heard and to defend herself is evident from the fact that the compliance
with the injunction to apprise her of the charges filed against her and to afford her a chance to prepare for
her defense was dispensed in only a day. This is not effective compliance with the legal requirements
aforementioned.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; NASECO was already bent on terminating her services when she was
informed on 1 December 1983 of the charges against her.The fact also that the Notice of Termination of
Credos employment (or the decision to dismiss her) was dated 24 November 1983 and made effective 1
December 1983 shows that NASECO was already bent on terminating her services when she was
informed on 1 December 1983 of the charges against her, and that any hearing which NASECO thought of
affording her after 24 November 1983 would merely be pro forma or an exercise in futility.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Credos non-compliance with Lorens memorandum did not
warrant the severe penalty of dismissal.Besides, Credos mere non-compliance with Lorens
memorandum regarding the entry procedures in the companys Statement of Billings Adjustment did not
warrant the severe penalty of dismissal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Credos previous and repeated acts of
insubordination, discourtesy and sarcasm towards her superior officers are deemed to have been condoned
by NASECO.Of course, in justifying Credos termination of employment, NASECO claims as
additional lawful causes for dismissal Credos previous and repeated acts of insubordination, discourtesy
and sarcasm towards her superior officers, alleged to have been committed from 1980 to July 1983. If
such acts of misconduct were indeed committed by Credo, they are deemed to have been condoned by
NASECO. For instance, sometime in 1980, when Credo allegedly reacted in a scandalous manner and
raised her voice in a discussion with NASECOs Acting head of the Personnel Administration, no
disciplinary measure was taken or meted against her. Nor was she even reprimanded when she allegedly
talked in a shouting or yelling manner with the Acting Manager of NASECOs Building Maintenance
and Services Department in 1980, or when she allegedly shouted at NASECOs Corporate Auditor in
front of his subordinates displaying arrogance and unruly behavior in 1980, or when she allegedly
shouted at NASECOs Internal Control Consultant in 1981. But then, in sharp contrast to NASECOs
penchant for ignoring the aforesaid acts of misconduct, when Credo committed frequent tardiness in
August and September 1983, she was reprimanded.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reinstatement is proper for the acts or
omissions for which Credos employment was sought to be legally terminated were insufficiently proved.
Considering that the acts or omissions for which Credos employment was sought to be legally
terminated were insufficiently proved, as to justify dismissal, reinstatement is proper. For absent the
reason which gave rise to [the employees] separation from employment, there is no intention on the part
of the employer to dismiss the employee concerned. And, as a result of having been wrongfully
dismissed, Credo is entitled to three (3) years of backwages without deduction and qualification.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Ruling in National Housing Corporation vs. Juco that employees of
government-owned or controlled corporations are governed by the civil service law should not be given
retroactive effect.It would appear that, in the interest of justice, the holding in said case should not be
given retroactive effect, that is, to cases that arose before its promulgation on 17 January 1985. To do
otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated, because under the same
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Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Same; Same; Where the cause of separation is more serious than mere inefficiency, the award is not
justified.But where the cause of the separation is more serious that mere inefficiency, the generosity of
the law must be more discerning. There is no doubt it is compassionate to give separation pay to a
salesman if he is dismissed for his inability to fill his quota but surely he does not deserve such generosity
if his offense is misappropriation of the receipt of his sales. This is no longer mere incompetence but clear
dishonesty. A security guard found sleeping on the job is doubtless subject to dismissal but may be
allowed separation pay since his conduct, while inept, is not depraved. But if he was in fact not really
sleeping but sleeping with a prostitute during his tour of duty and in the company premises, the situation is
changed completely. This is not only inefficiency but immorality and the grant of separation pay would be
entirely unjustified.
Same; Same; Same; Henceforth, separation pay shall be allowed only in those instances where the
employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral
character; Where the reason for the valid dismissal is habitual insubordination or an offense involving
moral turpitude, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay or
financial assistance.We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social
justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious
misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for
example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations
with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, of
financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A contrary rule would have the effect of rewarding rather than
punishing the erring employee for his offense.A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues,
have the effect of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not
agree that the punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the
wrong he has committed. Of course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the company is
granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely that he will commit a similar
offense in his next employment because he thinks he can expect a like leniency if he is again found out.
This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to do labor in general any good as it will encourage the
infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the protection and concern of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing.
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed
by the underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense.
Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a
rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice cannot be permitted to be the refuge of scoundrels
any more than can equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke social
justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives blameless and not simply because they
happen to be poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have
proved they are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes
of their own character.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Grant of separation pay to the private respondent who has been
dismissed for dishonesty, is justified; Reason.Applying the above considerations, we hold that the grant
of separation pay in the case at bar is unjustified. The private respondent has been dismissed for
dishonesty, as found by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC and as she herself has impliedly
admitted. The fact that she has worked with the PLDT for more than a decade, if it is, to be considered at
all, should be taken against her as it reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty that she should have strengthened
instead of betraying during all of her 10 years of service with the company. If regarded as a justification
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Atty. Gutierrez
representative of all the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. The law clearly
contemplates all the employees, not only some of them. As much as possible then, there is to be no
unwarranted reduction in the number of those taking part in a certification election, even under the guise
that in the meanwhile, which may take some time, some of those who are employees could possibly lose
such status, by virtue of a pending unfair labor practice case.
Same; Same; Discretion of Court of Industrial Relations on whether or not to allow the holding of a
certification election.The prevailing principle then on questions as to certification, as well as in other
labor cases, is that only where there is a showing of clear abuse of discretion would the Supreme Court be
warranted in reversing the actuation of the Court of Industrial Relations. [B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc.
vs. B. F. Goodrich (Marikina Factory) Confidential & Salaried Employees Union-NATU, 49 SCRA
532(1973)]
Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 44 SCRA
350(1972)
Court of Industrial Relations; Jurisdiction; Power to issue labor injunctions.There can be no injunction
issued against any strike except in only one instance, that is, when a labor dispute arises in an industry
indispensable to the rational interest and such dispute is certified by the President of the Philippines to the
Court of Industrial Relations in compliance with Section 10 of Republic Act 875. An injunction in an
uncertified case must be based on the strict requirements of Section 9(d) of Republic Act 875; the purpose
of such an injunction is not to enjoin the strike itself, but only unlawful activities.
Same; Findings of fact; When subject to review.In ignoring strong evidence coming from the witnesses
of the Company damaging to its case as well as that adduced by the Association also damaging to the
Companys case, the respondent court clearly and gravely abused its discretion thereby justifying this
Court to review or alter its factual findings.
Strike; When matter of illegality thereof rendered moot and academic.The return-to-work agreement is
in the nature of a partial compromise between the parties and, more important, a labor contract. When the
company unqualifiedly bound itself in the return-to-work agreement that all employees will be taken back
with the same employee status prior to April 22, 1965, the Company thereby made manifest its intention
and conformity not to proceed with Case No. 1484-MC(1) relating to the illegality of the strike incident.
While there is a reservation in the return-to-work agreement that all court cases now pending shall
continue, including CIR Case No. 1484-MC, the same is to be construed bearing in mind the conduct and
intention of the parties. The failure to mention Case No. 1484-MC (1) while specifically mentioning Case
No. 1484-MC bars the Company from proceeding with the former especially in the light of the additional
specific stipulation that the strikers would be taken back with the same employee status prior to the strike
on April 22, 1965.
Republic Act 875; Unfair labor practices of employer; Statutory provisions construed liberally in favor of
employees.Substantial, credible and convincing evidence appear on record establishing beyond doubt
the charge of unfair labor practices in violation of Section 4(a), Nos. (1), (3), (4), (5) and (6), of Republic
Act 875. And pursuant to the mandate of Article 24 of the Civil Code of the Philippines that courts must
be vigilant for the protection of one at a disadvantageand here the Association appears to be at a
disadvantage in its relations with the Companyadequate affirmative relief, including backwages, must
be awarded to the strikers. It is high-time and imperative that in order to attain the laudable objectives of
Republic Act 875 calculated to safeguard the rights of employees, the provisions thereof should be
liberally construed in favor of employees and strictly against the employer, unless otherwise intended by
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Labor law; A certification proceeding is not a litigation, but an investigation of a non-adversary, factfinding character.This Courthas always stressed that a certification proceeding is not a litigation, in the
sense in which this term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a non-adversary, fact-finding
character in which the Court of Industrial Relations plays the part of a disinterested investigator seeking
merely to ascertain the desires of employees as to the matter of their representation. Such being the nature
of a certification proceeding, we find no cogent reason that should prevent the industrial court, in such a
proceeding, from inquiring into and satisfying itself about matter which may be relevant and crucial,
though seemingly beyond the purview of such a proceeding, to the complete realization of the well-known
purposes of a certification case.
Same; Lexical definition of employer.The lexical definition of "employer" is one who employs; one
who uses; one who engages or keeps in service. To employ is to provide work and pay for the service, to
engage one's service.
Same; Industrial Court should be allowed ample discretion in securing disclosure of facts in a certification
case.Such a situation may arise, as it did in the case at bar, where a group of pilots of a particular airline
anticipating their forced retirement or resignation on account of strained relations with the airline arising
from unfulfilled economic demands, decided to adopt an amendment to their organizations constitution
and by-laws in order to enable them to retain their membership standing therein even after the termination
of their employment with the employer concerned. The industrial court definitely should be allowed ample
discretion to secure a disclosure of circumstances which will enable it to act fairly in a certification case.
Same.An employer is one who employs the services of others; one for whom employees work and who
pays their wages or salaries. An employer includes any person acting in the interest of an employer
directly or indirectly. A university that engaged the services of professors, provided them work and paid
them compensation or salary for their services is an employer even if it considers itself a mere "lessee" of
the services of said professors.
Same; When adoption of amendment to a unions by-laws is legal.We have made a careful examination
of the records of L-33705 and we find the adoption of the resolution introducing the questioned
amendment to be in substantial compliance with the ALPAP constitution and by-laws. Indeed, there is no
refutation of the fact that 221 out of the 270 members of ALPAP did cast their votes in favor of the said
amendment on October 30, 1970 at the ALPAP general membership meeting.
Same; Industrial establishments.Section 2(c) of the Industrial Peace Act does not state that the
employers included in the definition of the term "employer" are only and exclusively "industrial
establishments". On the contrary, the term embraces all employers except those specifically excluded
therein.
Same; The term labor organization as defined by RA 875 is not limited to the employees of a particular
employer.This Court cannot likewise subscribe to the restrictive interpretation made by the court below
of the term labor oganization, which Section 2(e) of R.A. 875 defines as any union or association of
employees which exists, in whole or in part, for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with
employers concerning terms and conditions of employment. The absence of the condition which the court
below would attach to the statutory concept of a labor organization, as being limited to the employees of a
particular employer, is quite evident from the law. The emphasis of the Industrial Peace Act is clearly on
the purposes for which a union or association of employees is established rather thanthat membership
therein should be limited only to the employees of a particular employer. Trite to say, under Section 2(h)
of R.A. 875 representative is defined as including a legitimate labor organization or any officer or
agent of such organization, whether or not employed by the employer or employee whom he represents.
It cannot be overemphasized likewise that a labor dispute can exists regardless of whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
Same.The Industrial Peace Act does not refer exclusively to industrial establishments and does not
confine its application thereto.
Same.For purposes of the Industrial Peace Act, a university is an industrial establishment because it is
operated for profit and it employs persons who work to earn a living. The term "industry", for purposes of
labor laws, should be given a broad meaning so as to cover all enterprises which are operated for profit
and which engage the services of persons who work to earn a living.
Same; Employee under the Industrial Peace Act.Under section 2(d) of the Industrial Peace Act, the term
"employee" embraces not only those who are usually and ordinarily considered as employees but also
those who have ceased as employees as a consequence of a labor dispute. An employee is one who is
engaged in the service of another; who performs services for another; who works for salary or wages.
Same.Professors and instructors, who are under contract to teach particular courses and are paid for
their services, are employees under the Industrial Peace Act. Teachers are employees.
Same.Striking professors and instructors of a university are employees because striking employees
retain their status as employees. Feati University vs. Bautista, 18 SCRA 1191(1966)
Air Line Pilots Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 76 SCRA 274(1977)
Same; When election of a set of officers by minority group in a union not binding.Moreover, this Court
cannot hold as valid and binding the election of Ben Hur Gomez as President of ALPAP. He was elected at
a meeting of only 45 ALPAP members called just one day after the election of Felix C. Gaston as
President of ALPAP who, as shown, received a majority of 180 votes out of a total membership of 270.
Same; A labor union may authorize a segment thereof to bargain collectively with the employer and in the
exercise of such authority to have custody of the unions fund and office and make use of the unions
name.In our opinion, it is perfectly within the powers and prerogatives of a labor organization, through
its duly elected officers, to authorized a segment of that organization to bargain collectively with a
particular employer, particularly where those constituting the segment share a common and
distinguishable interest, apart from the rest of their fellow union members, on matters that directly affect
the terms and conditions of their particular employment. As the circumstances pertinent to the case at bar
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Strike as used in the statute means temporary stoppage of work.Parenthetically, contrary to
ALPAP (Gaston)s argument that the pilots retirement/resignation was a legitimate concerted activity,
citing Section 2(1) of the Industrial Peace Act which defines strike as any temporary stoppage of work
by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial dispute, it is worthwhile to observe that
as the law defines it, a strike means only a temporary stoppage of work. What the mentioned pilots did,
however, cannot be considered, in the opinion of this Court, as mere temporary stoppage of work. What
they contemplated was evidently a permanent cut-off of employment relationship with their erstwhile
employer, the Philippine Air Lines.
Same; Same; A legitimate concerted activity cannot be used to circumvent judicial orders or be tossed
around like a plaything.A legitimate concerted activity is a matter that cannot be used to circumvent
judicial orders or be tossed around like a plaything. Definitely, neither employers nor employees should be
allowed to make a judicial authority a now-youve-got-it-now-you-dont affair. The courts cannot
hopefully effectuate and vindicate the sound policies of the Industrial Peace Act and all our labor laws if
employees, particularly those who on account of their highly advance technical background and relatively
better life status are far above the general working class spectrum, will be permitted to defy and invoke the
jurisdiction of the courts whenever the alternative chosen will serve to feather their pure and simple
economic demands. Air Line Pilots Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Industrial Relations,
76 SCRA 274(1977)
Lopez Sugar Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 247 SCRA 1(1995)
Labor Standards; Legitimate Labor Organization; Certification Election; Petitioning union in a
certification election must be a legitimate labor organization in good standing.Indeed, the law did not
reduce the Med-Arbiter to an automaton which can instantly be set to impulse by the mere filing of a
petition for certification election. He is still tasked to satisfy himself that all the conditions of the law are
met, and among the legal requirements is that the petitioning union must be a legitimate labor organization
in good standing.
Same; Same; Same; The local chapter, as its principal, should also be a legitimate labor organization in
good standing.The petition for certification election, in the case at bench, was filed by the NACUSIPTUCP, a national labor organization duly registered with the DOLE under Registration Certificate No.
FED-402-6390-IP. The legitimate status of NACUSIP-TUCP might be conceded; being merely, however,
an agent for the local organization (the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter), the
federations bona fide status alone would not suffice. The local chapter, as its principal, should also be a
legitimate labor organization in good standing. Accordingly, in Progressive Development, we elucidated:
In the case of union affiliation with a federation, the documentary requirements are found in Rule 11,
Section 3(e), Book V of the Implementing Rules, which we again quote as follows: (c) The local or
chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and maintain a constitution and by-laws, set of
officers and books of accounts.For reporting purposes, the procedure governing the reporting of
independently registered unions, federations or national unions shall be observed.
Same; Same; Bargaining Power; The policy of the law in conferring greater bargaining power upon labor
unions must be balanced with the policy of providing preventive measures against the commission of
fraud.Since the procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions refers to the
certification and attestation requirements contained in Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that the
constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts submitted by the local and chapter must
likewise comply with these requirements. The same rationale for requiring the submission of duly
subscribed documents upon union registration exists in the case of union affiliation. Moreover, there is
greater reason to exact compliance with the certification and attestation requirements because, as
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Atty. Gutierrez
the mass action on April 30, 1985 to press for their wages and other benefits. What transpired then was
clearly a strike, for the cessation of work by concerted action resulted from a labor dispute.
Same; Same; Arbiter correctly ruled that the strike was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements
of Article 264 paragraph (c) and (f) of the Labor Code.The complaint before the Labor Arbiter involved
the legality of said strike. The Arbiter correctly ruled that the strike was illegal for failure to comply with
the requirements of Article 264 (now Article 263) paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code.
Same; Same; The language of the law leaves no room for doubt that the cooling-off period and the sevenday strike ban after the strikevote report were intended to be mandatory.As we stated in the case of
National Federation of Sugar Workers v. Ovejera, the language of the law leaves no room for doubt that
the cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban after the strike-vote report were intended to be
mandatory.
Same; Same; The strike on April 30, 1985 was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of the
law.From the foregoing, it is patent that the strike on April 30, 1985 was illegal for failure to comply
with the requirements of the law.
Same; Same; Distinction between workers and union officers who participated in illegal strikes.A union
officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost their
employment status. An ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal
strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other
hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other
workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike.
Same; Dismissal; Reinstatement; An employee is entitled to reinstatement and to his full backwages when
he is unjustly dismissed.Under the law, an employee is entitled to reinstatement and to his full
backwages when he is unjustly dismissed.
Same; Same; Same; Reinstatement and backwages are separate and distinct reliefs given to an illegally
dismissed employee.Rein-statement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been
removed or separated. Reinstatement and backwages are separate and distinct reliefs given to an illegally
dismissed employee.
Same; Same; Well-settled is it that separation pay shall be allowed only in those instances where the
employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral
character.Hence, an employee dismissed for causes other than those cited above is not entitled to
separation pay. Well-settled is it that separation pay shall be allowed only in those instances where the
employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral
character.
Same; Same; Backwages; Backwages is a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of
unlawful dismissal.Back-wages, on the other hand, is a form of relief that restores the income that was
lost by reason of unlawful dismissal.
Same; Same; Same; There must generally be unjust or illegal dismissal from work, before reinstatement
and backwages may be granted.It is clear from the foregoing summary of legal provisions and
jurisprudence that there must generally be unjust or illegal dismissal from work, before reinstatement and
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
judicial order the legality of which is beyond dispute do not have to remind the court of their right to get
compensated of their lost earnings upon their actual reinstatement. Award thereof should come as a matter
of course. For Us not to rule on this point now only to leave it for action by the National Labor Relations
Board and thereby give rise to another possible appeal to Us is to unnecessarily lengthen even more the
tortuous road already travelled by respondents in their effort to get what has been rightfully due them
since years ago. We would be recreant to our constitutional duty to give protection to labor that way.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court may set fix amounts of backwages without any reference to deductions.
As to the amount of backwages, the Court applies the precedent recently set in Mercury Drug Co. vs.
CIR (L-23357, April 30, 1974, applied in NASSCO vs. CIR, L-31852 & L-32724, June 28, 1974 and
Almira, et al. vs. B.F. Goodrich Phil, Inc., L-34974, July 25, 1974.) of fixing the amount of backwages to
a just and reasonable level without qualification or deduction so as to avoid protracted delay in the
execution of the award for backwages due to extended hearings and unavoidable delays and difficulties
encountered in determining the earnings of the laid-off employees ordered to be reinstated with
backwages during the pendency of the case for purposes of deducting the same from the gross backwages
awarded. [Radio Communications of the Phil. vs. Phil. Communications Electronics & Electricity
Workers Federation (FCWF), 65 SCRA 82(1975)]
Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, 141 SCRA 179(1986)
Labor Law; Unfair Labor Practice; Collective Bargaining Agreement; Collective bargaining, concept of.
Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a collective agreement, is one of the
democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to stabilize the relation between labor and
management and to create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of
the employer and the Union and is characterized as a legal obligation. So much so that Article 249, par. (g)
of the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to
wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting
any grievance or question arising under such an agreement and executing a contract incorporating such
agreement, if requested by either party.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Preconditions for setting in motion mechanics of collective bargaining.
While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain, the employer, however, is not under any legal duty
to initiate contract negotiation. The mechanics of collective bargaining is set in motion only when the
following jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely, (1) possession of the status of majority
representation of the employees representative in accordance with any of the means of selection or
designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of majority representation; and (3) a demand to
bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code . . . . all of which preconditions are
undisputedly present in the instant case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Companys refusal to make counter-proposal to the unions proposed collective
bargaining agreement, an indication of its bad faith.We are in total conformity with respondent NLRCs
pronouncement that petitioner Company is GUILTY of unfair labor practice. It has been indubitably
established that (1) respondent Union was a duly certified bargaining agent; (2) it made a definite request
to bargain, accompanied with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement, to the Company
not only once but twice which were left unanswered and unacted upon; and (3) the Company made no
counter proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate. A
Companys refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may
indicate bad faith and this is specially true where the Unions request for a counter proposal is left
unanswered. Even during the period of compulsory arbitration before the NLRC, petitioner Companys
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
emergency leave may be staggered or it may last for any number of days as emergencies arise but the
employee is entitled only to six (6) days of emergency leave with pay per year. Since the emergency
leave is allowed to enable the employee to attend to an emergency in his family or household, it may be
taken at any time during the calendar year but he must render at least six months service for that year to be
entitled to collect his wages for the six (6) days of his emergency leave. Since emergencies are unexpected
and unscheduled happenings, it would be absurd to require the employee to render six (6) months service
before being entitled to take a six-day-emergency leave with pay for it would mean that no emergency
leave can be taken by an employee during the first six months of a calendar year.
Same; Same; Employer cannot require submission of training program before it pays the union agreed
Union Education and Training Fund.The Arbitrator did not abuse his discretion in ruling that the
respondent company should comply with its obligation to contribute to the Union Education and Training
Fund the amount of Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00) pesos per year by paying said amount to the Union at
the beginning of each and every year, or contributing P1,000.00 at the end of each and every month during
the lifetime of the CBA, at the option of the company. As correctly observed by the Arbitrator, the
employers demand for the submission of a seminar program is foreign to the language of the contract
with the union.Davao Integrated Port and Stevedoring Services Corporation vs. Olvida, 210 SCRA
553(1992)
Victoria vs. Inciong, 157 SCRA 339(1988)
Labor Laws; Dismissal.The purpose in requiring a prior clearance from the Secretary of Labor in cases
of shutdown or dismissal of employees is to afford the Secretary ample opportunity to examine and
determine the reasonableness of the request.
Same; Same; In case of petitioners dismissal, a report is required as provided under Section 11[f] of Rule
XIV of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code.We further agree with the Acting
Secretary of Labor that what was required in the case of petitioners dismissal was only a report as
provided under Section 11[f] of Rule XIV of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code
which provides: Every employer shall submit a report to the Regional Office in accordance with the form
presented by the Department on the following instances of termination of employment, suspension, lay-off
or shutdown which may be effected by the employer without prior clearance within five (5) days
thereafter: x xxxxxxxx
Same; Same; Jurisdiction.Employees and laborers in non-profit organizations are not covered by the
provisions of the Industrial Peace Act and Court of Industrial Relations (now RTC) has no jurisdiction to
entertain petitioners of labor organizations of said non-profit organizations for certification as the
exclusive bargaining representatives of said employees and laborers. [Victoria vs. Inciong, 157 SCRA
339(1988)
Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 44 SCRA
350(1972)
Court of Industrial Relations; Jurisdiction; Power to issue labor injunctions.There can be no injunction
issued against any strike except in only one instance, that is, when a labor dispute arises in an industry
indispensable to the rational interest and such dispute is certified by the President of the Philippines to the
Court of Industrial Relations in compliance with Section 10 of Republic Act 875. An injunction in an
uncertified case must be based on the strict requirements of Section 9(d) of Republic Act 875; the purpose
of such an injunction is not to enjoin the strike itself, but only unlawful activities.
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Same; Disaffiliation; Constitutional Law; Right of employees to join any labor organization
protected by Constitution; Certification election, its function.It was held in Philippine Labor Alliance
Counsel v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 76 SCRA 162, that: It is indisputable that the present controversy
would not have arisen if there were no mass disaffiliation from petitioning union. Such a phenomenon is
nothing new in the Philippine labor movement. Nor it is open to any legal objection. It is implicit in the
freedom of association explicitly ordained by the Constitution. There is then the incontrovertible right of
any individual to join an organization of his choice. That option belongs to him. A workingman is not to
be denied that liberty. He may be, as a matter of fact, more in need of it if the institution of collective
bargaining as an aspect of industrial democracy is to succeed. No obstacle that may possibly thwart the
desirable objective of militancy in labors struggle for better terms and conditions is then to be placed on
his way. Once the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond doubt, as in this case, a certification
election is the most expeditious way of determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive
bargaining representative.
Republic Act 875; Unfair labor practices of employer; Statutory provisions construed liberally in favor of
employees.Substantial, credible and convincing evidence appear on record establishing beyond doubt
the charge of unfair labor practices in violation of Section 4(a), Nos. (1), (3), (4), (5) and (6), of Republic
Act 875. And pursuant to the mandate of Article 24 of the Civil Code of the Philippines that courts must
be vigilant for the protection of one at a disadvantageand here the Association appears to be at a
disadvantage in its relations with the Companyadequate affirmative relief, including backwages, must
be awarded to the strikers. It is high-time and imperative that in order to attain the laudable objectives of
Republic Act 875 calculated to safeguard the rights of employees, the provisions thereof should be
liberally construed in favor of employees and strictly against the employer, unless otherwise intended by
or patent from the language of the statute itself. [Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association
vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 44 SCRA 350(1972)]
Same; Same; Registration; A labor union is entitled to registration when it complies with all registration
requirements; Ministerial duty of the Bureau of Labor Relations to register labor unions.Petitioner
union, Vassar Industries Employees Union, filed certiorari proceedings against the Acting Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations for his refusal to register the union on the ground that there is already a
registered collective bargaining agreement in the company. The union prayed that its application for
registration be given due course. The comment of the government counsel favored the stand of the labor
union. The Supreme Court held: As this is a certiorari proceeding, equitable in character, this Court is
empowered to grant the relief adequate and suitable under the circumstances so that justice in all its
fullness could be achieved. There is this affirmation in the comment of the then Acting Solicitor General
Vicente V. Mendoza as counsel for respondent Estrella: As long as an applicant union complies with all
of the legal requirements for registration, it becomes the BLRs ministerial duty to so register the union.
