Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Constitutional Law 2 Cases
Constitutional Law 2 Cases
6 OF 50
ANTONIO M. SERRANO
VS.
GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer. On
the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract upon
the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April
1998.Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Upon complaint filed by
Serrano before the Labor Arbiter , the dismissal was declared illegal.On appeal, the NLRC modified the
LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the
last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042 for violating the non-impairment clause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of
contracts.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative.\The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that
it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the
State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs,
with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may
be employed. However, the subject clauses violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
Facts:
RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352 passed by the Senate on 7
December 2006 and the House of Representatives on 19 December 2006.On 23 January 2007, less than
four months before the 14 May 2007 local elections.
On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition
alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioner also assails the
constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369.According to petitioner, these provisions are of
questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the
Constitution.
Issue:
WON Section 34 OF RA 9369 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of
contracts
Ruling:
The petition is denied .RA 9369 is constitutional. The Office of the Solicitor General argues that
petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause because this only applies to previously
perfected contracts. In this case, there is no perfected contact and, therefore, no obligation will be
impaired. Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is a proper exercise of police power and it
will prevail over a contract. The OSG further argues that the assurance that the poll watchers will receive
fair and equitable compensation promotes the general welfare. The OSG also states that this was a
reasonable regulation considering that the dominant majority and minority parties will secure a copy of
the election returns and are given the right to assign poll watchers inside the polling precincts.
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR 164815
FACTS:
Petitioner Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under PD
No. 1866. On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitioner guilty as charged and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum plus fine. RA 8294 amended PD
1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court, took effect.
Petitioner moved to reconsider but his motion was denied. He appealed to the CA. On May
4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed the RTC disposition.
SC affirmed CAs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not retroactive application of the law is valid.
HELD:
YES. RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the
trial court. The law looks forward, never backward (prospectivity).Lex prospicit, non
respicit. A new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect. However, penal laws that favor
a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
FACTS:
On April 4, 2001, Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A
separate Information for illegal use of alias, was likewise filed against him for using JOSE VELARDE in several transactions
and use and employ the said alias Jose Velarde which is neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing
documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
I've long been contemplating to come up with a blog that would help the
barristers,law students and anyone who wishes to get legal updates, review
materials, and digested cases to aid them in their respective endeavors. Finally, it
came into fruition. Thanks to my boredom coz it drives me to nuts in setting this
up.
MARTES, MAYO 08, 2012
PEOPLE V MAMAC
G.R. No.-130332 May 31,2000
Appellant woke up the victim by poking her with along stick while lying alongside her brother
and sister.When she opened the window, she saw appellant brandishing a bolo and ordered her
to go dwon.Appellant brought her to the bank of the river and raped her there while sticking the
bolo at her.
HELD:
We have long recognized that different people react differently to a given type of situation and
there is no standard behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange,startling or
frightful experience.Appellant cannot claim that the victim had no reason to be cowed outside
by his mere act of stabbing her with a stick or mere brandishing of the bolo. The information
does not charge appellant with qualified rape and he cannot be sentenced to death.Unlike a
generic aggravating circumsance which may be proved even if not alleged, aqualifying
aggravating cannnot be proved unless alleged in the information.It must be alleged to properly
inform the acused of the nature and cause of accusation against him in order not to violate due
process.
The appellant is not a step-grandfather.he co-habited and lived with the materialgrandmother of
Bernadette without the benefit of marriage.The word "step", when used as a prefix in
conjunction with a degree of kinship, is repugnant to blood relationship and is indicative of
relationship by affinity.There is no relationship by affinity between Bernadetted and appellant,
thus he cannot be considered as a step-grandfather.At most he is a common law husband of
Bernadette's grandmother thus not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the 3rd civil degree or the common law spouse of the parent of
the
victim.Thus
only
recusion
perpetua
may
be
imposed.
.
PEOPLE V DECENA
G.R. No.-131843 May 31,2000
HELD:
The minority and the relationship of the complainant to the accused must be alleged in the
information in order to convict the appellant of qualified rape.Qualifying circumstances under
Sec11 of RA7659 must be alleged with particularity in the information to be proved and used in
the imposition of the penalty.It would be a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple
rape but convicted of its qualified form punishable by death although the attendant circumstance
qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not aleged in the indictment under
which he was arraigned.
PEOPLE V COTAS
G.R. No.132043 May 31,2000
Appellant stabbed the victim whiles sleeping. He alleges that it was self-defense.
HELD:
Even Assuming that the victim was the aggressor, it is clear that at the time was killed, the
danger to accused has already ceased.It is a settled rule that when unlawful aggression ceases,
the defende has no longer any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation
and not self-defense is committed. There was treachery.It is settled that if the victim, whenkilled,
was sleeping or had just awakened, the killing is with treachery because in such cases, the
victim was not in a position to put up any form of defense.
PEOPLE V OBOSA
G.R. No.-132069 May 31, 2000
The appellant, with two other persons, waylaid former Secretary of Local Government Jaime
Ferrer and his driver. The appellant's defense is that as aprison inmate who based on prison
records was inside the compound of the Nat'l Bilibid Prisons Prisons on the date and time of the
incident, he could not have participated in the ambush; and if indeed he was able to leave the
prison premises it is unbelievable that an escaped convict would return to prison.
HELD:
The cited circumstances do not present a physical impossibility for the appellant to have
participated in the commission of the crime.First, the log book presented in court referred only to
the south gate.The Director of the Bureau of Prisons testified that Obosa was given preferential
treatment in prison and was allowed to park his vehicle inside the prison compound despite
prohibition.
Appellant's objection to the admissibility of the testimony of an inmate that the accused confided
his participation in the crime is without merit.A convicted felon is not disqualified by the Rules of
Evidence from testifying in Court.The judgment of conviction did not rest on the alleged
confession made by Obosa.Treachery is present for the car was shot at while it was slowing
down as it approached a corner ensuring the accomplishment of the attack and eliminating any
risk from possible defenses that the victim may put up.
PEOPLE V GOMEZ
G.R. No.-132171May 31,2000
HELD:
Physical ipossibility in relation to alibi takes into consideration not only the geographical
distance between the scene of the crime and the place where accused maintains he was at, but
more importantly, the accessibility between these two points---in the instant case, how this
distance translate to hours of travel.Thus, although geographical distances may be taken
judicial notice of, this alone will not suffice for purposses of proving an alibi, because it remains
for the defense to prove the relative accessibility of accused from the scene of the crime at the
time the crime was committed.The defense should have introduced evidence of a verage travel
time as of that day from between the two points---and it should have done so during the trial, not
on appeal.
The burden is upon the accused to present credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility
to be at the scene of the crime; otherwise, an alibi may not prevail over the positive testimony
and clear identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses.
Also, the presence of treachery is not discounted by the fact that the killing was effected by a
single stab wound or that the attack was frontal---for as long as the method employedtended
directly and especially to ensure the execution of the crime without risk of defense or retaliation
of the offender.
P V LEONARDO
G.R. No.-133109 May 31,2000
The appellant was convicted of homicide.The lower court relyed solely on the testimony of
victim's father.
HELD:
The rule as to motive and how it affects the witness' credibility is: absent evidence to show any
reason or motive why witnesses for the prosecution should have testified falsely, the logical
conclusion is that no improper motive existed and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit.On the other hand, if for any motive there is a possibility that a witness might have been
prompted to testify falsely, courts should be on guard in assessing the witness' credibility. it is
basic in criminal law that the prosecution has the obligation of proving beyond reasonable doubt
the identity of the malefactor and his participation in the crime or offense charged.Such
degree of proof does not mean excluding the possibility of error, as producing absolute
certainty.Only moral certainy is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.Only when the conscience is satisfied that the crime has been committed by
the person on trial should the sentence be for conviction.
PEOPLE V CONTEGA
G.R. No.-133579 May 31,2000
The victim was found bleeding while lying face down on the floor. When asked who his assailant
was he answered; "Rogelio,former pakyaw worker."
HELD:
It is axiomatic that the prosecution bears not only the onus to show that a crime has been
committed but also to establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the person or persons
who should be responsible therefor.The utterance of the victim did not sufficiently identify the
appellant.The prosecution has not eliminated the possibility that another piecemeal worker with
the name "Rogelio" was employed by the Barbas. The conclusion that accused was the same
person referred to by the prosecution has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. Alibi
is a weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and concoct between relative, friends and
even those not related to the offender. In order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide,
it is necessary that the robbery itself be established as conclusively as any other essential
element of the crime.
JUNE 2000
PEOPLE V ROBLES
Appellant was convicted of robbery with homicide.He was apprehended after admitting the
crime. He was with the other perpetratorsin a taxi which was stopped in a routine inspection.
HELD:
The unexplained possession of stolen articles gives rise to apresumption of theft, unless it is
proved that the owne of the articles was deprived of possession by violence, intimidation, in
which case the presumption becomes one of robbery.In robbery with homicide cases, the
prosecution need only to prove these elements: 1)the taking of personal property is perpetrated
by means of violence or intimidation against a person; 2)property taken belongs to another;
3)the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi, and 4)on the occasion of the
robbery or by reason thereof the crime of homicide, here used in a generic sense is
committed.The homicide may precede the robbery or may occur after the robbery.What is
essential is that there an intimate connection between robbery ad the killing whether the latter
be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes be committed at the same time.The
rule is that whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on occasion of the
robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals
of the crime of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the homicide, unless it
clearly appears they endeavored to prevent the homicide.
PEOPLE V ANTONIO
G.R. No.-122473 June 8,2000
HELD:
Rape may be committed even when the rapist and the victim are not alone, or while the rapist's
spouse are asleep, or in a small room where other family members also slept.A daughter would
not accuse her own father of such unspeakable crime as incestuous rape had she really not
been aggrieved.It is highly improbable for a woman, especially one of tender age, to concoct a
brutal tale of ravishment, allow a gynecologic examination, and undergo the humiliation of a
public trial if she is not motivated solely by a desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished.
PEOPLE V MUMAR
G.R. No.-123155 June 8,2000
The victim was shot while his back was turned towards his assailants.
HELD:
A direct proof to show that the accused had come to an agreement to commit a felony is not
necessary.It is sufficient that all the accused manifested by their acts a common intent to do
harm to the victim.
PEOPLE V MONIEVA
G.R. No.123912 June 8,2000
The victim was hacked with a bolo and was decapitated by the appellant.
HELD:
Inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony referring to minor details and not upon the
basic aspect of the crime do not impair the witness credibility. Even where a witness is found to
have deliberately falsified the truth in some particular, and it was not shown that there was such
intended prevarication, it is not required that the entire testimony be rejected, since such
portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited.
Abuse of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the
means available to the person attacked to defend himself. Before it may be appreciated, it must
be clearly shown that there was deliberate intent on the part of the malefacto to take advantage
thereof.The prosecution is of the opinion that since the appellant was armed with a bolo and
was chasing the unarmed victim who was trying to flee, this shows that the latter was powerless
to offer resistance thereby admitting his inferiority and superiority of the defendant.This is mere
conjecture, it was not all apparent that the appellant consciously adopted that particular means.
The mere fact that the victim was running away from the appellant who was wielding a bolo
shows that the victim was aware of the danger to himself, thus negating the suddenness of the
attack for which reason treachery cannot be appreciated.
PEOPLE V CAMBI
G.R. No.127131 June 8, 2000
HELD:
The absence of illumination in the place of the commission of the crime does not detract from
the positive identification by Margie of the appellant as her assailant. Although visibility is an
important factor in the identification of a criminal offender, its relative significance depends
largely on the attending circumstances and the discretion of the trial court.In the case at bar, the
assailant was well known to Margie as the former was her employer.Also, the voice of the
appellant was heard when he uttered threats against the complainant.It has been this Court's
observation that it is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the
looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which he crime was committed.
Not every rape victim can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of
everyone.Some may shout, some may faint; and some may be shocked into insensibility, while
others may openly welcome the intrusion. The force or violence that is required in rape cases is
relative.When applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible.It is enough that it has enabled
the offender to consummate his purpose to bring about the desired result.It is not even
necessary that the offender be armed with a weapon.
Oscar Carillo together with Eduardo Candare were accused of murder. The physical evidence
shows that the death of the victim was caused by 2 stab wounds probably caused by 2 separate
instruments. Candare executed an affidavit admitting sole responsibility. Prosecution presented
a second cousin of the victim as its main witness.
HELD:
Physical evidence ranks high in the hierarchy of evidence. As physical evidence is compatible
with the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses but inconsistent with the claim of the defense
witnesses, the former should prevail. For the same reason, the court cannot accept as true the
affidavit of Candare owning sole responsibility for the crime.
