IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

) CRIMINAL ACTION
v. )
) NO. 06-cr-466
STOLT-NIELSEN S.A., et al. )
)

GOVERNMENT’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION

TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT

ANTONIA R. HILL
WENDY BOSTWICK NORMAN
KIMBERLY A. JUSTICE
RICHARD S. ROSENBERG
LAURA HEISER
JEFFREY C. PARKER
Attorneys, Antitrust Division
U.S. Department of Justice
Philadelphia Office
The Curtis Center, Suite 650W
170 S. Independence Mall West
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Tel. No.: (215) 597-7401

Dated: January 3, 2007

 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II. STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

A. The Conspiracy, Its Discovery and Stolt’s Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

B. The Conditional Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

C. The Civil Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

III. ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

A. The January 15, 2003 Agreement Is Conditional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

B. The Evidence at the Hearing Will Establish

that Stolt Breached the Conditional Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

1. The Date on which Stolt Discovered

its Anticompetitive Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

2. The Defendants’ Subsequent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

3. Whether Stolt Took Prompt and

Effective Action to Terminate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

C. Stolt’s Arguments for Dismissal

as a Matter of Law Are Unsound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

1. Stolt Did Not Have License to Violate

the Law until January 15, 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

2. The Government Did Not Revoke the Agreement

Based on Oral Representations of Stolt Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3. Nannes’ “Discovery” of the Conspiracy Is Irrelevant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

4. The Government Is Not Prohibited from

Proving that O’Brien Discovered the Conspiracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

5. The Agreement Need Not Specify the Discovery Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

i
 6. Stolt Did Not Take Prompt and
Effective Action to Terminate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

7. Stolt Failed to Cooperate Fully . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

8. Defendants’ Benefit of the Bargain

Agument Fails as a Matter of Law and Fact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

D. Cooperman and Wingfield Cannot Establish

Either a Legal or Equitable Right to Leniency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

1. Cooperman and Wingfield Are Not Entitled to

Leniency as Third Party Beneficiaries of the Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

2. Cooperman’s and Wingfield’s Claims

of Detrimental Reliance Are Wrong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

ii
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Carlson v. Arnot-Ogden Memorial Hosp., 918 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Central Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund v. McCormick Dray Line, Inc.,

85 F.3d 1098 (3d Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 30

CTF Hotel Holdings, Inc. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 381 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 24

Government of Virgin Islands v. Springette, 614 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37, 38

H.C. Lawton, Jr., Inc. v. Truck Drivers, 755 F.2d 324 (3d Cir. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 24

In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 55 F.3d 1012 (5th Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

In re Tops Appliance City, Inc., 372 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

New Wrinkle, Inc. v. John L. Armitage & Co., 238 F.2d 753 (3d Cir. 1956) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Plaster v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 1532 (W.D. Va. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Process and Storage Vessels, Inc. v. Tank Service Inc., 541 F. Supp. 725 (D. Del. 1982) . . . . 33

Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 passim

United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.

433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 30

United States v. Baird, 218 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

United States v. Brechner, 99 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

United States v. Carrara, 49 F.3d 105 (3d Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 31

United States v. Castaneda, 162 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 18, 32

iii
United States v. Davis, 393 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

United States v. Fitch, 964 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

United States v. Flores, 975 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31, 32

United States v. Floyd, 428 F.3d 513 (3d Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

United States v. Gerant, 995 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 32

United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d 572 (1st Cir. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

United States v. Reardon, 787 F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

United States v. Roman, 121 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

United States v. Schilling, 142 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

United States v. Skalsky, 857 F.2d 172 (3d Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 30, 31

United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 309 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

U.S.S.G. 1B1.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

U.S.S.G. 2R1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Williston & Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, § 37.23 at 144 (4th ed. 2000) . . . . . . . 33

Williston & Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, § 37.24 at 157.58 (4th ed. 2000) . . . . . 34

iv
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

) CRIMINAL ACTION
v. )
) NO. 06-cr-466
STOLT-NIELSEN S.A., et al. )
)

GOVERNMENT’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION

TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT

The United States of America, by and through its attorneys, submits this Memorandum of

Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Indictment (docket nos. 89-91) on the

ground that this prosecution is precluded by a Conditional Leniency Agreement entered into on

January 15, 2003 between the United States Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and Stolt1

(the “Conditional Agreement”) (GX 1). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motions to

Dismiss should be DENIED.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 187 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S.

Ct. 494 (2006), the Third Circuit both reversed an order enjoining the United States from

indicting Stolt and defendant Richard Wingfield, and provided guidance as to how this

Courtshould handle the disputed issue of the effect of the Conditional Agreement once Stolt and

1
Unless otherwise stated, references to “Stolt” include all three Stolt entities indicted in
this case: Stolt-Nielsen S.A. (“SNSA”), and two of its subsidiaries, Stolt-Nielsen Transportation
Group Ltd. (Liberia) and Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group Ltd. (Bermuda) (collectively
“SNTG”).
Wingfield were indicted:

Therefore, if the appellees assert the Agreement as a defense after

they are indicted, the District Court must consider the Agreement
anew and determine the date on which Stolt-Nielsen discovered its
anticompetitive conduct, the Company’s and Wingfield’s
subsequent actions, and whether, in light of those actions, Stolt-
Nielsen complied with its obligation under the Agreement to take
“prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the
anticompetitive activity being reported upon discovery of the
activity.”

Id. at 187–88 n.7. The issues raised by the Third Circuit were never addressed in the prior civil

proceeding and can only be resolved by an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals also

emphasized the importance of Stolt’s obligation of “strict compliance” with the Conditional

Agreement’s requirement of “‘full, continuing and complete cooperation’” with the

Government’s investigation. Id. at 180. The Government believes that an evidentiary hearing

will establish the following facts that answer each of the issues raised by the Third Circuit, and

will also establish that Stolt failed to provide full and complete cooperation as required by the

Conditional Agreement.

From at least as early as August 1998, Stolt and its senior executives were deeply

involved in a billion-dollar, worldwide customer allocation scheme with their two biggest

competitors, Odfjell Seachem AS (“Odfjell”) and Jo Tankers B.V. (“Jo Tankers”). This scheme

was devised and orchestrated at Stolt by defendant Samuel Cooperman, then Chief Executive

Officer of defendant SNTG. After the conspiracy was firmly established, Cooperman delegated

responsibility for Stolt’s day-to-day management of the conspiracy to defendant Wingfield,

SNTG’s Managing Director of Tanker Trading, and other company employees.

The conspiracy operated without any major problems until early 2002, when Paul

2
O’Brien, SNTG’s Senior Vice President and General Counsel, found a copy of a 2001

memorandum anonymously left on his office chair. The memorandum, addressed to Wingfield

and prepared at the direction of SNSA’s Chairman, Jacob Stolt-Nielsen, Jr., discussed the

financial benefits associated with Stolt’s involvement in the conspiracy. O’Brien reported his

discovery of the memorandum to Cooperman and advised him that he believed Stolt was

engaged in an agreement with Odfjell to allocate customers in violation of the antitrust laws.

Despite O’Brien’s report, Cooperman did not arrange for an independent investigation,

did not alert SNSA’s Board of Directors, and did not terminate, discipline or reassign any Stolt

employee who had been involved in the conspiracy. O’Brien left Stolt in March 2002 because of

Stolt’s and Cooperman’s “refusal to cease its ongoing criminal conduct.” (GX 10A, Complaint,

O’Brien v. Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group Ltd. and Cooperman, CV 02-0190051S (Conn.

Super. Ct., Stamford/Norwalk J.D.) (June 18, 2002) ¶ 17). Thereafter, Wingfield and his top

subordinate, Bjorn Jansen, continued to discuss the agreement, customers and upcoming

contracts with their co-conspirators at Odfjell and Jo Tankers, assuring them that the conspiracy

would continue.

By November 22, 2002, however, Stolt and Cooperman knew that their illegal conduct

was likely to become the subject of a criminal investigation. Stolt hired experienced counsel to

ask the Antitrust Division to grant it and its executives conditional leniency – a type of immunity

or amnesty. But the Division’s Leniency Program requires leniency applicants to have taken

prompt and effective action to terminate their part in the illegal activity being reported upon

discovering it. When it signed the Conditional Agreement, Stolt expressly pledged that it had

done just that. However, Stolt’s continued involvement in the conspiracy for nine months after

3
O’Brien had discovered it disqualified Stolt from receiving leniency.

Stolt misrepresented in the Conditional Agreement that it had taken prompt and effective

action to terminate its involvement in the conduct being reported upon its initial discovery. And

Stolt subsequently provided false information and withheld evidence concerning its continued

involvement in the conspiracy. Shortly after the Conditional Agreement was executed, the

Division obtained credible evidence that Stolt had breached the Agreement and, as a matter of

fairness to Stolt, suspended its obligation to cooperate under the Agreement pending the

Division’s investigation into the matter. When the Division learned the truth, it revoked Stolt’s

leniency and sought Stolt’s indictment, as the express terms of the Conditional Agreement

allowed it to do. To this day, neither Stolt nor Wingfield has acknowledged the conspiracy’s

continued existence from March to November 2002. Nor has Cooperman ever admitted to the

Division his participation in the conspiracy before or after March 2002.