It suffices then to order that petitioner Union be registered, there being no legal obstacle to such a step and
the duty of the Bureau of Labor Relations being clear. [Vassar Industries Employees Union (VIEU) vs.
Estrella, 82 SCRA 280(1978)]
Part Two
Labor Law; Employer-Employee Relationship; The following elements are generally considered in the
determination of employer-employee relationship: (1) selection and engagement of the employee; (2)
payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees conduct.The
present case mainly calls for the application of the control test, which if not satisfied, would lead us to
conclude that no employer-employee relationship exists. Hence, if the union members are not employees,
no right to organize for purposes of bargaining, nor to be certified as such bargaining agent can ever be
recognized. The following elements are generally considered in the determination of the employeremployee relationship; (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3)
the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees conductalthough the latter is the
most important element (Mafinco Trading Corporation v. Ople, 70 SCRA 139 [1976]; Development Bank
of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, 175 SCRA 537 [1989]; Rosario Brothers, Inc.
v. Ople, 131 SCRA 72 [1984];Broadway Motors Inc. v. NLRC, 156 SCRA 522 [1987]; Brotherhood Labor
Unity Movement in the Philippines v. Zamora, 147 SCRA 49 [1986]).
Labor Law; Labor Unions; Constitutional Law; Freedom of association; Employees right to form unions
to protect their interests statutorily and constitutionally recognized.An earlier decision, Federation
Obrera v. Noriel, 72 SCRA 24, sets forth the scope and amplitude of the right to freedom of association.
Clearly, what is at stake is the constitutional right to freedom of association on the part of employees.
Petitioner labor union was in the past apparently able to enlist the allegiance of the working force in the
AngloAmerican Tobacco Corporation. Thereafter, a number of such individuals joined private respondent
labor union. That is a matter clearly left to their sole uncontrolled judgment. There is this excerpt from Pan
American World Airways, Inc. v. Pan American Employees Association: There is both a constitutional
and statutory recognition that laborers have the right to form unions to take care of their interests vis-a-viz
their employees. Their freedom to form organizations would be rendered nugatory if they could not
choose their own leaders to speak on their behalf to bargain for them. It cannot be otherwise, for the
freedom to choose which labor organization to join is an aspect of the constitutional mandate of protection
to labor. x xxThe new Labor Code is equally explicit on the matter. Thus: The State shall assure the rights
of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and humane conditions of
work.
Same; Same; Same; Control-test; Independent Contractors; Employer-employee relationship does not
exist between petitioner-company and its collecting agents considering that petitioner-company exercises
control only with respect to the result or amount of collection and not with respect to the means and
method of collection.The Agreement confirms the status of the collecting agent in this case as an
independent contractor not only because he is explicitly described as such but also because the provisions
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Court finds that since private respondents are not employees of the Company, they are not entitled to the
constitutional right to join or form a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining. Accordingly,
there is no constitutional and legal basis for their union to be granted their petition for direct
certification. This Court made thispronouncement in La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Director of
Bureau of Labor Relations, supra: x xx The question of whether employer-employee relationship exists is
a primordial consideration before extending labor benefits under the workmens compensation, social
security, medicare, termination pay and labor relations law. It is important in the determination of who
shall be included in a proposed bargaining unit because it is the sine qua non, the fundamental and
essential condition that a bargaining unit be composed of employees. Failure to establish this juridical
relationship between the union members and the employer affects the legality of the union itself. It means
the ineligibility of the union members to present a petition for certification election as well as to vote
therein x xx. (At p. 689) [Singer Sewing Machine Company vs. Drilon, 193 SCRA 270(1991)]
Metrolab Industries, Inc. vs. Roldan-Confesor, 254 SCRA 182(1996)
Labor Law; Dismissal; Exercise of management prerogatives is not absolute but subject to limitations
imposed by law.This Court recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives and often declines to
interfere with the legitimate business decisions of the employer. However, this privilege is not absolute but
subject to limitations imposed by law.
Same; Secretary of Labor; Evidence; Factual findings of administrative agencies supported by substantial
evidence are accorded great respect and binds the Court.After a judicious review of the record, we find
no compelling reason to overturn the findings of the Secretary of Labor. We reaffirm the doctrine that
considering their expertise in their respective fields, factual findings of administrative agencies supported
by substantial evidence are accorded great respect and binds this Court.
Same; Labor Union; Prohibition to join labor organization extends to confidential employees or those who
by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to
managerial employees.Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and
assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to
confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or
act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly
confidential records. Metrolab Industries, Inc. vs. Roldan-Confesor, 254 SCRA 182(1996)
Reyes vs. Trajano, 209 SCRA 484(1992)
Labor Law; Words and Phrases; The right to self-organization includes the right not to form or join a
union.Logically, the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to disaffiliate or resign
from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to
maintain membership therein. The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right
to refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the
exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right.
The fact that a person has opted to acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his
subsequently opting to renounce such membership.
Same; Same; Same.The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes
of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be represented by a
labor organization, and in the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization. If the results of the
election should disclose that the majority of the workers do not wish to be represented by any union, then
their wishes must be respected, and no union may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Same; Same; Where private respondents-employees were not privy to the agreement between
petitioner and the previous bargaining representatives as to their exclusion from the bargaining union of
the rank-and-file or from forming their own union, they can never bind subsequent federations and unions;
Reason.Petitioner, in justification of its action, maintained that the exclusion of the members of the
private respondent from the bargaining union of the rank-and-file or from forming their own union was
agreed upon by petitioner corporation with the previous bargaining representatives namely: the General
Rubber Workers Union-PTGWO, the General Workers Union-NAFLU and the General Rubber Workers
Union (independent). Such posture has no leg to stand on. It has not been shown that private respondent
was privy to this agreement. And even if it were so, it can never bind subsequent federations and unions
particularly private respondent-union because it is a curtailment of the right to self-organization
guaranteed by the laber laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To avoid confusion and fulfill the policy of the Labor Code and to be
consistent with the ruling in the Bulletin case, the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees should be
allowed to join the union of daily paid rank-and-file employees or to form their own rank-and-file union.
However, to prevent any difficulty and to avoid confusion to all concerned and, more importantly, to
fulfill the policy of the New Labor Code as well as to be consistent with Our ruling in the Bulletin case,
supra, the monthly-paid rank-and-file employees should be allowed to join the union of the daily-paidrank-and-file employees of petitioner so that they can also avail of the CBA benefits or to form their own
rank and file union, without prejudice to the certification election that has been ordered. General Rubber
and Footwear Corporation vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, 155 SCRA 283(1987)
Knitjoy Manufacturing, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 214 SCRA 174(1992)
Same; Failure to take part in previous elections no bar to right to participate in future elections.Neither
does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote because they "did not participate in
previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them
to form, join or assist labor organizations," persuade acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent
prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification
elections. In denying the petitioners' right to vote upon these egregiously fallacious grounds, the public
respondents exercised their discretion whimsically, capriciously and oppressively and gravely abused the
same. Reyes vs. Trajano, 209 SCRA 484(1992)
General Rubber and Footwear Corporation vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, 155 SCRA 283(1987)
Labor; Labor Unions; Right to self-organization; Members who are not managerial employees but
considered rank-and-file employees have every right to self-organization or be heard through a duly
certified collective bargaining union; Reason.Thus, it can be readily seen from the above findings of the
Bureau of Labor Relations that the members of private respondent are not managerial employees as
claimed by petitioners but merely considered as rank-and-file employees who have every right to selforganization or to be heard through a duly certified collective bargaining union. The Supervisory power of
the members of private respondent union consists merely in recommending as to what managerial actions
to take in disciplinary cases. These members of private respondent union do not fit the definition of
managerial employees which We laid down in the case of Bulletin Publishing Corporation V. Sanchez
(144 SCRA 628). These members of private respondent union are therefore not prohibited from forming
their own collective bargaining unit since it has not been shown by petitioner that the responsibilities (of
these monthly-paid-employees) inherently require the exercise of discretion and independent judgment as
supervisors or that they possess the power and authority to lay down or exercise management policies.
Similarly, We held in the same case that Members of supervisory unions who do not fall within the
definition of managerial employees shall become eligible to join or assist the rank-and-file labor
organization, and if none exists, to form or assist in the forming of such rank-and-file organizations.
Labor Laws; One company-one union policy; Exceptions.The present Article 245 of the Labor Code
expressly allows supervisory employees who are not performing managerial functions to join, assist or
form their separate union but bars them from membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees. It reads: ART. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right
of supervisory employees.Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the
rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own. This
provision obviously allows more than one union in a company. Even Section 2(c), Rule V, Book V of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, which seeks to implement the policy, also
recognizes exceptions. It reads: SEC. 2. Who may file.Any legitimate labor organization or the
employer, when requested to bargain collectively, may file the petition. The petition, when filed by a
legitimate labor organization shall contain, among others: x xx (c) description of the bargaining unit which
shall be the employer unit unless circumstances otherwise require; x xx. (Emphasis supplied) The usual
exception, of course, is where the employer unit has to give way to the other units like the craft unit, plant
unit, or a subdivision thereof; the recognition of these exceptions takes into account the policy to assure
employees of the fullest freedom in exercising their rights. Otherwise stated, the one company-one union
policy must yield to the right of the employees to form unions or associations for purposes not contrary to
law, to self-organization and to enter into collective bargaining negotiations, among others, which the
Constitution guarantees.
Same; Bargaining representatives for monthly-paid employees and daily or piece-rate employees;
Bargaining unit not same as employer unit.Furthermore, it is not denied that in the bargaining history of
KNITJOY, the CBA has been consistently limited to the regular rank-and-file employees paid on a daily or
piece-rate basis. On the other hand, the rank-and-file employees paid on a monthly basis were never
included within its scope. Respondent KMEUs membership is limited to the latter class of employees;
KMEU does not seek to dislodge CFW as the exclusive bargaining representative for the former. The
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Labor laws; Court of Industrial Relations; Return-to-work order; Court can order return of strikers
pending resolution of dispute; Order not grave abuse of discretion.Considering that the case at bar was
certified by the President, with respondent Court exercising its broad authority of compulsory arbitration,
the discretion it possesses cannot be so restricted and emasculated that the mere f ailure to grant a plea to
exclude f rom the returnto-work order the union officials could be considered as tantamount to a grave
abuse thereof. As f ar back as 1957, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Labrador, categorically
stated: We agree with counsel for the Philippine Marine Radio Off icers Association that upon
certification by the President under section 10 of Republic Act 875, the case comes under the operation of
Commonwealth Act 103, which enforces compulsory arbitration in cases of labor disputes in industries
indispensable to the national interest when the President certifies the case to the Court of Industrial
Relations. The evident intention of the law is to empower the Court of Industrial Relations to act in such
cases, not only in the manner prescribed under Commonwealth Act 103, but with the same broad powers
and jurisdiction granted by that Act. If the Court of Industrial Relations is granted authority to f ind a
solution in an industrial dispute and such solution consists in ordering of employees to return back to
work, it cannot be contended that the Court of Industrial Relations does not have the power or jurisdiction
to carry that solution into effect. And of what use is its power of conciliation and arbitration if it does not
have the power and jurisdiction to carry into effect the-, solution it has adopted. Lastly, if the said court
has the power to fix the terms and conditions of employment, it certainly can order the return of the
workers with or without backpay as a term or condition of the employment. (Phil. Marine Radio Officers
Assn. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 102 Phil. 374, 382383.)
Same; Same; Same; Refusal of company to accept employeesment. (Phil. Marine Radio Officers Assn. vs.
Court of Industrial ment displays what in the case at bar appears to be a grave but unwarranted distrust in
the union officials discharging their functions just because a strike was resorted to, then the integrity of the
collective bargaining process itself is called into question. It would have been different if there were a
rational basis for such fears, purely speculative in character. The record is bereft of ,the slightest indication
that any danger, much less one clear and present, is to be expected f rom their return to work. Necessarily,
the union officials have the right to feel offended by the fact that, while they will be paid their salaries in
the meanwhile, they would not be considered as fit persons to perform the duties pertaining to the
positions held by them. Far from being generous, such an offer could rightfully be considered insulting.
Same; Same; Same; Right to form unions; Freedom would be nugatory if employees cannot choose their
own officials.The greater offense is to the labor movement itself, more specifically to the right of selforganization. There is both a constitutional and statutory recognition that laborers have the right to form
unions to take care of their interests vis-a-vis their employers. Their freedom to form organizations would
be rendered nugatory if they could not choose their own leaders to speak on their behalf and to bargain for
them. [Pan American World Airways, Inc. vs. Pan American Employees Association, 27 SCRA
1202(1969)]
Union of Supervisors(R.B.)NATU vs. Secretary ofLabor, 109 SCRA 139(1981)
Labor Law; The fact that other employees-officers of the union were not dismissed even if they were
guilty of substantially same act of alleged insubordination, etc. as petitioner-employee does not
necessarily mean latter's dismissal not made due to his union activities, especially where latter appears to
be more militant than the others.To this, WE may ask the following: Why was not Caizares cited for
dereliction of duty when he also walked out of the meeting on February 12, 1974; failed to attend the
special meeting on February 26, 1974 despite notice; and walked out of the meeting on March 12, 1974
after Luna was physically ejected therefrom by security guards? The answers to these questions are
obvious: Caizares and the other union officers were not as active and militant in their defense of union
rights, much less did they pose any threat against the respondent bank's plan to control the funds of the
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
personality,neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of the local union. It
only gives rise to a contract of agency where the former acts in representation of the latter.
Same; Same; Same.By SAMANA BAYs disaffiliation from ANGLO, the vinculum that previously
bound the two entities was completely severed. ANGLO was divested of any and all power to act in
representation of SAMANA BAY. Thus, any act performed by ANGLO affecting the interests and affairs
of SAMANA BAY, including the ouster of herein individual private respondents, is rendered without force
and effect. [Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Org. vs.
SamahanngmgaManggagawangNagkakaisasa Manila Bay Spinning Mills, 258 SCRA 371(1996)
Bautista vs. Inciong, 158 SCRA 665(1988)
Labor; Illegal dismissal; Labor union; A labor union can be considered an employer of persons who work
for it.There is nothing in the records which support the Deputy Minister's conclusion that the petitioner
is not an employee of respondent ALU. The mere fact that the respondent is a labor union does not mean
that it cannot be considered an employer of the persons who work for it. Much less should it be exempted
from the very labor laws which it espouses as a labor organization.
Same; Same; Same; Employer-employee relationship; Factors in ascertaining the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.In the case of Brotherhood Labor Unity Movement in the Philippines
v. Zamora, (147 SCRA 49, 54), we outlined the factors in ascertaining an employer-employee relationship:
ln determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are generally
considered are the following: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of
wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee with respect to
the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. It is the so-called 'control test' that is the
most important element (Investment Planning Corp. of the Phils. v. The Social Security System, 21 SCRA
924; Mafinco Trading Corp. y. Ople, supra, and Rosario Brothers, Inc. v. Ople, 131 SCRA 72.)"
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner as an employee of respondent labor union in case at bar, proven.In
the case at bar. the Regional Director correctly found that the petitioner was an employee of the
respondent union as reflected in the latter's individual payroll sheets and shown by the petitioner's
membership with the Social Security System (SSS) and the respondent union's share of remittances in the
petitioner's favor. Even more significant, is the respondent union's act of filing a clearance application
with the MOL to terminate the petitioner's services. Bautista was selected and hired by the Union. He was
paid wages by the Union, ALU had the power to dismiss him as indeed it dismissed him. And definitely,
the Union tightly controlled the work of Bautista as one of its organizers. There is absolutely no factual or
legal basis for Deputy Minister Inciong's decision.
Same; Same; Same; If employee's reinstatement is not feasible, the employee shall be paid, separation pay
by the employer; Case at bar.We are, thus, constrained to reverse the findings of the respondent Deputy
Minister. However, the records show that antipathy and antagonism between the petitioner and the
respondent union militate against the former's reinstatement. ALU would not want to have a union
organizer whom it does not trust and who could sabotage its efforts to unionize commercial and industrial
establishments. Severance pay, therefore, is more proper and in order. [Bautista vs. Inciong, 158 SCRA
665(1988)]
Kapatiransa Meat and Canning Division vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 162 SCRA 367(1988)]
Labor; Labor Union; Right to self-organization; The right of members of the IglesianiKristo sect not to
join a labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs does not bar the members of that sect from
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
choice of bargaining representations by employees. Filoil Refinery Corporation vs. Filoil Supervisory
& Confidential Employees Association, 46 SCRA 512(1972)
Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation vs. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union, 268
SCRA 573(1997)
Labor Law; Labor Unions; Collective Bargaining; Certification Elections; Purpose of every certification
election is to determine the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining.The purpose of every certification election is to determine the
exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining. A certification election for the collective bargaining process is one of the fairest and most
effective ways of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force. In
determining the labor organization which represents the interests of the workforce, those interests must be,
as far as reasonably possible, homogeneous, so as to genuinely reach the concerns of the individual
members of a labor organization.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Labor Code has made it a statutory policy to prevent supervisory employees
from joining labor organizations consisting of rank-and-file employees as the concerns which involve
members of either group are normally disparate and contradictory.According to Rothenberg, an
appropriate bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, composed of all or less than the
entire body of employees, which the collective interests of all the employees, consistent with equity to the
employer indicate to be best suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of law. In Belyca Corporation v. Ferrer-Calleja, we defined the bargaining unit as
the legal collectivity for collective bargaining purposes whose members have substantially mutual
bargaining interests in terms and conditions of employment as will assure to all employees their collective
bargaining rights. This in mind, the Labor Code has made it a clear statutory policy to prevent
supervisory employees from joining labor organizations consisting of rank-and-file employees as the
concerns which involve members of either group are normally disparate and contradictory. Article 245
provides: ART. 245 Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of
supervisory employees.Managerial Employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the
rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory
employees is no labor organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor
organization.Clearly, based on this provision, a labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and
supervisory employees is no labor organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate
labor organization. Not being one, an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and
supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the
right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining. It becomes
necessary, therefore, anterior to the granting of an order allowing a certification election, to inquire into
the composition of any labor organization whenever the status of the labor organization is challenged on
the basis of Article 245 of the Labor Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer,
effectively recommend managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or
clerical in nature but require the use of independent judgment.While there may be a genuine divergence
of opinion as to whether or not union members occupying Level 4 positions are supervisory employees, it
is fairly obvious, from a reading of the Labor Codes definition of the term that those occupying Level 5
positions are unquestionably supervisory employees. Supervisory employees, as defined above, are those
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
of Labor and Employment, the Courts conclusion should not be interpreted as impairing any unions right
to be certified as the employees bargaining agent in the petitioners establishment. Workers of an
appropriate bargaining unit must be allowed to freely express their choice in an election where everything
is open to sound judgment and the possibility for fraud and misrepresentation is absent. [Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation vs. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union, 268 SCRA
573(1997)]
Dunlop Slazenger (Phils.), Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 300 SCRA 120(1998)
Labor Law; Unions; Certification Elections; Appropriate Bargaining Units; Words and Phrases; A unit to
be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages,
hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.We agree with the public
respondent that supervisors can be an appropriate bargaining unit. This is in accord with our repeated
ruling that [a]n appropriate bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, composed of all
or less than the entire body of employees, which the collective interests of all the employees, consistent
with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the parties
under the collective bargaining provisions of law. Otherwise stated, it is a legal collectivity for collective
bargaining purposes whose members have substantially mutual bargaining interests in terms and
conditions of employment as will assure to all employees their collective bargaining rights. A unit to be
appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours,
working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Supervisory Employees; Rank-and-File Employees; The test of supervisory
status is whether an employee possesses authority to act in the interest of his employer, which authority
should not be merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment.
Determining the status of supervisory and rank-and-file employees is not a hard row to hoe in labor law.
The test of supervisory status as we have repeatedly ruled is whether an employee possesses authority to
act in the interest of his employer, which authority should not be merely routinary or clerical in nature but
requires the use of independent judgment. Corrollarily, what determines the nature of employment is not
the employees title, but his job description.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Wages; The mode of compensation is usually a matter of
convenience and does not necessarily determine the nature and character of the job.The list reveals that
the positions occupied by the twenty six (26) office and technical employees are in fact rank-and-file
positions, i.e., A/C mechanic, draftsmen, storemen, motorpool mechanic, secretaries, accounts clerk,
company nurses, industrial mechanic, boiler men, laboratory technicians, payroll clerk, welder, purchasing
clerk, company drivers and electricians. It is fairly obvious that these positions cannot be considered as
supervisory positions for they do not carry the authority to act in the interest of the employer or to
recommend managerial actions. It is not decisive that these employees are monthly paid employees. Their
mode of compensation is usually a matter of convenience and does not necessarily determine the nature
and character of their job.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and
supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the
right to file a petition for certification election; A union has no legal right to file a petition for certification
election to represent a bargaining unit composed of supervisors for so long as it counts rank-and-file
employees among its members.We also do not agree with the ruling of the respondent Secretary of
Labor that the infirmity in the membership of the respondent union can be remedied in the pre-election
conference thru the exclusion-inclusion proceedings wherein those employees who are occupying rankand-file positions will be excluded from the list of eligible voters. Public respondent gravely
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
subordinates, they identify with the interests of the employer and may act contrary to the interests of the
rank and file.
Same; Labor Unions; These professional/technical employees are performing non-supervisory functions,
hence, they should be classified as rank and file employees. Consequently, they cannot be allowed to join
a union composed of supervisors.The certification of Personnel Officer Duhaylungsod that its
professional/technical employees occupy positions that are non-supervisory is evidence that said
employees belong to the rank and file. Quite obviously, these professional/technical employees cannot
effectively recommend managerial actions with the use of independent judgment because they are under
the supervision of superintendents and supervisors. Because it is unrefuted that these
professional/technical employees are performing non-supervisory functions, hence considered admitted,
they should be classified, at least for purposes of this case, as rank and file employees. Consequently,
these professional/technical employees cannot be allowed to join a union composed of supervisors.
Conversely, supervisory employees cannot join a labor organization of employees under their supervision
but may validly form a separate organization of their own. This is provided in Art. 245 of the Labor Code,
as amended by R.A. No. 6715, to wit: x xxx Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form
any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization of the rank and file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of
their own.
Same; Same; The intent of the law is to avoid a situation where supervisor s would merge with the rank
and file, or where the supervisors labor organization would represent conflicting interests.This is
precisely the situation which the law prohibits. It would create an obvious conflict of views among the
members, or at least between two (2) groups of members espousing opposing interests. The intent of the
law is to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rank and file, or where the supervisors
labor organization would represent conflicting interests, especially where, as in the case at bar, the
supervisors will be commingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in their own
bargaining unit. Members of the supervisory union might refuse to carry out disciplinary measures against
their co-member rank and file employees.
Same; Same; What the law prohibits is a union whose membership comprises of supervisors merging with
the rank and file employees because this is where the conflict of interest may arise in the areas of
discipline, collective bargaining and strikes.Supervisors have the right to form their own union or labor
organization. What the law prohibits is a union whose membership comprises of supervisors merging with
the rank and file employees because this is where conflict of interests may arise in the areas of discipline,
collective bargaining and strikes. The professional/technical employees of petitioner therefore may join
the existing rank and file union, or form a union separate and distinct from the existing union organized by
the rank and file employees of the same company. [Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. vs. Torres,
231 SCRA 335(1994)]
PagkakaisangmgaManggagawasa Triumph Intl.-United Lumber and General Workers of the Phils.
vs. Ferrer-Calleja , 181 SCRA 119(1990)
Labor Law; Evidence; Factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the Bureau of Labor Relations
which are supported by substantial evidence binding upon the Court and entitled to great respect.In the
determination of whether or not the members of respondent union are managerial employees, we accord
due respect and, therefore, sustain the findings of fact made by the public respondent pursuant to the timehonored rule that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies like the Bureau of Labor Relations which are
supported by substantial evidence are binding on us and entitled to great respect considering their
expertise in their respective fields.
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court impelled to disallow the holding of a certification election among the
workers sought to be represented by the respondent union for want of any proof that the right of said
workers to self-organization is being suppressed.In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the petitioner
is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of Triumph International. A
careful examination of the records of this case reveals no evidence that rules out the commonality of
interests among the rank-and-file members of the petitioner and the herein declared rank-and-file
employees who are members of the respondent union. Instead of forming another bargaining unit, the law
requires them to be members of the existing one. The ends of unionism are better served if all the rankand-file employees with substantially the same interests and who invoke their right to self-orgnization are
part of a single unit so that they can deal with their employer with just one and yet potent voice. The
employees bargaining power with management is strengthened thereby. Hence, the circumstances of this
case impel us to disallow the holding of a certification election among the workers sought to be
represented by the respondent union for want of proof that the right of said workers to self-organization is
being suppressed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent unions CBA constituted a bar to the holding of the
certification election as petitioned by the respondent union with public respondent.Anent the correlative
issue of whether or not the contract-bar rule applies to the present case, Rule V, Section 3, Book V of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code is written in plain and simple terms. It provides in
effect that if a collective bargaining agreement validly exists, a petition for certification election can only
be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of said agreement. Respondent unions
petition for certification election was filed on November 25, 1987. At the time of the filing of the said
petition, a valid and existing CBA was present between petitioner and Triumph International. The CBA
was effective up to September 24, 1989. There is no doubt that the respondent unions CBA constituted a
bar to theholding of the certification election as petitioned by the respondent union with public
respondent. [ PagkakaisangmgaManggagawasa Triumph Intl.-United Lumber and General
Workers of the Phils. vs. Ferrer-Calleja , 181 SCRA 119(1990)]
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines vs. Laguesma, 330 SCRA 295(2000)
Labor Law; Certification Elections; Managerial Employees; Words and Phrases; Managerial employees
are ranked as Top Managers, Middle Managers and First Line Managers; The mere fact that an employee
is designated manager does not ipso facto make him onedesignation should be reconciled with the
actual job description of the employee, for it is the job description that determines the nature of
employment.In United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) v. Laguesma, we had occasion to
elucidate on the term managerial employees. Managerial employees are ranked as Top Managers,
Middle Managers and First Line Managers. Top and Middle Managers have the authority to devise,
implement and control strategic and operational policies while the task of First-Line Managers is simply
to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-and-file employees of an organization. Under this
distinction, managerial employees therefore fall in two (2) categories, namely, the managers per se
composed of Top and Middle Managers, and the supervisors composed of First-Line Managers. Thus,
the mere fact that an employee is designated manager does not ipso facto make him one. Designation
should be reconciled with the actual job description of the employee, for it is the job description that
determines the nature of employment.