Relationship per se does not automatically discredit a witness. In fact, kinship by blood or
marriage to the victim would deter one from implicating innocent persons as ones natural
interest would be to secure conviction by the real culprit.
Accused was convicted of murder. Three high school students testified for the prosecution and
claimed that they actually saw the accused in flagrante delicto actually striking and submerging
the head of the victim in the river. Right after the incident, accused apparently saw them by the
riverbank and offered them a ride across the river, to which they readily acceded.
HELD:
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must
be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve
as probable under the circumstances. There can never be a better gauge by which a witness
testimony may be evaluated and analyzed than the ordinary common human experience.
In this case, it is rather unnatural, to say the least, actually defying sound reasons for 3 young
students, to allow themselves to be ferried by an adult male whom they have just recently
witnessed kill and drown a helpless and unsuspecting victim. It makes the court wonder if the 3
supposed eye witness directly saw the actual killing in this case.
The 3 accused were charged with murder. The prosecution presented one eyewitness. The
defense interposed self-defense. Accused questions trial courts appreciation of the credibility
of the prosecution witness as unbelievable and biased.
HELD:
The trial courts evaluation of a witness trustworthiness is entitled to highest respect for it has
the distinct opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness and to determine whether
he is telling the truth. Moreover, the defense has not presented any evidence that witness was
impelled by dubious or improper motives, therefore, it must be presumed that he was not so
moved. The testimony of a single prosecution witness, if found credible and positive, is
sufficient to convict, for the truth is not established by the number of witnesses, but by the
quality of their testimonies.
Besides, credibility of witness is no longer the issue since self-defense was invoked as justifying
circumstance. Whenever the accused admits inflicting a fatal injury on his victim and invokes
self-defense, the burden of proof immediately shifts from the prosecution to the defense, the
accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecutions evidence.
Accused was convicted of murder. He assails the credibility of the prosecution witness and the
sufficiency of evidence against him.
HELD:
On the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment
made by the trial court. Moreover, patent inconsistencies in and between appellants testimony
and those of his witnesses only undermine appellants defense.
HELD:
Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of all
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime. The conduct should point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. Conspiracy may be
proved by circumstantial evidence or deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense
was perpetrated. Here, the spouses referred the main perpetrator to the victim. The perpetrator
who posed as buyer did not even inform the seller who referred him, which is contrary to
common practice.
The accused was convicted for Robbery with Homicide in an information alleging
conspiracy. The 2 accused hoisted the defense of denial and alibi. One of the accused was
acquitted and so the accused questions his conviction because in as much as conspiracy was
not proved by the prosecution, the appellant should likewise be acquitted.
HELD:
By its nature, conspiracy is a joint offense as one person cannot conspire alone. In conspiracy,
the commission of a crime is through the joint act or intent of 2 or more persons. However,
there is nothing irregular with the acquittal of one of the supposed co-conspirators and the
conviction of another. Generally, conspiracy is only a means by which a crime is committed as
the mere act of conspiring is not by itself punishable. Hence, it does not follow that one person
alone cannot be convicted when there is a finding of conspiracy. As long as the acquittal of a
co-conspirator does not remove the basis of a charge of conspiracy, one defendant may be
found guilty of the offense.
In the case at bar, it is incorrect to state that the accused was acquitted because conspiracy
was not proved. The evidence established beyond doubt the existence of conspiracy to
rub. However, the evidence proved only the existence of a conspiracy but not the culpability of
the appellant. The trial court noted that the victims had no sufficient opportunity to recognize
the acquitted accused. The evaluation of evidence reveals that the same is true insofar as the
appellant is concerned.
Appellant was convicted for raping his 12 year old daughter and was sentenced to
death. Appeal assails the criminal complaint which was not under oath and is therefore
void. Also, prosecution failed to establish the use of force in the occasion of the crime. Further,
the penalty of death was also questioned as the information does not allege the age of the
victim and her relationship with the offender.
HELD:
A complaint presented by a private person when not sworn by him is not necessarily void. The
want of an oath is a mere defect of form which does not affect the substantial rights of the
defendant on the merits. The law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving the
resistance where there is intimidation. Moreover, in a crime of rape committed by a father
against his own daughter, the fathers moral ascendancy and influence over the latter
substitutes for violence or intimidation.
Age and relationship are special qualifying circumstances that changes the nature of simple
rape by producing a qualified form punishable by death. Since the charge of rape in the
complaint is not in its qualified form so as to fall under the special qualifying circumstance stated
in section 11 of RA 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.
Accused was convicted for murder and sentenced to death. Defense interposed insanity with
proof of his history of mental illness filed for suspension of arraignment and suspension of
proceedings. Both were denied without subjecting accused to mental examination.
HELD:
Case remanded for the conduct of a proper mental examination to determine competency to
stand trial. By depriving appellant of mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived
appellant of a fair trial and the proceedings before the court are therefore nullified. He who
invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive
evidence. The absence of direct proof however, does not entirely discount the probability that
accused was not of sound mind at that time. In passing the question of the propriety of
suspending the proceedings, the test is found in the question whether the accused would have
a fair trial with the assistance which the law secures or gives. There are 2 distinct matters to be
determined under this test (1) whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide his
counsel with information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense and (2) whether he is
able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it.
The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests generally
in the discretion of the trial court. In the case, the trial court took it solely upon itself to
determine the sanity of the accused. The trial judge however is not a psychiatrist or
psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the
state of a persons mental health. The court should have at least ordered the examination of the
accused, especially in the light of the latters history of mental item.
Accused was convicted of murder and slight physical injuries. The trial court imposed penalty of
reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua medium. In imposing the penalty, the trial
court applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law stating that RA 7659 (An act to impose the death
penalty on certain heinous crimes) made the penalty of reclusion perpetua divisible.
HELD:
Accused was convicted of 4 counts of rape of his 13 year old daughter. The information does
not allege the age of the victim and her relationship with the offender. He was sentenced to
death and made to pay civil indemnity only.
HELD:
Crime is only simple rape since the information does not allege the age of victim and her
relationship with he offender. Civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape; it
is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages which are based on different
jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion. An award of
50,000 as moral damages for each of the counts of rape is granted in recognition of the victims
injury as being inherently concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of
rape and to warrant per se an award of moral damages.
Accused was convicted for raping his 16 year old daughter. He was sentenced to death despite
the fact that the information does not allege the age of the victim and her relationship with the
offender.
HELD:
When the age and the relationship are not alleged in the information, such should not be
considered as special qualifying circumstances that will change the nature of simple rape and
punish offender with the penalty of death. If the qualifying circumstance is not alleged but
proved, it shall only be considered as an aggravating circumstance. It is a denial of the right of
an accused to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him and consequently a
denial of due process if he is convicted of a crime in its qualified form notwithstanding the fact
that the information on which he was arraigned charges him only of the crime in its simple form
by not specifying the circumstance that qualifies the crime.
Accused was convicted of murder. The crime was preceded by a heated argument. The
accused left and came back minutes after the altercation and stabbed victim at the latters
terrace.
HELD:
Homicide and not murder. Treachery was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Qualifying and
aggravating circumstances before being taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing
the degree of the penalty to be imposed must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as
that which establishes the commission of the act charged as a criminal offense. Dwelling was
correctly considered aggravating. The word dwelling includes every dependency of the house
that forms part thereof.
Accused was convicted of murder for shooting a bakery delivery man. The victim was brought
to the hospital and subjected to an operation. He was interviewed and he named the accused
as his assailant. He died a day after giving his statement.
HELD:
The statement was considered as a dying declaration and is admissible in evidence as part of
the res gestae. The requirements for the admissibility of an ante-mortem statement are: (1) it
must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (2) at the
time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (3) the
declarant was competent as a witness; (4) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for
homicide, murder or parricide in which the decedent was the victim. Although it may not be
ascertained from the written statement whether the victim was speaking with a consciousness of
impending death, the degree and seriousness of the wounds and the fact that death supervened
shortly afterwards may be considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by
the victim with full realization that he was in a dying condition.
Accused was convicted of rape. He interposed the defense that he and the victim was
sweethearts. He offered marriage but was rejected.
HELD:
The sweethearts defense cannot be appreciated as the defense failed to come up with
convincing proof. Indeed, the accused bears the burden of proving that he and the complainant
had an affair which naturally led to a sexual relationship. The guilt of the accused was also
established by the fact that he offered marriage to the complainant after the incident was
reported to the authorities. As a rule in rape cases, an offer of marriage is an admission of guilt.
Accused was convicted of murder. He interposed self-defense and that he acted in the
fulfillment of a duty.
HELD:
Self defense cannot be appreciated. Where the accused admits to killing the victim in self
defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him. For a person not to incur criminal liability when he
acts in the fulfillment of a duty, 2 requisites must concur: (1) that the offender acted in the
performance of a duty; (2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence
of the due performance of such right or office. However, second requisite here was not proved
since killing need not be a necessary consequence of his duty.
Accused was convicted of rape. The charge was filed 12 years after the alleged incident, when
the victim was already 20 years old.
HELD:
An accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is
even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent to disprove the charge. In rape
cases, the testimony of the complainant must stand or fall on its own merits and should never
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. The long delay
of the complainant in reporting the incident makes it difficult for the court not to have compelling
doubts on the veracity of her episode. Proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt not proven.
Accused was convicted of murder. The conviction was based purely on circumstantial evidence
because there was no eye witness to the actual killing of the victim.
HELD:
A judgment of conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The corollary rule is that the circumstances
proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
Accused was convicted of raping a 12 year old girl. The accused interposed alibi as defense.
HELD:
When a victim of rape says that she has been defiled, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape has been inflicted on her and so long as her testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. In the absence of strong and
convincing evidence, alibi could not prevail over the positive testimony of the victim, who had no
improper motive to testify falsely against him.
HELD:
The testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to produce a
conviction.
The 2 accused (Hermogenes and Edwin) were convicted for the murder of Emerita and Ireneo
and the attempted murder of Flor. The 2 were found to have conspired to kill Ireneo. However,
during the commission of the crime, Emerita was also killed and Flor hit by a bullet.
HELD:
Co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy. For other acts done
outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and logical
consequence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. Evidence only shows
conspiracy to kill Ireneo and no one else. Hence, both can be convicted for the murder of
Ireneo. However, only Hermogenes who fired at Emerita and Flor can be convicted for the
murder of Emerita and Flor respectively.
The 3 accused were convicted of highway robbery. They assert that they cannot be convicted
of highway robbery as the crime was not committed by at least 4 persons as required in Article
306 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
Highway robbery is now governed by PD No. 532, otherwise known as Anti-Piracy and AntiHighway Robbery Law of 1974. It is no longer required that there be at least 4 armed persons
forming a band of robbers. The no. of offenders is no longer an essential element of the crime
of highway robbery. PD 532 only requires proof that persons were organized for the purpose of
committing highway robbery indiscriminately. The robbery must be directed not only against
specific, intended or preconceived victims but against any and all prospective victims.
Motion for the return of seized goods on the ground that the warrant was illegal. Further, the
seized medicines were found genuine but were only illegally imported.
HELD:
Even if the medicines were genuine if the seller has no permit from the appropriate government
agency, the drugs or medicines cannot be returned although the search warrant was declared
illegal.
Accused, 82 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, was convicted of the crime
of rape. He raises as defense the 2 week delay in reporting the offense and his alleged
impotency.
HELD:
Delay or vacillation in criminal accusations do not necessarily impair the complainants
credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained. It is not uncommon to conceal rape because
of rapists threats to life, fear of public humiliation and lack of courage. Silence is not an odd
behavior of a rape victim. The presumption is always in favor of potency. Impotency is
considered an abnormal condition and should not be presumed. The doctors testimony stated
that his sex organ was diseased but never was there even a hint that accused was
impotent. The trial court also observed that accused was still strong, agile and capable of
committing the sexual act and seriously doubts that he is 82 years old.
HELD:
The accused who invokes self-defense admits authorship of the killing and therefore the burden
of proof shifts to him who must then establish with clear and convincing evidence all the
elements of self-defense. Accused failed to prove unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression
presupposes not merely a threatening/intimidating attitude, but an actual and sudden attack or
an imminent danger thereof, which imperils ones life or limb. In the case at bar, there was no
sign that victim was armed other than the fact that his hands were tucked inside his
shirt. Accused did not ascertain whether victim was really armed, or warn him to drop his
weapon.
Accused was convicted of raping his 2 minor children. He was sentenced to suffer the supreme
penalty of death.