This Court should not, as Stolt has requested, pretermit or curtail an evidentiary hearing

by relying on the district court’s prior decision in conducting the instant proceeding. The Court

of Appeals, after all, instructed this Court to “consider the Agreement anew,” Stolt-Nielsen, 442

F.3d at 187 n.7 (emphasis added), and also directed an inquiry very different from that conducted

in the prior civil case. The Government believes that an evidentiary hearing will resolve the

issues raised by the Third Circuit by establishing that: (1) Stolt, through O’Brien, discovered the

conspiracy in early 2002; (2) Stolt, through Wingfield and Jansen, continued its involvement in

the conspiracy for nine months after O’Brien’s discovery but never revealed this fact to the

Government; and, therefore, (3) Stolt did not comply with its obligations pursuant to the

Conditional Agreement because, among other things, it (a) did not take prompt and effective

4
action to end its involvement in the conspiracy after O’Brien discovered it, and (b) failed to

cooperate fully with the Government.

II.

STATEMENT

A. The Conspiracy, Its Discovery and Stolt’s Response

Prior to 1998, Stolt and its main competitors, Odfjell and Jo Tankers, had occasional

agreements to allocate customers and fix prices on various parcel tanker shipping routes. In

August 1998, Cooperman met in Stolt’s London offices with Bjorn Sjaastad, Odfjell’s Chief

Executive Officer, along with several of their subordinates to forge a more comprehensive cartel

agreement. During this meeting, Cooperman and Sjaastad entered into a global customer

allocation agreement to maintain the “status quo” and not compete for each other’s customers on

deep sea trade routes around the world. The CEOs directed their subordinates to create and

exchange customer lists to carry out the agreement. Those lists were then provided to lower-

level employees of both firms with instructions to abide by the agreement and not go after each

other’s business. In circumstances where it was necessary for Stolt and Odfjell to bid against

each other, the subordinates were directed to discuss prices before submitting the fraudulent bids.

During this same time, representatives of Stolt and Odfjell each also had discussions with

representatives of Jo Tankers in which they agreed not to compete for customers on various trade

lanes around the world. The conspiratorial discussions with Jo Tankers involved fewer

customers, were less frequent than those between Stolt and Odfjell and did not involve the

exchange of customer lists, but the arrangement was the same – the companies would not

compete for one another’s customers and, where necessary to carry out the agreement, prices

5
were discussed and fraudulent bids with intentionally high prices were submitted to create the

appearance of competition. In a meeting in January 1999, Cooperman, Sjaastad and their

subordinates met with their counterparts at Jo Tankers in Amsterdam and discussed, among other

things, ways in which the three companies could maintain their respective market shares and

suppress and eliminate competition.

The charged conspiracy was a hard-core cartel agreement confirmed both by documentary

evidence and the testimony of Odfjell and Jo Tankers representatives.

After organizing the cartel at Stolt, Cooperman entrusted its day-to-day operation to

subordinates. In January 2001, that responsibility was given to Wingfield when he was promoted

after thirty years of employment to serve as Stolt’s Managing Director of Tanker Trading.

Within two months of assuming this role, Wingfield and Jansen met with Odfjell executives in

Texas to discuss issues that had arisen with the conspiracy as a result of, among other things,

consolidation of allocated customers. At the meeting, Wingfield reaffirmed the customer

allocation scheme, and updated customer lists were negotiated and exchanged over the following

weeks. In May 2001, Jansen met with Cooperman and described in detail his and Wingfield’s

collusive contacts with Odfjell. Cooperman responded by assuring Jansen that he and

Wingfieldhad his approval to continue carrying out the agreement.

While the customer lists were being updated following the Texas meeting, Wingfield

directed Jansen and the business directors to conduct an analysis of the financial benefit of the

conspiracy to Stolt. Jansen summarized their findings in a memorandum, which he faxed to

Wingfield on April 10, 2001 (the “Jansen Memo”). (GX 2). In this memo, Jansen advised

Wingfield that he and the business directors strongly believed that it was preferable to continue

6
to “coop” with Odfjell rather than to “go to war” with Odfjell. (Id.). He explained that if Stolt

were to “break the coop,” it would take a long time to “put it back together” and that “we will

suffer a reduction of rates in general.” (Id.).2

In early 2002, Paul O’Brien, then Stolt’s Senior Vice President and General Counsel,

found a copy of the Jansen Memo left anonymously on his office chair. O’Brien had worked for

SNTG for eleven years and was responsible for supervising and directing all of the company’s

legal affairs. He also was directly responsible for overseeing its compliance with antitrust and

other federal laws and regulations. (GX 10A ¶ 5). During part of his employment, O’Brien

served as Senior Vice President of the Projects and Legal Department. In this capacity, he was a

member of SNTG’s Management Board of Directors which was responsible for recommending,

overseeing and implementing defendant SNTG’s business strategies. (Id. ¶ 6).

In February 2002, O’Brien advised Cooperman that he had discovered the Jansen Memo

and that he believed Stolt was engaged in an express agreement with Odfjell to allocate

customers, as evidenced by the memorandum, and that this agreement was in violation of the

antitrust laws. (GX 6, Nannes, TR2 at 104; GX 26, Transcript, July 27, 2004, O’Brien v. Stolt-

Nielsen Transportation Group Ltd. and Cooperman, CV 02-0190051S (Conn. Super. Ct.,

Stamford/Norwalk J.D.), Testimony of Paul O’Brien at 99). Cooperman responded by

appointing himself to “investigate” O’Brien’s discovery. One of Cooperman’s first acts was to

summon Jansen, the author of the document, to his office for a private meeting. He chastised

Jansen for putting evidence of the agreement into writing and called Wingfield “stupid” for

2
While Jansen did not know it at the time, he later learned that this analysis was
conducted at the direction of Jacob Stolt-Nielsen, Jr., Chairman of SNSA.

7
asking for the written report. (GX 24A, Declaration of Bjorn Jansen, Jan. 7, 2004 ¶1).

O’Brien, dissatisfied with Cooperman’s failure to initiate an independent investigation

and to terminate Stolt’s participation in the cartel, submitted his resignation to Cooperman on

March 1, 2002. (See GX 5, Nannes, TR1 at 113; GX 8, Memorandum from O’Brien to

Cooperman, Mar. 1, 2002; GX 10A ¶17; GX 10B, Amended Complaint, O’Brien v. Stolt-Nielsen

Transportation Group Ltd. and Cooperman, CV 02-0190051S (Conn. Super. Ct.,

Stamford/Norwalk J.D.) (Nov. 1, 2002), Count 1 ¶¶ 17, 23, Count 2 ¶ 25, Count 3 ¶ 19). A few

days later, Cooperman accepted the resignation – warning O’Brien of his duty “not to disclose

‘confidential information’” of the company. (GX 9, Letter from Cooperman to O’Brien, dated

Mar. 7, 2002). O’Brien subsequently sued Stolt for constructive termination, alleging that Stolt

did not stop its antitrust violations even after he brought those violations to Cooperman’s

attention. (See GX 10A, Count 1 ¶¶ 17–18, Count 3 ¶¶ 18–19, 22; GX 10B, Count 1 ¶¶ 17–18,

Count 3 ¶¶ 18–19, 22).

Cooperman’s actions after O’Brien’s resignation indicate that he sought to cover-up and

prevent further disclosure of the conspiracy rather than uncover and terminate all illegal activity.

Cooperman did not employ counsel (internal or outside) to conduct an independent investigation,

or disclose the conspiracy’s discovery to SNSA’s Board of Directors, notwithstanding the fact

that SNSA is a publicly-traded company, or report the cartel activity to the Government.

Moreover, he did not terminate, discipline or reassign any Stolt employee who had been involved

in the conspiracy, including Wingfield and Jansen;3 and he did not prevent Wingfield and Jansen

3
Stolt’s prior antitrust compliance policy was in effect while Cooperman and other Stolt
officials were fully involved in the conspiracy. Thus, their activities were in violation of the
prior policy as well as the laws. Among the consequences for violating the prior policy were

8
from continuing to meet alone with their co-conspirators, although Cooperman learned of at least

one such meeting.

Instead, Cooperman implemented a revised antitrust compliance policy, which included

seminars for employees. Additionally, on March 14, 2002, Stolt had e-mails sent under

Wingfield’s name to the company’s business partners (but not to co-conspirators Odfjell or Jo

Tankers) informing them that the company would adhere strictly to its revised antitrust policy.

(GX 11, E-mails from Wingfield to Business Partners, dated Mar. 14, 2002). Cooperman also

met privately with Stolt’s business directors and explained that the parcel tanker shipping market

was an oligopoly and suggested that there were many legitimate business reasons for Stolt not to

compete for business from Odfjell’s customers.4 Neither Cooperman nor anyone else at Stolt

ever arranged for an independent investigation of the conspiracy until things began to unravel in

November 2002.

Notwithstanding Stolt’s new antitrust compliance policy, Wingfield met separately in

Texas with Odfjell and Jo Tankers representatives in late March 2002, unaccompanied by

counsel. At his meeting with representatives of Odfjell, Wingfield advised them that Stolt was

having problems with a former employee and that as a result, the company had issued a revised

antitrust policy. Wingfield assured his counterparts at Odfjell, however, that the “status quo”

demotion, reduction in pay and termination. (GX 25, Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group
Antitrust Compliance Handbook, June 2000 at 9).
4
Given that both Cooperman and the Business Directors to whom he was speaking were
fully aware of Stolt’s involvement in the conspiracy, Cooperman’s motives in giving this
oligopoly lecture are suspect. Read in light of his “investigative report” in which he falsely states
that Jansen claimed that his memo related to legitimate business activities rather than
conspiratorial activities (see infra pp.11-12), this appears to have been an effort by Cooperman to
suggest to the business directors similar false explanations for evidence of collusion.