Same; Same; Same; Authority to Hire and Fire; Where the power to hire and fire is subject to evaluation,
review and final action by the department heads and other higher executives of the company, the same,
although present, is not effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law.In the
petition before us, a thorough dissection of the job description of the concerned supervisory employees
and section heads indisputably show that they are not actually managerial but only supervisory employees
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
employees and other documentary evidence on record vis-a-vis paragraph (m), Article 212 of the Labor
Code, as amended, and we find that only those employees occupying the position of route manager and
accounting manager are managerial employees. The rest, i.e., quality control manager, yard/transport
manager and warehouse operations manager are supervisory employees.
Same; Same; In the case of Workers Alliance Trade Unions (WATU) vs. Pepsi Cola Products, Phils., Inc.
(OS-MA-10-318-91), Court ruled that a route manager is a managerial employee within the context of the
definition of the law, and hence, ineligible to join, form or assist a union.The issue brought before us is
not of first impression. At one time, we had the occasion to rule upon the status of route manager in the
same company vis-a-vis the issue as to whether or not it is supervisory employee or a managerial
employee. In the case of Workers Alliance Trade Unions (WATU) vs. Pepsi Cola Products, Phils., Inc.
(OS-MA-10-318-91), 15 November 1991, we ruled that a route manager is a managerial employee within
the context of the definition of the law, and hence, ineligible to join, form or assist a union. We have once
more passed upon the logic of our Decision aforecited in the light of the issues raised in the instant appeal,
as well as the available documentary evidence on hand, and have come to the view that there is no cogent
reason to depart from our earlier holding. Route Managers are, by the very nature of their functions and
the authority they wield over their subordinates, managerial employees. The prescription found in Art. 245
of the Labor Code, as amended therefore, clearly applies to them.
Same; Same; Route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere supervisors.The route
managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere supervisors because their work does not only involve,
but goes far beyond, the simple direction or supervision of operating employees to accomplish objectives
set by those above them. They are not mere functionaries with simple oversight functions but business
administrators in their own right. An idea of the role of route managers as managers per se can be gotten
from a memo sent by the director of metro sales operations of respondent company to one of the route
managers.
Same; Same; Court upheld in several of its decisions the right of supervisors to organize for purposes of
labor relations.For its part, the Supreme Court upheld in several of its decisions the right of supervisors
to organize for purposes of labor relations.
Labor Law; Labor Unions; A distinction exists between top and middle managers and first-level
managers/supervisors; Whether they belong to the first or the second category managers, vis-a-vis
employers, are likewise employees.As can be seen from this description, a distinction exists between
those who have the authority to devise, implement and control strategic and operational policies (top and
middle managers) and those whose task is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rankand-file employees of an organization (first-level managers/supervisors). What distinguishes them from
the rank-and-file employees is that they act in the interest of the employer in supervising such rank-andfile employees. Managerial employees may therefore be said to fall into two distinct categories: the
managers per se, who compose the former group described above, and the supervisors who form the
latter group. Whether they belong to the first or the second category, managers, vis-a-vis employers, are,
likewise, employees.
Same; Same; The guarantee of organizational right in Art. 111, 8 not infringed by a ban against
managerial employees forming a union; There is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees
from forming or joining labor organizations.Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, 8
infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is
subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes not contrary to law. In the case of Art.
245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor
organizations. As Justice Davide, Jr., himself a constitutional commissioner, said in his ponencia in Philips
Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC: In the first place, all these employees, with the exception of the
service engineers and the sales force personnel, are confidential employees. Their classification as such is
not seriously disputed by PEO-FFW; the five (5) previous CBAs between PIDI and PEO-FFW explicitly
considered them as confidential employees. By the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a
confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial
functions in the field of labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial
employees to form, assist or joint a labor union equally applies to them.
Same; Same; Court finds that only those employees occupying the position of route manager and
accounting manager are managerial employees.In Case No. OS-MA-10-318-91, entitled Workers
Alliance Trade Union (WATU) v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., decided on November 13, 1991,
the Secretary of Labor found: We examined carefully the pertinent job descriptions of the subject
Remedial Law; Res Judicata; The doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative
proceedings; Proceedings for certification election are quasi judicial in nature and therefore decisions
rendered in such proceedings can attain finality.But the doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to
adversary administrative proceedings. As early as 1956, in Brillantes v. Castro, we sustained the dismissal
United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) vs. Laguesma, 288 SCRA 15(1998)
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
highly confidential. Neither can payment or non-payment ofunion dues be the determining factor of
whether the challenged employees should be excluded from the bargaining unit since the union shop
provision in the CBA applies only to newly hired employees but not to members of the bargaining unit
who were not members of the union at the time of the signing of the CBA. It is, therefore, not impossible
for employees to be members of the barganing unit even though they are non-union members or not
paying union dues. [Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) vs. Calleja, 172 SCRA
676(1989)]
Philtranco Service Enterprises vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, 174 SCRA 388(1989)
Labor Relations; Unions; Supervisors Unions; Managerial Employees; Supervisors performing
managerial functions are prohibited from forming or joining labor organizations.The Labor Code
recognizes two (2) principal groups of employees, namely, the managerial and the rank and file groups.
Thus, Art. 212 (k) of the Code provides: xxx xxxxxx k) Managerial employee is one who is vested with
powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend,
lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial
actions. All employees not falling within this definition are considered rank and file employees for
purposes of this Book. In implementation of the aforequoted provision of the law, Section 11 of Rule II,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code did away with existing supervisors unions
classifying the members either as managerial or rank and file employees depending on the work they
perform. If they discharge managerial functions, supervisors are prohibited from forming or joining any
labor organization. If they do not perform managerial work, they may join the rank and file union and if
none exists, they may form one such rank and file organization. This rule was emphasized in the case of
Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Sanchez, (144 SCRA 628 [1986]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Managerial and confidential employees are not qualified to join, much less,
form a union.It, therefore, follows that the members of the KASAMA KO who are professional,
technical, administrative and confidential personnel of PHILTRANCO performing managerial functions
are not qualified to join, much lessform a union. This rationalizes the exclusion of managers and
confidential employees exercising managerial functions from the ambit of the collective bargaining unit.
As correctly observed by Med-Arbiter Adap: x xx managerial and confidential employees were expressly
excluded within the operational ambit of the bargaining unit for the simple reason that under the law,
managers are disqualified to be members of a labor organization. On the other hand, confidential workers
were not included because either they were performing managerial functions and/or their duties and
responsibilities were considered or may be categorized as part and parcel of management as the primary
reason for their exclusion in the bargaining unit. The other categorized employees were likewise not
included because parties have agreed on the fact that the aforementioned group of workers are not
qualified to join a labor organization at the time the agreement was executed and that they were classified
as outside the parameter of the bargaining unit. (Rollo, pp. 28-29).
Same; Same; Collective Bargaining; One-Union One-Company Policy; Proliferation of unions in one
employer unit should be discouraged unless there are compelling reasons which would deny a certain class
of employees the right to self-organization.We are constrained to disallow the formation of another
union. There is no dispute that there exists a labor union in the company, herein intervenor, the
NAMAWU-MIF which is the collective bargaining agent of the rank and file employees in
PHILTRANCO. x xx We see no need for the formation of another union in PHILTRANCO. The qualified
members of the KASAMA KO may join the NAMAWU-MIF if they want to be union members, and to be
consistent with the one-union, one-company policy of the Department of Labor and Employment, and the
laws it enforces. As held in the case of General Rubber and Footwear Corp. v. Bureau of Labor Relations
(155 SCRA 283 [1987]): x xx It has been the policy of the Bureau to encourage the formation of an
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests or that the Union can be
company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership. A managerial
employee is defined under Art. 212 (k) of the new Labor Code as one who is vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions. All
employees not falling within this definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this
Book.
Same; Same; Same; Ruling also holds true for confidential employees.This rationale holds true also for
confidential employees such as accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators, who having access to
confidential information, may become the source of undue advantage. Said employee(s) may act as a spy
or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement. This is specially true in the present case
where the petitioning Union is already the bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees in the
establishment. To allow the confidential employees to join the existing Union of the rank-and-file would
be in violation of the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement wherein this kind of employees by the
nature of their functions/positions are expressly excluded.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Company foremen cannot also join the existing union of the rank-and-file.
As to the company foremen, while in the performance of supervisory functions, they may be the extension
or alter ego of the management. Adversely, the foremen, by their actuation, may influence the workers
under their supervision to engage in slow down commercial activities or similar activities detrimental to
the policy, interest or business objectives of the company or corporation, hence they also cannot join.
[Golden Farms, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 175 SCRA 471(1989)
Pier 8 Arrastre& Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Roldan-Confesor, 241 SCRA 294(1995)
Labor Law; Employees; The test of supervisory or managerial status is whether an employee possesses
authority to act in the interest of his employer, which authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature
but requires use of independent judgment.This Court has ruled on numerous occasions that the test of
supervisory or managerial status is whether an employee possesses authority to act in the interest of his
employer, which authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires use of independent
judgment. What governs the determination of the nature of employment is not the employee's title, but his
job description. If the nature of the employee's job does not fall under the definition of "managerial" or
"supervisory" in the Labor Code, he is eligible to be a member of the rank-and-file bargaining unit.
Same; Same; Foremen fall squarely under the category of supervisory employees, and cannot be part of
rank and file unions.Foremen are chief and often especially-trained workmen who work with and
commonly are in charge of a group of employees in an industrial plant or in construction work. They are
the persons designated by the employer-management to direct the work of employees, and to superintend
and oversee them. They are representatives of the employer-management with authority over particular
groups of workers, processes, operations, or sections of a plant or an entire organization. In the modern
industrial plant, they are at once a link in the chain of command and the bridge between management and
labor. In the performance of their work, foremen definitely use their independent judgment and are
empowered to make recommendations for managerial action with respect to those employees under their
control. Foremen fall squarely under the category of supervisory employees, and cannot be part of rankand-file unions.
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Same; Legal secretaries fall under the category of confidential employees.Upon the other hand,
legal secretaries are neither managers nor supervisors. Their work is basically routinary and clerical.
However, they should be differentiated from rank-and-file employees because they are tasked with, among
others, the typing of legal documents, memoranda and correspondence, the keeping of records and files,
the giving of and receiving notices, and such other duties as required by the legal personnel of the
corporation. Legal secretaries therefore fall under the category of confidential employees.
employees may handle will have to relate to their functions. From the foregoing functions, it can be
gleaned that the confidential information said employees have access to concern the employers internal
business operations. As held in Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, an
employee may not be excluded from appropriate bargaining unit merely because he has access to
confidential information concerning employers internal business operations and which is not related to
the field of labor relations.
Same; Same; Timekeeper and assistant timekeeper cannot be excluded from the bargaining unit.As for
the timekeeper and assistant timekeeper, it is clear from petitioner's own pleadings that they are neither
managerial nor supervisory employees. They are merely tasked to report those who commit infractions
against company rules and regulations. This reportorial function is routinary and clerical. They do not
determine the fate of those who violate company policy rules and regulations. It follows that they cannot
be excluded from the subject bargaining unit.
Same; Same; Same; Confidential employees who may be excluded from bargaining unit must be strictly
defined so as not to needlessly deprive many employees of their right to bargain collectively through
representatives of their choosing.It must be borne in mind that Section 3 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution mandates the State to guarantee to all workers the right to self-organization. Hence,
confidential employees who may be excluded from bargaining unit must be strictly defined so as not to
needlessly deprive many employees of their right to bargain collectively through representatives of their
choosing.
Same; Same; Collective Bargaining Agreement; Although a CBA has expired, it continues to have legal
effects as between the parties until a new CBA has been entered into.In the case of Lopez Sugar
Corporation vs. Federation of Free Workers, 189 SCRA 179 (1991), this Court reiterated the rule that
although a CBA has expired, it continues to have legal effects as between the parties until a new CBA has
been entered into. It is the duty of both parties to the CBA to keep the status quo, and to continue in full
force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day freedom period
and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. [Pier 8 Arrastre& Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs.
Roldan-Confesor, 241 SCRA 294(1995)
Same; Same; Appropriate Bargaining Unit Defined.An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as a
group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be
best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law. [San Miguel Corp. Supervisors and Exempt Employees Union vs. Laguema,
277 SCRA 370(1997)]
Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor, 312 SCRA 104(1999)
San Miguel Corp. Supervisors and Exempt Employees Union vs. Laguema, 277 SCRA 370(1997)
Labor Law; Labor Unions; Criteria to Determine who are Confidential Employees.Confidential
employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate,
determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are
cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employeethat is, the
confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must
handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.
Same; Same; Reason behind the confidential employee rule.The exclusion from bargaining units of
employees who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to
labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the confidential employee rule. The
broad rationale behind this rule is that employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential
conflict of interests. Management should not be required to handle labor relations matters through
employees who are represented by the union with which the company is required to deal and who in the
normal performance of their duties may obtain advance information of the companys position with regard
to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor relations matters.
Same; Same; Same; In determining the confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently
considered is the employees necessary access to confidential labor relations information.An important
element of the confidential employee rule is the employees need to use labor relations information.
Thus, in determining the confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently considered is the
employees necessary access to confidential labor relations information.
Same; Same; Same; An employee may not be excluded from appropriate bargaining unit merely because
he has access to confidential information concerning employers internal business operations and which is
not related to the field of labor relations.It is evident that whatever confidential data the questioned
Labor Law; Remedial Law; Action; Moot and Academic; It is unnecessary to indulge in academic
discussion of a moot question. The issue in G.R. No. 96663, whether or not the supervisors union can be
affiliated with a Federation with two (2) rank and file unions directly under the supervision of the former,
has thus become moot and academic in view of the Unions withdrawal from the federation. In a long line
of cases (NarcisoNakpil, et al. vs. Hon. Crisanto Aragon, et al., G.R. No.L-24087, January 22, 1980, 95
SCRA 85; Toribio v. Bidin, et al., G.R. No.L-37960, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 361; Gumaua v. Espino,
G.R. No. L-36188-37586, February 29, 1980, 96 SCRA 402), the Court dismissed the petition for being
moot and academic. In the case of F.C. Fisher v. Yangco Steamship Co., March 31, 1915, the Court held:
It is unnecessary, however to indulge in academic discussion of a moot question. x xxxxx The action
would have been dismissed at any time on a showing of the facts as they were . The question left for the
court was a moot one. Its Resolution would have been useless. Its judgment would have been impossible
of execution x x x.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the governing principle
is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly
situated.In the case of University of San Agustin, Inc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the court
resolved the case, ruling that even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the governing
principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others
similarly situated. xx x
Same; Labor Unions; Certification Election; An order to hold a certification election is proper despite the
pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of the respondent union. Anent the
issue of whether or not the Petition to cancel/revoke registration is a prejudicial question to the petition for
certification election, the following ruling in the case of Association of the Court of Appeals Employees
(ACAE) vs. Hon. PuraFerrer-Calleja, in her capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, et al., 203
SCRA 597, 598, [1991], is in point, to wit: x xx It is a well-settled rule that a certification proceedings is
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Same; Collective Bargaining; Employees of cooperatives who are themselves members or coowners of the same cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining; the rule however does not apply to
those employees who are not members or co-owners of such cooperatives.An employee therefore of
such a cooperative who is a member and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining
for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners. In the opinion of August 14, 1981 of
the Solicitor General he correctly opined that employees of cooperatives who are themselves members of
the cooperative have no right to form or join labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining for
being themselves co-owners of the cooperative. However, in so far as it involves cooperatives with
employees who are not members or co-owners thereof, certainly such employees are entitled to exercise
the rights of all workers to organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and others as are enshrined in
the Constitution and existing laws of the country. [Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs.
Ferrer-Calleja, 165 SCRA 725(1988)
Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Sec. of DOLE, 201 SCRA 584(1991)
Labor Law; Labor Organization; Collective Bargaining; Petitioner deemed to have submitted the issue of
membership withdrawal from the cooperative to the jurisdiction of the med-arbiter and now estopped from
questioning that same jurisdiction which it invoked in its motion to dismiss after obtaining an adverse
ruling thereon.From a perusal of petitioners motion to dismiss filed with the med-arbiter, it becomes
readily apparent that the sole basis for petitioners motion is the illegality of the employees membership
in respondent union despite the fact that they allegedly are still members of the cooperative. Petitioner
itself adopted the aforesaid argument in seeking the dismissal of the petition for certification election filed
with the medarbiter, and the finding made by the latter was merely in answer to the arguments advanced
by petitioner. Hence, petitioner is deemed to have submitted the issue of membership withdrawal from the
cooperative to the jurisdiction of the med-arbiter and it is now estopped from questioning that same
jurisdiction which it invoked in its motion to dismiss after obtaining an adverse ruling thereon.
Same; Same; Same; Argument of CENECO that the withdrawal was merely to subvert the ruling of the
Court in the Batangas case is without merit.The argument of CENECO that the withdrawal was merely
to subvert the ruling of this Court in the BATANGAS case is without merit. The case referred to merely
declared that employees who are at the same time members of the cooperative cannot join labor unions for
purposes of collective bargaining. However, nowhere in said case is it stated that member-employees are
prohibited from withdrawing their membership in the cooperative in order to join a labor union.
Same; Same; Same; The right to join an organization necessarily includes the equivalent right that to join
the same.It appears that the Articles of Incorporation of CENECO do not provide any ground for
withdrawal from membership which accordingly gives rise to the presumption that the same may be done
at any time and for whatever reason. In addition, membership in the cooperative is on a voluntary basis.
Hence, withdrawal therefrom cannot be restricted unnecessarily. The right to join an organization
necessarily includes the equivalent right not to join the same.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; The avowed policy of the state to afford full protection to labor
and to promote the primacy of free collective bargaining mandates that the employees right to form and
join unions for the purposes of collective bargaining be accorded the highest consideration.The right of
the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason why their withdrawal from the cooperative must
be allowed. As pointed out by CURE, the resignation of the member-employees is an expression of their
preference for union membership over that of membership in the cooperative. The avowed policy of the
State to afford full protection to labor and to promote the primacy of free collective bargaining mandates
that the employees right to form and join unions for purposes of collective bargaining be accorded the
highest consideration.
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Instance, the municipal judge and the judge of a city court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where
the value of the subject matter or amount of the demand does not exceed ten thousand pesos, exclusive of
interests and costs. The amount claimed by plaintiff on behalf of its members was P4,035.82 and if the
damages and attorneys fees be added, the total sum was less than P10,000.00. It is true that if an element
of unfair labor practice may be discerned in a suit for the enforcement of a collective bargaining contract,
then the matter is solely cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations. It is equally true that as of the
date the lower court decision was rendered, the question of such enforcement had been held to be for the
regular courts to pass upon. [Mactan Workers Union vs. Aboitiz, 45 SCRA 577(1972)]
Part Three
Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 212 SCRA 50(1992)
Labor Law; Corporation Law; Jurisdiction; The Med-Arbiter and the BLR, on appeal, not the Securities
and Exchange Commission, have jurisdiction over release of union dues by different officers claiming to
represent a union.There is no doubt that the controversy between the aforesaid two sets of officers is an
intra-union dispute. Both sets of officers claim to be entitled to the release of the union dues collected by
the company with whom it had an existing CBA. The controversy involves claims of different
members/officers to certain rights granted under the labor code. Article 226 of the Labor Code vests upon
the Bureau of Labor Relations and Labor Relations Division the original and exclusive authority and
jurisdiction to act on all inter-union and intra-union disputes. Therefore, the Med-Arbiter originally, and
the Director on appeal, correctly assumed jurisdiction over the controversy.
Same; Same; It is the registration with BLR, not with SEC that makes a union a legitimate labor
organization.As stated in the findings of fact in the questioned resolution of Director Pura FerrerCalleja, on October 23, 1950, a group of deck officers organized the Cebu Seamens Association, Inc.,
(CSAI), a non-stock corporation and registered it with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
The same group registered the organization with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) as Seamens
Association of the Philippines (SAPI). It is the registration of the organization with the BLR and not with
the SEC which made it a legitimate labor organization with rights and privileges granted under the Labor
Code.
Same; Same; Expulsion of an individual from the moribund corporate parent of a registered labor union
does not affect her membership from the latter.The expulsion of Nacua from the corporation, of which
she denied being a member, has however, not affected her membership with the labor union. In fact, in the
elections of officers for 1987-1989, she was re-elected as the president of the labor union. that Nacua was
already expelled from the union. Whatever acts their group had done in the corporation do not bind the
labor union. Moreover, Gabayoyo cannot claim leadership of the labor group by virtue of his having been
elected as a president of the dormant corporation CSAI.
Same; Same; Same.Public respondent Bureau of Labor Relations correctly ruled on the basis of the
evidence presented by the parties that SAPI, the legitimate labor union, registered with its office, is not the
same association as CSAI, the corporation, insofar as their rights under the Labor Code are concerned.
Hence, the former and not the latter association is entitled to the release and custody of union fees with
Aboitiz Shipping and other shipping companies with whom it had an existing CBA. [Cebu Seamen's
Association, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 212 SCRA 50(1992)]
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements before a local or chapter becomes a legitimate
labor organization.A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon
submission of the following to the BLR: 1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the
labor federation or national union, and 2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers,
and the books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case
may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its president. Absent compliance with these mandatory
requirements, the local or chapter does not become a legitimate labor organization.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the
required documents under oath is fatal to its acquisition of a legitimate status.In the case at bar, the
failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the required documents under oath is fatal to its
acquisition of a legitimate status.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the petition for certification election was filed by the
federation which is merely an agent, the petition is deemed to be filed by the chapter, the principal which
must be a legitimate labor organization.At this juncture, it is important to clarify the relationship
between the mother union and the local union. In the case of Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v.
Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 66 SCRA 512 [1975]), the Court held that the mother union, acting for and in
behalf of its affiliate, had the status of an agent while the local union remained the basic unit of the
association, free to serve the common interest of all its members subject only to the restraints imposed by
the constitution and by-laws of the association. Thus, where as in this case the petition for certification
election was filed by the federation which is merely an agent, the petition is deemed to be filed by the
chapter, the principal, which must be a legitimate labor organization. The chapter cannot merely rely on
the legitimate status of the mother union. [Progressive Development Corporation vs. Secretary,
Department of Labor and Employment, 205 SCRA 802(1992)]
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
union as the agent of the individual workers. The court in turn should certainly verify and assure itself of
the fact and extent of the authority of the union leadership to execute any compromise or settlement of the
judgment on behalf of the individual workers who are the real judgment creditors. [Heirs of Teodolo M.
Cruz vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 30 SCRA 917(1969)]
United Seamen's Union of the Phil. vs. Davao Shipowners Association, 20 SCRA 1226(1967)]
Labor Law; Strikes; Illegal strike.A strike by a union was considered illegal, where it appears that it was
declared even before the employers had answered the union's demands and it was in violation of an
agreement to maintain the status quo pending resolution of the union's petition for a certification election
and also in violation of a collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the strikers resorted to violent
means.
Same; Test to determine illegality of strike.The legality or illegality of a strike depends, first, upon the
purpose for which it is maintained, and, second, upon the means employed in carrying it on. Thus, if the
purpose which the laborers intend to accomplish by means of a strike is trivial, unreasonable or unjust, or
if, in carrying on the strike, the strikers should commit violence or cause injuries to persons or damage to
property, the strike, although not prohibited by injunction, may be declared illegal, with the adverse
consequences to the strikers.
Same.Where in carrying out the strike, coercion, force, intimidation, violence with physical injuries,
sabotage, and. the use of unnecessary and obscene language or epithets were committed by the top
officials and members of the union in an attempt to prevent the other willing laborers to go to work, a
strike held under those circumstances cannot be justified in a regime of law for that would encourage
abuses and terrorism and would subvert the very purpose of the law. which provides for arbitration and
peaceful settlement of labor disputes.
Same; Unions; When labor union is wholesome.A labor organization is wholesome if it serves its
legitimate purpose of promoting the interests of labor without unnecessary labor disputes. That is why it is
given personality and recognition in concluding collective bargaining agreements. But if it is made use of
as a subterfuge, or as a means to subvert valid commitments, it defeats its own purpose, for it tends to
undermine the harmonious relations between management and labor. The situation does not deserve any
approving sanction from the Court. [United Seamen's Union of the Phil. vs. Davao Shipowners
Association, 20 SCRA 1226(1967)]
Phoenix Iron and Steel Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 244 SCRA 173(1995)]
Labor Relations; Legitimate Labor Organizations; Requirements.A local or chapter x x x becomes a
legitimate labor organization only upon submission of the following to the BLR: 1) A charter certificate,
within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or national union, and 2) The constitution and bylaws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by
the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not become a legitimate
labor organization.
Protection Technology, Inc. vs. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, 242 SCRA
99(1995)
Labor Relations; Union Affiliation; Requirements; Books of account, consisting of ledgers, journals and
other accounting books, form part of the mandatory documentation requirements for registration of a
newly organized union affiliated with a federation.The principal issue here posed is whether books of
account, consisting of ledgers, journals and other accounting books, form part of the mandatory
documentation requirements for registration of a newly organized union affiliated with a federation, or a
local or chapter of such a federation, as a legitimate labor organization. The above issue was addressed
several years ago and answered in the affirmative by this Court in Progressive Development Corporation
v. Secretary, DOLE.