HELD:
Penalty reduced to reclusion perpetua. The victims minority was not sufficiently proved. In
accusations involving incestuous rape, the relationship of the accused with the offended party
as well as the latters age must be alleged in the information and proven by the prosecution with
competent evidence during their trial. A bare photocopy of the victims birth certificate which is
neither certified nor offered formally in evidence is not sufficient proof of the victims age.
As Danilo Morin and his cousin were walking one evening, Lozada followed from behind and
shot Morin to death. Lozada was convicted of murder appreciating treachery as a qualifying
circumstance.
HELD:
Affirmed. There was treachery since Morin was unsuspectingly shot from behind. The essence
of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission
without risk to himself. The 2 conditions for treachery to be considered as qualifying
circumstance are: (1) employment of means, methods and manner of execution to ensure the
safety of the malefactor from defensive and retaliatory acts of the victim; (2) and the deliberate
adoption of such means, methods and manner of execution.
Accused was held guilty of highway robbery with homicide. Accused interposed alibi as
defense. He questions credibility of witness.
HELD:
For alibi to be believed it must be shown that: (a) the accused was in another place at the time
of the commission of the offense; and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime
scene. This was not shown here. However, he cannot be held liable for highway
robbery. Conviction for highway robbery requires proof that several accused were organized for
the purpose of committing it indiscriminately. There is no proof in the instant case that the
accused and his cohorts organized themselves to commit highway robbery. Neither is there
proof that they attempted to commit robbery as to show the indiscriminate perpetration
thereof. On the other hand, what the prosecution established was only a single act of
depredation is not what is contemplated under PD 532 as its objective is to deter and punish
lawless elements who commit acts of depredation upon persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another.
Accused should be held liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide as the
allegation in the information are enough to convict him therefore.
HELD:
In instances where an accused acknowledges full responsibility for the death of the victim but
claims self-defense, the burden of evidence is transferred to the accused to prove that his taking
of a life was justified and that he did not incur any criminal liability for the same. In order that he
may be acquitted, the accused must prove that the 3 circumstances are present, namely: (a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. Unlawful
aggression was not proven. The alleged revolver used by the victim was not even presented in
evidence. Further, accused did not even voluntarily surrender and opted to remain silent about
the incident. A person claiming self-defense would have reported the incident to the police as
he has nothing to hide.
As to civil liability, aside from the ordinary indemnity of P50,000 accused is obliged to
compensate the heirs of the victim for the latters lose of earning capacity and pay the heirs of
the victim moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by them.
Accused was found guilty of 2 counts of rape of his 14 year old daughter. The information
alleges that the crime was committed on or about sometime in 1988 and 1989. He avers that
such allegations are indefinite and have deprived him of the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
HELD:
It is too late for the accused to question the form or substance of the information in these cases
since he did not move to quash the information before he was arraigned. Further, in the crime of
rape, the date of the commission is not an essential element of the crime.
The 2 accused were convicted of the special complex crime of rape with homicide attended with
conspiracy on the bases of their extra judicial confession. An interview with a radio announcer
was also done where the 2 accused accepted responsibility for the crime. They now assail their
conviction as their confession was attended by infirmities i.e. mainly the lack of counsel to
assist them during custodial investigation.
HELD:
The absence of counsel renders the extra judicial confession inadmissible. The presence of the
mayor, municipal judge and the family of the accused during the confession did not cure the
defect. However, statements spontaneously made by a suspect to a news reporter on televised
interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. By analogy, statements made
by herein accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible. The interview was
not in the nature of an investigation, and thus, the uncounselled confession did not violate
accuseds constitutional rights.
The 2 accused, stepfather and step grandfather of the victim, were convicted of rape and
sentenced to suffer supreme penalty of death. The information, however, does not allege the
relationship of the accused with the victim.
HELD:
The absence of the allegation of relationship in the information converted the crime to simple
rape which is not punishable by death. Qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in
the indictment. If the same are not pleaded, but are proved, they shall be considered only as
aggravating circumstances.
The accused was convicted of the crime of rape with the use of force. Accused used
sweetheart defense. He presented a letter written by the victim asking for money from the
accused since she was leaving town.
HELD:
In a rape case, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with great caution, for the crime
is usually known only to her and to her rapist. The dubious behavior of the alleged victim after
the rape detracts from her credibility and creates reasonable doubt that may lead to the acquittal
of the accused. Conviction always rests on the strength of the prosecutions evidence, never on
the weakness of that of the defense.
HELD:
Positive identification, where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill-motive on the
part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter prevails over alibi and denial which if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. However, appellant should be convicted of homicide not murder
since treachery was not established. Appellants stabbing of the victim was done on an
impulse. As appellant did not consciously adopt the means of attack, treachery cannot be
appreciated.
As regards the monetary award, aside from the civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 in
accordance with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, the defendant shall be liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of the deceased and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent and physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the
time of award. The amount of loss of earning capacity is based mainly on 2 factors: (1) the
number of years of which the damages shall be computed; and (2) the rate at which the losses
sustained by the respondent should be fixed.
JULY 2000
PEOPLE V. AGAPITO LISTERIO
G.R. NO. 122099
The accused was convicted of murder and frustrated murder committed with conspiracy. He
assails the testimony of the witness as insufficient to convict him of her crime charged.
HELD:
It is well settled that witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered, such that the testimony of a
single, trustworthy and credible witness could be sufficient to convict an accused. The trial court
found the witness testimony as candid and straightforward. Court defer to the lower courts
findings consistent with the principle that the trial judge is the best and the most competent
person who can weigh and evaluate the testimony of witnesses.
Conspiracy was also proven. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To establish the
existence of a conspiracy, direct proof is not essential since it may be shown by facts and
circumstances from which may be logically inferred the existence of a common design among
the accused to commit the offense charged, or it may be deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was perpetrated. If there is a chain of circumstances to that effect, conspiracy
can be established.
Accused was convicted of raping a mentally retarded girl. Appellant contends that the trial court
never acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complainant was signed and filed by the
chief of police and not by the complainant.
HELD:
Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the offended party can
initiate a prosecution for rape even if she is a minor, unless she is incompetent or incapable of
doing so upon grounds other than her minority. Although the victim in this case is no longer a
minor, it is undisputed that she is a mental retardate and suffering from physical deformity. No
woman would come out in the open, inform the authorities of the injustice done to her, unless
her purpose is to redress the wrong done against her honor. Once the violation of the law
becomes known through a direct original participation initiated by the victim, the requirement of
Art 344 of the RPC to the effect that the offense of rape shall not be prosecuted excerpt upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents are satisfied. Said provision is not
determinative of the jurisdiction of courts over the private offenses because the same is
governed by the Judiciary law, not the RPC. The complaint required in Art 344 is but a condition
precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty
parties. The complaint simply starts the prosecutory proceeding but does not confer jurisdiction
on the court to try the case.
HELD:
Accused acquitted on reasonable doubt. The records do not show how witness described
appellant and which description enabled an anonymous person to point at appellant as the one
who stabbed the victim. In the absence of these critical details of description, we cannot
adjudge whether the appellant was correctly and properly identified. Further, the crime was
committed when a dance was being held. The fight was a rumble, participated in by a lot of
people. All theses circumstances should make the identification of appellant difficult and we
should be extra careful in evaluating witness testimony. Positive identification of malefactors
should not be disregarded just because the name of some of them were supplied to the
eyewitness. But in such cases, the description of the criminal was detailed and fitted the
accused. In the instant case, these reliable details which could provide a good index for
identification are missing.
Accused was convicted of raping the 9 year old daughter of his live-in partner. He assails the
credibility of testimony since there are inconsistencies with the executed affidavit.
HELD:
Although there are omissions in the affidavit, such omissions did not diminish nor affect her
credibility as a witness. Ex parte affidavits are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate
and will thus not prevail over a witness statements on the stand.
Accused was convicted of carnapping with homicide. Appellants defense is alibi and
denial. They also content that their identification in the police line up was a violation of their
constitutional right and thus inadmissible.
HELD:
Alibis are generally considered with suspicion and are always received with caution, not only
because they are inherently weak and unreliable, but also because they can easily be
fabricated. Ergo, for alibi to serve as a basis for acquittal, the accused must establish by clear
and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
crime and (b) that it would be physically impossible for him to have her at the scene of the
crime. Since accused was unable to present witnesses to corroborate his testimony, his alibi
cannot be appreciated.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out of court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors: (1) he
witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the
crime and the identification and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Applying
this, there was no violation of constitutional right. The witnesses positively identified the 3
accused inside the jail. The 3 accused were in the company of other inmates. Thus, they were
in a group.
The accused was convicted of the crime of murder. He anchors his defense on mistaken
identity and denial and alibi.
HELD:
The appellants claim that witness was mistaken in naming him as Gilbert Araneta and not
Robert Araneta does not destroy her credibility and is not sufficient to exculpate him. For even
assuming that the accused real name is Robert, it is sufficient that she was positive as to his
physical identity as a participant in the shooting of her son from her personal knowledge for
purposes of identifying him in the present case. Given the positive identification made by the
lone prosecution witness, the appellants uncorroborated defense of denial and alibi must fail.
However, treachery and evident premeditation were not established, therefore, the crime
committed can only be homicide, not murder. Abuse of superiority was however
established. Considering that the victim when assaulted was unarmed, he was therefore no
match to his 3 adversaries who were all armed with handguns. Our jurisprudence is exemplified
by the holding that where 3 armed persons attacked the defenseless victim but there was no
proof as to how the attack commence and treachery was not proved, the fact that there were 3
armed assailants would constitute abuse of superior strength.
Accused was found guilty of raping his 16 year old step daughter. He assails the defective
information.
HELD:
The failure of the information to state that the accused raped the victim through force or
intimidation is not a fatal omission in this case because the complaint alleged the ultimate fact
that the accused raped the victim by means of force. So at the outset, the appellant could
have readily ascertained that he was being accused of rape committed through force, a charge
that sufficiently complies with Art 335. However, since the information alleges that the victim was
his daughter, when in truth the actual relationship of the appellant with the victim is that of
stepfather and stepdaughter, the appellant can be held liable only for simple rape.
Accused was convicted of murder. He assails credibility of witness and interposed alibi as
defense.
HELD:
The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was appellant who perpetrated
the killing. The information given by the witnesses at the identity of appellant is hearsay. The
hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told
him, whether orally or in writing. Section 36 of Rule 130 provides that a witness can testify only
to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the rules. In fact, the witness testimony is even
double or multiple hearsay since it is based upon third hand information related to the witness
by someone who heard it from others. Multiple hearsay is no more competent than single
hearsay.
Accused was convicted of the crime of rape committed against his 12 year old daughter. He
interposed alibi ad defense.
HELD:
Established is the rule that testimonies of rape victims especially of child victims are given full
weight and credit. Well settled is the rule that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says
that she has been rapes, she says in effect all that is necessary to prove that rape was
committed. Considering the categorical and unequivocal testimonies of the victim and an
eyewitness, appellants alibi and self-serving denial cannot prosper.
The accused were convicted of murder. Appellants point out that they have no reason to
assault the deceased since they had never any quarrel with the victim. They also assail the
credibility of the child witness.
HELD:
While it is true that they have no motive to assault the deceased, nevertheless, it is hornbook
knowledge that crimes have been attributed to persons who appear to have no reasons for
committing them as long as they have been clearly identified as the offenders. Motive gains
importance only when the identity of the culprit is suspect. It is also well-established that any
child regardless of age can be competent witness if he can perceive and can make known his
perceptions to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is
examined. The childs competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of
recollection; (c) capacity of communication. The childs lone testimony is sufficient to sustain a
conviction.
Accused was convicted of violating Sec 14-A of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 972 Unauthorized
manufacture of regulated drugs. He contends that since his alleged co-conspirator was
acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence to prove that she conspired with him, he should
likewise be acquitted.
HELD:
Once a conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and each of the conspirators is
liable for the crimes committed by the other conspirators. It follows then that if the prosecution
fails to prove conspiracy, the alleged conspirators should be held individually responsible for
their own respective acts. Accordingly, appellants criminal liability in this case must be judged
on the basis of his own acts as established by the quantum of proof required in criminal cases.
HELD:
To be convicted for illegal recruitment, 2 elements must concur: (1) the offender has no valid
license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes either any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement. The 2 elements were proven. The testimonies of complainant
corroborated each other and were buttressed by other prosecution witnesses.
The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit; and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused by
offended party. These were also established in the case.
Accused was convicted of estafa. Appellant contends that his conviction should be reversed
because the element of fraud or deceit was not proven. He insists that the stop payment order
was made in good faith and was not meant to evade payment of the debt.