9
agreement would continue, but that contacts would have to be more limited and be made by

Wingfield and Jansen. Wingfield gave representatives of Jo Tankers many of the same

assurances in their meeting. Wingfield also expressly told Jo Tankers that Stolt was having

internal problems because O’Brien had discovered the company’s antitrust activities.

After Wingfield told Stolt’s co-conspirators that the conspiracy would continue, he e-

mailed copies of the revised antitrust policy to those firms. (GX 12, E-mails from Wingfield to

Odfjell and Jo Tankers, dated Apr. 8, 2002). However, unlike the e-mails Wingfield sent weeks

earlier to Stolt’s business partners, the e-mails to Odfjell and Jo Tankers notably did not state that

Stolt intended to comply with its new policy. Instead, the e-mails referred to Wingfield’s “recent

discussions” with the competitors – discussions in which he had told them the conspiracy would

continue, albeit with fewer lines of communication. (Compare GX 11 with GX 12).

Wingfield reiterated Stolt’s intention to continue in the cartel during a June 2002 meeting

he and Jansen had with Odfjell in London. Wingfield told Odfjell that O’Brien was the former

employee who had discovered the conspiracy, but assured them that their status quo agreement

would continue and that O’Brien was prohibited from disclosing what he knew about it by the

attorney-client privilege.

Cooperman prepared a two-page report on his “investigation.” (GX 13, Memorandum

from Cooperman to SNSA Board of Directors re: Internal Investigation, dated Aug. 12, 2002).

He was, of course, well-positioned to know the facts given his personal participation in the

formation of the cartel in 1998 and his supervision of its subsequent operation. Nevertheless, the

report did not disclose Stolt’s or Cooperman’s own participation in the cartel, said that

employees interviewed denied an “ongoing” conspiracy, and asserted that the Jansen Memo

10
discovered by O’Brien referred to independent business activity rather than cartel activity.

Moreover, Cooperman, after consultation with SNSA Chairman, Jacob Stolt-Nielsen, Jr., did not

disclose O’Brien’s allegations to the SNSA Board at its April 2002 meeting.

By the time the Board met in August 2002, an independent member of SNSA’s Board of

Directors had obtained anonymously a copy of the complaint in O’Brien’s lawsuit and insisted

that Cooperman address the issues raised therein. Cooperman then read to the Board from his

two-page investigation report and said that O’Brien’s lawsuit was baseless and that Stolt was not

involved in an ongoing conspiracy. Cooperman again did not reveal Stolt’s and his own long-

standing participation in the conspiracy.

On November 22, 2002, the Wall Street Journal, after making inquiries at Stolt, published

an article about Stolt, including O’Brien’s lawsuit and his charges of Stolt’s antitrust violations.

(GX 14, James Bandler and John McKinnon, “Stolt-Nielsen Unit is Probed for Traffic with

Iran,” Wall St. J., Nov. 22, 2002). SNTG hired outside attorney John Nannes, formerly a Deputy

Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division. Cooperman briefed Nannes on

November 22, 2002, emphasizing the oligopolistic nature of the parcel tanker market and the

revised Stolt antitrust compliance program, but did not disclose Stolt’s and his own participation

in the cartel. (GX 5, Nannes, TR1 at 109-114, 125-130). After discussing the Antitrust

Division’s Leniency Program and its requirements, Nannes finally asked Cooperman whether an

internal investigation would reveal facts providing a sufficient basis to seek leniency.

Cooperman only said he “thought” it would. (GX 5, Nannes, TR1 at 132). Shortly thereafter,

Cooperman falsely reported to SNSA’s Board of Directors that “possible antitrust violations by

SNTG” during 2000-2001 had come to his attention “for the first time,” just ten days earlier.

11
(GX 15, Memorandum from Cooperman to SNSA Board of Directors, dated Nov. 25, 2002).

B. The Conditional Agreement

The same day the Wall Street Journal article appeared, Nannes contacted the Antitrust

Division about leniency. The Division’s Corporate Leniency Policy provides that the Division

will agree not to prosecute an applicant corporation that reports its illegal antitrust activity to the

Division and meets all of the Policy’s stated conditions. (GX 3, Antitrust Division Corporate

Leniency Policy, Aug. 10, 1993). Among those conditions are that the reporting corporation

must truthfully represent that “upon its discovery of the illegal activity being reported, [it] took

prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the activity,” and that once conditionally

accepted into the Program the corporation will give the Division “full, continuing and complete

cooperation.” (GX 3 ¶ B.4; see also GX 1 ¶¶ 1–2). As set forth in Stolt’s Conditional

Agreement, a failure to satisfy any condition expressly allows the Division to void the agreement

and prosecute the corporation “without limitation.” (GX 1 ¶ 3). If a corporation qualifies for

leniency, its “directors, officers and employees who come forward with the corporation will be

considered for immunity from criminal prosecution on the same basis as if they had approached

the Division individually.” (GX 3 ¶ C; see also GX 1 ¶ 4). The Policy and a model leniency

agreement are publicly available and are widely known to antitrust counsel.5

Throughout the extensive negotiations between Stolt and the Division, Deputy Assistant

Attorney General James Griffin repeatedly reminded Nannes and Stolt that if Stolt had not

5
Division officials also have discussed and explained the Leniency Policy in numerous
public speeches which are collected on the Division’s public web site.
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/speeches.htm. Nannes, as a former Division Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, was familiar with both the Policy and the speeches. (See GX 5,
Nannes, TR1 at 105).

12
complied with the prompt termination condition, Stolt would not qualify for leniency and any

conditional leniency agreement made would be revoked. (See GX 5, Griffin, TR1 at 204-07; GX

6, Nannes, TR2 at 58). Nannes knew that the Division’s Agreement with Stolt was

“conditional”; that “the representations by Stolt are stated in the letter and are conditions of the

leniency agreement”; and that if “the conditions aren’t met, the Antitrust Division has the right to

revoke” the Conditional Agreement. (GX 6, Nannes, TR2 at 58).6

On January 15, 2003, Stolt and the Division signed the Conditional Agreement. (GX 1).

The Agreement makes clear that it is conditioned on Stolt’s truthful representation that it had

taken prompt and effective action to terminate its participation in the conspiracy and on Stolt’s

compliance with its full cooperation obligations, which are expressly set forth in the Conditional

Agreement. (GX 1 ¶¶ 1–2). The Agreement further states that a subsequent Government

determination that Stolt violated the Conditional Agreement – including any of the conditions –

would void the Conditional Agreement and allow a criminal prosecution of Stolt. (GX 1 ¶ 3).

The Conditional Agreement also contemplated leniency for any Stolt employees who admitted

their participation in the illegal conduct, provided they themselves fully and truthfully cooperated

with the Division’s ongoing investigation of the illegal activity being reported. (GX 1 ¶ 4).

Stolt’s post-Agreement cooperation was limited. Nannes admitted Stolt’s participation in

a conspiracy with Odfjell and Jo Tankers prior to March 2002. (See GX 5, Nannes, TR1 at

6
That Stolt understood that the Agreement was conditional is also clear from a press
release issued after Stolt signed the Conditional Agreement in which Stolt explained that the
company “has been granted conditional amnesty . . . by the Antitrust Division of the U. S.
Department of Justice,” and that its amnesty was “subject to the conditions of the amnesty
programs, including continued cooperation.” (GX 16, Press Release, Stolt-Nielsen
Transportation Group, “Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group Granted Conditional Amnesty in
Parcel Tanker and Inland Barge Investigations,” Feb. 25, 2003).

13
155–57, 166; GX 6, Nannes, TR2 at 22, 39–40). He later identified dates of certain meetings and

Stolt participants, but never attributed any information he proffered to any particular Stolt

employee, including Wingfield or Cooperman. (GX 5, Nannes, TR1 at 164–171). Stolt

produced two executives for interviews accompanied by Nannes. (GX 6, Nannes, TR2 at 13).

The first, Andrew Pickering, provided information regarding the conspiracy through 2000.7 The

second, Jansen, lied and falsely corroborated Nannes’ proffer that Stolt’s participation in the

cartel ended after O’Brien’s discovery.8 Thereafter, when the Government learned that Jansen

had lied, Jansen obtained his own counsel and recanted his earlier lies, admitting that he and

Wingfield continued to meet and conspire with Stolt’s competitors until the fall of 2002. (See

GX 24A ¶¶ 4-5; GX 24B, Declaration of Bjorn Jansen, Jan. 7, 2004 ¶¶ 8–12). Stolt also

submitted documents, all of which would have been subject to a grand jury subpoena. Stolt

never disclosed its participation in the conspiracy after March 2002.

In April 2003, less than three months after the Conditional Agreement was signed, the

Division learned from credible sources that Stolt had continued participating in the conspiracy

until as late as November 2002.9 On April 8, 2003, as a matter of fairness to Stolt, the Division

suspended Stolt’s obligation to cooperate under the Agreement while it investigated whether

Stolt had violated the Agreement’s prompt termination condition. Finally, on March 2, 2004, the

7
Pickering was the Managing Director, Tanker Trading, at Stolt until the end of 2000
when he traded jobs with Wingfield and, with Cooperman’s approval, his role as key Stolt
conspirator also was passed to Wingfield.
8
The Division does not contend that Nannes knew his proffer was false.
9
In October 2003 and June 2004, Odfjell and Jo Tankers, along with several of their
executives, pleaded guilty and admitted that they had participated with Stolt in a global customer
allocation conspiracy until November 2002. (See GX 17A–C, GX 18A, B).