Same; Same; Same; Certification Election; Non-submission of such books of account is a ground to
oppose a petition for certification election.Non-submission of such books of account certified by and
attested to by the appropriate officer is a ground which the employer can invoke legitimately to oppose a
petition for certification election filed by the local or chapter concerned.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Books of Account.Books of account are quite different in their essential
nature from financial statements. In generally accepted accounting practice, the former consist of journals,
ledgers and other accounting books (which are registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue) containing
a record of individual transactions wherein monies are received and disbursed by an establishment or
entity; entries are made on such books on a day-to-day basis (or as close thereto as is possible). Statements
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
of accounts or financial reports, upon the other hand, merely summarize such individual transactions as
have been set out in the books of account and are usually prepared at the end of an accounting period,
commonly corresponding to the fiscal year of the establishment or entity concerned. Statements of account
and financial reports do not set out or repeat the basic data (i.e., the individual transactions) on which they
are based and are, therefore, much less informative sources of cash flow information. Books of account
are kept and handled by bookkeepers (employees) of the company or agency; financial statements may be
audited statements, i.e., prepared by external independent auditors (certified public accountants).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The controlling intention is to minimize the risk of fraud and diversion
in the course of subsequent formation and growth of the Union fund.It is immaterial that the Union,
having been organized for less than a year before its application for registration with the BLR, would have
had no real opportunity to levy and collect dues and fees from its members which need to be recorded in
the books of account. Such accounting books can and must be submitted to the BLR, even if they contain
no detailed or extensive entries as yet. The point to be stressed is that the applicant local or chapter must
demonstrate to the BLR that it is entitled to registered status because it has in place a system for
accounting for members contributions to its fund even before it actually receives dues or fees from its
members. The controlling intention is to minimize the risk of fraud and diversion in the course of the
subsequent formation and growth of the Union fund.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The statutory and regulatory provisions defining the requirements of
registration of legitimate labor organizations are an exercise of the overriding police power of the State,
designed for the protection of workers against potential abuse by unions and federations of unions that
recruit them.The public respondent Undersecretary thus acted arbitrarily in disregarding the plain terms
of the Omnibus Implementing Rules (Section 3(e), Rule II, Book V, Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code), and as well the rule laid down by this Court in the Progressive Development Corporation
case. The statutory and regulatory provisions defining the requirements of registration of legitimate labor
organizations are an exercise of the overriding police power of the State, designed for the protection of
workers against potential abuse by unions and federations of unions that recruit them. This purpose is
obviously defeated if the registration requirements are relaxed arbitrarily by the very officials supposed to
administer such requirements and registered status extended to an organization not entitled to such status,
as in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The certification election was held in the presence of representatives of the
DOLE and presumably reflected the free and democratic will of the workers of petitioner Company.The
Court is not closing its eyes to the certification election actually, if precipitately, held in this case
notwithstanding the prior issuance of the temporary restraining order of this Court. So far as the record of
this case is concerned, that certification election was held in the presence of representatives of the DOLE
and presumably reflected the free and democratic will of the workers of petitioner Company. The Court
will not set aside that will, in the absence of compelling reasons to do so.
Same; Same; Same; Registration is a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by a
labor organization.Nevertheless, private respondent Union must comply with all the requirements of
registration as a legitimate labor organization before it may enjoy the fruits of its certification election
victory and before it may exercise the rights of a legitimate labor organization. Registration is a condition
sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by a labor organization and the exercise of the rights
and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations.
Same; Same; Same; Private respondent Union must submit its books of account certified under oath by its
treasurer and attested to by its president before such Union may demand recognition by the Company as
the exclusive bargaining agent.We hold, therefore, that private respondent Union must submit its books
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
establishment.It bears stressing that no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification elections,
for it is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. The certification election is the most
democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers can freely determine the union that shall act as
their representative in their dealings with the establishment where they are working. It is the appropriate
means whereby controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal vote
of the employees themselves. Indeed, it is the keystone of industrial democracy.
Same; Same; Same; What is required to be certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer and attested to
by the locals president are the constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books
of accounts of the organization the charter certificate issued by the mother union need not be certified
under oath.Petitioner next asseverates that the Charter Certificate submitted by the private respondent
was defective in that it was not certified under oath and attested to by the organizations secretary and
President. Petitioner is grasping at straws. Under our ruling in the Progressive Development Corporation
case, what is required to be certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer and attested to by the locals
president are the constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts
of the organization. The charter certificate issued by the mother union need not be certified under oath by
the secretary or treasurer and attested to by the locals president.
Certiorari; The Supreme Court is definitely not the proper venue to consider a factual issue as it is not a
trier of facts.This is a factual issue which petitioner should have raised before the Med-Arbiter so as to
allow the private respondent ample opportunity to present evidence to the contrary. This Court is
definitely not the proper venue to consider this matter for it is not a trier of facts. It is noteworthy that
petitioner did not challenge the legal personality of the federation in the proceedings before the MedArbiter. Nor was this issue raised in petitioners appeal to the Office of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. This matter is being raised for the first time in this petition. An issue which was neither
alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time
before this Court. It would be offensive to the basic rule of fair play, justice and due process.
Same; Certiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in character it is not a general utility
tool in the legal workshop.Certiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in character. It is not
a general utility tool in the legal workshop. Factual issues are not a proper subject for certiorari, as the
power of the Supreme Court to review labor cases is limited to the issue of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion. It is simply unthinkable for the public respondent Undersecretary of Labor to have committed
grave abuse of discretion in this regard when the issue as to the legal personality of the private respondent
IBM Federation was never interposed in the appeal before said forum.
Labor Law; It bears stressing that labor legislation seeks in the main to protect the interest of the members
of the working class and it should never be used to subvert their will.The certification election sought to
be stopped by petitioner is, as of now, fait accompli. The monthly paid rank-and-file employees of SMFI
have already articulated their choice as to who their collective bargaining agent should be. In the
certification election held on August 20, 1994, the SMFI workers chose IBM at SMFI to be their sole and
exclusive bargaining agent. This democratic decision deserves utmost respect. Again, it bears stressing
that labor legislation seeks in the main to protect the interest of the members of the working class. It
should never be used to subvert their will. [San Miguel Foods, Inc.-Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant vs.
Languesma, 263 SCRA 68(1996)]
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Labor Law; A close-shop agreement is a valid form of union security.It is true that disaffiliation from a
labor union is not open to legal objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the
Constitution. But this Court has laid down the ruling that a closed shop is a valid form of union security,
and such provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of
association guaranteed by the Constitution.
Same; The mother union has the right to investigate members of a local union affiliated to it under the
mother unions by-laws and procedures, and if found guilty to expel such members.We reject
petitioners theory that their expulsion was not valid upon the grounds adverted to earlier in this Decision.
That PAFLU had the authority to investigate petitioners on the charges filed by their co-employees in the
local union and after finding them guilty as charged, to expel them from the roll of membership of the
Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU is clear under the constitution of the PAFLU to which the local union
was affiliated. And pursuant to the security clause of the new CBA, reiterating the same clause in the old
CBA, PAFLU was justified in applying said security clause. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of
the OIC of Regional Office No. 4 in upholding the validity of the expulsion and on the part of the
respondent Deputy Minister of Labor in sustaining the same.
Same; Same.The contention of petitioners that the charges against them being intra-union problems,
should have been investigated in accordance with the constitution and by-laws of the Amigo Employees
Union-PAFLU and not of the PAFLU, is not impressed with merit. It is true that under the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, in case of intra-union disputes, redress must first be sought
within the organization itself in accordance with its constitution and by-laws. However, it has been held
that this requirement is not absolute but yields to exception under varying circumstances.
Same; The local unions by-laws shall not apply in the investigation of charges against its members filed
by its officers, who, under said by-laws will also act as judges. In such a case, the mother unions by-laws
shall apply.The facts of the instant petition stand on all fours with the aforecited case that the principle
therein enunciated applies here as well. In the case at bar, the petitioners were charged by the officers of
the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU themselves who were also members of the Board of Directors of the
Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. Thus, were the petitioners to be charged and investigated according to
the local unions constitution, they would have been tried by a trial committee of three (3) elected from
among the members of the Board who are themselves the accusers. (Section 2, Article 11, Constitution of
the Local Union). Petitioners would be in a far worse position had this procedure been followed.
Nonetheless, petitioners admit in their petition that two (2) of the six (6) charges, i.e. disaffiliation and
filing a petition for certification election, are not intra-union matters and, therefore, are cognizable by
PAFLU.
Same; A mere minority of a local unions membership cannot disaffiliate their union from its mother
union.Extant from the records is the fact that petitioners numbering ten (10), were among the ninety-six
(96) who signed the Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan whereas there are two hundred thirty four (234) union
members in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. Hence, petitioners constituted a small minority for
which reason they could not have successfully disaffiliated the local union from PAFLU. Since only 96
wanted disaffiliation, it can be inferred that the majority wanted the union to remain an affiliate of PAFLU
and this is not denied or disputed by petitioners. The action of the majority must, therefore, prevail over
that of the minority members.
Same; A mere minority cannot file a petition for union disaffiliation even within the prescribed 60-day
period before the expiry of an existing CBA.It is true, as contended by petitioners, that under Article
257 of the Labor Code and Section 3, Rule 2, Book 2 of its Implementing Rules, questions of exclusive
bargaining representation are entertainable within the sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of an existing
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Labor Law; Judgment; Findings of Facts; Findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies will not be disturbed
unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion.The rule is that findings of facts of quasi-judicial
agencies will not be disturbed unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion. We find none in the
case at bench. We therefore affirm that there is a validly executed collective bargaining agreement
between FORMEY and KAMAPI.
Labor Relations; Certification Election; Petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can
only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.Art. 253-A of the
Labor Code provides that (n)o petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent
shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and
Employment outside of the sixty (60)-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five-year
term of the collective bargaining agreement. Sec. 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code provides that x x x (i)f a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in
accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention
can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.
Same; Labor Organization; Labor Union; A local union maintains its separate personality despite
affiliation with a larger national federation.It is further argued that the CBA has no binding force since it
was entered into by KAMAPI as a federation and not by the local union. Perusal of the agreement proves
the contention flawed.
The signatories for KAMAPI consisted of its national president and of the duly elected officers of the
local union. Thus the fact that KAMAPI was particularly mentioned as the bargaining party without
specifying the local union cannot strip it of its authority to participate in the bargaining process. The local
union maintains its separate personality despite affiliation with a larger national federation.
Same; Same; Same; The mother union acting for and in behalf of its affiliates has the status of an agent
while the local union remain the basic unit of the association free to serve the common interest of all its
members subject to the restraints imposed by the Constitution and By-Laws of the association.The
doctrine laid down in Progressive Development Corporation is a mere clarification of the principle
enunciated in Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc. Both cases have provided
that the mother union acting for and in behalf of its affiliate ha(s) the status of an agent while the local
union remained the basic unit of the association free to serve the common interest of all its members
subject only to the restraints imposed by the Constitution and By-Laws of the association. Nonetheless,
the facts and principles laid down in both cases do not jibe squarely with the case at bench. The
controversy in Progressive Development Corporation centered on the requirements before a local or
chapter of a federation may file a petition for certification election and be certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent, while in Liberty Cotton Mills Workers the issue involved was the disaffiliation
of the local union from the federation. The question of whether there was a valid and existing CBA, which
is the question being resolved in the case at bench, was never raised in the two cited cases since it was
already an accepted fact that the CBA was validly executed and existing. [Pambansang Kapatiran Ng Mga
Anak Pawis Sa Formey Plastic National Workers Brotherhood vs. Secretary of Labor, 253 SCRA
96(1996)]
Furusawa Rubber Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 282 SCRA 635(1997)]
Labor Law; Labor Unions; Court agrees with respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment that FEUIND is a legitimate labor organization.We cannot sustain petitioner. We agree with respondent Secretary
of Labor and Employment that FEU-IND is a legitimate labor organization. As such, it enjoys all the
rights and privileges recognized by law. The fact that FEU-IND has been issued Certificate of Registration
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
organization voluntarily without fear of suppression or reprisal from management. PD No. 828 encourages
trade unionism to supplement and strengthen the exercise of the workers right to self-organization.
Same; Same; Same; In an unorganized establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, a
certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon filing of a petition by a
legitimate labor organization for a certific ation election.Petitioner FURUSAWA further argues that the
Med-Arbiter ignored the fact that FEU-IND does not represent at least 20% of the employees in the
bargaining unit which it seeks to represent. Public respondent however has found the petition to be
sufficient in form and substance, there being compliance with the required 20% support signatures. Article
257 of the Labor Code provides that in an unorganized establishment where there is no certified
bargaining agent, a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon filing
of a petition by a legitimate labor organization for a certification election. [Furusawa Rubber Philippines,
Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 282 SCRA 635(1997)]
Tropical Hut Employees' Union-CGW vs. Tropical Hut Food Market, Inc., 181 SCRA 173(1990)]
Labor; Appeal; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Remedy of appeal from the Secretary of Labor to
the Office of the President not a mandatory requirement before resort to Courts can be had.The remedy
of appeal from the Secretary of Labor to the Office of the President is not a mandatory requirement before
resort to courts can be had, but an optional relief provided by law to parties seeking expeditious
disposition of their labor disputes. Failure to avail of such relief shall not in any way serve as an
impediment to judicial intervention. And where the issue is lack of power or arbitrary or improvident
exercise thereof, decisions of the Secretary of Labor may be questioned in a certiorari proceeding without
prior appeal to the President (Arrastre Security Association___TUPAS v. Ople, No. L-45344, February 20,
1984, 127 SCRA 580). Since the instant petition raises the same issue of grave abuse of discretion of the
Secretary of Labor amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in deciding the controversy, this Court
can properly take cognizance of and resolve the issues raised herein.
Same; Evidence; Court aware of the time-honored doctrine that the findings of the NLRC and the
Secretary of Labor are binding on the Court if supported by substantial evidence.We are aware of the
time-honored doctrine that the findings of the NLRC and the Secretary of Labor are binding on this Court
if supported by substantial evidence. However, in the same way that the findings of facts unsupported by
substantial and credible evidence do not bind this Court, neither will We uphold erroneous conclusions of
the NLRC and the Secretary of Labor when We find that the latter committed grave abuse of discretion in
reversing the decision of the labor arbiter (San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, L-50321, March 13, 1984,
128 SCRA 180). In the instant case, the factual findings of the arbitrator were correct against that of public
respondents.
Same;Constitutional Law; Right to Self-organization; Employees enjoy the right to self-organization and
to form and join labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to
engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection.All employees enjoy the right to self
organization and to form and join labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective
bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection. This is a fundamental
right of labor that derives its existence from the Constitution. In interpreting the protection to labor and
social justice provisions of the Constitution and the labor laws or rules or regulations, We have always
adopted the liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor rights.
Same; Same; Same; Right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother federation well-settled.The
right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother federation is well-settled. A local union, being a
separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the interest of all its members including the freedom to
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
faith to said unions demands.Contrary to the pretensions of complainant LAKAS, the respondent
Marcelo Companies did not ignore the demand for collective bargaining contained in its letter of June 20,
1967. Neither did the companies refuse to bargain at all. What it did was to apprise LAKAS of the existing
conflicting demands for recognition as the bargaining representative in the appropriate units involved, and
suggested the settlement of the issue by means of the filing of a petition for certification election before
the Court of Industrial Relations. This was not only the legally approved procedure but was dictated by the
fact that there was indeed a legitimate representation issue. PSSLU, with whom the existing CB As were
entered into, was demanding of respondent companies to collectively bargain with it; so was Paulino
Lazaro of MUEWA, J.C. Espinas & Associates for MACATIFU and the MFWU, and the complainant
LAKAS for MULU which we understand is the aggrupation of MACATIFU, MFWU and UNWU. On top
of all of these, Jose Roque of UNWU disauthorized the PSSLU from representing his union; and similarly,
Augusto Carreon of MACATIFU itself informed management as late as July 11, 1967 or after the demand
of LAKAS that no group representing his Union is not authorized and should not be entertained.
Same; Where there exists a legitimate issue as to which of several unions is the legitimate representative
of employees, it is ULP for one of the unions to stage a strike and demand that employer sit down with it
for collective bargaining.The clear facts of the case as hereinbefore restated indisputably show that a
legitimate representation issue confronted the respondent Marcelo Companies. In the face of these facts
and in conformity with the existing jurisprudence, We hold that there existed no duty to bargain
collectively with the complainant LAKAS on the part of said companies. And proceeding from this basis,
it follows that all acts instigated by complainant LAKAS such as the filing of the Notice of Strike on June
13, 1967 (although later withdrawn) and the two strikes of September 4, 1967 and November 7, 1967 were
calculated, designed and intended to compel the respondent Marcelo Companies to recognize or bargain
with it notwithstanding that it was an uncertified union, or in the case of respondent Marcelo Tire and
Rubber Corporation, to bargain with it despite the fact that the MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro was already
certified as the sole bargaining agent in said respondent company. These concerted activities executed and
carried into effect at the instigation and motivation of LAKAS are all illegal and violative of the
employers basic right to bargain collectively only with the representative supported by the majority of its
employees in each of the bargaining units. This Court is not unaware of the present predicament of the
employees involved but much as We sympathize with those who have been misled and so lost then-jobs
through hasty, ill-advised and precipitate moves, We rule that the facts neither substantiate nor support the
finding that the respondent Marcelo Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice.
Same; Employer not guilty of bad faith where it not with unions officers and offered suggestions on how
to resolve their dif-ferences.It is also evident from the records that the charge of bargaining in bad faith
imputed to the respondent companies, is hardly credible. In fact, such charge is valid as only against the
complainant LAKAS. The parties had a total of five (5) conferences for purposes of collective bargaining.
It is worth considering that the first strike of September 4, 1967 was staged less than a week after the
fourth CBA conference and without any benefit of any previous strike notice. In this connection, it must
be stated that the notice of strike filed on June 13, 1967 could not have been the strike notice for the first
strike because it was already withdrawn on July 14, 1967. Thus, from these stated facts can be seen that
the first strike was held while the parties were in the process of negotiating. Nor can it be sustained that
the respondent Marcelo Companies bargained in bad faith since there were proposals offered by them, but
the complainant LAKAS stood pat on its position that all of their economic demands should be met and
that all of these demands should be granted in all of the respondent Marcelo Companies. The companies
refusal to accede to the demands of LAKAS appears to be justified since there is no showing that these
companies were in the same state of financial and economic affairs. There is reason to believe that the first
strike was staged only for the purpose of compelling the respondent Marcelo Companies to accede to the
inflexible demands of the complainant LAKAS. The records further establish that after the resumption of
normal operations following the first strike and the consequent Return-to-work Agreement, the striking
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
individual affiliation with LAKAS, LAKAS bears no legal interest in representing MUEWA or any of its
members.
Same; Same.Nor will the lower courts opinion be availing with respect to the complaining employees
belonging to UNWU and MFWU. Although it is true, as alleged by LAKAS, that when it filed the charge
on December 26, 1967, the officers of the movant unions were not yet then the officers thereof,
nevertheless, the moment MFWU and UNWU separated from and disaffiliated with LAKAS to again
exercise its rights as independent local unions, registered before as such, they are no longer affiliates of
LAKAS, as what transpired here. Naturally, there would no longer be any reason or occasion for LAKAS
to continue representing them. Notable is the fact that the members purportedly represented by LAKAS
constitute the mere minority of the movant unions, as may be inferred from the allegations of the movant
unions as well as the counter-allegations of LAKAS filed below. As such, they cannot prevail or dictate
upon the will of the greater majority of the unions to which they still belong, it appearing that they never
disaffiliated from their unions; or stated in another way, they are bound by the action of the greater
majority.
Same; Same; Where a union brought suit in behalf of employees it was not authorized to represent, the
proper remedy is to drop the union as party to the action and place the names of the employees instead.
This is not to say that the complaining employees were without any venue for redress. Under the
aforestated considerations, the respondent court should have directed the amendment of the complaint by
dropping LAKAS as the complainant and allowing the suit to be further prosecuted in the individual
names of those who had grievances. A class suit under Rule 3, Section 12 of the Rules of Court is
authorized and should suffice for the purpose.
Same; Same; Appeals; Supreme Court may cure defect of inclusion/non-inclusion of proper parties even
on appealIn fairness to the complaining employees, however, We treated their Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision subject of appeal as curing the defect of the complaint as the said motion
expressly manifested their collective desire to pursue the complaint for and in their own behalves and
disauthorizing LAKAS counsel from further representing them. And We have also treated their petition
before Us in the same manner, disregarding the fact that LAKAS remained the petitioning party, as it
appears from the verification that the petition in L-38258 was for and in behalf of the complaining
employees. The merits of their petition, however, fall short of substantiating the charge of unfair labor
practice against the respondent Marcelo Companies. On the other hand, the appeal of the Marcelo
Companies in L-38260 must be upheld and sustained. [Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan vs. Marcelo
Enterprises, 118 SCRA 422(1982)]
Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization vs. Laguesma, 254 SCRA 565(1996)]
Labor Law; Administrative Proceedings; Due Process; Administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial
powers, like the DOLE, are free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, nonetheless, they are
bound by law and practice to observe the essential requisites of due process.While, in general,
administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers, like the Department of Labor and Employment,
are free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, they are nonetheless bound by law and
practice to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases
presented before them.
Same; Same; Same; The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard, as applied in
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side.The most basic tenet of due process
is the right to be heard, and as applied in administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side.
Such opportunity was denied petitioner in this case.
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Same; Same.Under Section 1, Article II of our Constitution, (n)o person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law x x x and under Article 238 of the Labor Code, (t)he
certificate of registration of any legitimate labor organization, whether national or local, shall be cancelled
by the Bureau if it has reason to believe, after due hearing, that the said labor organization no longer meets
one or more of the requirements herein prescribed. (emphasis supplied)
and academic. The prayer is for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that it is moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is dismissed for being moot and academic. [Tablante-Tungol
Enterprises vs. Noriel, 84 SCRA 738(1978)]
Labor Relations; Labor Organization; Unions; Cancellation of a certificate of registration is the equivalent
of snuffing out the life of a labor organization, without such, it loses its rights under the Labor Code.
The cancellation of a certificate of registration is the equivalent of snuffing out the life of a labor
organization. For without such
registration, it losesas a ruleits rights under the Labor Code. Under the circumstances, petitioner was
indisputably entitled to be heard before a judgment could be rendered cancelling its certificate of
registration. In David vs. Aguilizan, it was held that a decision rendered without any hearing is null and
void. [Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization vs. Laguesma, 254 SCRA 565(1996)]
National Union of Bank Employees vs. Minister of Labor, 110 SCRA 274(1981)]
Labor Law; A certification election may be ordered despite pendency of a petition to cancel the unions
registration certificate.The Court rules in the affirmative. The pendency of the petition for cancellation
of the registration certificate of herein petitioner union is not a bar to the holding of a certification
election. The pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of petitioner union
founded on the alleged illegal strikes staged by the leaders and members of the intervenor union and
petitioner union should not suspend the holding of a certification election, because there is no order
directing such cancellation (cf. Dairy Queen Products Company of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, et al., No. L-35009, Aug. 31, 1977). In said Dairy Queen case, one of the issues
raised was whether the lower court erred and concomitantly committed grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding the fact that therein respondent unions permit and license have been cancelled by the then
Department of Labor and therefore could not be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank and file employees of therein petitioner company.
Same; Petition to cancel union registration evidently intended to delay holding of a certification election.
It may be worthy to note also that the petition for cancellation of petitioner unions registration
certificate based on the alleged illegal strikes staged on October 12, 1979 and later November 57, 1979
was evidently intended to delay the early disposition of the case for certification election considering that
the same was apparently filed only after the October 18, 1979 Order of Med-Arbiter Plagata which
directed the holding of a certification election.
Same; Cancellation of union registration certificate is not the only penalty for violation of the Labor Code.
From the aforequoted provisions, We are likewise convinced that as it can be gleaned from said
provisions, cancellation of the registration certificate is not the only resultant penalty in case of any
violation of the Labor Code. Certainly, the penalty imposable should be commensurate to the nature or
gravity of the illegal activities conducted and to the number of members and leaders of the union staging
the illegal strike. [National Union of Bank Employees vs. Minister of Labor, 110 SCRA 274(1981)]
Tablante-Tungol Enterprises vs. Noriel, 84 SCRA 738(1978)]
Moot and Academic; Where both parties are no longer interested in the outcome of a case, a prayer for its
dismissal on the ground that it is moot and academic may be granted.That both parties are no longer
interested in the outcome/result of this case and pray of this Honorable Court to dismiss it for being moot
Labor Law; Actions; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Hierarchy of Courts; Challenges against rulings of
the labor secretary and those acting on his behalf, like the director of labor relations, shall be acted upon
by the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court over petitions for
certiorari.At the outset, the Court stresses that National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Laguesma has
held that challenges against rulings of the labor secretary and those acting on his behalf, like the director
of labor relations, shall be acted upon by the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction with this
Court over petitions for certiorari. However, inasmuch as the memoranda in the instant case have been
filed prior to the promulgation and finality of our Decision in NFL, we deem it proper to resolve the
present controversy directly, instead of remanding it to the Court of Appeals. Having disposed of the
foregoing procedural matter, we now tackle the issues in the present case seriatim.
Same; Right to Self-Organization; Unions; Employees have the right to form, join or assist labor
organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining or for their mutual aid and protection.Selforganization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Philippine Constitution and the Labor Code.
Employees have the right to form, join or assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective
bargaining or for their mutual aid and protection. Whether employed for a definite period or not, any
employee shall be considered as such, beginning on his first day of service, for purposes of membership in
a labor union.
Same; Same; Same; To become a union member, an employee must, as a rule, not only signify the intent
to become one, but also to take some positive steps to realize that intent.Corollary to this right is the
prerogative not to join, affiliate with or assist a labor union. Therefore, to become a union member, an
employee must, as a rule, not only signify the intent to become one, but also take some positive steps to
realize that intent. The procedure for union membership is usually embodied in the unions constitution
and bylaws. An employee who becomes a union member acquires the rights and the concomitant
obligations that go with this new status and becomes bound by the unions rules and regulations.
Same; Same; Same; Members frustration over the performance of the union officers, as well as their fears
of a fraudulent election to be held under the latters supervision, could not justify the disregard of the
unions constitution and by-laws.Petitioners claim that the numerous anomalies allegedly committed by
the private respondents during the latters incumbency impelled the October 4, 1996 election of the new
set of USTFU officers. They assert that such exercise was pursuant to their right to self-organization.
Petitioners frustration over the performance of private respondents, as well as their fears of a fraudulent
election to be held under the latters supervision, could not justify the method they chose to impose their
will on the union. Director Bitonio aptly elucidated: The constitutional right to self-organization is better
understood in the context of ILO Convention No. 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of Right to
Organize), to which the Philippines is signatory. Article 3 of the Convention provides that workers
organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitution and rules and to elect their representatives
in full freedom, free from any interference from public authorities. The freedom conferred by the
provision is expansive; the responsibility imposed on union members to respect the constitution and rules
they themselves draw up equally so. The point to be stressed is that the unions CBL is the fundamental
law that governs the relationship between and among the members of the union. It is where the rights,
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Union may not arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership.It is well settled that
labor unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership, and a closed-shop
provision would not justify the employer in discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of, an
employee whom the union thus refuses to admit to membership, without any reasonable ground therefor.
Needless to say, if said unions may be compelled to admit new members who have the requisite
qualifications, with more reason may the law and the courts exercise the coercive power when the
employee involved is a long standing union member who, owing to provocations of union officers, was
impelled to tender his resignation, which he forthwith withdrew or revoked. Surely, he may at least invoke
the right of those who seek admission for the first time, and cannot arbitrarily be denied readmission.