HELD:
Despite his denials during testimony, it is obvious that appellant was aware at the time he made
the postdated checks for several creditors that he would have several debts maturing at the
same time, of which are recoverable from the same bank account. Then knowing that the
balance is not sufficient to cover complainants check, he immediately ordered the drawee bank
to stop its payment. These circumstances, taken together, indicate appellants intent to deceive
and defraud at the time he issued the check. The indeterminate sentence law must also be
applied.
Accused was convicted of raping a 7 year old girl. He interposed denial and assails the
admissibility of the medical certificate since the doctor who prepared it was not presented.
HELD:
Concededly, the subject medical certificate cannot be given any probative value. It is settled
that since a medical certificate involves an opinion of one who must first be established as an
expert witness, it could not be given weight nor credit unless the doctor who issued it be
presented in court to show his qualifications. In any case, medical certificate is not
indispensable to prove the commission of rape. It is merely a corroborative evidence. The lone
testimony of the complainant which is credible and free from serious and material contradictions
is sufficient to warrant the conviction of appellant.
Accused was convicted of the crime of robbery with multiple rape. One of the accused is a
youth offender and was thus placed under the custody of DSWD, Regional Rehabilitation
Center for Youth. DSWD recommended that the case of the accused be dismissed and his
custody be transferred to his father after taking into account the minors performance in the
rehabilitation center.
HELD:
The Final Report and Recommendation of the DSWD should be referred to the RTC for its
appropriate action and disposition. Where the DSWD recommends the discharge of a youthful
offender, it is the trial court before whom the report and recommendation is subject to judicial
review. Recommendation alone is not sufficient to warrant the release of a youthful
offender. The youthful offender however is not to be tries anew by the trial court. The inquiry is
not a criminal prosecution but is rather limited to the determination of the offenders proper
education and his moral and social fitness to re-join the community.
Accused was convicted of 3 counts of rape committed against an 11 year old girl. Accused
interposed denial and alibi. He assails the credibility of witness.
HELD:
A witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and
remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. When the accused was
positively identified by the victim who harbored no ill motive against the accused, the defense of
alibi must fail. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is essential that he can show physical
impossibility for him to be at the locus criminis. In the case at bar, it is possible for appellant to
be present at the scene of the crime.
HELD:
For alibi to be tenable, accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime. Here, the alleged place where
the accused was at the time of the crime was only 40 meters from the place where the victim
was shot. It was not physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of
the shooting.
HELD:
As a rule, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is
binding on appellate courts, absent any fact or circumstance of weight and substance that may
have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. In this case, the court a quo committed
serious lapses which warrant the acquittal of the appellant.
Accused was convicted of murder. Defense interposed denial and alibi. He questions credibility
of sole witness and testimonies being insufficient to sustain conviction. He points
inconsistencies between the witness testimony and her declarations during preliminary
investigation.
HELD:
The testimony of a sole witness, if found convincing and credible by the trial court is sufficient to
support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Declarations at the preliminary investigation
which are conducted to determine the existence of a probable cause and to secure the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, should not be equated with testimonies
before the court. While transcripts of a preliminary investigation may form part of the records of
the case, testimony taken at the trial on the merits of the case where the adverse party has the
full opportunity to cross-examine the witness and to ferret out the truth, deserves more
credence. Similarly, sworn statements that are taken ex-parte are generally incomplete and
therefore, discrepancies between statements made on the witness stand and those in an
affidavits are generally subordinated in importance in open court declarations because they are
often times not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident
which transpired.
Accused was convicted of murder. He questions credibility of witness because the latters first
statement differed with his succeeding statements and his testimony in open court.
HELD:
Affidavits or statements taken ex-parte are generally considered incomplete and
inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court and whenever there is
inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony
commands greater weight. Moreover, inconsistencies between the declaration of the affiant in
his sworn statements and those in open court do not necessarily discredit said
witness. Previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of a witness
unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he was then given an opportunity
to explain them. It is only when no reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling
his conflicting declarations that he should be deemed impeached.
Further, in an appeal, where the culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge on the
issue of credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of trial court are
entitled to and given the highest degree of respect. There was no treachery. It is not only the
sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be a conscious and deliberate
adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose. All the evidence shows was that the
incident was an impulse killing. It was a spur of the moment crime. A sudden and unexpected
attack would not constitute alevosia where the aggressor did not consciously adopt a mode of
attack intended to penetrate the homicide without risk to himself.
alibi
as
HELD:
For evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but
must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances. The test to determine the value of the testimony
of a witness is whether such is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience
of mankind. Whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible that lies outside pf
judicial cognizance. In this case, the testimony of appellant barely meets the minimum standard
of credibility. Accused however is guilty only of simple rape as there was no allegation as to the
minority of the complainant.
Accused was convicted of murder. Statements from 2 witnesses were taken. However, only
1witnes was presented.
HELD:
Their extrajudicial statement of the witness who was not placed in the witness stand should not
be considered because it deprived the defense of its right to cross-examination. The veracity of
her statements, not having been ascertained, should not have been given any probative value
at all. Be that as it may, her testimony is merely corroborative and its exclusion will not affect
the finding of guilt of the accused.
The accused was convicted of murder. Defense questions the credibility of witnesses.
HELD:
Well-entrenched is the tenet that this Court will not interfere with the trial courts assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses absent any indication or showing that the trial court has
overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion. The matter of assigning values
to declarations at the witness stand is best and most competently performed or carried out by a
trial judge, who, unlike appellate magistrate, can weigh such testimony in light of the accuseds
behavior, demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial.
Accused was convicted of estafa. Trial court found conspiracy on the acts of the accused
appellant of facilitating and initiating the meeting between the other 2 accused and the
complainant and in convincing the latter to sell rice to the former and following it up till the
delivery of the same.
HELD:
Court is not convinced that conspiracy to defraud complainant was proven. A conspiracy exists
when 2 or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. It is the unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. To
establish conspiracy, there must be proof that 2 or more persons agreed to commit the
crime. However, mere knowledge, acquiescence or agreement to cooperate is not enough to
constitute one as a conspirator, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime,
with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. And to be he basis of
conviction, conspiracy must be proven in the same manner as any element of the criminal ct
itself. The same degree of proof required to establish the crime is necessary to support a
finding of the presence of conspiracy, that is, it must be shown to exist s clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.
Accused was found guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale. Defense challenges the
sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence.
HELD:
Despite non presentation of POEA officer to testify, the POEA certification will suffice to prove
that she has no permit to engage in the business. POEA certification is a pubic document
issued by a public officer in the performance of an official duty, hence, it is a prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. Public documents are entitled to presumption of regularity,
consequently, the burden of proof rests upon him who alleges the contrary.
The accused were convicted of murder. Defense interposed alibi as defense. The conviction of
the 2 accused was based largely on the alleged dying declaration of the victim made to 2
witnesses of the prosecution and the apparent weakness of their defense.
HELD:
Dying declaration is one of the exceptions to the rule of inadmissibility of hearsay
evidence. The requirement are: (1) it must concern the crime and the surrounding
circumstances of the declarants death; (2) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a
consciousness of impending death; (3) the declarant was competent as a witness; (4) the
declaration was offered in a criminal case for murder, homicide or parricide where the declarant
was the victim. In the instant case, it was not established by the prosecution that the statements
of the declarant were made under the consciousness of impending death. No proof to this
effect was ever presented by the prosecution.
Neither may the alleged statements be admissible as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers
to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to
a crime immediately before, during, or after the commission of a crime when the circumstances
are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion ands there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement. In order to admit the statements as evidence part of res gestae, the
element of spontaneity is critical.
The accused were convicted of murder. They boxed and stabbed a snatcher who was caught
while running with the loot. Conspiracy, treachery and abuse of superior strength were found by
the trial court. Defense interposed alibi.
HELD:
The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellants by the
prosecution witnesses. Conspiracy was not proven. The existence of conspiracy is never
presumed. It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable
doubt. Hence, appellant will be separately adjudged according to the extent of their individual
participation in the commission of the crime charged in the information.
Treachery was also not present. The fact that the victim had a stab wound at the back is not, in
itself, indicative of treachery. Where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be
proven. It cannot be presumed or concluded merely on the basis of the resulting crime. Also,
the appellant does not appear to have consciously adopted the mode of attack to facilitate the
killing of the victim without risk to himself. The stabbing was the result of a rash and impetuous
impulse of the moment, rather than from a deliberate act of will, thus negating the existence of
treachery.
Abuse of superior strength may not be appreciated to qualify the killing to the crime of murder
for the reason that the same is not alleged in the information. It has been the rule that qualifying
circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment.
The accused was convicted of robbery with homicide. He was sentenced by the trial court to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to death.
HELD:
Under Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, if an accused is found guilty of a felony for which the
law prescribes a penalty composed of 2 indivisible penalties, the trial court judge has to impose
one or the other, not both. Since no aggravating circumstance was alleged in the information
and since neither was any mitigating circumstance established by the defense, the lesser
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua should be imposed.
HELD:
Prosecution witness inconsistencies are more than enough to engender some doubt as to the
guilt of the appellants. The onus probandi in establishing the guilt of an accused for a criminal
offense lies with the prosecution. The burden must be discharged by it on the strength of its
own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense or the lack of it. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that
would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who are to act in judgment, is indispensable
to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The overriding consideration is not
whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable
doubt as to his guilt.
The accused were convicted of murder. The defense interposed alibi. Conviction was rendered
based on the testimony of he eyewitness.
HELD:
Trial court relied on the weakness of the defense rather than on the strength of the prosecution
evidence, by emphasizing that alibi is a weak defense. It is settled that where the evidence of
the prosecution is itself feeble, particularly as to the identity of the accused as the author of the
crime, the defense of alibi assumes importance and acquires commensurate strength. The rule
that alibi must be satisfactorily proven was never intended to change the burden of proof in
criminal cases, otherwise, the accused would be put in the difficult position of proving his
innocence even where the prosecutions evidence is vague and weak. The prosecution cannot
profit from the weakness of the appellants alibi. It must rely on the strength of its evidence and
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused were convicted of estafa. Appellants contend that their liability is only civil and not
criminal since the check was issued only to secure the loan they obtained from complainant and
that there was no deceit on their part because they duly informed the complainant that the
check was not yet funded.
HELD:
The elements of estafa involved in this case are: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a
check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the
time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank or the funds
deposited were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; (3) the payee has been
defrauded. The drawer of the dishonored check is given 3 days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor to deposit the amount necessary to cover the check. Otherwise, a prima facie
presumption of deceit will arise which must then be overcome by the accused. In this case, no
evidence of deceit accompanied the issuance of the check. The prosecution presented
evidence to show that a notice of dishonor had been sent to appellant. The complainant
actually knew at the time of the issuance of the check that it was not funded and that the money
to cover it was still to come from Switzerland.
The accused was found guilty of 3 counts of rape. Appellants make issue of the trial; courts
reliance on the victims testimony.
HELD:
Credible, natural and convincing testimony of the victim is sufficient basis to convict. The
inconsistencies pointed out cannot overthrow the trial courts conviction. For a discrepancy in
testimony to acquit, such must refer to significant facts crucial to the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Inconsistencies irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds to reverse the
conviction. Further, appellants were at large for 5 years. Flight indicates guilt. Accuseds acts of
not confronting their accuser goes against the principle that the first impulse of an innocent man
when accused with wrong doing is to express his innocence at the first opportune time.
The accused was found guilty of the crime of rape committed against his 14 year old daughter.
HELD:
There are 3 guiding principles in rape cases: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent to
disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only 2 persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Here, the trial courts finding as to
the credibility of the complainants testimony deserve respect. Further, the accused escaped
from jail and was only recaptured. Flight is an implied admission of guilt and his desire to evade
responsibility therefore. Death penalty however cannot be imposed because relationship of
complainant with the accused was not alleged in the information.
Accused was found guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1072. Appellant questions
judgment of conviction because there was no showing that a sale of prohibited drug took
place. She argues that the prosecution has failed to establish that money or specifically
marked money was paid or exchanged hands between her and the supposed poseurbuyer. She theorizes that in a contract of sale, the payment of the contract price is essential to
consummate the transaction. Considering that there was no payment made, the contract of
sale was not consummated and inevitably, the accused cannot be convicted for the illegal sale
of prohibited drug.
HELD:
Under Sec 4, the act of selling or acting as broker in a sale of marijuana and other prohibited
drugs consummates the crime. It punishes the mere act of delivery of prohibited drugs after the
offer to buy by the entrapping officer has been accepted by the seller. The absence of the
marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as the sale
of the dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is
presented before the court. In every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is
material and indispensable is the submission of proof that the sale of illicit drug took place
between the seller and the poseur-buyer.