14
Division withdrew its leniency to Stolt and announced its intent to indict both Stolt and

Wingfield for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.10

C. The Civil Case

Stolt and Wingfield brought civil suits in this district, asking for an injunction to bar their

indictment on the ground that the Division had breached the Conditional Agreement. The

Division replied that the district court had no authority to issue such an injunction and should

dismiss the case. The district court, however, disagreed and held a brief evidentiary hearing –

with Griffin and Nannes as the sole witnesses – focusing mainly on whether Stolt and the

Division had agreed on the date when Stolt discovered the conspiracy. 11 In a decision on

January 14, 2005, the district court held that the Division had failed to show that there was any

agreement on the discovery date and that the Division had breached the Conditional Agreement.

It permanently enjoined the United States from indicting Stolt and Wingfield for participation in

the parcel tanker conspiracy.

The Court of Appeals reversed. Stolt-Nielsen, 442 F.3d 177 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 127

S. Ct. 494 (2006). The Court held that “the District Court lacked authority to employ the

extraordinary remedy of enjoining the Government’s indictments of Stolt-Nielsen and

10
During the period April 2003 – March 2004, Stolt requested and was afforded
numerous opportunities to meet with Division officials before a decision was made to withdraw
the conditional leniency. (See GX 5, Griffin, TR1 at 211–13; GX 6, Nannes, TR 2 at 73-74,
79–80).
11
The Division, bound by Rule 6(e), Fed. R. Crim. P., and concerned about disclosing
information to subjects of a grand jury investigation, did not openly present grand jury evidence
of Stolt’s breach of the Conditional Agreement. Instead, the Division submitted such evidence to
the court in camera and ex parte. The district court allowed the Division to submit the evidence,
but later expressly refused to consider it. (GX 19, Order dated June 8, 2004, Stolt-Nielsen v.
United States, Civ. No. 04-CV-537 (E.D. Pa.)).

15
Wingfield,” and it reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaints. Id. at 187.

The Court of Appeals, anticipating a subsequent indictment of Stolt and Wingfield and their

motions to dismiss the indictment based on the Conditional Agreement, also gave the district

court guidance on how to proceed in those circumstances. First, it noted that “[b]ecause the

judgment is reversed, it lacks preclusive effect.” Id. at 187 n.7. Second, the Court of Appeals

said:

Therefore, if the appellees assert the Agreement as a defense after

they are indicted, the District Court must consider the Agreement
anew and determine the date on which Stolt-Nielsen discovered its
anticompetitive conduct, the Company’s and Wingfield’s
subsequent actions, and whether, in light of those actions, Stolt-
Nielsen complied with its obligation under the Agreement to take
“prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the
anticompetitive activity being reported upon discovery of the
activity.”

Id. at 187–88 n.7. Just as the Court of Appeals anticipated, the Government has indicted and the

defendants have moved to dismiss.12

III.

ARGUMENT

A. The January 15, 2003 Agreement Is Conditional

The Conditional Agreement is a type of non-prosecution agreement. Non-prosecution

agreements, like plea bargains, are contracts and, for purposes relevant here, should be construed

under general principles of contract law. United States v. Baird, 218 F.3d 221, 229 (3d Cir.

2000); United States v. Castaneda, 162 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 1998). Thus, a leniency

12
All references in this memorandum to arguments made by Stolt include related
arguments made by Wingfield and Cooperman.

16
agreement should be read according to its plain meaning. See In re Tops Appliance City, Inc.,

372 F.3d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 2004). And, “like any contract, [it] should be construed as a whole,

so that various provisions of the contract are harmonized and none are rendered meaningless.”

United States v. Schilling, 142 F.3d 388, 395 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citations

omitted); accord United States v. Skalsky, 857 F.2d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 1988); H.C. Lawton, Jr.,

Inc. v. Truck Drivers, 755 F.2d 324, 328 (3d Cir. 1985) (contract to be read as a whole; contract

terms “must be construed so as to render none nugatory”) (internal quotations and citation

omitted); see also CTF Hotel Holdings, Inc. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 381 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir.

2004).

Under the plain language of the Conditional Agreement, Stolt’s prompt termination of its

involvement in the conspiracy was a critical prerequisite to its receiving leniency. As the

introductory paragraph of the Conditional Agreement clearly states, “[t]his agreement is

conditional and depends upon [Stolt] satisfying the conditions” listed in the next two numbered

paragraphs. In the first paragraph Stolt represents, among other things, that it “(a) took prompt

and effective action to terminate its part in the anticompetitive activity being reported upon

discovery of the activity.” In the next paragraph, entitled “Cooperation,” Stolt pledges to provide

seven types of “full, continuing and complete cooperation to the Antitrust Division.” (GX 1 ¶¶

1–2).

The conditional nature of the Agreement is further emphasized in paragraph 3, which

states that Stolt’s leniency is expressly “[s]ubject to verification of [Stolt’s] representations in

paragraph 1 above [prompt termination] and subject to its full, continuing and complete

cooperation, as described in paragraph 2. . . .” (GX 1 ¶ 3). This paragraph further provides that,

17
if at any time the Division determines that Stolt has violated the Conditional Agreement, it “shall

be void,” that the Division “may revoke the conditional acceptance of [Stolt] into the Corporate

Leniency Program,” and “thereafter initiate a criminal prosecution against [Stolt] without

limitation.” Id.

The Third Circuit recognized the obviously conditional nature of the Agreement by

noting that the Government’s promise not to prosecute Stolt “was, of course, subject to Stolt-

Nielsen’s strict compliance with the aforementioned conditions. . . .” Stolt-Nielsen, 442 F.3d at

180 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Third Circuit has instructed this Court to hear evidence and

evaluate facts central to whether defendants have complied with these very conditions. See id. at

187–88 n.7.

B. The Evidence at the Hearing Will Establish

that Stolt Breached the Conditional Agreement

While the presentation of evidence is, of course, for the hearing rather than this pre-trial

memorandum, the Government wishes now to outline the key elements of what we expect the

evidence to show.13

13
While the Government assumed the burden of proof in the civil case, the Third Circuit
has held that the party alleging breach bears the burden of proving it by a preponderance of
evidence. United States v. Floyd, 428 F.3d 513, 515–16 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Roman,
121 F.3d 136, 142 (3d Cir. 1997). However, other circuits have placed the burden of proof on
the Government, regardless of which party alleges breach. Castaneda, 162 F.3d at 836; United
States v. Gerant, 995 F.2d 505, 508 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 891
(7th Cir. 1986). In any event, the Government believes that it will prove that Stolt breached the
Conditional Agreement and that it will not be necessary to reach this issue.

18
 1. The Date on which Stolt Discovered
Its Anticompetitive Activity

Stolt’s General Counsel, Paul O’Brien, discovered the conspiracy in early 2002 when he

found a copy of the Jansen Memo left anonymously on his chair.14 In that memorandum, Jansen

reported that he, with input from the firm’s business directors, had concluded that Stolt would

make more money by continuing the conspiracy with Odfjell: “There is a strong sense among

people here that the continued coop is preferable . . . [to] going to war . . . [because] a net gain

from going to war is not easily seen.” (GX 2). O’Brien, who was responsible for Stolt’s antitrust

compliance and well-versed in the company’s business strategies after eleven years of

employment, believed (correctly) that the Jansen Memo showed an illegal agreement between

Stolt and its largest competitor to collude rather than compete for business. (See GX 6, Nannes,

TR2 at 104; GX 26 at 99). Thus, shortly thereafter, O’Brien reported his discovery of the

memorandum to Cooperman. O’Brien told Cooperman that he thought the activity described in

the memorandum violated the law (id.), and asked Cooperman to arrange for an independent

14
In a 1998 Policy Statement, the Division defined discovery as occurring “at the earliest
date on which either the board of directors or counsel for the corporation (either inside or
outside) were first informed of the conduct at issue.” (GX 4, Gary Spratling, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Corporate Leniency Policy:
Answers to Recurring Questions (Apr. 1, 1998) (the “1998 Policy Statement”) at 3-4). Stolt does
not dispute this definition. (Stolt Mem. 13.)
Furthermore, the Division has the right to decide the qualifications for leniency. The
conditions in the Leniency Policy were established for both important public policy and practical
prosecutorial reasons. As a matter of good public policy, it would be inappropriate to grant
leniency to a company that continues its criminal behavior even after counsel’s discovery of it.
(See GX 5, Griffin, TR1 at 191). Further, as an investigative tool, evidence obtained from
potential witnesses whose credibility is so damaged will have less value. (See id. at 191-92; see
also, e.g., United States v. Brechner, 99 F.3d 96, 99-100 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[A] cooperating
defendant’s truthfulness about his own past conduct is highly relevant to the quality of his
cooperation.”).