Same; Unfair labor practice; When company was not guilty of unfair labor practice.In the case at bar,
the company was reluctantif not unwillingto discharge petitioner. When the union first informed it of
petitioners resignation and urged implementation of Section 3 of the bargaining contract, the company
advised petitioner of its provisions, thereby intimating that he had to withdraw his resignation in order to
keep his employment. Besides, the company notified the union that it would not take any action on the
case and would consider petitioner still a member of the union. When the latter, thereafter, insisted on
petitioners discharge, the company still demurred and explained that it was not taking sides and that its
stand was prompted merely by humane considerations, springing from the belief that petitioner had
resigned from the union without realizing its effect upon his employment. And, as the union reiterated its
demand, the company notified petitioner that it had no other alternative but to terminate his employment,
and dismissed him from the service, although with regret. Under the circumstances, the company was
not unfair to petitioner.
Same; Same; Right of employee dismissed from service due to unfair labor practice.Having been
dismissed from the service owing to an unfair labor practice on the part of the union, petitioner is entitled
to reinstatement as member of the union and to his former or substantially equivalent position in the
company, without prejudice to his seniority and/or rights and privileges, and with back pay, which back
pay shall be borne exclusively by the union. In the exercise of its sound judgment and discretion, the
lower court may, however, take such measures as it may deem best, including the power to authorize the
company to make deductions for petitioners benefit, from the sums due to the union by way of check off
or otherwise. [Salanga vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 21 SCRA 216(1967)
Bugay vs. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company, 4 SCRA 487(1962)
Court of Industrial Relations; Jurisdiction; Moral damages.Claim form oral damages cannot be included
in a charge for unfair labor practice filed with the Industrial Court as the same does not come within the
jurisdiction of said court. This is a matter that has to be looked into by the regular courts. Bugay vs.
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company, 4 SCRA 487(1962)
Tancinco vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 157 SCRA 203(1988)
Labor Law; Election; Submission of the employees names with the BLR as qualified members of the
union is not a condition sine qua non to enable said members to vote in the election of unions officers;
Question of eligibility to vote may be determined through the use of the applicable payroll period and
employees status.The finding does not have a leg to stand on. Submission of the employees names
with the BLR as qualified members of the union is not a condition sine qua non to enable said members to
vote in the election of unions officers. It finds no support in fact and in law. For public respondents
findings, the April 24, 1986 list consists of 180 union members only wherein 51 of the 56 challenged
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
have been made in good faith and the amount spent for the purpose mentioned in the report, if concurred
in or accepted by the members, are reasonable.
Same; Election Law; Re-election of petitioners and non-election of respondents convincing show of faith
on petitioners leadership.The repudiation of both private respondents to the highly sensitive position of
auditor at the October 4, 1982 election, is a convincing manifestation and demonstration of the union
memberships faith in the herein officers leadership on one hand and a clear condonation of an act they
had allegedly committed.
Same; Same; Public Officers; Removal of officer for acts done prior to present term not proper.By and
large, the holding of the referendum in question has become moot and academic. This is in line with Our
ruling in Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 471, which We quote: The Court should
never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to
deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it
must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such
faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people. [Kapisanan ng Manggagawang
Pinagyakap (KMP) vs. Trajano, 134 SCRA 236(1985)]
Rodriguez vs. Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, 165 SCRA 239(1988)
Labor; Unions; General elections for union officers; Elections for union officers which were attended by
grave irregularities, held invalid.A review of the record fails to disclose any grave abuse of discretion
tainting the adjudgment of respondent Director of Labor Relations that the general elections for union
officers held in 1986 were attended by grave irregularities, rendering the elections invalid. That finding
must thus be sustained. The dates for provincial elections were set for July 14 to 18, 1986. But they were
in fact held on July 21 and 22, 1986, without prior notice to all voting members, and without ground rules
duly prescribed therefor. The elections in Metro Manila were conducted under no better circumstances. It
was held on July 25, 1986 in disregard and in defiance of the temporary restraining order properly issued
by the Med-Arbiter on July 23, 1986, notice of which restraining order had been regularly served on the
same date, as the proofs adequately show, on both the Union President, Manolito Paran, and the Chairman
of the Union COMELEC, Benedicto Rodriguez. Moreover, as in the case of the provincial elections, there
were no ground rules or guidelines set for the Metro Manila elections. Undue haste, lack of adequate
safeguards to ensure integrity of the voting, and absence of notice of the dates of balloting, thus attended
the elections in the provinces and in Metro Manila. They cannot but render the proceedings void.
Same; Same; Same; Free and honest elections are indispensable to the enjoyment by employees and
workers of their right to self-organization; The right would be diluted if the election is not fairly and
honestly conducted.It goes without saying that free and honest elections are indispensable to the
enjoyment by employees and workers of their constitutionally protected right to self-organization. That
right would be diluted if in the choice of the officials to govern x x (union) affairs, the election is not
fairly and honestly conducted, and the labor officers concerned and the courts have the duty to see to it
that no abuse is committed by any official of a labor organization in the conduct of its affairs.
Same; Same; Same; The assent of 30% of the union membership is not a factor in the acquisition of
jurisdiction by the Bureau of Labor Relations over all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all
disputes, grievances or problems arising from labor-management relations; Use of the permissive word
may in Article 242 of the Labor Code.The respondent Directors ruling, however, that the assent of
30% of the union membership, mentioned in Article 242 of the Labor Code, was mandatory and essential
to the filing of a complaint for any violation of rights and conditions of membership in a labor
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
organization (such as the arbitrary and oppressive increase of union dues here complained of), cannot be
affirmed and will be reversed. The very article relied upon militates against the proposition. It states that a
report of a violation of rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization may be made by (a)t
least thirty percent (30%) of all the members of a union or any member or members specially
concerned. The use of the permissive may in the provision at once negates the notion that the assent of
30% of all the members is mandatory. More decisive is the fact that the provision expressly declares that
the report may be made, alternatively by any member or members specially concerned. And further
confirmation that the assent of 30% of the union members is not a factor in the acquisition of jurisdiction
by the Bureau of Labor Relations is furnished by Article 226 of the same Labor Code, which grants
original and exclusive jurisdiction to the Bureau, and the Labor Relations Division in the Regional Offices
of the Department of Labor, over all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or
problems arising from or affecting labor management relations, making no reference whatsoever to any
such 30%-support requirement. Indeed, the officials mentioned are given the power to act on all interunion and intra-union conflicts (1) upon request of either or both parties as well as (2) at their own
initiative.
acquainting the parties with the various issues involved and the reasons therefor (Ang Tibay vs. Court, 69
Phil. 635, cited on p. 84, Philippine Constitution Law, Fernando, 1984 ed.).
Same; Same; Same; Petition to nullify the union elections clearly involved an intra-union conflict over
which jurisdiction could be assumed by the Labor Relations Director or the Med-Arbiters.These
considerations apply equally well to controversies over elections. In the cases at bar, the petition to nullify
the 1986 union elections could not be deemed defective because it did not have the assent of 30% of the
union membersip. The petition clearly involved an intra-union conflictone directly affecting the right of
suffrage of more than 800 union members and the integrity of the union electionsover which, as the law
explicitly provides, jurisdiction could be assumed by the Labor Relations Director or the Med-Arbiters at
their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties.
Same; Same; A 30% to 45% attorneys lien on award to union members is exorbitant.The 45%
attorneys lien on the award of those union members who were no longer working and the 30% lien on the
benefits of those who were still working as provided for in the alleged retainers contract are very
exorbitant and unconscionable in view of Section 11, Rule VIII of Book III which explicitly provides:
Sec. 11. Attorneys fees.Attorneys fees on any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery
of wages shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded. The fees may be deducted from the total amount
due the winning party.
Same; Same; Same; Union Dues; The resolution of the unions Legislative Council increasing the union
dues is illegal and void because it does not bear the signature of at least two-thirds of the members of the
Council as required by the unions constitution and by-laws, and the absence of proper ratification of the
resolution by a majority of the general union membership at a plebiscite.As regards the final issue
concerning the increase of union dues, the respondent Director found that the resolution of the unions
Legislative Council to this effect does not bear the signature of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the members of
the Council, contrary to the requirement of the union constitution and bylaws; and that proof is wanting of
proper ratification of the resolution by a majority of the general union membership at a plebiscite called
and conducted for that purpose again in violation of the constitution and by laws. The resolution
increasing the union dues must therefore be struck down, as illegal and void, arbitrary and oppressive. The
collection of union dues at the increased rates must be discontinued; and the dues thus far improperly
collected must be refunded to the union members or held in trust for disposition by them in accordance
with their charter and rules, in line with this Courts ruling in a parallel situation. [Rodriguez vs. Director,
Bureau of Labor Relations, 165 SCRA 239(1988)]
Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112(1985)
Administrative Law; Labor Law, Requisites for validity of administrative proceedings.This Court, as
earlier stated, nullified said orders dated September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983 of Labor Arbiter
Valenzuela as violative of the due process clause. It is a settled rule that in administrative proceedings, or
cases coming before administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers, due process requires not
only notice and hearing, but also the consideration by the administrative tribunal of the evidence
presented; the existence of evidence to support the decision; its substantiality; a decision based thereon or
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties; such decision by the administrative tribunal
resting on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy; and such decision
Attorneys; Labor Law; Act of counsel of filing a motion in the Supreme Court for authority to sell
property in question which he acknowledged that he has no authority, a violation.Significantly, Atty.
Pinedas act of filing a motion with this Court on December 1, 1982 praying for authority to sell was by
itself an admission on his part that he did not possess the authority to sell the property and that this Court
was the proper body which had the power to grant such authority.
Same; Same; Counsel knew the Labor Arbiter has no authority to authorize sale of property at bar Only
the final orders or decisions of a Labor Arbiter or NLRC may be implemented.He could not and did not
even wait for such valid authority but instead previously obtained the same from the labor arbiter whom
he knew was not empowered to so authorize. Under Article 224 (a) of the Labor Code, only final decisions
or awards of the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter, or compulsory or voluntary arbitrators may be implemented or
may be the subject of implementing orders by aforenamed body or officers.
Same; Same; Donation of a portion of attorneys fees to the Union is improper.The amount of
P101,856,00 which Atty. Pineda donated to the Union and which actually corresponds to 5% of the total
35% attorneys fees taken from the proceeds (p. 263, L-24864, rec.) appears improper since it amounts to
a rebate or commission. This amount was subsequently treated as union miscellaneous operating expenses
without the consent of the general membership.
Same; Same; The pleadings show a deceitful pattern on the part of Atty. Pineda who alternatively signed
on behalf of J.C. Espinas and Associates or B.C. Pineda as lone counsel.A deeper scrutiny of the
pleadings in L-24864 notably indicates a fraudulent or deceitful pattern in the actuations of Atty. Pineda.
Thus, in his motion for execution of judgment filed on September 18, 1965 in this, he signed for and in
behalf of J.C. Espinas & Associates (p. 323, rec.). In his manifestation dated December 10, 1968, he
signed as B.C. Pineda, lone counsel for petitioner (p. 327, rec.); and yet, he carried the address of
Espinas & Associates at 716 G. Puyat Building, Escolta.
Same; Same; Sale; The Courts resolution which made null and void the orders for authority to sell issued
by Arbiter Valenzuela makes the sale of the Union property illegal.In view of Our resolution of October
18, 1983, which set aside as null and void the questioned orders dated September 23, 1982 and February
9, 1983 issued by Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela, the sale of the Union property and the distribution of the
proceeds therefrom had been effected without authority and, therefore, illegal. Consequently, Atty. Pineda
and Arbiter Valenzuela become liable for their unauthorized acts.
Contempt; Labor Law; Contempt, defined.Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or
dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation (12 Am. jur
389, cited in 14 SCRA 813).
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Same; A private attorney may be held liable criminally under the Anti-Graft Act for knowingly
inducing a public official to commit an offense.Atty. Benjamin Pineda could also be held liable under
Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) which makes it unlawful for any
person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3
of said act. Section 3 enumerates the corrupt practices which public officers may be prosecuted for. Atty.
Pineda knowingly induced or caused Labor Arbiter Valenzuela to issue the questioned orders without or
beyond the latters authority and to which orders the former was not entitled, considering that he was not
the sole and proper representative.
Contempt; Manila Banking Corporation could no longer be held in contempt after it obeyed the Courts
orders.The Manila Banking Corporation (Cubao Branch) per manifestation and motion dated October
28, 1983 and reiterated on November 10, 1983, had transmitted to the NLRC the remaining balance of
P417,380.64 and P2,022.70 for the account of the Union and Atty. Pineda, respectively. This turnover of
the aforecited amounts is a sufficient compliance with Our restraining order and resolution of September
13, 1983 and hence, the Manila Banking Corporation can no longer be liable for contempt of court.
Contempt; Labor Law; The Union is dropped from the contempt charge in view of its explanation.In the
same motion, Mr. Capuno clarifies that with regard to attorneys fees, Atty. Pineda made the Union
officers believe that he would be the one to pay the fees of Attys. Espinas and Lopez for which reason, the
35% increased fees was approved by the Unions board in good faith. The Union likewise confirms that
Atty. Pineda came into the picture only when he was assigned by Atty. Espinas in 1965 to execute the CIR
decision which, thru Atty. Espinas handling, was upheld by this Court in L-24864 in 1968. The Union
officers were aware that Atty. Espinas was the principal counsel even after Atty. Pinedas assignment.
They also knew of the original contract for 20% attorneys fees which was increased to 35% by Atty.
Pineda upon the arrangement that with the increase, he would answer for the payment of Attys. Espinas
and Lopez fees and for necessary representation expenses. Acting on the aforesaid motion, this Court in
its resolution of August 28, 1964, dropped the Union and its officers from the within contempt charge.
[Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112(1985)]
Pacific Banking Corporation vs. Clave, 128 SCRA 112(1984)
Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreement; Attorneys Fees; Office of the President, without
jurisdiction to adjudicate attorneys fees of a lawyer who assisted the union president in negotiating the
agreement with the employer; Reason.We hold that, under the circumstances, the Office of the President
had no jurisdiction to make an adjudication on Saavedras attorneys fees. The case was appealed with
respect to the CBA terms and conditions, not with respect to attorneys fees. Although the fees were a
mere incident, nevertheless, the jurisdiction to fix the same and to order the payment thereof was outside
the pale of Claves appellate jurisdiction. He was right in adopting a hands-off attitude in his first
resolution and holding that the payment of the fees was a question between the lawyer and the union.
Same; Same; Same; Employees protected by law from unwarranted practices that diminish an employees
compensation without his knowledge and consent.Moreover, the case is covered squarely by the
mandatory and explicit prescription of article 222 which is another guarantee intended to protect the
employee against unwarranted practices that would diminish his compensation without his knowledge and
consent. (See National Power Corporation Supervisors Union vs. National Power Corporation, L-28805,
August 10, 1981, 106 SCRA 556).
Same; Same; Same; Payment of attorneys fees of lawyer is an obligation of the union, not the employees;
Money of employees, not to be used to pay the attorneys fees of a lawyer.There is no doubt that lawyer
Saavedra is entitled to the payment of his fees but article 222 ordains that union funds should be used for
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
in what manner the cancellation of the permit of the Coto Labor Union made the petitioner an heir to the
union dues. On the other hand, the petitioner secured its own registration as a labor organization on 20
August 1963 while the registration of the Coto Labor Union was cancelled only on 22 November 1963. So
that between these two dates, both unions were simultaneously existing, precluding the idea of one union
being the successor of the other, and, furthermore, the Consolidated Workers Union would not have
entered into a consent election agreement with the Coto Labor Union if it did not recognize the existence
of the Coto Labor Union with whom it had contracted.
ID.; ID.; ID.; UNION DUES; PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION REGARDING DEPOSIT OF UNION
DUES PROPER IN INSTANT CASE. Complainant Coto Labor Union filed a motion for preliminary
injunction to enjoin Benguet Consolidated, Inc. and Consolidated Workers Union from negotiating and
concluding, between themselves, a new collective bargaining agreement; to enjoin the corporation from
turning over to the latter union, and for the latter to receive from the former, the dues collected from the
workers, and from disbursing said dues; and for the deposit into court of all dues collected or which may
thereafter be collected. The said motion makes out a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief
which is necessary to preserve the right asserted by the movant, and herein petitioner Consolidated
Workers Union admitted in its answer in the main case that deductions made pursuant to the previous
agreement between the company and the Coto Labor Union were subsequently turned over to the
Consolidated Workers Union from the time the company learned about the cancellation of the registration
permit of the Coto Labor Union. Hence, the lower court, even without the evidence alluded to by the
petitioner as necessary, had sufficient basis on record to support its order. The court acted reasonably, and
with fairness to the parties, and not abusively as charged, in adopting the remedial measure of ordering the
deposit of the union dues which were turned over to the herein petitioner, considering that the complaint
asked the Industrial Court to declare that the Consolidated Workers Union, petitioner herein, was either a
company union or was company dominated.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS IN INSTANT
CASE. There is no merit to the argument of petitioner that the order directing the Consolidated
Workers Union to deposit in court the union dues involved constitutes deprivation of property without due
process of law. As pointed out in the appealed order, if the Industrial Court, after hearing, should
ultimately find that the Consolidated Workers Union is company dominated or is a company union and
order it dis-established, the result would be that petitioner would have to return all moneys and dues
collected by it from the workers, since the union would have had no authority to represent the workers.
Because the moneys collected might be improperly spent by the time the dis-establishment order is made,
it was logical for the court below to order that such moneys be deposited in the meantime.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POSTING OF BOND REQUIRED. It was error for the labor court not to
require the complainant-movant, Coto Labor Union (herein respondent), to file a bond for the issuance of
preliminary injunction. The posting of a bond under Section 4 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court is a
condition sine qua non in order that the writ of preliminary injunction may issue (Siva, Et. Al. v. Reyes, Et
Al., 83 Phil. 416; Villarosa v. Teodoro, 100 Phil. 24).
Labor Law; Labor Union; The system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the union and only
indirectly for the individual employees.In check-off, the employer, on agreement with the Union, or on
prior authorization from employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from the latters wages and remits
them directly to the union. It assures continuous funding for the labor organization. As this Court has
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
members consist of back payments of their unpaid emergency cost of living allowances which are totally
distinct from their wages. Allowances are benefits over and above the basic salaries of the employees
(University of Pangasinan Faculty Union vs. University of Pangasinan, G.R.No. L-63122, February 20,
1984, 127 SCRA 691). We have held that such allowances are excluded from the concept of salaries or
wages (Cebu Institute of Technology (CIT) vs. Ople, G.R. No. L-58870, December 18, 1987, 156 SCRA
629). In addition, the payment of the fringe benefits were effected through an amicable settlement and not
in an administrative proceeding. [Vengco vs. Trajano, 173 SCRA 155(1989)]
Galvadores vs. Trajano, 144 SCRA 138(1986)
Labor Law; Attorneys; There can be no deduction from an employees salary for attorneys fees without
his written, signed authorization. A plebiscite is not enough.The provisions are clear. No check-offs
from any amounts due employees may be effected without individual written authorizations duly signed
by the employees specifically stating the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction. The required
individual authorizations in this case are wanting. In fact, petitioner employees are vigorously objecting.
The question asked in the plebiscite, besides not being explicit, assumed that there was no dispute relative
to attorneys fees.
Same; Same; Words & Phrases; Placement of re-negotiations for a CBA under compulsory process does
not make it a mandatory activity as to authorize check-offs from employees salary for attorneys fees
without written, signed authorization.Contrary to respondent Unions and Counsels stand, the benefits
awarded to PLDT employees still formed part of the collective bargaining negotiations although placed
already under compulsory arbitration. This is not the mandatory activity under the Code which
dispenses with individual written authorizations for check-offs, notwithstanding its compulsory nature.
It is a judicial process of settling disputes laid down by law. Besides, Article 222(b) does not except a
CBA, later placed under compulsory arbitration, from the ambit of its prohibition. The cardinal principle
should be borne in mind that employees are protected by law from unwarranted practices that diminish
their compensation without their knowledge and consent.
Same; Same; Union funds respond for attorneys fees.ACCORDINGLY, the assailed Decision of
February 18, 1985 rendered by respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, is hereby SET
ASIDE. The attorneys fees herein involved may be charged against Union funds pursuant to Article
222(b) of the Labor Code, as may be agreed upon between them. [Galvadores vs. Trajano, 144 SCRA
138(1986)]
Continental Cement Corporation Labor Union(NLU) vs. Continental Cement Corporation, 189
SCRA 134(1990)
Labor Law; Strike is illegal if not in connection with any unresolved economic issue in collective
bargaining.Private respondent was engaged in the manufacture of cement which is no doubt a vital
industry in which a strike or lockout is prohibited under the foregoing aforestated decree. And even
assuming that private respondent was not engaged in a vital industry, the strike that was staged by
petitioner was nonetheless illegal. It was not in connection with any unresolved economic issue in
collective bargaining which is the only ground for which a lawful strike can be held.
Same;Dismissal of the uniono fficers, just penalty for their unlawful acts.Petitioner then contends that
the separation from work of the officers of the union is quite severe. The officers had the duty to guide
their members to respect the law. Instead, they urged them to violate the law and defy the duly constituted
authorities. Their responsibility is greater than that of the members. Their dismissal from the service is a
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Labor Law; Confidential Employees; Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a
confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management
policies [specifically in the field of labor relations].Now may the said bank personnel be deemed
confidential employees? Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity,
in regard (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies [specifically in the
field of labor relations]. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be
considered a confidential employeethat is, the confidential relationship must exist between the
employee and his superior officer; and that officer must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to
labor relations.
Same; Same; Right to Self-Organization; When the employee does not have access to confidential labor
relations information, there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees from forming, assisting,
or joining a union.Article 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from
engaging in union activities. However, under the doctrine of necessary implication, the disqualification of
managerial employees equally applies to confidential employees. The confidential-employee rule justifies
exclusion of confidential employees because in the normal course of their duties they become aware of
management policies relating to labor relations. It must be stressed, however, that when the employee does
not have access to confidential labor relations information, there is no legal prohibition against
confidential employees from forming, assisting, or joining a union.
Same; Same; Same; Collective Bargaining Agreement; One of the rights of a legitimate labor organization
under Article 242(b) of the Labor Code is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.One of the rights of a
legitimate labor organization under Article 242(b) of the Labor Code is the right to be certified as the
exclusive representative of all employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective
bargaining.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certification Election; Article 257 of the Labor Code mandates that a
certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by
a legitimate labor organization.Having complied with the requirements of Art. 234, it is our view that
respondent union is a legitimate labor union. Article 257 of the Labor Code mandates that a certification
election shall automatically be conducted by the MedArbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate
labor organization. Nothing is said therein that prohibits such automatic conduct of the certification
election if the management appeals on the issue of the validity of the unions registration. On this score,
petitioners appeal was correctly dismissed. [Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc. vs. Laguesma, 324 SCRA
425(2000)]
St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. vs. Torres, 223 SCRA 779(1993)
Labor Law; Labor Code; Considering public respondents expertise on the subject and his observance of
the cardinal principles of due process, the assailed order deserves to be accorded great respect by this
Court.We rule that the Order, particularly in its disposition on the economic issues, was not arbitrarily
imposed by public respondent. A perusal of the Order shows that public respondent took into
consideration the parties respective contentions, a clear indication that he was keenly aware of their
contrary positions. Both sides having been heard, they were allowed to present their respective evidence.
The due process requirement was thus clearly observed. Considering public respondents expertise on the
subject and his observance of the cardinal principles of due process, the assailed Order deserves to be
accorded great respect by this Court.
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Constitution and By-laws. Upon demand of the federation, the company terminated the petitioners without
conducting a separate and independent investigation. Respondent company did not inquire into the cause
of the expulsion and whether or not the federation had sufficient grounds to effect the same. Relying
merely upon the federations allegations, respondent company terminated petitioners from employment
when a separate inquiry could have revealed if the federation had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
expelling the union officers. Respondent companys allegation that petitioners were accorded due process
is belied by the termination letters received by the petitioners which state that the dismissal shall be
immediately effective.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right of an employee to be informed of the charges against him and to
reasonable opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the company or his own union is not
wiped away by a union security clause or a union shop clause in a collective bargaining agreement.As
held in the aforecited case of Carino, the right of an employee to be informed of the charges against him
and to reasonable opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the company or his own
union is not wiped away by a union security clause or a union shop clause in a collective bargaining
agreement. An employee is entitled to be protected not only from a company which disregards his rights
but also from his own union the leadership of which could yield to the temptation of swift and arbitrary
expulsion from membership and mere dismissal from his job.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even assuming that a federation had valid grounds to expel union officers, due
process requires that these union officers be accorded a separate hearing by the company. While
respondent company may validly dismiss the employees expelled by the union for disloyalty under the
union security clause of the collective bargaining agreement upon the recommendation by the union, this
dismissal should not be done hastily and summarily thereby eroding the employees right to due process,
self-organization and security of tenure. The enforcement of union security clauses is authorized by law
provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness, and always with due process. Even on the
assumption that the federation had valid grounds to expel the union officers, due process requires that
these union officers be accorded a separate hearing by respondent company.
Same; Same; Same; Intra-Union Disputes; Illegal Dismissal; While it is true that the issue of expulsion of
local union officers is originally between the local union and the federation, hence, intraunion in character,
the issue is later on converted into a termination dispute when the company dismisses the union officers
from work without the benefit of a separate notice and hearing; Notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal
was at the instance of a labor federation which undertook to hold the company free from any liability
resulting from such a dismissal, the company may still be held liable if it was remiss in its duty to accord
the would-be dismissed employees their right to be heard on the matter.In its decision, public
respondent also declared that if complainants (herein petitioners) have any recourse in law, their right of
action is against the federation and not against the company or its officers, relying on the findings of the
Labor Secretary that the issue of expulsion of petitioner union officers by the federation is a purely intraunion matter. Again, such a contention is untenable. While it is true that the issue of expulsion of the local
union officers is originally between the local union and the federation, hence, intra-union in character, the
issue was later on converted into a termination dispute when the company dismissed the petitioners from
work without the benefit of a separate notice and hearing. As a matter of fact, the records reveal that the
termination was effective on the same day that the termination notice was served on the petitioners, x x x
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was at the instance of the federation and that it undertook
to hold the company free from any liability resulting from such a dismissal, the company may still be held
liable if it was remiss in its duty to accord the would-be dismissed employees their right to be heard on the
matter.