Accused was found guilty of murder and frustrated murder. Accused denied commission of the
crime and imputed the same to another person.
HELD:
As weighed against the positive identification of accused by one of his victims, which was
further corroborated by an eyewitness to the scene, and the absence of any showing of illmotive on their part other than their quest for justice, appellants denial of the commission of the
crime and imputation of the same to another person is demolished to obscurity. Besides, the
imputation of the crime to another malefactor was heard of only during his testimony, and was
never raised before the police authorities during the investigation. Clearly, his bare denial
amounts to nothing more than negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.
As to the amount of damages, prevailing jurisprudence sets the civil indemnity for death in the
amount of P50,000, which can be awarded without need of further proof other than the death of
the victim. With respect to actual damages, the court can only grant such amount for expenses
if they are supported by receipts. Moral damages may be recovered in criminal offenses
resulting in physical injuries but there must be a factual basis for the award. As to exemplary
damages, there being one aggravating circumstance, exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000 may be awarded in both murder and frustrated murder case pursuant to Art 2230 of the
New Civil Code.
The accused was found guilty of 2 counts of rape against his 15 year old daughter of his
common law spouse.
HELD:
In evaluating the credibility of rape victims, the court has repeatedly held that it is not unnatural
for inconsistencies to creep into the testimony of a rape victim, especially one who is of tender
age, as the witness is narrating the details of a harrowing experience. So long as the testimony
is consistent on material points, slightly conflicting statements will not undermine the witness
credibility nor the veracity of her testimony. On the contrary, these mistakes in fact strengthen,
rather than weaken, the complainants credibility as they erase suspicion that the testimony is
rehearsed. However, death cannot be imposed since the relationship of the complainant with
the accused was not alleged in the information.
Accused was convicted of (1) robbery with rape and (2) highway robbery. He contends that
since he did not flee from his residence, he should be exonerated.
HELD:
It is true that the flight of an accused is competent evidence against him tending to establish his
guilt. However, no law nor jurisprudence holds that non-flight per se is conclusive proof of his
innocence. Further, for alibi to be validly invoked, the accused must not only prove that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed but must also establish that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.
HELD:
The trial court did not err in giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution
witness. The record is bereft of any evidence to show that the witnesses had improper motive
to testify falsely against appellant and the rule is well settled that absent evidence showing any
reason or motive for a prosecution witness to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such
improper motive exists, and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
Accused was found guilty of the crime of rape committed against his 14 year old step
daughter. He contends that there is reasonable doubt as to his guilt to warrant his acquittal.
HELD:
Reasonable doubt is not a mere guess that the appellant may or may not be guilty. It is such a
doubt that a reasonable man may entertain after a fair review and consideration of the
evidence. It is a state of mind engendered by insufficient proof. But, time and again, the Court
has ruled that the lone testimony of the victim may suffice to convict the rapist. When a victim
says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been
committed and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on
the basis thereof. Further, absence of threats does not negate the charge of rape. Although it is
true that there were no physical injuries found in the victims body, in rape cases, absence of
bodily threats does not matter where there is an existing relationship between the appellant and
the victim, resulting to moral ascendancy of the former over the latter.
HELD:
Extrajudicial confession of accused is not admissible in evidence. He was not informed of his
constitutional right before his statements were taken. However, his open court testimony is
enough to convict him. His subsequent allegation that he was given money to accept culpability
deserves scant consideration. Judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order. The
presumption is that no sane person would deliberately confess to the commission of a crime
unless prompted to do so by truth and conscience. Further, accused went into hiding. Flight
has been held to be an indication of guilt.
Accused was convicted of rape committed against a mental patient. He contends that as
complainant is schizophrenic, her testimony should not have been given credence by the trial
court. Further, he contends that victim consented with the sex.
HELD:
Notwithstanding her mental illness, complainant showed that she was qualified to be a
witness. She could perceive and was capable of making known her perceptions to others. Her
testimony indicates that she could understand questions particularly relating to the incident and
could give her responsive answers to them. Although complainant herself admitted that she
agreed to have sex with him after he gave her a stick of cigarette, it should be stressed that
complainant was in no position to give her consent. Accused is to be convicted under Art 335
par 2, rape of a woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. The phrase deprived of
reason has been construed to include those suffering from mental abnormality or deficiency or
some other form of mental retardation, those who are feebleminded although coherent.
Accused was convicted of murder. Defense argues that prosecution failed to establish the
identity of the assailant.
HELD:
The finding of the trial court as to the credibility of the witnesses deserves respect. Further, the
defense of alibi is so weak. In order to prosper, it must be so convincing as to preclude any
doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its
vicinity at the time of the commission of the crime. Further, treachery was properly
appreciated. The fact that the victim had been forewarned by somebody against possible attack
does not negate the presence of treachery. What is important is that the victim was attacked
even before he and his companions could get out of the tricycle. The mode of attack ensured
the commission of the crime without risk to the accused.
The accused was convicted of murder. Defense interposed denial and alibi.
HELD:
Alibi is an inherently weak defense, easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. For said defense to
prosper, he accused must not only prove that he was at some other place at the time the crime
was committed but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the
time of the alleged crime. However, this was not shown here.
AUGUST 2000
Accused was convicted of rape. The victim was raped when unconscious.
HELD:
In cases where the victim is raped in a state of unconsciousness, the fact of sexual assault and
the identity of the assailant can be established from the events preceding or following the
victims loss of consciousness. True, there was no test conducted to determine the presence of
any sedative or drug in the drinks given to the victims which caused them to lose momentarily
control of their faculties. But this is of little consequence as the same is not an indispensable
element in a prosecution for rape. Under the circumstances, it suffices that the victim was found
to have been unconscious at the time the offender had carnal knowledge of her.
Accused were convicted of murder. Defense assails credibility of prosecutions lone witness.
HELD:
Assessment of the credibility of witnesses lies within the province and competence of the trial
courts. Appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to
the testimonies of the witnesses, unless it be clearly shown that the latter could have overlooked
or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of significance in the case. In the case at
bar, the findings of the trial court are supported by substantial evidence.
Accused was found guilty of murder and frustrated murder. Defense interposed self-defense.
HELD:
The burden of proof shifts to the person invoking self-defense, who, with clear and convincing
evidence must establish all the following requisites: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense. Upon failure to establish
these requisites, conviction is inevitable because the accused, by setting up self-defense,
admits being the author of the killing.
Accused was convicted of raping his 11 year old daughter. Defense interposed denial.
HELD:
Defense of alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove. A
positive identification of the accused made by an eyewitness prevails over such a defense. The
denial of the accused cannot prevail over the categorical testimony of the victim that he raped
her. The absence of convincing evidence showing any improper motive on the part of the
principal witness for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such
improper motive exists, and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. Even if the
victim was not familiar with the precise date of the commission of the offense and the time of its
occurrence, this fact does not convince the court that she was not raped by him. The date of
commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime. However, since relationship
was not alleged in the information, death sentence cannot be imposed in the absence of the
qualifying circumstance.
Accused was convicted of robbery with homicide. He was committed based on circumstantial
evidence.
HELD:
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may
draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict if the ff.
elements are present: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be sustained only when the circumstances proved form an
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the culprit. In the case at bar, the combination of all the
circumstancial evidence presented established the participation of the accused in the robbery
and death of the victim.
Accused was convicted of statutory rape committed against an 11 year old girl in full view of the
latters 5 year old sister. Death was imposed.
HELD:
Death cannot be imposed. In the case at bar, the attendant aggravating circumstance that the
victim was raped in full view of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity was not
alleged in the information filed against the accused. Further, trial court erred in considering this
as statutory rape. To effectively prosecute for statutory rape, its elements must be set out in the
complaint or information to apprise the accused of the crime of which he is being charged. The
gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is in having carnal knowledge with a girl under 12
years of age. In the case a bar, although it was established during the trial that the victim was
only 11 years old at the time the crime was committed, the information filed against the accused
charged him with having carnal knowledge of a girl who is 12 years of age.
HELD:
There is an absence of physical evidence to corroborate victims claim of resistance. Verily, the
law does not impose on the rape victim the burden of proving resistance where force was used
on her. However, in the case at bar, where the victims narration of the rape incident is open to
doubt and does not jibe with human experience, physical evidence of bruises and scratches on
her face or arms which were allegedly pinned behind her back would have spoken louder than
words.
HELD:
A rape victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and
remains consistent is a credible witness. The lone testimony of the victim, which if credible and
free from any serious and material contradictions, as in this case, is enough basis for the
accuseds prosecution and conviction.
Accused was convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Two days after the taking of
the child, she informed the childs parents of the whereabouts of the child.
HELD:
In cases of kidnapping, if the person detained is a child, the question is whether there was
actual deprivation of the childs liberty and whether it was the intention of the accused to deprive
the parents of the custody of the child. The child in this case was deprived of liberty. True, she
was treated well, however, there is still kidnapping. For there to be kidnapping, it is not
necessary that the victim be placed in an enclosure. It is enough that the victim is restrained
from going home. The intention to deprive the childs parents of her custody is indicated by the
accuseds hesitation for 2 days to disclose the whereabouts of the child and more so by her
actual taking of the child. Accuseds motive at this point is not relevant. It is not an element of
the crime. The fact that she later on felt remorse and showed the childs parents where the
former was, cannot absolve her. At that point, the crime was consummated.
The testimony of the child is also credible. A witness young age will not deter him or her from
being a competent and credible witness. To be a competent child witness, the following must be
met: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; (c) capacity of communication
Accused was convicted of robbery with homicide. Defense interposed denial and alibi. He was
convicted based on circumstantial evidence.
HELD:
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses spawn and generate facts which constitute an
unbroken chain of events leading to the inevitable conclusion of guilt on the part of the
appellant.
Accused was convicted of raping a 10 year old child. Defense interposed alibi.
HELD:
Not only was accuseds alibi weak, it also did not rule out the possibility of his having committed
the crime. It was not physically impossible therefore, for the accused to be at the crime scene,
rape the victim and go back to his work.
Accused was convicted of raping a 14 year old retardate. He contends that victims testimony is
unreliable because of her mental capacity or state of mind.
HELD:
A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a witness. In this case,
the victim was able to intelligently make known such perceptions or narrate them truthfully
despite the grueling examination by both prosecutor and defense counsel.
HELD:
State of mental retardation of a victim of rape can be established by evidence other than the
medical findings of a specialist. So also, the court has said that a woman need not be
completely deprived of reason for sexual intercourse by a man with her to constitute the crime of
rape. The term deprived of reason has been construed to include the feeble-minded although
coherent and those suffering from mental deficiency or some form of mental disorder. Further, a
mental retardate who has the ability to make known her perceptions is still a competent witness.
Accused was found guilty of estafa. Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to sufficiently
prove that the merchandise he ordered were delivered to and received by him or his authorized
representatives. Thus, he argues, he cannot be held liable for estafa since he was not able to
obtain the goods from the private complainant by means of the check he issued.
HELD:
Art 315 (2)(d) of the RPC penalizes any person who shall defraud another by postdating a
check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender has no funds in the
bank. The transaction between the parties here is in the nature of contract of sale. The
contract of purchase and sale is reciprocal and from it arises not only the obligation to deliver
the thing but also that of paying the price. In this case, there is no ample proof that appellant or
his representatives ever received the merchandise. Since no damage was sustained by
complainant in as much as appellant received nothing of value from the complainant, appellant
cannot be held guilty of estafa. He had no obligation to pay or to make good the issued check.
Accused was convicted of raping an 11 year old girl. Appellant interposed the defense of denial
and alibi.
HELD:
Basic is the rule that alibi which is easy to concoct cannot prevail over the positive identification
by the witnesses. What is more, appellant utterly failed to prove that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of his commission.
Accused was convicted of raping several children. On appeal to CA, the accused escaped from
jail.
HELD:
His appeal should be dismissed. He cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Court to seek a review
of his conviction after he has made a mockery of the judicial process by escaping from
prison. However, this does not affect the review in criminal cases where death penalty had
been imposed because review in such case is not only automatic but also mandatory.
Accused was convicted of murder. Conspiracy and treachery were found by court.
HELD:
Conspiracy exists when 2 or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence as
the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding
among them with respect to the commission of the offense. Conspiracy was established in the
instant case by the concerted and synchronized actions of the accused and his companions in
carrying out the ambush. Treachery was also correctly appreciated as the method employed in
the execution of the crime ensured no risk to the assailants arising from the defense which their
victims might put up.