19
investigation and to stop the criminal conduct. (GX 10B, Count 3 ¶ 19). O’Brien’s discovery of

the conspiracy is also evidenced by Wingfield’s subsequent statements to co-conspirators at

Odfjell and Jo Tankers. Wingfield alerted these other cartel members to O’Brien’s discovery of

the conspiracy, but assured them that O’Brien’s discovery would not interfere with its

continuation, explaining to Odfjell that the attorney-client privilege would keep O’Brien quiet.

2. The Defendants’ Subsequent Actions

Stolt and Cooperman declined to initiate an independent investigation and failed to stop

the company’s participation in the parcel tanker conspiracy. When Cooperman learned of

O’Brien’s discovery of the Jansen Memo, he criticized Jansen and Wingfield – not for

participating in the cartel, but only for putting evidence of Stolt’s cartel activities in writing. And

while Stolt made some changes to its obviously ineffective antitrust compliance program, it made

no changes that would have risked exposing Stolt’s and Cooperman’s wrongdoing, such as

terminating, disciplining or reassigning Wingfield and Jansen.

Thereafter, Wingfield was still permitted to meet with competitors without counsel. In

March 2002, he met separately with Odfjell and Jo Tankers representatives in Texas. He told

Odfjell that, while Stolt had adopted a revised antitrust compliance policy, the “status quo”

would continue with cartel contacts limited to himself and Jansen. After advising Jo Tankers

that Stolt was having internal problems because O’Brien had discovered the company’s antitrust

activities, Wingfield likewise assured Jo Tankers that cartel contacts, although limited, would

continue. At a meeting with Odfjell in London in June, Wingfield repeated Stolt’s intent to

continue to participate in the cartel. At another meeting with Odfjell in October 2002 and during

various telephone discussions with Jo Tankers and Odfjell, Wingfield and Jansen disclosed

20
prices, promised not to compete for particular customers, and discussed and resolved instances of

cheating on the status quo agreement. Stolt’s and Wingfield’s cartel participation did not stop

until well into November 2002, when the Wall Street Journal made public their illegal activity.

3. Whether Stolt Took Prompt and

Effective Action to Terminate

Cooperman’s actions after O’Brien’s resignation indicate that he sought to cover-up and

prevent further disclosure of the conspiracy rather than uncover and terminate all illegal activity.

Stolt, through Wingfield, its top executive responsible for parcel tanker shipping, and Jansen, his

key subordinate, continued the cartel from the date of O’Brien’s discovery of it until the public

exposure of the cartel in November 2002. As such, Stolt did not take prompt and effective action

to terminate cartel participation.15 After O’Brien’s discovery of the cartel and before its public

disclosure, Stolt and Cooperman: (1) never commissioned an independent investigation of

O’Brien’s discovery; (2) never disciplined Wingfield or Jansen for prior cartel activities; (3)

never transferred Wingfield or Jansen to positions with no responsibility for parcel tanker pricing

or, at the very least, ones which required no contact with competitors; (4) never objected to

Wingfield and Jansen continuing to meet alone with cartel members outside of the presence of

legal counsel, although Cooperman learned of at least one such meeting; (5) never told the SNSA

Board of Directors of the firm’s long-standing participation in the conspiracy; (6) kept the truth

about the company’s illegal conduct from the Board, even after one independent director learned

15
In the 1998 Policy Statement, the Division provided guidance to leniency applicants,
like Stolt, on the meaning of their obligation to take “prompt and effective action to terminate
their illegal activity upon discovery.” (GX 4 at 3). Indeed, as Stolt conceded (Stolt Mem.
12–13), a leniency applicant must “refrain[] from further participation [in the conspiracy] unless
continued participation is with Division approval.” (GX 4 at 3).

21
from an anonymous source about O’Brien’s lawsuit and allegations of Stolt’s participation in

illegal conduct, and assured the Board in August 2002 that O’Brien was a disgruntled employee

whose allegations were baseless; and (7) again in November 2002, made misrepresentations to

the SNSA Board about SNTG senior management’s knowledge of and participation in the

conspiracy.

And while it is true that Stolt promptly adopted and circulated among its employees a

revised antitrust compliance policy, this policy failed to constrain its key conspirators, Wingfield

and Jansen, who were just as promptly making clear to Odfjell and Jo Tankers that this policy

would not prevent Stolt’s continued participation in the cartel. The fact that Stolt’s new antitrust

policy reduced what had previously been the large number of Stolt employees who had been

aware of and involved in the conspiracy to just a few does not establish that Stolt was engaging

in good faith efforts to discover and terminate the illegal activity. The evidence is to the

contrary.

Stolt cannot avoid responsibility for its participation in the illegal conspiracy because a

corporation is liable for the acts of its agents within the scope of their authority, whether or not

authorized. United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204-

05 (3d Cir. 1970); see also Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 149-50 (6th

Cir. 1960). The Stolt agents involved in this conspiracy were neither rogue employees nor low-

level corporate functionaries. Cooperman, SNTG’s CEO and later its Chairman, who was

responsible for Stolt’s role in the formation of the conspiracy in 1998 and who supervised its

subsequent operation, failed to take the appropriate action to contain Wingfield because to do so

risked revealing the existence of the conspiracy and his own participation in it. Cooperman took

22
no significant action to prevent Wingfield, Stolt’s highest-level tanker trading executive, from

continuing to participate in the cartel until November 2002. Accordingly, the law and fairness

dictate that Stolt be held responsible for the actions of these high-level executives.

C. Stolt’s Arguments for Dismissal

as a Matter of Law Are Unsound

Stolt makes a number of arguments for immediate dismissal of the Indictment as a matter

of law. (Stolt Mem. 22–55.) All are mistaken. Most are based on interpretations of the

Conditional Agreement that ignore both its plain language and the Third Circuit’s opinion, or on

factual findings in the civil case that are irrelevant.16

1. Stolt Did Not Have License to Violate

the Law until January 15, 2003

Stolt first argues (Stolt Mem. 23–25) that the Conditional Agreement gave it leniency for

any illegal conduct up to the January 15, 2003 date of the Conditional Agreement. This

argument is inconsistent with its obligation under the Agreement to take prompt and effective

action to terminate the conspiracy and contradicts the Third Circuit’s instructions. Stolt-Nielsen,

442 F.3d at 187-88 n.7.

Stolt’s argued interpretation that the Agreement granted it conditional leniency for

conduct prior to January 15, 2003 must be read in light of Stolt’s express representation that it

took prompt and effective action to terminate its participation in the conspiracy when it

16
Stolt’s lengthy discussion of the findings in the civil case misses the point that those
findings did not address the three issues identified as relevant by the Third Circuit, ignores that
court’s direction to consider the issues presented anew, and were made by a judge who expressly
declined to review the extensive grand jury submission provided by the Government (see GX 19)
and who, the Third Circuit held, had no authority to do anything other than dismiss the
complaints for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

23
discovered it. If, as the Government contends the evidence will establish, O’Brien discovered the

conspiracy in early 2002, then that date triggered Stolt’s obligation to take prompt and effective

action. Stolt’s contended interpretation then cannot be correct, because it reads out of the

contract both the requirement that Stolt must have ceased its illegal activity when it first was

discovered, and the Division’s express right to verify Stolt’s eligibility for leniency. 17

The Third Circuit recognized this when it instructed this Court to consider “the date on

which Stolt-Nielsen discovered its anticompetitive conduct, the Company’s and Wingfield’s

subsequent actions, and whether, in light of those actions, Stolt-Nielsen complied with its

obligation under the Agreement.” Stolt-Nielsen, 442 F.3d at 187 n.7. If the defendant is correct

in contending that the leniency granted to them was a license to continue to violate the law until

the date the Agreement was executed, the Third Circuit would have had no reason to issue those

instructions to the court that would hear defendants’ motions to dismiss. Because the

Government has never argued that this conspiracy continued after the Agreement was executed,

the Third Circuit clearly understood that the leniency contained in the Agreement was

conditioned on Stolt having ceased the activity upon discovery, not upon execution of the

Agreement.

17
As already noted, contract terms must be construed so as to render none “nugatory.”
CTF Hotel Holdings, Inc. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 381 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2004); H.C. Lawton,
Jr., Inc., 755 F.2d 324,328 (3d Cir. 1985). Accordingly, while enforcing what “[t]he plea
agreement explicitly states,” the Third Circuit explained in United States v. Carrara, 49 F.3d 105,
107 (3d Cir. 1995), that “[s]pecific performance requires that the court enforce every portion of
the agreement, which most specifically here includes the government’s right to withhold its
[promised downward departure] motion because Carrara gave false testimony.” See also New
Wrinkle, Inc. v. John L. Armitage & Co., 238 F.2d 753, 757 (3d Cir. 1956) (“[O]ne of the basic
canons of contract construction . . . is that the Court must look to the whole instrument, and
ascertain the intention of the parties by an examination of all that they have said, rather than of a
part only.”).

24
 Finally, defendants knew months before signing the January 15, 2003 Agreement that, as

a matter of Division policy, leniency agreements are always conditioned upon prompt and

effective action to terminate. In fact, Stolt’s antitrust compliance seminars, which were

conducted after O’Brien’s discovery, discussed the Division’s Leniency Policy and correctly

explained that prompt termination meant “[s]top illegal activity immediately upon discovery.”

(GX 20, Slide from Stolt Antitrust Compliance Seminar Presentation, Apr. 2002).

2. The Government Did Not Revoke the Agreement

Based on Oral Representations of Stolt Counsel

The Government did not, as Stolt argues (see Stolt Mem. 25–28), revoke its leniency on

the basis of any oral representation by Nannes concerning Stolt’s termination of the conspiracy.