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Same; Same; Where violence was committed on both sides during a strike, such violence cannot be
a ground for declaring the strike as illegal.On the allegation of violence committed in the course of the
strike, it must be remembered that the Labor Arbiter and the Commission found that the parties are
agreed that there were violent incidents x x x resulting to injuries to both sides, the union and
management. The evidence on record show that the violence cannot be attributed to the striking
employees alone for the company itself employed hired men to pacify the strikers. With violence
committed on both sides, the management and the employees, such violence cannot be a ground for
declaring the strike as illegal.
Same; Abandonment; Requisites.Jurisprudence holds that for abandonment of work to exist, it is
essential (1) that the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid
or justifiable reason; and (2) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship manifested by some overt acts. Deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the employee
to go back to his work post and resume his employment must be established. Absence must be
accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work
anymore. And the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to go back to work rests on
the employer.
Same; Same; The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the allegation of
abandonment.This Court has ruled that an employee who took steps to protest his lay-off cannot be
said to have abandoned his work. The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the
allegation of abandonment. In the case under consideration, the petitioners did, in fact, file a complaint
when they were refused reinstatement by respondent company.
Same; Union Security Clauses; Unfair Labor Practices; Due Process; Dismissals pursuant to union
security clauses are valid and legal subject only to the requirement of due process; Dismissal of an
employee by the company pursuant to a labor unions demand in accordance with a union security
agreement does not constitute unfair labor practice.Anent public respondents finding that there was no
unfair labor practice on the part of respondent company and federation officers, the Court sustains the
same. As earlier discussed, union security clauses in collective bargaining agreements, if freely and
voluntarily entered into, are valid and binding. Corrolarily, dismissals pursuant to union security clauses
are valid and legal subject only to the requirement of due process, that is, notice and hearing prior to
dismissal. Thus, the dismissal of an employee by the company pursuant to a labor unions demand in
accordance with a union security agreement does not constitute unfair labor practice.
Same; Corporation Law; Company officials cannot be held personally liable for damages on account of
the employees dismissal because the employer corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its
officers who merely acted as its agents.The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that respondent
company officials cannot be held personally liable for damages on account of the employees dismissal
because the employer corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its officers who merely
acted as its agents.
Same; Illegal Dismissal; Backwages; An employee who is dismissed, whether or not for just or authorized
cause but without prior notice of his termination, is entitled to full backwages from the time he was
terminated until the decision in his case becomes final, when the dismissal was for cause; and in case the
dismissal was without just or valid cause, the backwages shall be computed from the time of his dismissal
until his actual reinstatement.In Ruben Serrano vs. NLRC and Isetann Department Store (G.R. No.
117040, January 27, 2000), the Court ruled that an employee who is dismissed, whether or not for just or
authorized cause but without prior notice of his termination, is entitled to full backwages from the time he
was terminated until the decision in his case becomes final, when the dismissal was for cause; and in case
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
case, we start with the recognized rule that the right of supervisory employees to organize under the
Industrial Peace Act carries certain restrictions but the right itself may not be denied or unduly abridged.
The supervisory employees of an employer cannot join any labor organization of employees under their
supervision but may validly form a separate organization of their own. As stated in Caltex Filipino
Managers and Supervisors Association v. Court of Industrial Relations (47 SCRA 112), it would be to
attach unorthodoxy to, not to say an emasculation of, the concept of law if managers as such were
precluded from organizing. Thus, if Republic Act 875, in its Section 3, recognizes the right of supervisors
to form a separate organization of their own, albeit they cannot be members of a labor organization of
employees under their supervision, that authority of supervisors to form a separate labor union carries with
it the right to bargain collectively with the employer. (Government Service Insurance System v.
Government Service Insurance System Supervisors Union (68 SCRA 418).
Same; Same; Affiliation by a duly registered local union with a national union or federation does not make
the local union lose its legal personality.There is nothing in the provisions of the Industrial Peace Act
which provides that a duly registered local union affiliating with a national union or federation loses its
legal personality, or its independence.
Same; Same; Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; Right of supervisory
employees; Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the
rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.The
prohibition against a supervisors' union joining a local union of rank-and-file is replete with jurisprudence.
The Court emphasizes that the limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors wanting to join a rankand-file local union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors' local union applying for membership in a
national federation the members of which include local unions of rank-and-file employees. The intent of
the law is clear especially where, as in the case at bar, the supervisors will be comingling with those
employees whom they directly supervise in their own bargaining unit. Technicalities should not be
allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.
(Rapid Manpower Consultants, Inc. vs. NLRC, 190 SCRA 747 [1990]) What should be paramount is the
intent behind the law, not its literal construction. Where one interpretation would result in mischievous
consequences while another would bring about equity, justice, and the promotion of labor peace, there can
be no doubt as to what interpretation shall prevail. [Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. vs. Laguesma, 205
SCRA 12(1992)]
Same; Same; Same; Despite affiliation, the local union remained the basic unit free to serve the common
interest of all its members.In other words, notwithstanding affiliation, the local union remained the
basic unit free to serve the common interest of all its members. [Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs. CIR, 127
SCRA 268(1984)]
Same; Same; Same; Same; One union for every industry policy should not violate the constitutional
mandate of protecting labor and the workers right to self organization; Workingmens welfare, the
paramount consideration in the implementation of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations;
Restricting the right to self-organization due to the existence of a collective bargaining agreement would
go against the spirit of the labor law.In reversing the Med-Arbiters resolution, respondent Bureau
declared: the Department of Labor is set on a task to restructure the labor movement to the end that the
workers will unite themselves along industry lines. Carried to its complete fruition, only one union for
every industry will remain to bargain collectively for the workers. The clear policy therefore even now is
to conjoin workers and worker groups, not to dismember them. This policy is commendable. However, we
must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate of protecting labor and the workers right to selforganization. In the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations, the workingmans welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration. In the case at bar, it would go against the spirit of the labor law to restrict petitioners right
to self-organization due to the existence of the CBA. We agree with the Med-Arbiters opinion that A
disaffiliation does not disturb the enforceability and administration of a collective agreement; it does not
occasion a change of administrators of the contract nor even an amendment of the provisions thereof. But
Labor Law; Constitutional Law; Right of employees to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted
activities.The right of employees to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of
their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for
mutual aid or protection is a fundamental right of labor that derives its existence from the Constitution. It
is recognized and implemented through the abovecited Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act as amended.
Same; Same; Interpretation; Liberal approach in implementing constitutional mandates on labor favors
exercise of labor rights.In interpreting the protection to labor and social justice provisions of the
Constitution and the labor laws or rules and regulations implementing the constitutional mandates, we
have always adopted the liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor rights.
Same; Labor Organizations; Prohibition on supervisory employees of employer from joining any labor
organization of employees, although they may validly form a separate organization of their own; Authority
of supervisors to form a separate labor union includes the right to bargain collectively.In deciding this
Volkschel Labor Union vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, 137 SCRA 42(1985)
Labor Law; Unions; Disaffiliation; Constitutional Law; Right of a local union to disaffiliate from its
mother union; Freedom of local union to serve the interest of all its members, including the freedom to
disaffiliate; Right to disaffiliate is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association.
The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother union is well-settled. In previous cases, it has been
repeatedly held that a local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the interest
of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate when circumstances warrant. This right is
consistent with the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of association (Article IV, Section 7, Philippine
Constitution).
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
nowhere in the record does it appear that the contract entered into by the petitioner and ALUMETAL
prohibits the withdrawal of the former from the latter.
opportunity to air their side and explain their moves. If, after an investigation the petitioners were found to
have violated union rules, then and only then should they be subjected to proper disciplinary measures.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Check-off; Obligation of employee to pay union dues is co-terminous with his
affiliation or membership; A contract between an employee and the parent organization as bargaining
agent for employees, terminated by the disaffiliation of the local union.This now brings us to the second
issue. Under Section 3, Article I, of the CBA, the obligation of the respondent companies to deduct and
remit dues to ALUMETAL is conditioned on the individual check-off authorization of petitioners
members. In other words, ALUMETAL is entitled to receive the dues from respondent companies as long
as petitioner union is affiliated with it and respondent companies are authorized by their employees
(members of petitioner union) to deduct union dues. Without said affiliation, the employer has no link to
the mother union. The obligation of an employee to pay union dues is co-terminous with his affiliation or
membership. The employees check-off authorization, even if declared irrevocable, is good only as long
as they remain members of the union concerned. A contract between an employer and the parent
organization as bargaining agent for the employees is terminated by the disaffiliation of the local of which
the employees are members. Respondent companies therefore were wrong in continuing the check-off in
favor of respondent federation since they were duly notified of the disaffiliation and of petitioners
members having already rescinded their check-off authorization.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The need for a company investigation is founded on the consistent ruling of the
Court that the twin requirements of notice and hearing which are essential elements of due process must
be met in employment-termination cases.The need for a company investigation is founded on the
consistent ruling of this Court that the twin requirements of notice and hearing which are essential
elements of due process must be met in employment-termination cases. The employee concerned must be
notified of the employers intent to dismiss him and of the reason or reasons for the proposed dismissal.
The hearing affords the employee an opportunity to answer the charge or charges against him and to
defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Entitlement by local union which has disaffiliated and continued to
represent the employees of an employer to check-off dues under a collective bargaining contract.Suffice
it to state that respondent federation is not entitled to union dues payments from petitioners members. A
local union which has validly withdrawn from its affiliation with the parent association and which
continues to represent the employees of an employer is entitled to the check-off dues under a collective
bargaining contract. [Volkschel Labor Union vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, 137 SCRA 42(1985)]
Same; Same; Same; Same; The need for the observance of an employees right to procedural due process
in termination cases cannot be overemphasized.If an employee may be considered illegally dismissed
because he was not accorded fair investigation (Hellenic Philip-pine Shipping vs. Siete, 195 SCRA 179
[1991]), the more reason there is to strike down as an inexcusable and disdainful rejection of due process a
situation where there is no investigation at all (See: Collegio del Sto. Nio vs. NLRC, 197 SCRA 611
[1991]; Artex Development Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, 187 SCRA 611 [1990]). The need for the observance of
an employees right to procedural due process in termination cases cannot be overemphasized. After all,
ones employment, profession, trade, or calling is a property right and the wrongful interference
therewith gives rise to an actionable wrong (Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc., 145 SCRA 268
[1986]). Verily, a mans right to his labor is property within the meaning of constitutional guarantees
which he cannot be deprived of without due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if no hearing is conducted, the requirement of due process would have
been met where a chance to explain a partys side of the controversy had been accorded him.
Observance to the letter of company rules on investigation of an employee about to be dismissed is not
mandatory. It is enough that there is due notice and hearing before a decision to dismiss is made (Mendoza
vs. NLRC, 195 SCRA 606 [1991]). But even if no hearing is conducted, the requirement of due process
would have been met where a chance to explain a partys side of the controversy had been accorded him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While the law recognizes the right of an employer to dismiss employees in
warranted cases, it frowns upon arbitrariness as when employees are not accorded due process.While
the law recognizes the right of an employer to dismiss employees in warranted cases, it frowns upon
arbitrariness as when employees are not accorded due process (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651 [1990]).
Thus, the prerogatives of the OFC to dismiss petitioners should not have been whimsically done for it
unduly exposed itself to a charge of unfair labor practice for dismissing petitioners in line with the closed
shop provision of the CBA, without a proper hearing.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While termination of employment is traditionally considered a management
prerogative, it is not an absolute prerogative subject as it is to limitations founded in law, the CBA or
general principles of fair play and justice.Neither can the manner of dismissal be considered within the
ambit of managerial prerogatives, for while termination of employment is traditionally considered a
management prerogative, it is not an absolute prerogative subject as it is to limitations founded in law, the
CBA, or general principles of fair play and justice.
Same; Same; Same; The right of a local union to disaffiliate from a federation in the absence of any
provision in the federations constitution preventing disaffiliation of a local union is legal.
Parenthetically, the right of a local union to disaffiliate from a federation in the absence of any provision
in the federations constitution preventing disaffiliation of a local union is legal (Peoples Industrial and
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Same; Same; Liability of national union to pay backwages of dismissed employees; Payment of
backwages equivalent to three years wages without deduction or qualification.Considering that the
dismissal of the employees was effected without previous hearing, and at the instance of PAFLU, this
mother federation should be held liable to the dismissed Employees for the payment of their back wages.
Following the precedent of Mercury Drug Co. vs. CIR, of fixing an amount of net backwages and doing
away with the protracted process of determining the complainants-workers earnings elsewhere during the
period of their illegal dismissal, the Court fixes the amount of backwages to be paid under this decision to
the complainants-workers at three (3) years backwages without deduction or qualification. [Liberty Cotton
Mills Workers Union vs. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 66 SCRA 512(1975)]
Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC) vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, 75 SCRA 162(1977)
Labor law; Constitutional law; Disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to any legal objection. It is
implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the Constitution.It is indisputable that the present
controversy would not have arisen if there were no mass disaffiliation from petitioning union. Such a
phenomenon is nothing new in the Philippine labor movement. Nor is it open to any legal objection. It is
implicit in the freedom of association explicitly ordained by the Constitution. There is then the
incontrovertible right of any individual to join an organization of his choice. That option belongs to him. A
working man is not to be denied that liberty.
Same; Once disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond doubt, a certification election is the most
expeditious way of determining who should be the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees.
Once the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond doubt, as in this case, a certification
election is the most expeditious way of determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive
bargaining representative. It is as simple as that.
Same; The contract-bar rule cannot be invoked where there has been a valid decertification of a collective
bargaining agreement.The contract-bar rule could then be invoked by petitioner. It is, as pointed out by
Justice Fernandez in Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions v. National Labor Relations Commission, a
principle in labor law that a collective bargaining agreement of reasonable duration is, in the interest of the
stability of industrial relations, a bar to certification elections. Even then, as was pointed out in the justcited Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions decision, it is not to be applied with rigidity. x x x The
element of flexibility in its operation cannot be ignored. In this controversy, however, such a principle is
not applicable. The collective bargaining agreement entered into by petitioner with management on March
9, 1974 was decertified in the challenged order of April 8, 1975. The power to decertify by respondent
Bureau is not disputed. It is the exercise thereof that is now assailed. If done arbitrarily, there is valid
ground for complaint. The due process clause is a guarantee against any actuation of that sort. It stands for
fairness and justice. That standard was not ignored. It suffices to read the petition to disprove any
allegation of such failing, whether in its procedural or substantive aspect Petitioner was heard by
respondent Bureau before the order of decertification was issued on April 8, 1975. The denial of its motion
for reconsideration came also after it had an opportunity to present it side. Procedural due process was
thus observed. Nor was there any denial of substantive due process in the sense of such decertification
being an act of arbitrariness and caprice. In the order of April 8, 1975, it was specifically pointed out: In
the instant case, it is not disputed that the collective bargaining agreement certified by the NLRC was not
ratified by the majority of the employees within the bargaining unit. This is defective. It is blatant nonobservance of the basic requirement necessary to certification. To allow it to remain uncorrected would
allow circumvention of what the law specifically ordained x x x.
Same; The findings of the National Labor Relations Commission on factual matters is generally binding
on the courts.There is no need for a citation of authorities to show how well-settled and firmly-rooted is
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
representation of SAMANA BAY. Thus, any act performed by ANGLO affecting the interests and affairs
of SAMANA BAY, including the ouster of herein individual private respondents, is rendered without force
and effect. [Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Org. vs. Samahan ng mga Manggagawang
Nagkakaisa sa Manila Bay Spinning Mills, 258 SCRA 371(1996)]
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
unit, more so when there is no existing collective bargaining agreement and there has not been a
certification election in the com-pany for the past three years and as in the instant case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Any doubt cast on the authenticity of signature to the petition for holding a
certification election cannot be a bar to its being granted.It is significant to note that 124 employees out
of the 205 employees of the Belyca Corporation have expressed their written consent to the certification
election or more than a majority of the rank and file employees and workers; much more than the required
30% and over and above the present requirement of 20% by Executive Order No. 111 issued on December
24, 1980 and applicable only to unorganized establishments under Art. 257, of the Labor Code, to which
the BELYCA Corporation belongs (Ass. Trade Unions (ATU) v. Trajano G.R. No. 75321, June 20, 1988).
More than that, any doubt cast on the authenticity of signatures to the petition for holding a certification
election cannot be a bar to its being granted (Filipino Metals Corp. v. Ople 107 SCRA 211 [1981]). Even
doubts as to the required 30% being met warrant holding of the certification election (PLUM Federation
of Industrial and Agrarian Workers v. Noriel 119 SCRA [1982]). In fact, once the required percentage
requirement has been reached, the employees withdrawal from union membership taking place after the
filing of the petition for certification election will not affect said petition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should
not be circumvented.On the contrary, the presumption arises that the withdrawal was not free but was
procured through duress, coercion or for a valuable consideration (La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory
v. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations 123 SCRA 679 [1983]). Hence, the subsequent disaffiliation
of the six (6) employees from the union will not be counted against or deducted from the previous number
who had signed up for certification elections (Vicmico Industrial Workers Association (VIWA) v. Noriel
131 SCRA 569 [1984]). Similarly, until a decision, final in character, has been issued declaring the strike
illegal and the mass dismissal or retrenchment valid, the strikers cannot be denied participation in the
certification elections notwithstanding, the vigorous condemnation of the strike and the fact that the
picketing were attended by violence. Under the foregoing circumstances, it does not necessarily follow
that the strikers in question are no longer entitled to participate in the certification election on the theory
that they have automatically lost their jobs. (Barrera v. CIR, 107 SCRA 596 [1981]). For obvious reasons,
the duty of the employer to bargain collectively is nullified if the purpose of the dismissal of the union
members is to defeat the union in the consent requirement for certification election. (Samahang
Manggagawa ng Via Mare v. Noriel 98 SCRA 507 [1980]). As stressed by this Court, the holding of a
certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A certification election is the sole concern of the workers;
Exception.As a general rule, a certification election is the sole concern of the workers. The only
exception is where the employer has to file a petition for certification election pursuant to Art. 259 of the
Labor Code because the latter was requested to bargain collectively. But thereafter the role of the
employer in the certification process ceases. The employer becomes merely a bystander.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; No showing that the instant case falls under the exception.
There is no showing that the instant case falls under the above mentioned exception. However, it will be
noted that petitioner corporation from the outset has actively participated and consistently taken the
position of adversary in the petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative and/or certification election filed by respondent Associated Labors Unions (ALU)-TUCP to
the extent of filing this petition for certiorari in this Court. Considering that a petition for certification
election is not a litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character to determining the
bargaining unit to represent the employees and its only purpose is to give the employees true
representation in their collective bargaining with an employer, there appears to be no reason for the
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should such
contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down
these stipulations. [International School Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing, 333 SCRA 13(2000)]
Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 596 SCRA
92(2009)
Labor Law; Collective Bargaining; Labor Unions; Words and Phrases; Article 212(g) of the Labor Code
defines a labor organization as any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for
the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of
employment; Any applicant labor organization shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the
rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of
registration.Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as any union or association
of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with
employers concerning terms and conditions of employment. Upon compliance with all the documentary
requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the applicant labor organization a
certificate indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. Any applicant labor
organization shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law
to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different
from, but related to, the concept of a bargaining unit; A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a
given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to
the employer, indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under
the collective bargaining provisions of the law; Employees in two corporations cannot be treated as a
single bargaining unit even if the businesses of the two corporations are related.
The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from, but related to, the
concept of a bargaining unit. We explained the concept of a bargaining unit in San Miguel Corporation v.
Laguesma (236 SCRA 595 [1994]), where we stated that: A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a
given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to
the employer, indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under
the collective bargaining provisions of the law. The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate
collective bargaining unit are: (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the
employees interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and
working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
similarity of employment status. Contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court has categorically ruled that
the existence of a prior collective bargaining history is neither decisive nor conclusive in the determination
of what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit. However, employees in two corporations cannot be
treated as a single bargaining unit even if the businesses of the two corporations are related.
Same; Same; Same; The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for
cancellation of registration, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud
under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code, and the proper
procedure is for the employer to file a petition for cancellation of certificate of registration of such union
and not to immediately commence voluntary recognition proceedings with another labor organization.
The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation of
registration, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the
circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code. Thus, CLUP-SLECC
and its Affiliates Workers Union, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
employees within the context of E.O. 180.Even assuming arguendo that UP professors discharge policydetermining functions through the University Council, still such exercise would not qualify them as highlevel employees within the context of E.O. 180. As correctly observed by private respondent, Executive
Order No. 180 is a law concerning public sector unionism. It must therefore be construed within that
context. Within that context, the University of the Philippines represents the government as an employer.
Policy-determining refers to policy-determination in university matters that affect those same matters
that may be the subject of negotiation between public sector management and labor. The reason why
policy-determining has been laid down as a test in segregating rank-and-file from management is to
ensure that those who lay down policies in areas that are still negotiable in public sector collective
bargaining do not themselves become part of those employees who seek to change these policies for their
collective welfare.
Same; Same; Bargaining Unit defined.A bargaining unit has been defined as a group of employees of
a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective
interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve
the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Our labor laws do not provide the criteria for determining the proper collective
bargaining unit.Our labor laws do not however provide the criteria for determining the proper collective
bargaining unit.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The basic test of an asserted bargaining units acceptability is whether or not it
is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights.The Court further explained that (t)he test of the grouping is community or mutuality
of interests. And this is so because the basic test of an asserted bargaining units acceptability is whether
or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, 490). Hence, in that case, the Court upheld
the trial courts conclusion that two separate bargaining units should be formed, one consisting of regular
and permanent employees and another consisting of casual laborers or stevedores.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The community or mutuality of interests test has provided the standard
in determining the proper constituency of a collective bargaining unit.Since then, the community or
mutuality of interests test has provided the standard in determining the proper constituency of a collective
bargaining unit. In Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Company, et al. vs. Alhambra Employees
Association (PAFLU), 107 Phil. 23, the Court, noting that the employees in the administrative, sales and
dispensary departments of a cigar and cigarette manufacturing firm perform work which have nothing to
do with production and maintenance, unlike those in the raw lead (malalasi), cigar, cigarette, packing
(precintera) and engineering and garage departments, authorized the formation of the former set of
employees into a separate collective bargaining unit. The ruling in the Democratic Labor Association case,
supra, was reiterated in Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 110 Phil.
176, where casual employees were barred from joining the union of the permanent and regular employees.
[University of the Philippines vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 211 SCRA 451(1992)]
San Miguel Corporation vs. Laguesma, 236 SCRA 595(1994)
Same; Same; Same; Membership in the University Council can not elevate the professors to the status of
high-level employees.Neither can membership in the University Council elevate the professors to the
status of high-level employees.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even assuming arguendo that UP professors discharge policy-determining
functions through the University Council, still such exercise would not qualify them as high-level
Labor Law; Bargaining Unit, defined.A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer,
indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of the law.
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Corporation Law; Doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity applies when the corporate fiction is
used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime or where a corporation is
the mere alter ego or business conduit of a person.Under the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
entity, when valid grounds therefore exist, the legal fiction that a corporation is an entity with a juridical
personality separate and distinct from its members or stockholders may be disregarded. In such cases, the
corporation will be considered as a mere association of persons. The members or stockholders of the
corporation will be considered as the corporation, that is liability will attach directly to the officers and
stockholders. The doctrine applies when the corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, or when it is made as a shield to confuse the legitimate issues, or
where a corporation is the mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so
organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency,
conduit or adjunct of another corporation.
Same; Same; Fact that the businesses of private respondent and Acrylic are related, that some of the
employees of the private respondent are the same persons manning and providing for auxilliary services to
the units of Acrylic and that the physical plants, offices and facilities are situated in the same compound
are not sufficient to justify the piercing of the corporate veil of Acrylic.In the case at bar, petitioner
seeks to pierce the veil of corporate entity of Acrylic, alleging that the creation of the corporation is a
devise to evade the application of the CBA between petitioner Union and private respondent Company.
While we do not discount the possibility of the similarities of the businesses of private respondent and
Acrylic, neither are we inclined to apply the doctrine invoked by petitioner in granting the relief sought.
The fact that the businesses of private respondent and Acrylic are related, that some of the employees of
the private respondent are the same persons manning and providing for auxilliary services to the units of
Acrylic, and that the physical plants, offices and facilities are situated in the same compound, it is our
considered opinion that these facts are not sufficient to justify the piercing of the corporate veil of Acrylic.
Same; Same; The legal corporate entity is disregarded only if it is sought to hold the officers and
stockholders directly liable for a corporate debt or obligation.In the same case of Umali, et al. v. Court
of Appeals (supra), We already emphasized that "the legal corporate entity is disregarded only if it is
sought to hold the officers and stockholders directly liable for a corporate debt or obligation." In the
instant case petitioner does not seek to impose a claim against the members of the Acrylic.
Same; Same; Same; It is grave abuse of discretion to treat two companies as a single bargaining unit when
these companies are indubitably distinct entities with separate juridical personalities.Furthermore, We
already ruled in the case of Diatagon Labor Federation Local 110 of the ULGWP v. Ople (supra) that it is
grave abuse of discretion to treat two companies as a single bargaining unit when these companies are
indubitably distinct entities with separate juridical personalities. [Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union vs.
Calica, 205 SCRA 697(1992)]
Golden Farms, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor, 234 SCRA 517(1994)]
Labor Law; Right to Self-organization; The monthly paid office and technical rank-and-file employees of
petitioner Golden Farms enjoy the constitutional right to self-organization and collective bargaining;
Definition of a bargaining unit.The monthly paid office and technical rank-and-file employees of
petitioner Golden Farms enjoy the constitutional right to self-organization and collective bargaining. A
bargaining unit has been defined as a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less
than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with
equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties
under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Labor Law; Labor Unions; Criteria to Determine who are Confidential Employees.Confidential
employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate,
determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are
cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employeethat is, the
confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must
handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.
Same; Same; Reason behind the confidential employee rule.The exclusion from bargaining units of
employees who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to
labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the confidential employee rule. The
broad rationale behind this rule is that employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential
conflict of interests. Management should not be required to handle labor relations matters through
employees who are represented by the union with which the company is required to deal and who in the
normal performance of their duties may obtain advance information of the companys position with regard
to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor relations matters.
Same; Same; Same; In determining the confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently
considered is the employees necessary access to confidential labor relations information.An important
element of the confidential employee rule is the employees need to use labor relations information.
Thus, in determining the confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently considered is the
employees necessary access to confidential labor relations information.