The 2 accused were convicted of murder. Defense questions adequacy of evidence and finding
of treachery.
HELD:
One of the witnesses is a victim himself having been stabbed by the appellant. As such, his
testimony, standing alone, can be made the basis of accuseds prosecution and conviction, if
such testimony meets the test of credibility. The matter of accuracy of the identification by the
victim of the offenders is a factual issue resolved by the trial court which should be given weight
on appeal, unless there are convincing indications that certain facts or circumstances of weight
and significance have been overlooked. An unexpected and sudden attack under circumstances
which render the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness
and severity of the attack constitutes alevosia and the fact that the act was frontal does not
preclude the presence of treachery.
Accused was convicted of raping his 9 year old niece. He contends that death penalty should
not be imposed since the information accuse him of rape under Art 335 par 3 which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua.
HELD:
What is controlling in an information should not be the title of the complaint, nor the designation
of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being, by
and large, mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime
charged and the particular facts therein cited. The real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the
law allegedly violated, but from the actual recital of facts alleged in the body of the information.
However, the relationship to the victim, while proven by competent evidence, was not sufficiently
alleged in the information.
Accused was found guilty of statutory rape for raping his own daughters. The victims testified
that appellant was not able to insert his penis into their vagina because they kept on moving in
an effort to evade the sex organ of the appellant. However, they recounted that the penis of
appellant touched the lips of their vagina and they felt pain in the process. The information
indicted him for the crime of rape with force and intimidation under par 1 of Art. 335, although
the prosecutor established that complainants were below 12 years old at the time of the rape.
HELD:
Conviction of appellant for statutory rape absent any allegation in the information that the
complainants were below 12 years old at the time of the rape and not for rape through force or
intimidation which was the method alleged would violate the right of the appellant to be informed
of the nature of the accusation against him, which right is granted by the
Constitution. Convicting appellant of a crime not alleged while he is concentrating his defense
against the offense alleged would be unfair and underhanded.
However, the force or intimidation employed by the culprit and resistance put up by the victim
are not necessary for the conviction of the perpetrator. In incestuous rape, the absence of
violence or offer of resistance by the victim would not matter because of the overpowering and
overbearing moral ascendancy by the father over his daughter. Lack of penetration cannot
exculpate appellant. Settled is the rule that complete penetration is not essential. The slightest
touching of the lips of the female organ or labia of the pudendum constitutes rape.
HELD:
A plea of self-defense automatically shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the
defense since such a plea means that the accused admits to having performed the criminal act,
but disclaims legal liability on the ground that his life had been exposed to harm first before he
committed the act in defense of himself. Thus, when the accused invokes self-defense, he must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence,
for even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accuseds open admission
of responsibility for the killing. In the case at bar, apart from self-serving statements, appellants
testimony is uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, thus cannot be given
weight.
Accused was convicted of 2 counts of rape committed against his 15 year old daughter. He
assails delay in filing of complaint and interposed alibi as defense.
HELD:
By itself, delay in prosecuting rape is not an indication of fabricated charges. The charge is only
rendered doubtful if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained.
The 2 accused were convicted of murder. In their defense, appellants denied any knowledge of
the incident. They assail the credibility of prosecution witnesses by pointing to alleged
inconsistencies.
HELD:
It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give
varying details as there may be some details which one witness may notice while the other may
not observe or remember. In fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dove tailing of
narration by different witnesses as it could mean that their testimonies were prefabricated and
rehearsed. Finally, a careful examination of the evidence on record shows that while the
prosecution witnesses differ in their narration of trivial details like those mentioned on appeal,
they did not waver in their identification of the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.
Accused was convicted of 3 counts of rape committed against the 11 year old daughter of his
common law wife. He contends that accused and complainant were actually lovers.
HELD:
In rape cases falling under Art 335 (3) when the woman is under 12 years of age or is
demented, 2 elements must be established to hold the accused guilty of rape: (1) that the
accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age. Proof
of consent of the woman is immaterial. Sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years old is
statutory rape. Her consent to the intercourse is involuntary because she is considered to have
no will of her own.
SEPTEMBER 2000
Acused was convicted of murder. An extrajudicial confession was made. Defense interposed
self-defense.
HELD:
Extrajudicial statement is inadmissible because of violation of constitutional rights during
custodial investigation. A suspects confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken
without the assistance of counsel without a valid waver of such assistance regardless of the
absence of coercion, or the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence,
even if appellants confession were gospel truth. However, his statements made to the
barangay captain, who is neither police officer nor a law enforcement agent is admissible. When
an accused invokes self-defense, the onus probandi to show that the killing was justified shifts
to him. Even if the prosecutions evidence was weak, it could not be readily dismissed after the
accused had openly admitted his responsibility for the killing.
Accused was convicted of rape. He questions the credibility of the testimony of the
complainant.
HELD:
There are 3 guiding principles in the review of rape cases: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy,
but to disprove it is difficult though the accused may be innocent; (2) considering that in the
nature of things, only 2 persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense. Equally unquestionable is the principle that as long as the
complainants testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on its basis.
The accused were found guilty of rape. Defense put up denial and alibi.
HELD:
Alibi is a weak defense which becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification of
appellants by the prosecution witness. Denial and alibi unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence are negative and self-serving evidence bearing no real weight in law and
jurisprudence. Moreover, alibi might be aptly considered only when an accused had been
shown to be in some other place at the crucial time and that it would have been physically
impossible form him to be at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the
commission of the crime. The presence of the appellants at the crime scene immediately after
the victim was raped indicates strongly that they were the culprits. Also, there is nothing to
show that the victim was moved by any ill motive to testify falsely against the accused. She did
not know them before the fateful evening. Her honest and straightforward testimony deserves
full faith and credence.
Accused was found guilty of raping his minor daughter. He questions credibility of complainant.
HELD:
There are 3 guiding principles in reviewing rape cases: (1) an accusation of rape can be made
with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only 2 persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense. Even if the complainant is less than chaste, this fact
would not detract from the fact that appellant violated her. As long as the victims testimony
measures up to the standard of credibility, the fact that she had sexual relations with other men
would not destroy or affect her credibility. The moral character of the victim is immaterial in rape
cases. For even a prostitute can be the victim of rape.
Accused was found guilty of murder. In his defense, he denied responsibility and pointed to a
certain person as the real culprit. One eyewitness was presented by prosecution.
HELD:
The testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to produce a
conviction. Appellants likewise failed to show any ill-motive on the part of the witness. There is
no showing of improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
HELD:
The general rule in criminal cases is that the conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in
rape cases lie heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court which is accorded great weight
and respect, if not conclusive effect. In this case, there is nothing that would warrant a deviation
from the general rule.
Accused was convicted of 2 counts of rape. He was convicted on the basis of the lone
testimony of the victim despite lack of physical injuries.
HELD:
It is doctrinally settled that the lone testimony of a rape victim, by itself, is sufficient to convict if
credible. Equally settled is the principle that when a woman declares that she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped and where the
testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof.
Further, in proving rape cases, it is not necessary that the act was committed with genital
injury. And a finding that the victims hymen is intact, as in this case, does not disprove rape. In
fact, a medial examination is not indispensable in the prosecution for rape.
Accused, 72 years of age, was convicted of 5 counts of rape committed against 2 minors. He
insists in his appeal that he could not be convicted considering that the medical examination
showed that the complaining witnesses suffered no lacerations, abrasions or contusions.
HELD:
Medical examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. In fact, there can be rape
even if the medical examination shows no vaginal laceration. Medical findings only serve to
corroborate the testimonies of the victims. The accused may be convicted on the basis of the
lone uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim provided that her testimony is clear, positive,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of this.
The accused was convicted of the crime of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for
firing an M14 rifle to police men who were about to enter his house to serve a search
warrant. Further, he was also convicted for illegal possession of firearm.
HELD:
RA no. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested
committed no other crime. Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or homicide,
illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate
offense. Hence, where an accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted
homicide for firing an unlicensed M14 rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a
search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of
firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct assault.
Accused was convicted of raping a 22 year old retardate woman. He questions credibility of
complainant.
HELD:
A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness,
her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that
intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the
competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable
narrative of the matter testified to.
HELD:
Preliminarily, having admitted the killing, the accused assumed the burden of proving legal
justification therefore. He must establish clearly and convincingly how he acted in the fulfillment
of his official duty and/or in complete self-defense, otherwise, he must suffer all the
consequences of his malefaction. He has to rely on the quantitative and qualitative strength of
his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not
be disbelieved after he had admitted the killing. To justify the incident as fulfillment of a duty, 2
requisites must concur: (1) that he acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of
a right or an office; (2) that the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
The second shot, which was the fatal shot was uncalled for and therefore was no longer a
necessary consequence of appellants due performance of duty. Thus, only an incomplete
justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty can be appreciated.
Accused was convicted of the complex crime of double murder with frustrated murder. The
conviction hinges on the testimony of 2 prosecution witnesses.
HELD:
In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-pronged: (1) to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with the same
quantum of proof the identity of the person or persons responsible therefore, for even if the
commission of the crime is given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the
malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained.
The identification of the perpetrator of the crime bears heavily on the reasonableness or
probability of the testimony of the prosecution witness. There is unfortunately, no single test to
determine with all exactitude the probity of testimony, and the courts can only give conformity to
the quotidian knowledge, observation and experience of man. It has been observed that the
most positive testimony of a witness may be contradicted on the fact that the testimony is
contrary to common observation or experience or the common principles by which the conduct
of mankind is governed. The courts are not required to believe that which they judicially know to
be incredible. A close scrutiny of the accounts given by the witnesses produce a serious doubt
as to the veracity of the malefactors identity almost as if it were merely contrived to pin the
liability of the crime upon appellant.
Accused was found guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972., An extrajudicial
confession was made as to the ownership of marijuana plants.
HELD:
The marijuana plants seized were product of an illegal search because of the absence of search
warrant and are therefore inadmissible in evidence. The voluntary confession of ownership of
marijuana was in violation of the custodial rights because of the absence of competent and
independent counsel, and thus, inadmissible too. In sum, both the object evidence and the
testimonial evidence as to the appellants voluntary confession of ownership of the prohibited
plants relied upon to prove appellants guilt failed to meet the test of constitutional
competence. Without these, the prosecutions remaining evidence did not even approximate
the quantum of evidence necessary to warrant appellants conviction. Hence, the presumption
of innocence on his favor stands.
HELD:
There are 2 elements of arson: (1) that there is intentional burning; (2) that what is intentionally
burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Proof of corpus delicti is indispensable in prosecution
for felonies and offense. Corpus delicti is the body or substance of the crime. It refers to the
fact that a crime has actually been committed. Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the
crime that may be proved by the testimonies of the witnesses. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is
satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and of its having been intentionally caused.
The uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, may be enough to prove the
corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. Here, corpus delicti of the arson and murder was duly
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused was convicted of qualified rape and sentenced to death. The victim was the sister of
the common law wife of the accused.
HELD:
Although the circumstance of relationship by affinity within the third civil degree was alleged in
the information, evidence for the prosecution clearly showed the lack or absence of such
circumstance to qualify the rape because the accused and the sister of the victim were common
law husband and wife and were not legally married at the time of the tape. The accused and the
victim cannot be said to be related by affinity within the third civil degree at the time of the
commission of the crime.
Accused was convicted of statutory rape committed against a 9 year old girl. However, during
trial, the fact of age was not proven. Can the accused be convicted of simple rape when the
charge against him was for statutory rape?
HELD:
It is too late to assail the duplicitous character of the information as no objection was raised in a
motion to quash before a plea to the information is made. The defect is deemed waived.
The accused were convicted of Robbery with Homicide. They contend that in as much as they
were the only ones apprehended and held for trial, their non-flight should have been considered
as indication of their innocence.
HELD:
While flight indicates guilt, non-flight does not mean innocence.
Accused was convicted of incestuous rape committed against his 13 year old daughter. He
questions credibility of the complainant.
HELD:
The bare denial of the accused cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim. Denial,
when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, as in this case, is a negative and selfserving evidence which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
HELD:
The death of the appellant pending appeal and prior to the finality of conviction extinguished his
criminal and civil liabilities (civil liability ex delicto) arising from the delict or crime. Hence, the
criminal case against him, not the appeal, should be dismissed. However, it must be added that
his civil liability may be based on sources of obligation other than delict. For this reason, the
victims may file a separate civil action against his estate, as may be warranted by law or
procedural rules.
This is a hold-up but a passenger was a policeman. He was stabbed. Later a tabloid reported
that his gun was found with a killed hold-upper not a party to the case.