Regardless of any representations by Nannes, by signing the Conditional Agreement, Stolt itself

represented that it took prompt and effective action to cease the illegal conduct upon discovery. 18

Moreover, as the Court of Appeals explained, the key issues for this Court to determine “anew”

are when Stolt discovered its participation in the conspiracy and whether it took prompt and

effective action to stop that participation. Stolt-Nielsen, 442 F.3d at 187-88 n.7.

3. Nannes’ “Discovery” of the Conspiracy Is Irrelevant

Stolt’s claim that its obligation to take prompt and effective action was not triggered until

the conspiracy was discovered by Nannes in January 2003 (Stolt Mem. 28–31) is likewise

incorrect. As the Third Circuit recognized, the date of “discovery” is a disputed issue of fact. It

18
The only true significance of what occurred at meetings prior to signing the
Conditional Agreement is to confirm that Stolt was fully aware of the Government’s concerns
and the fact that the Agreement was expressly conditioned on it satisfying the Leniency Program
requirements. The Government made sure at those meetings that Stolt agreed to assume the risk
of going forward and losing its leniency if O’Brien’s allegation that the company continued to
conspire proved true. (See GX 5, Griffin, TR1 at 204).

25
has always been the Government’s contention, and the hearing evidence will prove, that Stolt

discovered the conspiracy when O’Brien, its own General Counsel, discovered the cartel in early

2002. If that is correct, the issue of discovery is settled, and Nannes’ discovery of the same

illegal activity a year later is irrelevant. Stolt cannot avoid the reality of O’Brien’s discovery and

restart the discovery clock by bringing in new counsel (hired many months after O’Brien’s

discovery) to conduct his own investigation.

4. The Government Is Not Prohibited from

Proving that O’Brien Discovered the Conspiracy

The contention that the Government “cannot prove” that O’Brien discovered the cartel in

early 2002 (Stolt Mem. 31–36) is premature. Only after all the evidence is presented at the

hearing can this Court decide whether O’Brien discovered the cartel at that time. To the extent

Stolt argues that attorney-client privilege will prevent O’Brien from saying anything useful on

this subject, it misconceives the scope of attorney-client privilege. The privilege only shields

communications between O’Brien and Stolt employees that are within its proper scope. It does

not prevent the Government from introducing evidence not protected by the privilege. For

example, O’Brien’s discovery of the conspiracy through the Jansen Memo does not implicate

attorney-client privilege and, even if it did, Stolt long ago waived the privilege by admitting that

O’Brien discovered the memorandum and discussed it with Cooperman. (GX 5, Nannes, TR1 at

113, 129; GX 6, Nannes, TR2 at 104).19 Nor does it prevent the testimony of Odfjell and Jo

Tankers representatives about Wingfield’s admissions in March and June 2002 that O’Brien had

discovered the conspiracy.

19
In fact, at a hearing in O’Brien’s wrongful termination action against Stolt, Stolt itself
called O’Brien as a witness. (See GX 26).

26
 5. The Agreement Need Not Specify the Discovery Date

Stolt also argues (Stolt Mem. 32–35) that a dispute over the discovery date could have

been avoided if the Conditional Agreement could have specified an exact date, relying on a

leniency agreement in a prior case that contained a discovery date. But Stolt signed the

Conditional Agreement at issue here. As the Third Circuit emphasized, that Agreement contains

Stolt’s express representation that it took prompt and effective action to terminate its

involvement in the conspiracy “upon discovery.” Stolt-Nielsen, 442 F.3d at 179–80. If, as the

evidence will establish, O’Brien discovered the conspiracy in early 2002, that is when discovery

occurred and that is when Stolt should have, but did not, take prompt and effective action to

terminate its participation in the conspiracy. Thus, Stolt made a material misrepresentation in the

Conditional Agreement that it did sign, and therefore, breached that Agreement.

6. Stolt Did Not Take Prompt and

Effective Action to Terminate

Stolt’s claim that, even if it discovered the conspiracy in February 2002, it took prompt

and effective action to terminate its participation (Stolt Mem. 36–45) is unsound. As a factual

matter, the claim is plainly premature on a motion to dismiss without a hearing; rather, this is a

matter for the Court’s determination on the evidence presented at the hearing. Stolt is also

mistaken in suggesting that, as a matter of law, its establishment of a revised compliance

program constituted prompt and effective action to terminate. The evidence will demonstrate

that there were many actions that Stolt and Cooperman could have taken, but did not, had they

been serious about promptly and effectively terminating their participation in the cartel. And

what Cooperman did do indicates that his primary concern was not terminating Stolt’s

27
participation in the cartel, but rather preventing Stolt’s and his own participation from being

detected by independent members of the SNSA Board of Directors or the Government.

7. Stolt Failed to Cooperate Fully

Stolt’s argument that it fully cooperated with the Government after signing the

Conditional Agreement (Stolt Mem. 45–50) is also without merit. The adequacy of Stolt’s

cooperation – which included: (1) reporting a crime that was public and already being

investigated by the Division; (2) producing documents that otherwise were fully obtainable by a

grand jury subpoena; and (3) producing a senior executive who lied about the continuation of the

conspiracy after O’Brien’s discovery of it – is a disputed issue of material fact that cannot be

decided without a hearing. Suffice it to say, there is strong evidence – notably Stolt’s post-

agreement refusal to admit that it participated in the conspiracy after O’Brien’s discovery – that

Stolt did not fully cooperate. This failure to cooperate constitutes a separate, independent basis

for revocation of the agreement.

8. Defendants’ Benefit of the Bargain

Argument Fails as a Matter of Law and Fact

Finally, Stolt maintains that, even if it did breach the Conditional Agreement, it is still

entitled to leniency because the Government “received the benefit of its bargain.” (Stolt Mem.

50–55.) This argument is incorrect as a matter of law and fact.

The Government bargained for an agreement that granted leniency only if Stolt strictly

complied with all of the Leniency Policy’s conditions. See Stolt-Nielsen, 442 F.3d at 180. But

Stolt was not eligible to receive leniency because its involvement in the conspiracy continued for

28
nine months after O’Brien discovered it.20 Thus, whether the Government received useful

information from Stolt after the conditional grant of leniency does not change the fact that Stolt

was ineligible to receive leniency in the first place. Any other interpretation of the Conditional

Agreement would pervert the Government’s Leniency Policy by allowing ineligible applicants

like Stolt, which misrepresent facts to obtain leniency and then withhold relevant information, to

go free while their co-conspirators who provide full and truthful cooperation are “rewarded” by

being required to plead guilty, pay fines, and go to jail.21

In any event, Stolt’s misrepresentations plus its failure to disclose fully its involvement in

the conspiracy impeded the grand jury’s investigation and amounted to a material breach of the

Agreement. Specifically, because Stolt failed to disclose the true duration of the conspiracy, and

provided a witness who lied about the duration of the conspiracy, the Government found it

necessary to (1) spend additional time and resources to learn the truth about the extent of this

conspiracy; (2) immunize co-conspirators that it otherwise could have prosecuted; and (3) make

deals with other co-conspirators that were less favorable than they would have been but for

20
Stolt argues (Stolt Mem. 49–50) that it should have been given the opportunity to
“cure” its breach of the Conditional Agreement. But it fails to explain how it could have cured
its breach if, as the Government contends, it was never eligible for leniency in light of its
failureto take prompt and effective action after O’Brien discovered the conspiracy. In any event,
Stolt requested and was afforded numerous meetings with Division officials before the
Conditional Agreement was revoked.
21
Stolt assumed the risk that if conditional leniency was denied or revoked, “any
documentary or other information provided by [Stolt or any Stolt executive] . . . may be used
against [Stolt] in any . . . prosecution,” as the Conditional Agreement expressly provides (GX 1 ¶
3), and as Nannes acknowledged. (See GX 6, Nannes, TR2 at 60).

29
Stolt’s deceit.22 Indeed, to this day Stolt has never provided the Government with any

information that the conspiracy and Stolt’s participation in it continued after March 2002, even

though such information would have been “important,” i.e., material, to the Government. (GX 6,

Nannes, TR2 at 31, 52–53). Thus, Stolt did not provide “a full exposition of all facts known to

[Stolt] relating to the anticompetitive activity being reported,” an explicit benefit stated in the

Conditional Agreement for which the Government bargained.23 (GX 1 ¶ 2(a)). This failure to

disclose all relevant evidence forced the Government to look elsewhere and bargain for evidence

to prove the truth.

The Third Circuit has repeatedly held that a defendant who, like Stolt, provides

incomplete or misleading information breaches a plea agreement requiring a complete disclosure

of truthful information. For example, in Skalsky, 857 F.2d 172 (1988), the Third Circuit

reviewed a district court finding that Skalsky materially breached his non-prosecution agreement

22
Defendants wrongly suggest that the Government’s successful prosecutions resulted
solely from Stolt’s cooperation. In fact, those “successful” prosecutions were guilty pleas by
Stolt’s co-conspirators who, unlike Stolt, provided truthful and complete evidence. Because
Stolt failed to admit that the conspiracy continued until November 2002, the Government had to
exclude the volume of commerce that was affected by the conspiracy after March 2002 in
calculating the Sentencing Guidelines’ fine ranges for co-conspirators who provided such
information. See U.S.S.G. 1B1.8 and 2R1.1. Also, as a result of defendants’ dissembling, the
Government found it necessary to file motions to depart from the Guidelines based on substantial
assistance in each case it did bring. (See GX 17A–C, GX 18A, B).
23
For example, as the Government will prove, when Stolt provided Jansen for interview
in February 2003, Jansen falsely stated that the conspiracy did not continue past March 2002, and
specifically withheld evidence that both he and his direct superior, Wingfield, continued
conspiratorial activity into late 2002. Wingfield knew about Jansen’s lies but did not disclose
those lies to the Government. Stolt is, of course, responsible for the actions (or inactions) of its
senior managers Wingfield and Jansen. See United States v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1970); Continental Baking Co. v. United States,
281 F.2d 137, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1960).