Same; Same; Same; An employee may not be excluded from appropriate bargaining unit merely because
he has access to confidential information concerning employers internal business operations and which is
not related to the field of labor relations.It is evident that whatever confidential data the questioned
employees may handle will have to relate to their functions. From the foregoing functions, it can be
gleaned that the confidential information said employees have access to concern the employers internal
business operations. As held in Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, an
employee may not be excluded from appropriate bargaining unit merely because he has access to
confidential information concerning employers internal business operations and which is not related to
the field of labor relations.
Same; Same; Same; Confidential employees who may be excluded from bargaining unit must be strictly
defined so as not to needlessly deprive many employees of their right to bargain collectively through
representatives of their choosing.It must be borne in mind that Section 3 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution mandates the State to guarantee to all workers the right to self-organization. Hence,
confidential employees who may be excluded from bargaining unit must be strictly defined so as not to
needlessly deprive many employees of their right to bargain collectively through representatives of their
choosing.
Same; Same; Appropriate Bargaining Unit Defined.An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as a
group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be
best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law. [San Miguel Corp. Supervisors and Exempt Employees Union vs. Laguema, 277
SCRA 370(1997)]
Mechanical Dept. Labor Union sa Phil. NaVL Railways vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 24 SCRA
925(1968) GLOBE DOCTRINE
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
entitled under the law to bargain collectively with the top management with respect to their terms and
conditions of employment.
Same; Where confidential employees are few in number.Since the confidential employees are very few
in number and are by practice and tradition identified with the supervisors in their role as representatives
of management vis-a-vis the rank and file employees, such identity of interest should allow their inclusion
in the bargaining unit of supervisors-managers for purposes of collective bargaining in turn as employees
in relation to the company as their employer. This will fulfill the laws objective of insuring to them the
full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, which could hardly be
accomplished if the respondent associations membership were to be broken up into five separate
ineffective tiny units as urged by the company.
Same; Court of Industrial Relations enjoys wide leeway in determining appropriate bargaining unit.The
industrial court enjoys a wide discretion in determining the procedure necessary to insure the fair and free
choice of bargaining representations by employees. [Filoil Refinery Corporation vs. Filoil Supervisory &
Confidential Employees Association, 46 SCRA 512(1972)]
Negros Oriental Electric Cooperative 1 vs. Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment,
357 SCRA 668(2001)]
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Factual issues are not a proper subject for certiorari which is limited to the
issue of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion.The above finding was correctly upheld by the Court
of Appeals, and we find no cogent basis to reverse the same. Factual issues are not a proper subject for
certiorari which is limited to the issue of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Jurisdiction; The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction of which is initially lodged with an administrative body
of special competence.Indeed, the Court of Appeals cannot be expected to go over the list of alleged
supervisory employees attached to the petition before it and to pass judgment in the first instance on the
nature of the functions of each employee on the basis of the job description pertaining to him. As
appropriately observed by the said court, the determination of such factual issues is vested in the
appropriate Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment and pursuant to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, the Court should refrain from resolving such controversies. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. [Negros
Oriental Electric Cooperative 1 vs. Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, 357 SCRA
668(2001)]
General Rubber and Footwear Corporation vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, 155 SCRA 283(1987)]
Labor; Labor Unions; Right to self-organization; Members who are not managerial employees but
considered rank-and-file employees have every right to self-organization or be heard through a duly
certified collective bargaining union; Reason.Thus, it can be readily seen from the above findings of the
Bureau of Labor Relations that the members of private respondent are not managerial employees as
claimed by petitioners but merely considered as rank-and-file employees who have every right to selforganization or to be heard through a duly certified collective bargaining union. The Supervisory power of
the members of private respondent union consists merely in recommending as to what managerial actions
to take in disciplinary cases. These members of private respondent union do not fit the definition of
managerial employees which We laid down in the case of Bulletin Publishing Corporation V. Sanchez
(144 SCRA 628). These members of private respondent union are therefore not prohibited from forming
Dela Salle University vs. Dela Salle University Employees Association, 330 SCRA 363(2000)]
Labor Law; Certification Elections; Rules in a Petition for Certiorari Involving Labor Cases.Now,
before proceeding to the discussion and resolution of the issues raised in the pending petitions, certain
preliminary matters call for disposition. As we reiterated in the case of Caltex Refinery Employees
Association (CREA) vs. Jose S. Brillantes, the following are the well-settled rules in a petition for
certiorari involving labor cases. First, the factual findings of quasijudicial agencies (such as the
Department of Labor and Employment), when supported by substantial evidence, are binding on this
Court and entitled to great respect, considering the expertise of these agencies in their respective fields. It
is well-established that findings of these administrative agencies are generally accorded nbt only respect
but even finality. Second, substantial evidence in labor cases is such amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind will accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Third, in Flores vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, we explained the role and function of Rule 65 as an extraordinary remedy: It
should be noted, in the first place, that the instant petition is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court. An extraordinary remedy, its use is available only and restrictively in
truly exceptional casesthose wherein the action of an inferior court, board or officer performing judicial
or quasi-judicial acts is challenged for being wholly void on grounds of jurisdiction. The sole office of the
writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does not include correction of public respondent
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
NLRCs evaluation of the evidence and factual findings based thereon, which are generally accorded not
only great respect but even finality.
Same; Same; Bargaining Units; Collective Bargaining Agreements; The express exclusion of certain
groups of employees from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees in a previous collective
bargaining agreement does not bar any re-negotiation for the future inclusion of the said employees in the
bargaining unit.The Universitys arguments on the first issue fail to impress us. The Court agrees with
the Solicitor General that the express exclusion of the computer operators and discipline officers from the
bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees in the 1986 collective bargaining agreement does not bar any
re-negotiation for the future inclusion of the said employees in the bargaining unit. During the freedom
period, the parties may not only renew the existing collective bargaining agreement but may also propose
and discuss modifications or amendments thereto.
Same; Same; Same; Confidential Employees; Computer operators and discipline officers are not
confidential employees.With regard to the alleged confidential nature of the said employees functions,
after a careful consideration of the pleadings filed before this Court, we rule that the said computer
operators and discipline officers are not confidential employees. As carefully examined by the Solicitor
General, the service record of a computer operator reveals that his duties are basically clerical and nonconfidential in nature. As to the discipline officers, we agree with the voluntary arbitrator that based on the
nature of their duties, they are not confidential employees and should therefore be included in the
bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees.
Same; Same; Corporation Law; Piercing the Veil of Corporate Ficton; The employees of an affiliated
educational institution should be excluded from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees of the
other institution where the two educational institutions have their own separate juridical personality and
no sufficient evidence was shown to justify the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction.The Court also
affirms the findings of the voluntary arbitrator that the employees of the College of St. Benilde should be
excluded from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees of Dela Salle University, because the
two educational institutions have their own separate juridical personality and no sufficient evidence was
shown to justify the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction.
Same; Management Prerogatives; An employer, as an exercise of management prerogative, has the right to
adopt valid and equitable grounds as basis for terminating or transferring employees.We agree with the
voluntary arbitrator that as an exercise of management prerogative, the University has the right to adopt
valid and equitable grounds as basis for terminating or transferring employees. As we ruled in the case of
Autobus Workers Union (AWU) and Ricardo Escanlar vs. National Labor Relations Commission, [a]
valid exercise of management prerogative is one which, among others, covers: work assignment, working
methods, time, supervision of workers, transfer of employees, work supervision, and the discipline,
dismissal and recall of workers. Except as provided for, or limited by special laws, an employer is free to
regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment.
Same; Collective Bargaining; Financial Statements; Financial statements audited by independent external
auditors constitute the normal method of proof of profit and loss performance of a companythe financial
capability of a company cannot be based on its proposed budget because a proposed budget does not
reflect the true financial condition of a company.On the fourth issue involving the voluntary arbitrators
ruling that on the basis of the Universitys proposed budget, the University can no longer be required to
grant a second round of wage increases for the school years 1991-92 and 1992-93 and charge the same to
the incremental proceeds, we find that the voluntary arbitrator committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As we ruled in the case of Caltex Refinery Employees
Association (CREA) vs. Jose S. Brillantes, x x x x x x. [w]e believe that the standard proof of a
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
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Atty. Gutierrez
the supervisory employees should be excluded, it follows that the number of valid votes cast would
increasefrom 321 to 337. Under Art. 256 of the Labor Code, the union obtaining the majority of the
valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the
workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence, 50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at
least 170.
Same; Same; Same; Two-fold objective of the conduct of a certification election.It bears reiteration that
the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing
the required majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections. The opening of the
segregated but valid votes has thus become material. To be sure, the conduct of a certification election has
a two-fold objective: to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to ascertain the majority
representation of the bargaining representative, if the employees desire to be represented at all by anyone.
It is not simply the determination of who between two or more contending unions won, but whether it
effectively ascertains the will of the members of the bargaining unit as to whether they want to be
represented and which union they want to represent them.
Same; Same; Same; Run-off Election; Meaning of a Run-off Election.A run-off election refers to an
election between the labor unions receiving the two (2) highest number of votes in a certification or
consent election with three (3) or more choices, where such a certified or consent election results in none
of the three (3) or more choices receiving the majority of the valid votes cast; provided that the total
number of votes for all contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes cast. With
346 votes cast, 337 of which are now deemed valid and HIMPHLU having only garnered 169 and
petitioner having obtained 151 and the choice NO UNION receiving 1 vote, then the holding of a runoff election between HIMPHLU and petitioner is in order. [National Union of Workers in Hotels,
Rwestaurants and Allied Industries-Manila Pavillion Hotel Chapter vs. Secretary of Labor and
Employment, 594 SCRA 773(2009)]
Warren Manufacturing Workers Union (WMWU) vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, 159 SCRA
387(1988)]
Labor; Certification Election; Distinction between a consent election and a certification election; Consent
election does not shorten the terms of nor entitle the participants to immediately renegotiate an existing
collective bargaining agreementThe records show that petitioner admitted that what was held on August
25, 1985 at the Companys premises and which became the root of this controversy, was a consent election
and not a certification election (italics supplied), As correctly distinguished by private respondent, a
consent election is an agreed one, its purpose being merely to determine the issue of majority
representation of all the workers in the appropriate collective bargaining unit while a certification election
is aimed at determining the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. From the very nature of consent election, it is a
separate and distinct process and has nothing to do with the import and effect of a certification election.
Neither does it shorten the terms of an existing CBA nor entitle the participants thereof to immediately
renegotiate an existing CBA although it does not preclude the workers from exercising their right to
choose their sole and exclusive bargaining representative after the expiration of the sixty (60) day freedom
period.
Same; Same; Election held in case at bar only to determine which labor union shall administer the existing
CBA.It is, therefore, unmistakable that the election thus held on August 25, 1985 was not for the
purpose of determining which labor union should be the bargaining representative in the negotiation for a
collective contract, there being an existing collective bargaining agreement yet to expire on July 31, 1986;
but only to determine which labor union shall administer the said existing contract.
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Same; There should be no obstacle to the right of the employees to petition for certification election
within 60 days prior to the expiration of the 3-year period.Thus, as stated by this Court in General
Textiles Allied Workers Association v. The Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations (84 SCRA 430
[1978]) there should be no obstacle to the right of the employees to petition for a certification election at
the proper time, that is, within 60 days prior to the expiration of the three year period x x x.
and for all in a determination where everything is open to their sound judgment and the possibility of
fraud and misrepresentation is minimized, if not eliminated, without any unnecessary delay and/or
maneuvering. [Algire vs. De Mesa, 237 SCRA 647(1994)]
Same; Same; The premature agreement entered into by petitioner union and the company does not affect
the petition for certification election filed by the respondent union.Finally, such premature agreement
entered into by the petitioner and the Company on June 2, 1986 does not adversely affect the petition for
certification election filed by respondent PACIWU (Rollo, p. 85).
Labor Law; Labor Unions; An employer does not have the power to declare a union as the exclusive
representative of its workers for the purpose of collective bargaining.In accordance with this ruling,
Permex Producer should not have given its voluntary recognition to SMP-PIILU-TUCP when the latter
asked for recognition as exclusive collective bargaining agent of the employees of the company. The
company did not have the power to declare the union the exclusive representative of the workers for the
purpose of collective bargaining.
Same; Same; Interpretation; Administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to
interpret the law have the force of law and entitled to great respect.Apart from the fact that the above
Rule is clear and explicit, leaving no room for construction or interpretation, it is an elementary rule in
administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law and are entitled to great respect
(Espaol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]).
Same; Same; Requirements for certification election met; When the petition for certification election has
the support of at least 30% of the employees in the bargaining unit, it is mandatory for the Bureau of
Labor Relations to conduct a certification election.As aforestated, the existing collective bargaining
agreement was due to expire on July 31, 1986. The Med-Arbiter found that a sufficient number of
employees signified their consent to the filing of the petition and 107 employees authorized intervenor to
file a motion for intervention. Otherwise stated, he found that the petition and intervention were supported
by more than 30% of the members of the bargaining unit. In the light of these facts, Article 258 of the
Labor Code makes it mandatory for the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a certification election
(Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills, Inc. v. Noriel, et al., 134 SCRA 152 [1985]). In the case of
Federation of Free Workers (Bisig ng Manggagawa sa UTEX v. Noriel etc. et al, 86 SCRA 132 [1978]),
this Court was even more specific when it stated No administrative agency can ignore the imperative
tone of the above article. The language used is one of command. Once it has been verified that the petition
for certification election has the support of at least 30% of the employees in the bargaining unit, it must be
granted. The specific word used can yield no other meaning. It becomes under the circumstances,
mandatory x x. [Warren Manufacturing Workers Union (WMWU) vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, 159
SCRA 387(1988)]
Algire vs. De Mesa, 237 SCRA 647(1994)]
Labor Relations; Consent Election; Consent election is an agreed one, the purpose being merely to
determine the issue of majority representation of all the workers in the appropriate collective bargaining
unit.It is unmistakable that the election held on November 15, 1990 was a consent election and not a
certification election. It was an agreed one, the purpose being merely to determine the issue of majority
representation of all the workers in the appropriate collective bargaining unit. It is a separate and distinct
process and has nothing to do with the import and effort of a certification election.
Same; Certification Election; The choice by the majority of employees of the union officers that should
best represent them in the collective bargaining negotiations should be achieved through the democratic
process of an election.In any event, the choice by the majority of employees of the union officers that
should best represent them in the forthcoming collective bargaining negotiations should be achieved
through the democratic process of an election, the proper forum where the true will of the majority may
not be circumvented but clearly defined. The workers must be allowed to freely express their choice once
Same; Same; Certification Elections; Certification election is the most effective and the most democratic
way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force in the appropriate
bargaining unit of a company.Indeed, petitioners contention runs counter to the trend towards the
holding of certification election. By virtue of Executive Order No. 111, which became effective on March
4, 1987, the direct certification previously allowed under the Labor Code had been discontinued as a
method of selecting the exclusive bargaining agents of the workers. Certification election is the most
effective and the most democratic way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the
working force in the appropriate bargaining unit of a company.
Same; Same; Same; It is not enough that a union has the support of the majority of the employees.But it
is not enough that a union has the support of the majority of the employees. It is equally important that
everyone in the bargaining unit be given the opportunity to express himself. [Samahang Manggagawa sa
Permex vs. Secretary of Labor, 286 SCRA 692(1998)]
Oriental Tin Can Labor Union vs. Secretary gof Labor and Employment, 294 SCRA 640(1998)]
Labor Law; Labor Unions; Certification elections are exclusively the concern of employees; hence, the
employer lacks the legal personality to challenge the same.It is a well-established rule that certification
elections are exclusively the concern of employees; hence, the employer lacks the legal personality to
challenge the same. In Golden Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, the Court declared: x x x. Law and
policy demand that employers take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections. The bargaining
representative of employees should be chosen free from any extraneous influence of management. A labor
bargaining representative, to be effective, must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and to no other.
Same; Same; The companys interference in the certification election below by actively opposing the same
is manifestly uncalledfor and unduly creates a suspicion that it intends to establish a company union.
The only instance when an employer may concern itself with employee representation activities is when it
has to file the petition for certification election because there is no existing CBA in the unit and it was
requested to bargain collectively, pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code. After filing the petition, the
role of the employer ceases and it becomes a mere bystander. The companys interference in the
certification election below by actively opposing the same is manifestly uncalled-for and unduly creates a
suspicion that it intends to establish a company union. On this score, it is clear that the perceived grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Secretary is non-existent and G.R. No. 116779 should,
consequently, be dismissed.
Same; Same; The Labor Code imposes upon the employer and the representative of the employees the
duty to bargain collectively.The Labor Code imposes upon the employer and the representative of the
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Same; Same; It is judicially settled that a certification election is the most effective and expeditious
means of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force in the appropriate
bargaining unit of the company.All doubts as to the number of employees actually supporting the
holding of a certification election should, therefore, be resolved by going through such procedure. It is
judicially settled that a certification election is the most effective and expeditious means of determining
which labor organization can truly represent the working force in the appropriate bargaining unit of the
company. If the OTCLU wanted to be retained as the rank-and-file employees bargaining representative,
it should have sought their vote, not engaged in legal sophistry. The selection by the majority of the
employees of the union which would best represent them in the CBA negotiations should be achieved
through the democratic process of an election. [Oriental Tin Can Labor Union vs. Secretary gof Labor and
Employment, 294 SCRA 640(1998)]
Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs. Ople, 163 SCRA 323(1988)]
Labor Laws; Reinstatement; An employer cannot be compelled to continue with the employment ofa
person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance towards his employer and whose continuance in the
service is patently inimical to his interest.The order of the respondent Minister to reinstate the
employees despite a clear finding of guilt on their part is not in conformity with law. Reinstatement is
simply incompatible with a finding of guilt. Where the totality of the evidence was sufficient to warrant
the dismissal of the employees the law warrants their dismissal without making any distinction between a
first offender and a habitual delinquent. Under the law, respondent Minister is duly mandated to equally
protect and respect not only the labor or workers' side but also the management and/or employers' side.
The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the
employer. To order the reinstatement of the erring employees namely, Mejia, Sayson and Reynante would
in effect encourage unequal protection of the laws as a managerial employee of petitioner company
involved in the same incident was already dismissed and was not ordered to be reinstated. As stated by Us
in the case of San Miguel Brewery vs. National Labor Union, "an employer cannot legally be compelled
to continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasan^e
towards his employer, and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his
interest."
Same; Same; Certification Election; Procedure for a representation case, outlined in Arts. 257-260 of the
Labor Code in relation to Arts. 239-240; The requirements in ascertaining majority representation are
calculated to ensure that the certified bargaining representative is the true choice ofthe employees against
all contenders; Case at bar.The petition merits our consideration. The procedure for a representation
case is outlined in Arts. 257-260 of the Labor Code, in relation to the provisions on cancellation of a
Union registration under Arts. 239-240 thereof, the main purpose of which is to aid in ascertaining
majority representation. The requirements under the law, specifically Secs. 2, 5, and 6 of Rule V, Book V
of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code are all calculated to ensure that the certified bargaining
representative is the true choice of the -employees against all contenders. The Constitutional mandate that
the State shall "assure the rights of the workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of
tenure and just and humane conditions of work," should be achieved under a system of law such as the
aforementioned provisions of the pertinent statutes. When an overzealous official by-passes the law on the
pretext of retaining a laudable objective, the intendment or purpose of the law will lose its meaning as the
law itself is disregarded. When respondent Minister directly certified the Union, he in fact disregarded this
procedure and its legal requirements. There was therefore failure to determine with legal certainty whether
the Union indeed enjoyed majority representation. Contrary to the respondent Minister's observation, the
holding of a certification election at the proper time is not necessarily a mere formality as there was a
compelling legal reason not to directly and unilaterally certify a union whose legitimacy is precisely the
object of litigation in a pending cancellation case filed by certain "concerned salesmen," who also claim
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
choice in a secret ballot. Certification election is the best and most appropriate means of ascertaining the
will of the employees as to their choice of an exclusive bargaining representative. That there are no
competing Unions involved should not alter that principle, the freedom of choice by the employees being
the primordial consideration besides the fact that the employees can still choose between ALU and No
Union. Even if the withdrawals of the employees concerned were submitted after the Petition for direct
certification had been filed, the doubt as to the majority representation of the Union has arisen, and it is
best to determine the true sentiment of the employees through a certification election. If respondent Union
is confident that it commands the majority of the workers, there is no reason why it should object to the
holding of a certification election. [George & Peter Lines, Inc. vs. Associated Labor Union, 134 SCRA
82(1985)]
Barbizon Philippines, Inc. vs. Nagkakaisang Supervisor ng Barbizon Philippines, Inc.-NAFLU, 261
SCRA 738(1996)]
Labor Law; Right to Self-Organization; Certification Election; The exclusion of a companys
supervisors from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees indiscriminately curtails the right of
such employees to self-organization and representation for purposes of collective bargaining.The
exclusion of petitioners supervisors from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees
indiscriminately curtailed the right of these employees to self-organization and representation for purposes
of collective bargaining, a right explicitly mandated by our labor laws and accorded the highest
consideration.
Same; Same; Same; One Union-One Company Rule; The one company-one union policy must yield to
the right of the employees to form unions or associations for purposes not contrary to law, to
selforganization and to enter into collective bargaining negotiations, among others, which the Constitution
guarantees.As clearly indicated in the aforequoted decision, the one union-one company rule is not
without exception. The exclusion of the subject employees from the rank-and-file bargaining unit and the
CBA is definitely a compelling reason for it completely deprived them of the chance to bargain
collectively with petitioner and are thus left with no recourse but to group themselves into a separate and
distinct bargaining unit and form their own organization. The rationale behind the exception to the
aforementioned policy is further elucidated in Knitjoy Manufacturing, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja. The usual
exception, of course, is where the employer unit has to give way to the other units like the craft unit, plant
unit, or a subdivision thereof, the recognition of these exceptions takes into account the policy to assure
employees of the fullest freedom in exercising their rights. Otherwise stated, the one company-one union
policy must yield to the right of the employees to form unions or associations for purposes not contrary to
law, to self-organization and to enter into collective bargaining negotiations, among others, which the
Constitution guarantees. (Italics ours.)
Same; Same; Same; Same; The receipt by supervisor employees of certain benefits under the CBA
between the union of rank-andfile employees and the company is not sufficient reason to deny the petition
for certification election filed by the labor organization formed by the excluded employees.The receipt
by petitioners supervisor employees of certain benefits under the CBA between BUKLOD and
petitioner is not sufficient to deny the petition for certification election filed by the labor organization
formed by the excluded employees. It is not equivalent to and does not compensate for the denial of the
right of the excluded employees to selforganization and collective bargaining.
Same; Same; Same; Contract-Bar Rule; The contract-bar rule has no application where the petition for
certification election is addressed to a separate bargaining unit.The petition for certification election
cannot likewise be deterred by the contract-bar rule, which finds no application in the present case. The
petitioning union NSBPI is not questioning the majority status of Buklod as the incumbent bargaining
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Same; Same.The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes
of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be represented by a
labor organization, and in the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization. If the results of the
election should disclose that the majority of the workers do not wish to be represented by any union, then
their wishes must be respected, and no union may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of
the workers in the bargaining unit in dealing with the employer regarding wages, hours and other terms
and conditions of employment. The minority employeeswho wish to have a union represent them in
collective bargainingcan do nothing but wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a certification
election and hope that the results will be different. They may not and should not be permitted, however, to
impose their will on the majoritywho do not desire to have a union certified as the exclusive workers'
benefit in the bargaining unitupon the plea that they, the minority workers, are being denied the right of
self-organization and collective bargaining. As repeatedly stated, the right of self-organization embraces
not only the right to form, join or assist labor organizations, but the concomitant, converse right NOT to
form, join or assist any labor union.
Same; INK employees have the right to participate in a certification election and vote for "No Union."
That the INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit in the true sense of the term, do have
the right of self-organization, is also in truth beyond question, as well as the fact that when they voted that
the employees in their bargaining unit should be represented by "NO UNION," they were simply
exercising that right of self-organization, albeit in its negative aspect. The respondents' argument that the
petitioners are disqualified to vote because they "are not constituted into a duly organized labor
union""but members of the INK which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or
forming any labor organization"and "hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole
and exclusive bargaining representative," is specious. Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence
requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a certification
election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to all
bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or not,
Labor Law; Words and Phrases; The right to self-organization includes the right not to form or join a
union.Logically, the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to disaffiliate or resign
from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to
maintain membership therein. The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right
to refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the
exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right.
The fact that a person has opted to acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his
subsequently opting to renounce such membership.
Same; Failure to take part in previous elections no bar to right to participate in future elections.Neither
does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote because they "did not participate in
previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them
to form, join or assist labor organizations," persuade acceptance. No law, administrative rule or precedent
prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification
elections. In denying the petitioners' right to vote upon these egregiously fallacious grounds, the public
respondents exercised their discretion whimsically, capriciously and oppressively and gravely abused the
same. [Reyes vs. Trajano, 209 SCRA 484(1992)]
Natl. Mines and Allied Workers Union vs. Secretary of Labor, 227 SCRA 821(1993)
Labor Law; Certification Election; Pleadings and Practice; Verification; Verification of pleading is a
formal not jurisdictional requisite. Generally, technical and rigid rules of procedure are not binding in
labor cases specifically certification election proceedings which are non-litigious but mere investigative
and non-adversarial in character.Verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite
(Buenaventura v. Uy, 149 SCRA 22 [1987]; In the Matter of the Change of Name of Antonina B. Oshita,
19 SCRA 700 [1967]. Even if verification is lacking and the pleading is formally defective, the courts may
dispense with the requirement in the interest of justice and order the correction of the pleading
accordingly. Generally, technical and rigid rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases; and this rule
is specifically applied in certification election proceedings, which are non-litigious but merely
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
investigative and non-adversarial in character (Associated Labor Unions vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 179 SCRA
127 [1989]; Tanduay Distillery Labor Union v. NLRC, 149 SCRA 470 [1987]). Nevertheless, whatever
formal defects existed in the first petition were cured and corrected in the second petition for certification
election.
Clearly, private respondents registration is not covered by the prohibition. In any event, the union
registration was effected in September 1990, a month before the secretary of labor issued his decision on
the result of the certification election on October 31, 1990. Hence, there was yet no certified bargaining
agent when the private respondent was registered as a union.
Same; Same; The number of undisputed signatures represents more than 25% of the total number of
company employees required by law to support a petition for certification election.Granting that 36
signatures were falsified and that 13 were disowned, this leaves 92 undisputed signatures which is
definitely more than 75i.e., 25% of the total number of company employees required by law to support
a petition for certification election. The disclaimer by 13 employees of their respective signatures covers
only their own personal participation and cannot in any way be extended to include the rest of those who
did not question the same.