HELD:
In the light of positive identification, appellant's defense of alibi and denial must fail. Positive
testimony is stronger that negative testimony, and alibi becomes worthless in the face of positive
identification of the accused. For alibi to prosper it must be shown that it was physically
impossible to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission (place of alibi was only 5
minutes away).
Even if there are flaws in the testimony as to who stabbed the victim is immaterial because
conspiracy was proven. They masqueraded as passengers, positioned themselves strategically
inside the jeep, pulled out their knives simultaneously, concertedly inflicted stab wounds upon
learning that he was a policeman. It is no moment that an accused has not taken part in the
actual commission of every act constituting the crime. The precise modality or extent of
participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary since the act of one is the act of
all.
As to the report of the gun, it is merely hearsay. The authors of the newspaper reports had no
personal knowledge of the identity of the perpetrators. Such was only obtained from the police
investigators handling the case. This fact is of no moment for a possession thereof could have
reached this person for a number of reasons.
There was a shooting incident resulting to the death of Perez. Accused was detailed in the
Mayor's Office. His revolver and a 38 palter was taken from him. Branch 9 acquitted him of the
crime of homicide but Branch 3 found him guilty of illegal possession of firearms aggravated by
homicide under PD1866.
Issue: W/N the doctrine of P v Quijada stating that qualified illegal possession of firearms and
homicide are distinct and separate offenses is still followed.
HELD:
No Applying the new law RA8249 in P v Molina the Court has declared that under the
amendment in said law that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
forearm, such use of the same should only be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Accused was found guilty of murdering a fellow member of the NPA. Accused now appeals on
the ground that the crime of murder is an offense committed in pursuance or in furtherance of
rebellion.
HELD:
The court acquitted the appellant. His application for amnesty was approved and one of the acts
listed in the resolution of the Nat'l Amnesty Commission is the killing of the victim in this case.
The approval was pursuant to Proc. No 347 granting amnesty to all persons who shall apply
who have committed crimes on or before June 1 1995 in pursuit of their political beliefs.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive. It is a private act, which must be pleaded and proved
by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the CE with the concurrence of Congress is a public act of w/c the courts
should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted
to classes of person or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks
forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been
convicted, it abolishes or forgives the punishment thus it does not work the restoration of the
rights to hold public office or right of suffrage unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence (Art 36).
PEOPLE V. GENOSA
GRNo.-135891 Sept. 29, 2000
Appellant was found guilty of parricide. She now requests an examination by psychologists to
determine her state of mind then under the ground of the "battered woman syndrome".
HELD:
There are four characteristics of the syndrome:1)woman believes that the violence was her
fault;2)she has an inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere;3)she fears for
her life and/or the children's lives;4)she has an irrational belief that the abuser is omnipresent
and omniscient. Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would
succumb to her helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem than to injure
or kill her batterer. She is seized by fear of an existing or impending lethal aggression and thus
would have no opportunity beforehand to deliberate o her acts and to choose a less fatal means
of eliminating her sufferings.
Petition granted. In P v Pares, after a final conviction of appellant therein, the Court granted his
Urgent Omnibus Motion and allowed him to undergo mental and neuralgic other examinations to
determine that he was a deaf-mute. Based on that finding and that he was unaided in the trial,
he was granted a rearrangement and retrial. This action is justified on the rule that only upon
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt may an accused to consigned to a lethal injection
chamber. Also as Justice Pun said, man should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful
acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.
OCTOBER 2000
PEOPLE V. SANTIAGO
GRNO.129371 OCT. 4, 2000
Appellant was convicted of murder for shooting the victim after a prior street altercation that
erupted when the parties' vehicles collided.
HELD:
Only Homicide. No treachery. Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or
as conclusively as the killing itself. When the witnesses did not see how the attack was carried
out and cannot testify how it began, the trial court cannot presume from the circumstances of
the case that there was treachery. Treachery cannot be considered where the lone witness did
not see the commencement of the assault. Since the lone witness failed to witness the initial
attack inflicted upon the victim, treachery cannot be considered a qualifying circumstance.
All the elements of evident premeditation must also be proven. Premeditation to kill must be
plain notorious and sufficiently proven by the evidence of outward acts showing the intent to kill.
A 15-minute interval is not sufficient time for the accused to coolly reflect on their plan to kill the
victim. In one case, 30 minutes was held also insufficient time between determination to commit
and the execution is insufficient for full meditation on the consequences of the act.
Liability of one whose participation in crime was limited to driving for the killers is only that of an
accomplice. The lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, which creates the doubt whether he
has acted as principal or an accomplice, implies the court to resolve the question in favor of the
accused.
PEOPLE V. BAWANG
GRNo.-131942 October 5, 2000
HELD: The fact that the hymen is intact does not prove absence of sexual intercourse and the
presence of laceration does not prove defloration. The hymen may be lacerated due to some
other causes not sexual intercourse.
The qualifying circumstance provided by RA7658 for the imposition of death penalty is present
in the information--minority and relationship having been averred. However, it is the burden of
the prosecution to prove the victim was below 18 when the rape was committed in order to
justify the imposition of the death penalty. In this case, no evidence was given--not even a
Certificate of Live Birth.
PEOPLE V. LOPEZ
GRNo.-132168 October 10, 2000
NOVEMBER 2000
PEOPLE V. BALMORIA
GRNo.-134539 November 15, 2000
HELD: It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the assault against their
virtue because of the threat on their lives. A young girl, unlike a mature woman, can not be
expected to have the courage and intelligence to immediately report a sexual assault committed
against her especially when a death threat hangs ver her head. We cannot reject the testimony
of victim on the ground that her 3 other companions were not awakened by her groans while
she was being raped. It is not impossible to commit rape in a small room even if there are
several persons in it.
PEOPLE V. MOYONG
GRNo.-135413-15 November 15, 2000
Facts: The hotel guests and manager were stabbed to death in a room. Appellant was caught
while fleeing the establishment with stained clothes.
HELD: A conviction based on circumstantial evidence is proper if:1)there is more than just one
circumstance in attendance;2)the facts from which inferences can be derived are adequately
proven;3)the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. These circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty of the crime sought to be established and can lead to no rational assumption
that may be congruent with the innocence of the accused. Since no eyewitness was presented
and no evidence was shown on how the killings transpired the aggravating and qualifying
circumstances cannot be appreciated.
PEOPLE V. PACANA
G.R. No.97472-73 Nov.20, 2000
HELD: If the accused was positively identified by the victim himself who harbored no ill motive
against the former, the defense of alibi must fail. In any even the proof of motive is not
indispensable for conviction when there is positive identification. Motive assumes significance
only when there is no showing of who the perpetrator of the crime might be. An appeal taken by
one or more of several accused shall not effect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. Hence, the reduction of
the indeterminate penalty for the frustrated murder case shall affect not only the appellant but
also those who withdrew their appeal.
PEOPLE V. CASTURIA
HELD: For conspiracy to exist it does not require an appreciable period lapsed prior to the
occurence. It is sufficient that the form and manner in which the attack was accomplished
clearly indicate unity of action and purpose. The accused act of mauling the victim and
thereafter handling the bolo to his brother who hacked the victim.
PEOPLE V. ALVAREZ
GRNo.-121769 November 22, 2000
Appellant was convicted of murder after shooting the victim with a bardog--a locally made
shotgun.
PEOPLE V. VELASQUEZ
HELD: The mere fact that Karen did not attempt to escape when the opportunity resented itself
should not be construed as a manifestation of consent and does not necessarily negate her
charge of rape or taint her credibility considering the accused employed force and intimidation.
Accused was charged of raping a 12yr old minor who is his niece by affinity.
ISSUE: Nature of Rape: Penalty; Whether the death penalty should be imposed
HELD: SIMPLE RAPE! RECLUSION PERPETUA! Although, art. 335, RPC says, death penalty
shall be imposed when the victim is under 18 and the offender...is a relative by affinity within the
third civil degree... such circumstances (minority and relationship) are in the nature of qualifying
circumstances which should be alleged in the information and proved at the trial (Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, Dec1, 2000). IN THIS CASE, the prosecution failed to allege the
relationship of the accused with the victim, Thus the accused cannot be convicted of qualified
rape punishable by death but only simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE V. FERNANDEZ
GR 137647; Feb.1, 2001
Accused was charged of raping the 15yr old daughter of his common law spouse.
HELD: SIMPLE RAPE! RECLUSION PERPETUA! Although art.335 of the RPC says that death
penalty shall be imposed when the victim is under 18 and the offender is ...the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim... having been charged only of simple rape in the information,
the accused is held guilty only of simple rape with the penalty of reclusion perpetua
HELD: GUILTY! The Defense of self-defense and alibi was outweighed by the positive and
categorical eyewitness accounts corroborated by the extent of hack wounds on the victim;
MURDER! The killing was qualified by abuse of superior strength.
PEOPLE V. BAYOD
GR 122664; Feb 5, 2001
PEOPLE V. BAYANG
GR 134402; Feb 5, 2001
HELD: GUILTY and sentenced to reclusion perpetua under art. 294, RPC. Although there were
NO eyewitness accounts of the robbery with homicide, the circumstantial evidence presented
was sufficient to convict. Under the revised rules on evidence, circumstantial evidence is
sufficient, when a) there is more than one circumstance; b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In affirming convictions beyond reasonable doubt the
degree of proof required is NOT proof that excludes all possibility of error but only moral, not
absolute certainty, is what the fundamental law requires.
PEOPLE V. PABILLANO
GR 108618; Feb.6, 2001
Accused was found guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide by the trial court
HELD: Accused are guilty or robbery with homicide and were sentenced to reclusion perpetua;
Alibi is a weak defense. It should be rejected when the identity of the accused is sufficiently and
positively established by eyewitnesses to the offense. Note there is no law that a police line-up
is an essential requisite to proper identification.
PEOPLE V. LOYOLA
GR 126026; Feb.6, 2001
The trial court sentenced the accused to reclusion perpetua for the
rape of a 16yr old girl while aboard a bus.
HELD: Accused is guilty and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The defenses of alibi and
denial by the accused were found unavailing in the face of positive and credible testimony of
prosecution witnesses. Note, no young Filipina of decent repute even in modern times, would
publicly admit she had been raped unless that was the truth. Accused was not able to prove that
he and the victim were indeed lovers. Likewise, the claim of lack of force or intimidation cannot
prevail. The TEST is whether the threat or intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind
of the victim that is she resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would
be carried out. Where resistance would be futile, offering none at all does not amount to consent
to sexual assault. Lastly, an offer of marriage which occurred in this case is an admission of
guilt.
PEOPLE V. RAYOS
GR 133823; Feb.7,2001
HELD: Accused is guilty and sentenced to DEATH in accordance with art 335 of the RPC (as
amended by RA 7659) or where on the occasion of a rape homicide was committed, the penalty
is death. ! The guilt of the accused was established through circumstantial evidence, taken in
entirety unmistakably pointing to guilt. Circumstantial evidence may be resorted in the absence
of eyewitnesses and is sufficient for conviction if, a)there is more than one circumstance; b) the
facts from which that inferences were derived are proven; and c) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE V. FRANCISCO
GR 135200; Feb.7,2001
The trial court found the accused guilty of qualified rape sentencing him to death for raping his
daughter.
HELD: SIMPLE RAPE with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; The prosecution failed to allege
the qualifying circumstance of relationship between the accused and the victim in the
information. This is not a mere technicality but a concept of due process as provided in the
Constitution.
PEOPLE V. CORDERO
GR 136894-96; Feb.7, 2001
Accused, a 63yr old was charged of 3 counts of rape of the Nana sisters, one was 13 and the
other 15.
HELD: GUILTY and sentenced to reclusion perpetua on each information charged. The
assertions of the accused cannot stand against the testimonies and positive identification of the
two rape victims. Alibi is weak and age is not a determinant of the inability to have carnal
knowledge rather it is impotency, which nonetheless should be proven by the defense.
PEOPLE V. RONDILLA
GR 134368; Feb.8,2001
The accused was sentenced to death by the trial court in accordance with art 335 of the RPC for
raping his own daughter.
HELD: The accused is guilty but only of simple rape for the prosecution merely charged him of
simple rape. Nonetheless he is guilty and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Hardly can any
defense stand a chance against the unimpeached testimony of the young victim in great detail
the sexual assault. The testimony is even given greater weight when the victim accuses a close
relative.
PEOPLE V. NAVARRO
GR 132696 Feb.12,2001
Accused was convicted by the trial court for the crime of murder with the use of an unlicensed
firearm.