30
by failing to disclose completely all information concerning his dealings with a grand jury target.

Noting that Skalsky gave the Government “misleading answers” that “threw the agents off the

scent” (the court never characterized the answers as untruthful), the court concluded that

Skalsky’s information was “a far cry from the ‘complete, truthful and accurate information and

testimony’ contemplated by his agreement with the government,” and amounted to a “material[]

breach[]” of the agreement because “the grand jury’s investigation . . . was severely hampered by

Skalsky’s incomplete and evasive testimony.” Id. at 178-79 (citation omitted) (emphasis

added).24

That the Division may have obtained some useful information or evidence from Stolt

does not relieve Stolt from its breach. In Carrara, for example, the defendant “cooperated with

the government and gave information by which the government was able to convict several

individuals. That is undisputed.” 49 F.3d 105, 106 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). But the

defendant subsequently lied in an affidavit and, when he later admitted the lie, the Government

refused to request a downward departure as it had promised in the plea agreement. Id. In

rejecting the defendant’s claim that the Government had “reap[ed] the benefits of the plea

agreement,” the Third Circuit explained that “to the extent that the government benefitted from

information Carrara provided, the government was also put in the unenviable position of having

to ascertain what aspects of Carrara’s testimony were true and what aspects were lies.” Id. at

24
Accord United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d 572, 578 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[T]he
failure of the defendant to fulfill his promise to cooperate and testify fully and honestly releases
the government from the plea agreement”); United States v. Reardon, 787 F.2d 512, 516 (10th
Cir. 1986) (defendant’s failure to provide a “full and truthful accounting” and “statement of all
knowledge” of the crime constitutes breach of the plea agreement); United States v. Flores, 975
F. Supp. 731, 742 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (same).

31
108. Stolt’s misrepresentations and omissions placed the Government in the same position. See

United States v. Davis, 393 F.3d 540, 547 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The government did not receive the

honest, truthful disclosure of information that it had bargained for” even though the information

it did receive resulted in a conviction.).25

The cases cited by defendants are inapposite. In Castaneda, defendant’s omissions were

unintentional and did not prejudice the Government because “the relatively little that Castaneda

omitted was already known to the government . . . [and] must be classified either as cumulative

or surplusage.” 162 F.3d 832, 839 (5th Cir. 1998). Here, Stolt never provided any information

about the conspiracy operating after March 2002, and Stolt’s misrepresentations, intentional

omissions, and Jansen’s lies, cannot be viewed as either “cumulative or surplusage.” In United

States v. Fitch, 964 F.2d 571, 575-77 (6th Cir. 1992), the Sixth Circuit held that the Government

could not void the agreement and prosecute Fitch for the immunized crimes because the

agreement lacked any provision allowing the Government to declare it “null and void” and,

therefore, the Government was “limited to its contractually agreed-upon remedy of prosecuting

Fitch for perjury.” In contrast, the Conditional Agreement in this case clearly provided that in

the event of breach the “Agreement shall be void” and the Government could then prosecute

Stolt “without limitation.” (GX 1 ¶ 3).

25
See, e.g., United States v. Gerant, 995 F.2d 505, 509 (4th Cir. 1993) (defendant’s
benefit of the bargain argument “ignores the express condition in the nonprosecution agreement
that [defendant] would come forth with complete truthfulness and candor.”) (emphasis added);
Flores, 975 F. Supp. at 740, 745 (false statements by defendant during Government interviews
resulted in breach, even though he had provided “substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person”) .

32
D. Cooperman and Wingfield Cannot Establish
Either a Legal or Equitable Right to Leniency

Cooperman and Wingfield were the Stolt executives with primary responsibility for

Stolt’s participation in the illegal conspiracy prior to O’Brien discovering it. Both also were

personally responsible for Stolt’s continued involvement in the conspiracy after O’Brien’s

discovery – Wingfield for his actual participation in continued cartel activities, and Cooperman

for his efforts to prevent discovery of his own and Stolt’s long-standing involvement in the

illegal conspiracy, efforts which led to Stolt’s ineffective compliance program and enabled

Wingfield’s conduct. Moreover, neither provided self-incriminating information to the

Government, nor has Cooperman ever admitted his involvement in the conspiracy. Under these

circumstances, neither the law of contracts nor the law of equity recognizes their leniency claims.

1. Cooperman and Wingfield Are Not Entitled to

Leniency as Third-Party Beneficiaries of the Agreement

Neither Wingfield nor Cooperman was a party to the Agreement between Stolt and the

Division. Nonetheless they erroneously claim a contractual right to immunity as third-party

beneficiaries to Stolt’s void Conditional Agreement.

Third-party beneficiaries have no rights under a contract that is void as to the contract

signatory from whom they claim rights. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 309 (1981);

Williston & Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts, § 37.23 at 144 (4th ed. 2000). Moreover,

“one who seeks to enforce a contract as a third party beneficiary is bound by the terms and

conditions of the agreement and has no greater rights than those of the contracting party. . . . A

third party simply cannot accept the benefits, and at the same time attempt to avoid the burdens

or limitations, of a contract.” Process and Storage Vessels, Inc. v. Tank Service Inc., 541 F.

33
Supp. 725, 733 (D. Del. 1982) (citations omitted). Thus, the law expressly recognizes that third-

party beneficiary rights may be conditional. Williston, § 37.24 at 157–58 (“it should be no less

true of third party beneficiaries than of the directly contracting parties that, if a promise is in

terms conditional, no one can acquire any rights under it unless the condition happens or is

performed or excused.”) (footnotes omitted).26

The Agreement at issue in this case was conditional, and because Stolt failed to satisfy

the pre-conditions to receiving leniency, the Agreement is void. There is, therefore, no contract

on which Cooperman, Wingfield or any other Stolt employee can rely. See Central Pa.

Teamsters Pension Fund v. McCormick Dray Line, Inc., 85 F.3d 1098, 1102 (3d Cir. 1996)

(citation omitted) (“[t]hird-party beneficiaries are generally subject to the same defenses that the

promisor [the Division] could raise in a suit by the promisee [Stolt]”); United States v. Lopez,

944 F.2d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 1991) (third party “could assert no right to performance under an

agreement which was never enforceable between the contracting parties due to the failure of a

condition precedent; . . .”).27

26
In light of the Conditional Agreement’s specificity in paragraph 4 that any employee
rights were subject to Stolt’s full and continuing cooperation, there is also no merit to
Cooperman’s suggestion (Cooperman Mem. 22 n.7) that paragraph 4 should be read to create an
unstated but implied right to immunity through “acceptance by conduct.” See United States v.
Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453, 455 (1985) (what parties in fact agree to in written agreement controls
questions of breach, not “such implied-in-law terms as were read into this agreement by the
Court”).
27
After requiring that they obtain separate counsel, the Division entered into separate
non-prosecution/cooperation agreements with lower-level Stolt managers who participated in the
conspiracy up until March 2002 but were not involved in its continuation after O’Brien’s
discovery. Revocation of Stolt’s Conditional Agreement did not affect the Division’s separate
agreements with these individuals.

34
 2. Cooperman’s and Wingfield’s Claims
of Detrimental Reliance Are Wrong

Cooperman and Wingfield also argue, apart from third-party beneficiary law, that as a

matter of fairness they should have leniency because they detrimentally relied on the Conditional

Agreement. (Cooperman Mem. 33; Wingfield Mem. 33–35.) But as a matter of fairness

generally, and of detrimental reliance law particularly, their claims fail.

Purely as a matter of equity, Cooperman and Wingfield cannot seek leniency on the basis

of any claim of “fairness.” Nannes specifically advised them that “the success of the strategy in

protecting the company and the individuals was dependent upon their candor and cooperation

and the forthcomingness of the employees in telling [him] what had previously transpired.” (GX

5, Nannes, TR1 at 160).

Both Cooperman and Wingfield likewise were personally aware of the Leniency Policy’s

requirements for the company and the individuals. Those requirements had been discussed

during Stolt’s antitrust compliance seminars attended by both Cooperman and Wingfield, and

Wingfield’s own notes reveal his understanding that leniency depended on the company having

“ended promptly” its conspiratorial conduct when it “[f]irst found out” about it. (GX 23, Pages

dated Nov. 25, 2002 from Wingfield Business Journal). Yet Wingfield never provided the

Government with any information concerning the conspiracy’s continuation after O’Brien

discovered it.

Nannes also reviewed the requirements of the Leniency Program at his initial meeting

with Cooperman on November 22, 2002. (GX 5, Nannes, TR1 at 113–14, 131). But rather than

own up to his misconduct, Cooperman explained all the legitimate reasons why Stolt might speak

35
to its competitors (GX 5, Nannes, TR1 at 111–112), knowing full well those were not the real

reasons for most of Stolt’s communications with its co-conspirators.