Same; Same; Section 6 of PD 1391 has nothing to do with the registration of a union.Very clearly, the
foregoing provision does not help petitioner. It has nothing to do with the registration of a union. It deals
only with petitions for certification election, intervention or disaffiliation and notwe hazard being
redundantto applications for registration of a new union.
Same; Same; When all the requirements have been complied, it is incumbent upon the Med-Arbiter to
order a certification election to be conducted.The fact that the list of signatures is undated does not
necessarily mean that the signatures were obtained prior to the 60-day freedom period before the
expiration of the existing collective bargaining agreement. What is important is that the petition for
certification election must be filed during the freedom period and that the 25% requirement of supporting
signatures be met upon the filing thereof. These requirements have been complied by respondent FFWSMQCC in their first and second petitions, and it was thus incumbent upon the Med-Arbiter to order a
certification election to be conducted among the rank and file employees of the company (Labor Code of
the Philippines, Art. 256; Warrent Mfg. Workers Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 159 SCRA 387
[1988]; Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills v. Noriel, 134 SCRA 152 [1985]).
Same; Same; Certification election is the most effective and expeditious way to determine which labor
organization truly represents the working force in the appropriate bargaining unit of the company.If
indeed there are employees in the bargaining unit who refuses to be represented by respondent FFWSMQCC with all the more reason should a certification election be held where the employees themselves
can freely and voluntarily express by secret ballot their choice of bargaining representative. A certification
election is the most effective and expeditious way to determine which labor organization can truly
represent the working force in the appropriate bargaining unit of the company (Central Negros Electric
Cooperative, Inc. v. Sec. of Labor, 201 SCRA 584 [1991]; National Association of Free Trade Unions v.
Bureau of Labor Relations, 164 SCRA 12 [1988]). [Natl. Mines and Allied Workers Union vs. Secretary
of Labor, 227 SCRA 821(1993)]
Katipunan ng mga Manggagawa sa Daungan vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 278 SCRA 531(1997)]
Labor Law; Labor Unions; Appeals; Factual findings of quasijudicial agencies, like the Labor Department,
which have acquired expertise in matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by the Court not only
respect but finality if supported by substantial evidence.It is settled that factual findings of quasijudicial agencies, like the Labor Department, which have acquired expertise in matters entrusted to their
jurisdiction are accorded by this Court not only respect but finality if supported by substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence refers to that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.
Same; Same; Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code prohibits not
the registration of a new union but the holding of a certification election within one year from the date of
issuance of a final certification election result.Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, prohibits not the registration of a new union but the holding of a
certification election within one year from the date of issuance of a final certification election result.
Same; Same; Section 5, Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code enumerates
the grounds for the denial of registration to local unions, and the existence of another union is not one of
these grounds.Moreover, the issue of which union truly represents the working force should be raised
during the certification election, not during the registration period. Indeed, a certification election provides
the most effective and expeditious mode to determine the real representatives of the working force in the
appropriate bargaining unit. It may be well to add that Section 5, Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, enumerates the grounds for the denial of registration to local unions, and
the existence of another union is not one of these grounds. [Katipunan ng mga Manggagawa sa Daungan
vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 278 SCRA 531(1997)]
Cruzvale, Inc. vs. Laguesma, 238 SCRA 389(1994)]
Labor Law; Petition for Certification Election; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction as used in the provision refers
to the venue where the petition for certification must be filed.The word jurisdiction as used in said
provision refers to the venue where the petition for certification must be filed. Unlike jurisdiction, which
implies the power of the court to decide a case, venue merely refers to the place where the action shall be
brought (Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. v. Araneta, Inc. 72 SCRA 347 [1976]). Venue touches more the convenience
of the parties rather than the substance of the case (Consolidated Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
198 SCRA 34 [1991]).
Same; Same; Same; Labor Code; Sec. 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code refers only to cases where the place of work of the employees and the place of the principal office of
the employer are within the same territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Office where the Petition for
certification election is filed.Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code refers only to cases where the place of work of the employees and the place of the principal office of
the employer are within the same territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Office where the petition for
certification election is filed. The said provision does not apply to the filing of the petitions for
certification election where the place of work of the employees and the place of principal office of the
employer are located within the territorial jurisdictions of different regional offices. We assume that in the
drafting of the Omnibus Rules, the Secretary of Labor and Employment took into consideration the fact
that there are many companies with factories located in places different from places where the corporate
offices are located.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The nearest governmental machinery to settle a labor dispute must be placed at
the workers immediate disposal.The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party whether as
complainant, petitioner or respondent, as the case may be, the nearest governmental machinery to settle a
labor dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal and the employer must in no case be allowed a
choice in favor of another competent agency sitting in another place to the inconvenience of the worker
(Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 209 SCRA 834 [1992]).
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
bargain collectively. Thereafter, the role of the employer in the certification process ceases. The employer
becomes merely a by-stander. [California Manufacturing Corporation vs. Laguesma, 209 SCRA
606(1992)]
Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. of Manila, Inc. vs. Laguesma, 212 SCRA 281(1992)]
Labor Law; Regular Employees; The regularization of all the regular project employees with at least one
year of service and their membership with the URFA mean that the alleged regular project employees
whom respondent LAKAS-NFL seeks to represent are regular employees by contemplation of law and
included in the appropriate bargaining unit of said collective bargaining.Although the aforementioned
definition does not include petitioners regular project employees in the coverage of the existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and the URFA, the regularization of all the regular
project employees with at least one year of service and the subsequent membership of said employees
with the URFA mean that the alleged regular project employees whom respondent LAKAS-NFL seeks to
represent are, in fact, regular employees by contemplation of law and included in the appropriate
bargaining unit of said Collective Bargaining Agreement consequently, the bargaining unit which
respondent LAKAS-NFL seeks to represent has already ceased to exist.
Same; Same; Collective bargaining agreement; The existence of a duly registered collective bargaining
agreement between petitioner and URFA, bars any other labor organization from filing a petition for
certification election except within the 60-day freedom period.Consequently, the existence of a duly
registered Collective Bargaining Agreement between the petitioner and URFA, which is the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file employees of the petitioner including
the regular project employees with more than one year of service, bars any other labor organization from
filing a petition for certification election except within the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. To rule otherwise would negate the legislative intent in the enactment
of Article 232 of the Labor Code which was designed to ensure industrial peace between the employer and
its employees during the existence of the collective bargaining agreement. [Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co.
of Manila, Inc. vs. Laguesma, 212 SCRA 281(1992)]
Associated Labor Unions (ALU) vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 179 SCRA 127(1989)]
Labor Law; Certification Election; Certification election not a litigation but merely an investigation of a
non-adversarial and factfinding character; hence not covered by technical rules of procedure and evidence.
As it has been ruled in a long line of decisions, a certification proceedings is not a litigation in the sense
that the term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding character.
As such it is not covered by the technical rules of evidence. Thus, as provided under Article 221 of the
Labor Code, proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are not covered by the
technical rules of procedure and evidence. The Court had previousy construed Article 221 as to allow the
NLRC or the labor arbiter to decide the case on the basis of position papers and other documents
submitted without resorting to technical rules of evidence as observed in regular courts of justice.
Same; Same; Requirement of 20% signature for a certification election under Art. 257 applies only in
unorganized labor organization.On the other hand, Article 257 is applicable only to unorganized labor
organizations and not to establishments like PASAR where there exists a certified bargaining agent,
petitioner ALU, which as the record shows had previously entered into a CBA with the management. This
could be discerned from the clear intent of the law which provides thatART. 257. Petitions in
unorganized establishmentsIn any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, the
petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor organization shall be supported by the written
consent of at least twenty per cent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Upon receipt and
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Labor Code became effective, previous circulars of the Secretary of Labor to take care of the transitional
stage prior to its coming into force, certainly were deemed superseded. From any standpoint then, it
cannot be gainsaid that the petition certainly lacks juridical basis. [Todays Knitting Free Workers Union
vs. Noriel, 75 SCRA 450(1977)]
Port Workers Union of the Phils. (PWUP) vs. Laguesma, 207 SCRA 329(1992)]
Labor Laws; Unions; Certification election; Implementing rules.The certification election is the most
democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers can freely determine the union that shall act as
their representative in their dealings with the establishment where they are working. As we stressed in
Belyca Corporation vs. Ferrer-Calleja, the holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that
should not be circumvented. x x x. In line with this policy, we feel that the administrative rule requiring
the simultaneous submission of the 25% consent signatures upon the filing of petition for certification
election should not be strictly applied to frustrate the determination of the legitimate representative of the
workers. Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the law it seeks to
implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation should at best be given only a directory effect.
Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for certification election within the freedom period
is sufficient basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a certification election, subject to the
submission of the consent signatures within a reasonable period from such filing.
Same; Same; Same; Technical rules not strictly applied.The contention that the petitioners had no right
to represent the principal petitioners which had not appealed the dismissal order is also not acceptable. We
repeat that the certification election is not a litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character
where the rules of procedure are not strictly applied. Technical rules and objections should not hamper the
correct ascertainment of the labor union that has the support or confidence of the majority of the workers
and is thus entitled to represent them in their dealings with management.
Same; Same; Same; Contract-bar rule.Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only where the
need for industrial stability is clearly shown to be imperative. Subject to this singular exception, contracts
where the identity of the authorized representative of the workers is in doubt must be rejected in favor of a
more certain indication of the will of the workers. As we stated in Philippine Association of Free Labor
Union vs. Estrella, any stability that does not establish the type of industrial peace contemplated by the
law must be subordinated to the employees freedom to choose their real representative. [Port Workers
Union of the Phils. (PWUP) vs. Laguesma, 207 SCRA 329(1992)]
Airtime Specialists, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 180 SCRA 749(1989)]
Attorneys; Labor Counsels should acquaint themselves with decisional law.For the present, it suffices to
call the attention of counsel to the desirability of being acquainted with applicable decisions, especially
one that strikes so close to home, even if, or perhaps more precisely when, the ruling is adverse to ones
claim. That is to live true to his duty as an officer of the court on whose trustworthiness reliance may be
placed.
Labor law; Statutory construction; A memorandum circular of the Secretary of Labor issued on September
5, 1974 cannot prevail over the provisions of the Labor Code which took effect on November 1, 1974.
Not much attention need be paid x x x to the allegation that a memorandum circular of the Secretary of
Labor dated September 5, 1974 was disregarded by respondent Director. It is true there was therein stated
that where there is a bona fide union comprising the majority voluntarily recognized and in the process of
negotiating a contract, an application for a certification election should not be entertained. In the first
place, amemorandum circular certainly cannot prevail as against the very language of the statute. That is
merely to state the obvious. In the second place, x x x from and after November 1, 1974 when the present
Labor; Certification election; Discretion should be given to the Bureau of Labor Relations in deciding
whether or not to grant a petition for certification election; Compliance with the 30% requirement (now
20%) makes it mandatory for the Bureau to order a certification election.Petitioners contentions are
untenable. It is Our holding in the case of B.F. Goodrich Phils., Inc. vs. B.F. Goodrich Confidential &
Salaried Employees Union-NATU (49 SCRA 532) that the objectives of the Industrial Peace Act would be
sooner attained if at the earliest opportunity the employees, all of them, in an appropriate bargaining unit
be polled to determine which labor organization should be its exclusive representative. This Court had
made it clear that We should give discretion to the Court of Industrial Relations, or in this case, the Bureau
of Labor Relations in deciding whether or not to grant a petition for certification election considering the
facts and circumstances of which it has intimate knowledge. Moreover, a perusal of Art. 258 of the Labor
Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 442 reveals that compliance with the 30% requirement (now
20%) makes it mandatory upon the Bureau of Labor Relations to order the holding of a certification
election in order to determine the exclusive-bargaining agent of the employees. Stated otherwise, it means
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Same; Same; Reason behind the 20% requirement in petitions for certification election; The mere fact that
20% of the workers in the bargaining unit signify their support to the petition by their written consent, it
becomes mandatory for the Med-Arbiter to order the holding of a certification election in an unorganized
establishment.This leads Us to the question of purpose. The reason behind the 20% requirement is to
ensure that the petitioning union has a substantial interest in the representation proceedings and, as
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, that a considerable number of workers desire their
representation by the said petitioning union for collective bargaining purposes. Hence, the mere fact that
20% of the workers in the bargaining unit signify their support to the petition by their written consent, it
becomes mandatory on the part of the MedArbiter to order the holding of a certification election in an
unorganized establishment (Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Noriel, 134 SCRA 152).
The 20% requirement, therefore, is peculiar to petitions for certification election.
Same; Same; Intervention; Essence of the proceeding for certification election; As long as the motion for
intervention has been properly and timely filed and it did not cause injustice to anyone, it should not be
denied and even if the purpose of the motion is to participate in the certification election.ln the light of
the foregoing, KAMAPI must be allowed to participate in the certification election since the essence of
such proceeding is to settle once and for all which union is preferred by the workers to represent them
(PAFLU vs. BLR, 69 SCRA 132; PAFLU vs. BLR, 72 SCRA 396). As long as the motion for intervention
has been properly and timely filed and the intervention would not cause any injustice to anyone it should
not be denied and this is so even if the eventual purpose of the motion for intervention is to participate in
the certification election. After all the original applicant had already met the 20% requirement. [Phil.
Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 169 SCRA 491(1989)]
Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. vs. Laguesma, 223 SCRA 452(1993)]
Labor Law; Certification Election; Supervisory Employees; Case at Bar; Since no certified bargaining
agent represented the supervisory employees, PT&T may be deemed an unorganized establishment within
the purview of Art. 257 of the Labor Code.The applicable provision of law in the case at bar is Art. 257
of the Labor Code. It readsArt. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments.In any establishment
where there is no certified bargaining agent, a certification election shall automatically be conducted by
the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization (italics supplied). The
supervisory employees of PT&T did not yet have a certified bargaining agent to represent them at the time
the UNION, which is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment, filed the petition for certification election. Since no certified bargaining agent represented
the supervisory employees, PT&T may be deemed an unorganized establishment within the purview of
Art. 257 of the Labor Code.
Same; Same; Same; It is a well settled rule that an employer has no standing to question a certification
election since it is the sole concern of the workers, unless the former filed the certification election itself
pursuant to Art. 258 of the Labor Code.It is well-settled that an employer has no standing to question a
certification election since this is the sole concern of the workers. The only exception to this rule is where
the employer has to file the petition for certification election itself pursuant to Art. 258 of the Labor Code
because it was requested to bargain collectively. But, other than this instance, the choice of a collective
bargaining agent is purely the internal affair of labor. [Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. vs. Laguesma,
223 SCRA 452(1993)]
Celine Marketing Corporation vs. Laguesma, 205 SCRA 849(1992)]
Labor Law; Collective Bargaining; Petitions in Unorganized Establishment; The petition for certification
election may be filed by any union, not by the employees.While it may be true that the petition for
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
certification election did not carry the authorization of a majority of the rank-and-file employees of the
petitioner, their consent is not necessary when the bargaining unit that the union seeks to represent, is still
unorganized. The petition for certification election may be filed by any union, not by the employees. Thus,
Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, provides: "Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized
establishments.In any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agent, a certification election
shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor
organization." The law assumes that the union is the real party in interest in a petition for certification
election. Anyway, the certification election itself is the appropriate forum for the employees to express
their choice of a bargaining representative or none at all. [Celine Marketing Corporation vs. Laguesma,
205 SCRA 849(1992)]
Same; Employer has no role in certification election except when asked to bargain collectively under the
Bystander Rule.___And finally, the Court would wish to stress once more the rule which it has
consistently pronounced in many earlier cases that a certification election is the sole concern of the
workers and the employer is regarded as nothing more than a bystander with no right to interfere at all in
the election. The only exception here is where the employer has to file a petition for certification election
pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code because it is requested to bargain collectively. Thus, upon the
score alone of the Bystander Rule, the instant petition would have been dismissed outright. [Philippine
Fruits and Vegetables Industries, Inc. vs. Torres, 211 SCRA 95(1992)]
Philippine Fruits and Vegetables Industries, Inc. vs. Torres, 211 SCRA 95(1992)]
Labor Law; Certification Election; Factual finding of labor officials are conclusive and binding on the
Court when supported by substantial evidence.Petitioners arguments deserve scant consideration. The
facts and circumstances extant in the record indicate that the Med-Arbiter and Secretaries Drilon and
Torres were not mistaken in holding that the three security companies are in reality a single business entity
operating as a single company called the PGA Security Group or PGA Security Services Group.
Factual findings of labor officials are conclusive and binding on the Court when supported by substantial
evidence.
Labor Law; Words and Phrases; Meaning of Close of election proceedings.As explained correctly by
the Solicitor General, the phrase close of election proceedings as used in Sections 3 and 4 of the
pertinent Implementing Rules refers to that period from the closing of the polls to the counting and
tabulation of the votes as it could not have been the intention of the Implementing Rules to include in the
term close of the election proceedings the period for the final determination of the challenged votes and
the canvass thereof, as in the case at bar which may take a very long period. Thus, if a protest can be
formalized within five days after a final determination and canvass of the challenged votes have been
made, it would result in an undue delay in the affirmation of the employees expressed choice of a
bargaining representative.
Same; One-day deficiency in giving notice of holding of certification election is insignificant where
compelling majority took part in election.Petitioner would likewise bring into issue the fact that the
notice of certification election was posted only on December 12, 1988 or four days before the scheduled
elections on December 16, 1988, instead of the five-day period as required under Section 1 of Rule VI,
Book V of the Implementing Rules. But it is not disputed that a substantial number, or 291 of 322
qualified voters, of the employees concerned were informed, thru the notices thus posted, of the elections
to be held on December 16, 1988, and that such employees had in fact voted accordingly on election day.
Viewed thus in the light of the substantial participation in the elections by voter-employees, and further in
the light of the all-too settled rule that in interpreting the Constitutions protection to labor and social
justice provisions and the labor laws and rules and regulations implementing the constitutional mandate,
the Supreme Court adopts the liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor rights, We find the lack
of one day in the posting of notices insignificant, and hence, not a compelling reason at all in nullifying
the elections.
Same; Employees who may vote in certification election.At any rate, it is now well-settled that
employees who have been improperly laid off but who have a present, unabandoned right to or
expectation of re-employment, are eligible to vote in certification elections. Thus, and to repeat, if the
dismissal is under question, as in the case now at bar whereby a case of illegal dismissal and/or unfair
labor practice was filed, the employees concerned could still qualify to vote in the elections.
Philippine Scout Veterans Security and Investigation Agency vs. Torres, 224 SCRA 682(1993)]
Same; Same; When a duly organized union files a petition for certification election, the Med-Arbiter has
the duty to automatically conduct an election.Under the amendments, there is no need for the labor
union to prove that at least 20% of the security guards in the three agencies supported the petition. When a
duly organized union files a petition for certification election, the Med-Arbiter has the duty to
automatically conduct an election. He has no discretion on the matter. This is clearly the mandate of
Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 24 of R.A. 6715.
Same; Same; Employer has nothing to do with a certification election which is the sole concern of the
workers.Finally, except where the employer has to file a petition for certification election pursuant to
Article 258 of the Labor Code because of a request to bargain collectively, it has nothing to do with a
certification election which is the sole concern of the workers. Its role in a certification election has aptly
been described in Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano, as that of a
mere by-stander. It has no legal standing in a certification election as it cannot oppose the petition or
appeal the Med-Arbiters orders related thereto. An employer that involves itself in a certification election
lends suspicion to the fact that it wants to create a company union. [Philippine Scout Veterans Security
and Investigation Agency vs. Torres, 224 SCRA 682(1993)]
Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Filsystems vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 290 SCRA
680(1998)]
Labor Law; Certification Elections; Labor Unions; The failure of an independently registered labor union
to prove its affiliation with a labor federation cannot affect its right to file a petition for certification
election as an independent union.The reasoning of the public respondent and the Med-Arbiter is flawed,
proceeding as it does from a wrong premise. Firstly, it must be underscored that petitioner is an
independently registered labor union as evidenced by a Certificate of Registration issued by the DOLE. As
a legitimate labor organization, petitioners right to file a petition for certification election on its own is
beyond question. Secondly, the failure of petitioner to prove its affiliation with NAFLU-KMU cannot
affect its right to file said petition for certification election as an independent union. At the most,
petitioners failure will result in an ineffective affiliation with NAFLU-KMU. Still, however, it can pursue
its petition for certification election as an independent union. In our rulings, we have stressed that despite
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
Labor Relations; Certification Election; Rule provides that no certification election may be held within
one year from the date of issuance of a final certification election result.Likewise untenable is
petitioners contention that the second petition for certification election should have been filed after one
year from the dismissal of the first petition for certification election under Section 3, Rule V, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code as amended. Said section provides as follows: When to
fileIn the absence of collective bargaining agreement duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of
the Code, a petition for certification election may be filed any time. However, no certification election
may be held within one year from the date of issuance of a final certification election result (italics
supplied).
Same; Same; By final certification election result is meant that an actual election, that is, ballots were
cast and there was counting of votes that was conducted.Apparently, petitioner misread the abovementioned provision of law. The phrase final certification election result means that there was an actual
conduct of election i.e., ballots were cast and there was a counting of votes. In this case, there was no
certification election conducted precisely, because the first petition was dismissed, on the ground of a
defective petition which did not include all the employees who should be properly included in the
collective bargaining unit.
Same; Same; Employees are entitled to vote in certification election regardless of the period or status of
their employment.Devoid of merit is petitioners contention that the employment status of the members
of respondent CLOP who joined the strike must first be resolved before a certification election can be
conducted. As held in the case of Philippine Fruits and Vegetables Industries, Inc. v. Torres, 211 SCRA 95
(1992): At any rate, it is now well-settled that employees who have been improperly laid off but who
have a present, unabandoned right to or expectation of re-employment, are eligible to vote in certification
elections (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 548). Thus, and to repeat, if the dismissal is under question,
as in the case now at bar whereby a case of illegal dismissal and/or unfair labor practice was filed, the
employees concerned could still qualify to vote in the elections.
Same; Same; Employees who participated in the strike remain as such until their employment status is
resolved by NLRC.Therefore, the employees of petitioner who participated in the strike, legally remain
as such, until either the motion to declare their employment status legally terminated or their complaint for
illegal dismissal is resolved by the NLRC.
Same; Same; Employer has no right to interfere in the election and is merely regarded as a bystander.It
should be noted that it is petitioner, the employer, which has offered the most tenacious resistance to the
holding of a certification election. This must not be so for the choice of a collective bargaining agent is the
sole concern of the employees. The employer has no right to interfere in the election and is merely
regarded as a bystander (Divine Word University of Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 213
SCRA 759 [1992]).
Labor Law; Pleadings and Practice; Resort to Supreme Court without waiting for the resolution of motion
to dismiss with the Undersecretary of Labor is premature. Petitioner is guilty of forum shopping in
pursuing the same cause of action, involving the same issue, parties and subject matter between two
different fora.Finally, petitioners Comment and Objection to the Order dated October 29, 1992 with
Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Certification Election is still pending with the Undersecretary of
Labor. The resort to judicial action by petitioner is premature. Hence, it is also guilty of forum-shopping in
pursuing the same cause of action involving the same issue, parties and subject matter before two different
fora. [R. Transport Corporation vs. Laguesma, 227 SCRA 826(1993)]
Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa vs. Dir. of Labor Relations, 91 SCRA 482(1979)]
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez
respondents claim, the fact that the members-employees of petitioner do not participate in the actual
management of the cooperative does not make them eligible to form, assist or join a labor organization for
the purpose of collective bargaining with petitioner. The Courts ruling in the Davao City case that
members of cooperative cannot join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining was based on the
fact that as members of the cooperative they are co-owners thereof. As such, they cannot invoke the right
to collective bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners.
[Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, et al., supra.] It is the fact of ownership of
the cooperative, and not involvement in the management thereof, which disqualifies a member from
joining any labor organization within the cooperative. Thus, irrespective of the degree of their
participation in the actual management of the cooperative, all members thereof cannot form, assist or join
a labor organization for the purpose of collective bargaining.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Members of cooperatives have rights and obligations different from those of
stockholders of ordinary corporations; Because of the special nature of cooperatives, members-employees
cannot form or join a labor union.The above contention of respondent union is based on the erroneous
presumption that membership in a cooperative is the same as ownership of stocks in ordinary
corporations. While cooperatives may exercise some of the rights and privileges given to ordinary
corporations provided under existing laws, such cooperatives enjoy other privileges not granted to the
latter [See Sections 4, 5, 6, and 8, Pres. Decree No. 175; Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City v. FerrerCalleja, supra.] Similarly, members of cooperatives have rights and obligations different from those of
stockholders of ordinary corporations. It was precisely because of the special nature of cooperatives, that
the Court held in the Davao City case that members-employees thereof cannot form or join a labor union
for purposes of collective bargaining.
Same; Same; Same; Certification election, null and void; Reason.It is important to note that, in her
order dated September 2, 1985, medarbiter Elnora V. Balleras made a specific finding that there are only
thirty-seven (37) employees of petitioner who are not members of the cooperative and who are, therefore,
the only employees of petitioner cooperative eligible to form or join a labor union for purposes of
collective bargaining [Annex A of the Petition, p. 12; Rollo, p. 22]. However, the minutes of the
certification election [Annex C of the Petition; Rollo, p. 28] show that a total of eighty-three (83)
employees were allowed to vote and of these, forty-nine (49) voted for respondent union. Thus, even if We
agree with respondent unions contention that the thirty seven (37) employees who were originally nonmembers of the cooperative can still vote in the certification election since they were only forced and
compelled to join the cooperative on pain of disciplinary action, the certification election held on October
1, 1986 is still null and void since even those who were already members of the cooperative at the time of
the issuance of the med-arbiters order, and therefore cannot claim that they were forced to join the union,
were allowed to vote in the election. [Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 180 SCRA
740(1989)]
Young Men Labor Union Stevedores vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 13 SCRA 285(1965)]
Court of Industrial Relations; Jurisdiction over matters pertaining to certification election.Under
Republic Act No 875, matters pertaining to certification election involving two or more unions belong to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, which will not be interfered with by the
Supreme Court unless a grave abuse of discretion is shown.
Same; Jurisdiction to prohibit illegal picketing.The Court of Industrial Relations can lawfully prohibit
the commission of illegal acts in connection with picketing in a rivalry between two unions over a
stevedoring contract.
Jose D. Dula II
Atty. Gutierrez