Furthermore, Cooperman and Wingfield are the Stolt personnel primarily responsible for

Stolt’s continued participation in the conspiracy for months after O’Brien discovered and

reported it, and so they are the Stolt employees primarily responsible for Stolt’s failure to fulfill

the Conditional Agreement’s pre-condition of prompt termination upon discovery.

Wingfield, of course, continued conspiring until November 2002, assuring his co-

conspirators that it was business as usual, that O’Brien could be silenced and that the conspiracy

would continue. Wingfield also was not forthcoming with Nannes about Stolt’s continued

participation in the conspiracy after March 2002 - even after Stolt’s obligation to cooperate under

the Agreement was suspended in April 2003, Wingfield failed to alert Nannes to the truth.28 (See

GX 6, Nannes, TR2 at 31, 77-78). Thus, Wingfield’s deception was not just a one-time event,

but rather a continuing effort over a period of several months to prevent exposure of facts that

would disqualify him and the company from receiving leniency.

And for his part, Cooperman chose not to report Stolt’s anti-competitive activity to the

Antitrust Division in February 2002, when O’Brien discovered it, but instead tried to keep secret

what he and Stolt had done by refusing to authorize an investigation and failing to notify the

28
The Government will also prove that Wingfield knew that Jansen lied in his first
interview when he falsely told the Government the conspiracy ended by March 2002. Not only
did Wingfield fail to notify the Government (either through Nannes or directly) about this lie, but
he failed to disclose his very own participation in the conspiracy through November 2002, less
than one month before Stolt sought leniency.

36
SNSA Board.29 Only in November 2002, when the conspiracy was about to become public, did

Cooperman seek approval from SNTG’s Board to approach the Division for leniency. And in

reporting the matter to SNSA’s Board, Cooperman was far from candid, falsely telling Board

members that “for the first time” ten days earlier he learned of “possible antitrust violations by

SNTG during 2000-2001,” and that he sought an investigation to determine if such information

was true. (GX 15).30

The net effect of this conduct was to cause SNSA’s Board of Directors to oversee Stolt’s

application for a leniency to which Stolt, Cooperman and Wingfield had no right. Because

Cooperman and Wingfield caused the creation of an agreement which should never have existed,

they may not now claim fairness as the basis for relief to them in this case.

In any event, to prove detrimental reliance, Cooperman and Wingfield must show that

they materially changed their position to their detriment in reliance on an alleged promise; i.e.,

that they were harmed. Carlson v. Arnot-Ogden Memorial Hosp., 918 F.2d 411, 416 (3d Cir.

1990); Government of Virgin Islands v. Springette, 614 F.2d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 1980). This they

cannot do.

29
If Stolt and Cooperman had instituted an antitrust compliance program that had been
effective in terminating Stolt's participation in the conspiracy after O'Brien discovered it in early
2002, it's failure to come forward to the Division at that time would not have made it ineligible
for leniency in November 2002. However, by failing to come forward when O'Brien discovered
the illegal activity, both Stolt and Cooperman assumed the risk that the conspiracy would
continue and that Stolt and its executives would be ineligible for leniency.
30
Citing Plaster v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 1532 (W.D. Va. 1985), Cooperman and
Wingfield both wrongly argue that the fact that they were available to be interviewed at any time
proves the Government acted unreasonably in this matter. That case is distinguishable, because,
in contrast to the obligations imposed on the defendants here, Plaster’s only obligation was “to
agree to testify.” Id. at 1535.

37
 The fact that either Cooperman or Wingfield might have disclosed information that

implicated Stolt in the conspiracy is irrelevant, because unless they incriminated themselves they

cannot show “that a fair trial would no longer be possible.” Government of Virgin Islands, 614

F.2d at 365. And while they claim to have provided “incriminating information and documents”

to the Government (Wingfield Mem. 35; see also Cooperman Mem. 33), they fail to substantiate

this claim. Cooperman, who never talked to the Government, identifies no documents that he

produced. And his lack of candor in his dealings with an independent member of SNSA’s Board

of Directors, with the entire Board, and in his initial discussion with Nannes concerning the

conspiracy, all demonstrate his unwillingness to admit truthfully his role in the conspiracy.31

Wingfield, who also never talked to the Government, relies on production of the customer

allocation lists and his “personal journals.” (Wingfield Mem. 20.) However, both Stolt’s and

Wingfield’s counsel have admitted that all of the documents that Wingfield gave to Nannes were

corporate business records obtainable by subpoena. (GX 21, Black, TR at 53–54, 60, 65; GX 6,

Nannes, TR2 at 9, 79). See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 55 F.3d 1012 (5th Cir. 1995)

(“daytimers” reflecting daily business activities of corporate executive deemed corporate not

personal records). As custodians of Stolt’s business records, neither Cooperman nor Wingfield

could invoke the Fifth Amendment “to refuse production although their contents tend to

[in]criminate him.” Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110 (1988).

31
Cooperman seeks credit for conduct of others by merging his actions with theirs. For
example, without any further explanation, he refers to “information and documents provided by
Cooperman, Wingfield and other SNTG employees” (Cooperman Mem. 14) prior to January 8,
2003 and to “the substantial incriminating information provided by SNTG, Cooperman,
Wingfield and other SNTG employees.” (Cooperman Mem. 16.) He also seeks recognition for
providing customer allocation lists obtained from others. (Cooperman Mem. 12–14.)

38
 The Division received Stolt’s information from Nannes but did not “know who gave the

information to Mr. Nannes.” (GX 5, Griffin, TR1 at 218). At the April 2004 hearing, Stolt

disclosed for the first time that Wingfield had given Nannes information “that went from Mr.

Wingfield through the company to the Government” (GX 22, Terwilliger, TR at 67), but Stolt did

not attribute any information it gave the Government to Wingfield or anyone else. (GX 5,

Griffin, TR1 at 218). Thus, Cooperman’s and Wingfield’s claim that they gave the Government

evidence that incriminated them is completely unsupported.32

IV.

CONCLUSION

An evidentiary hearing is necessary to answer the questions posed by the Third Circuit in

Stolt-Nielsen, 442 F.3d at 187 n.7: when did Stolt discover its involvement in the conspiracy,

what did it do after that discovery, and whether Stolt complied with its contractual obligation to

take prompt and effective action to terminate its involvement in the conspiracy upon discovery.

That hearing, the Government believes, will establish that Stolt, through its General Counsel

O’Brien, discovered the conspiracy in early 2002, that Stolt continued its participation in the

conspiracy after O’Brien’s discovery but never told the Government about the conspiracy’s

continued existence from March through November 2002, and that Stolt therefore breached its

32
Paragraph 4 of the Conditional Agreement sets forth contract rights and obligations for
individuals, independent of those of the corporation. While some of those obligations require the
Government to make a request for assistance, paragraph 4 (d) requires an individual leniency
applicant to “otherwise voluntarily provid[e] the United States with any material or information,
not requested in [paragraphs] (a) - (c) . . . that he or she may have relevant to the anticompetitive
activity being reported.” (GX 1 ¶ 4(d)) (emphasis added). Because Wingfield has never told the
truth about personally continuing the conspiracy until November 2002 and never notified the
Government that Jansen lied, he likewise cannot meet the express requirements for individual
leniency.

39
obligations under the Conditional Agreement to take prompt and effective action to terminate its

involvement in the conspiracy upon discovery and to fully disclose its illegal conduct.

Accordingly, the Government was fully justified in revoking Stolt’s Conditional Agreement and

obtaining the Indictment.

Because the Government was justified in revoking the Conditional Agreement, Wingfield

and Cooperman cannot rely on it. Nor should they be allowed to, given their personal

responsibility for Stolt’s continuation in the conspiracy after O’Brien’s discovery. Therefore,

defendants’ motions to dismiss must be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Antonia R. Hill

ANTONIA R. HILL
WENDY BOSTWICK NORMAN
KIMBERLY A. JUSTICE
RICHARD S. ROSENBERG
LAURA HEISER
JEFFREY C. PARKER
Attorneys, Antitrust Division
U.S. Department of Justice
Philadelphia Office
The Curtis Center, Suite 650W
170 S. Independence Mall West
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Tel. No.: (215) 597-7401

Dated: January 3, 2007

40
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

) CRIMINAL ACTION
v. )
) NO. 06-cr-466
STOLT-NIELSEN S.A., et al. )
)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on the 3rd day of January, 2007, a copy of the Government’s

Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss the Indictment and

proposed Order, has been sent by express mail to counsel of record for the defendants as follows:

J. Mark Gidley, Esquire

White & Case LLP
701 13th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005

Allen D. Black, Esquire

Fine, Kaplan and Black, RPC
1845 Market Street, 28th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Elkan Abramowitz, Esquire

Morvillo, Abramowitz, Grand, Iason,
Anello and Bohrer, P.C.
565 Fifth Avenue
New York, NJ 10017
Thomas A. Bergstrom, Esquire
1138 Davis Road
Malvern, PA 19355

/s/ Antonia R. Hill

ANTONIA R. HILL
Attorney, Philadelphia Office
Antitrust Division
U.S. Department of Justice
The Curtis Center, Suite 650W
170 S. Independence Mall West
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Tel. No.: (215) 597-7401