HELD: GUILTY! Trial court Affirmed and the accused was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The
crime was murder because the killing was attended with treachery. There was no opportunity for
the deceased to retaliate or defend himself, the particular means employed which was the use
of a motor vehicle, and, the circumstance of nighttime, all point to the nature of the killing. On
the issue of the firearm, there can be no separate conviction for the illegal use of a firearm. As
the law now stands, this is merely considered as an aggravating circumstance (P.D. 1866 as
amended by RA 8294). Since the death penalty was not yet effective at the time of the offense,
the penalty is reclusion perpetua. The original penalty for murder was reclusion temporal but
since there was an aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty
was raised to reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE. V. OPTANA
GR 133922; Feb.12,2001
4 informations for the violation of the sec. 5 RA7610 (Special Protection of Children against
Child Abuse) and 4 informations for rape were filed against the accused.
HELD: The SC affirms the decision of the trial court convicting the accused for one incident of
rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and one charge violating RA7610, sentencing him to
suffer 8yrs and 1 day of prison mayor as minimum to 17 yrs. and 4mos of reclusion temporal as
maximum. The other informations failed to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Likewise,
charging the accused with two different offenses for the same act committed on the same date
against the same victim is erroneous and illegal except where the law itself so allows. This is not
allowed by RA7610. It specifically provides that in instances where the victim is under 12, the
case should fall under art. 335 of the RPC, thus only cases where the victim is over 12 but
under 18 can fall under this law. In the case at bar, where the accused was charged for several
occasions of rape and abuse the conviction or acquittal on the informations was based on the
age of the child, the concept of non-multiplicity of suits, and the evidence presented. Thus, only
one rape case prospered (incident when the child was below 12) and one violation of RA7610
(when the child was above 12 but below 18).
PEOPLE V. VELASCO
GR 128089; Feb13,2001
The accused was indicted for parricide under art 246 of the RPC for the killing of his wife.
HELD: The accused is guilty of parricide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Parricide is
committed when 1) a person is killed; 2)the deceased is killed by the accused; 3)the deceased
is the...or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element is the relation of the offender
to the victim. In case of a marital relationship the best evidence is the marriage certificate. The
own testimony of the accused as married to the victim may also be taken as an admission
against penal interest. The case was proved through circumstantial evidence sufficiently
establishing the malefactor, destroying the presumption of innocence, and fulfilling the standard
of moral certainty. Circumstantial evidence may be resorted in the absence of eyewitnesses and
is sufficient for conviction if, a)there is more than one circumstance; b) the facts from which that
inferences were derived are proven; and c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Further, a conviction based on such can be
upheld if the circumstances established would lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime.
PEOPLE V. PEREZ
GR 134756; Feb.13,2001
Accused was found guilty of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the trial court.
HELD: Accused is guilty of murder. A frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery.
Although the shots were taken facing the accused, according to witnesses, the victim was
eating merienda with her back turned to the accused when he came; the victim only stood and
faced him after he cursed her. The accused deliberately sought the manner of the attack, going
to the victim's barangay, armed with a pistol, approaching the victim from behind and shooting
her at close range. Treachery was present. The attack was sudden and the victim was
defenseless, had no opportunity to escape, and lastly, there was no risk to the accused when he
fired his gun.
PEOPLE V. GUZMAN
GR 117952-53; Feb.14,2001
The accused was found guilty by the trial court of violating RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972).
HELD: The accused is GUILTY. The accused was caught in flagrante delicto, possessing an
unlicensed firearm. The search conducted thereafter was valid. It was within the immediate
control of the arrested person. Likewise, the drugs and paraphernalia obtained where in plain
view of the police when the accused was arrested. Quoting PEOPLE v. Khor, the elements of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: 1) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified as a prohibited drug; 2) such possession is not authorized by law; and 3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. All elements concurring, the accused
is thus guilty. Lastly, the accused failed to quash the information against him before arraignment
thus he is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.
PEOPLE V. YBANEZ
GR 136257; Feb.14, 2001
Accused was charged of raping a 10yr old girl who is the daughter of his common law spouse.
He was sentenced to death by the trial court.
HELD: Accused was sentenced by the SC to reclusion perpetua convicting him only of simple
rape. The prosecution failed to indicate the relationship of the accused to the victim in the
information thus merely charging Ybanez of simple rape. Convicting the accused of an offense
not specifically charged in the complaint is a violation of his right to due process.
PEOPLE V. AVECILLA
GR117033; Feb.15, 2001
Accused was charged of qualified illegal possession of a firearm; accused willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously with intent to kill, and actually killing a victim as a consequence, possess and
carry an unlicensed firearm.
ISSUE: Conviction and Retroactivity of RA8294 (An act Amending the Provisions of PD 1866)
HELD: SC dismissed the case. Originally he could have been convicted of illegally possessing a
firearm separately from his conviction on the killing that occurred as a consequence thereof,
which happened in 1991. With the passage of RA 8294 in 1997 amending PD1866, the
possession of an unlicensed firearm has become merely an aggravating circumstance to a
murder or homicide charge. As a general rule, penal laws have prospective effect EXCEPT
where the new law will be advantageous to the accused, as in this case, sparing him of two
separate convictions.
PEOPLE V. PAGDAYAWON
GR 130522; Feb.15,2001
Accused, a police officer was charged of raping his 11yr. Old stepdaughter. Both circumstances,
minority and relationship was indicated in the complaint. The trial court sentenced the accused
to death.
HELD: The accused is guilty. The witness is credible and there was indeed force and
intimidation in the act. The penalty prescribed by the trial court was also correct. Under art335 of
the RPC, death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is under 18 and the offender is the
stepparent of the victim. Such information was formally included in the charge.
PEOPLE V. B. TUMANON
GR 135066, Feb.15, 2001
HELD: The accused are guilty of murder. There was abuse of superior strength shown through
superiority in number and the use of arms. To take advantage of superior strength is to use
force out of proportion to the means available to the person attacked to defend himself.
Conspiracy was also present. It is not necessary that there be a previous plan or agreement to
commit the assault. It is sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all the accused, by their
acts, gave evidence of common intent to kill the victim, so that the act of one becomes the act of
all and all of them will thus be liable as principals.
PEOPLE v. NAAG
GR No. 136394; Feb. 15, 2001
Accused was charged and found guilty by the lower court of the special complex crime of
robbery with rape.
ISSUE: Was there rape? Was he guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape?
HELD: There was rape. In rape cases, what is material is that there is penetration no matter
how slight. The only essential point is to prove the entrance or at least the introduction of the
male organ into the labia of the pudendum. The moment the accuseds penis knocks at the door
of the of the pudenda it suffices to constitute the crime of rape. Accused is guilty of separate
crimes of rape and theft. Facts show that the primary intent of accused was to rape the victim
and not to rob her. Moreover, the crime of taking away the property is theft and not robbery
because of the absence of violence and intimidation.
PEOPLE v. MACAYA
GR No. 137185-86; Feb 15, 2001
Accused was charged of raping the two children of his common-law spouse in two separate
complaints and was found guilty in both cases and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua in one
case and death in the other.
HELD: NO. The accused was charged only with simple rape. Under Art. 355 of the Revised
Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed when rape is committed against a victim who is
under 18 years of age, and the offender among other circumstances, is the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim. But these circumstances must be alleged in the complaint or
information. Otherwise, even if the minority of the victim and the relationship of the victim and
the accused are established during the trial, he cannot be punished for a graver offense than
that with which he is charged. He can only be convicted of simple rape the imposable penalty
for which is reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE v. ALBIOR
GR No. 115079; Feb 19, 2001
Accused was charged and found guilty by the lower court of rape and was sentenced to a
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Is the absence of spermatozoa in the victims genitalia negate rape? Do minor
inconsistencies in victims testimonies destroy credibility?
HELD: Absence of spermatozoa in the victims genitalia does not negate rape. Further, as for
appellants claim that the victim did not suffer complete lacerations and other signs of physical
violence, suffice it to say that even the absence of hymenal laceration does not rule out sexual
abuse, especially when the victim is of tender age. Nor is it necessary for the victim to suffer
external injuries in order for the crime of rape to be established. As for the minor
inconsistencies, these are badges of truthfulness and candor for they erase the suspicion the
testimony was
rehearsed. Also, victims are not expected to have a total recall of the incident.
PEOPLE v. NAVARRA
GR No. 119361, Feb 19, 2001
The accused-appellants were charged and found guilty by the RTC of illegal recruitment
committed in a large scale resulting to economic sabotage and sentenced to life imprisonment.
ISSUE: Did the RTC err in disregarding their defense of denial and in finding them guilty of the
offense charged.
HELD: Denials, without clear and convincing evidence to support them, can not sway
judgement. They are self-serving statements and are inherently weak. Decision of lower court
affirmed. Illegal recruitment has 2 essential elements: first, the offender has no valid license or
authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment or placement of
workers; second, the offender undertakes any activity within the meaning of recruitment and
placement defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Art 34 of
the Labor Code. A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or
entity without a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment or placement from the
Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by
the POEA or the Sec. of Labor.
Under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refer to, any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising, or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment to 2 or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment or placement.
Accused-appellants committed acts of recruitment and placement, such as promises to the
complainants of profitable employment abroad and acceptance of placement fees. They were
also not authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment as certified by the DOLE. Art. 38
(b) of the Labor Code provides that illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage if any of the following qualifying circumstances exists: first, when illegal
recruitment is committed by a syndicate; second when it is committed in a large scale,
committed against three or more persons individually or as a group.
PEOPLE v. BLAZO
GR No. 127111; Feb 19, 2001
Accused was charged and found guilty of rape and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution proved the accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD: Delay in criminal accusation is not an indication of a fabricated charge, if such charge is
satisfactorily explained. A young girl, such as the victim in this case, cannot be expected to have
the courage and intelligence of a mature woman to immediately report her defilement, especially
when accompanied by a death threat. A medical examination and a medical certificate are
merely corroborative and are not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case. Lacerations of
the hymen, while considered as the most telling and irrefutable physical evidence of a penile
invasion, are not always necessary to establish the commission of rape, where other evidence
is available to show consummation
PEOPLE v. MURILLO
GR No. 128851-56; Feb 19, 2001
Accused were charge and found guilty of rape and were sentenced to death.
HELD: NO. The death sentence given to the accused was based on the following attendant
circumstances: first, the victim is under the custody of the police or military officers, and second,
when committed by and member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine
National Police or any law enforcement agency. To merit the punishment of death, these
circumstances must be properly alleged in the information. For the prosecutions failure to do
PEOPLE v. MOLINA
GR No. 133917; Feb 19, 2001
Accused were charged and found guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for having
in their possession 946.9 grams of marijuana and were sentenced to death.
HELD: NO. Accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest.
In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing,
attempting to commit, or have committed a crime. There was no probable cause in arresting the
accused thus making the arrest illegal. Because the arrest was illegal, so was the search made
by the police officers. This being the case, the evidence is inadmissible and the accused are
found not guilty of the alleged offense.
PEOPLE vs AWING
GR No. 133919-20; Feb 19, 2001
Accused was charged and found guilty of 2 counts of rape against his stepdaughter.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court gave him the correct sentence of death?
HELD: NO. Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 7659 imposes the death penalty when the rape victim is under
18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the victims
parent. Both the age of the offended party and the filiation or kinship with the accused must be
alleged in the information as part of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. In this case, complainants age n the
accusatory portion of the informations were omitted, hence appellant was only charged of
simple rape and not qualified rape. The proper penalty to be imposed to the appellant is
reclusion perpetua and not death.
PEOPLE v. TOLENTINO
GR No. 139834; Feb 19, 2001
Accused was charged and convicted for committing the crime of rape.
HELD: Victim will not go through the humiliation if it is not to seek justice, hence her testimony is
credible. Also, there was no showing that the victim was impelled by ill motive to testify against
the accused. Conviction for rape may be based on circumstantial evidence when the victim
cannot testify on the actual commission of the rape because she was unconscious when the act
was committed, provided that one circumstance is duly proved and the totality or the unbroken
chain of the circumstances proven lead to no other logical conclusion than accuseds guilt.
PEOPLE v. MUSTAPA
GR No. 141244; Feb. 19, 2001
Accused was charged and found guilty of violating Sec. 16 of RA No 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether the court erred in not appreciating the accuseds testimony denying ownership
of bag containing shabu?
HELD: Lower Courts decision affirmed. Denial is a weak form of defense, particularly when it is
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The defense of denial or frame-up, like
alibi, has been viewed by courts with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common
and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Also,
issues raised by the defense are factual and involves credibility of witnesses, a matter
addressed to the trial court because it is in a better position to decide such questions. It is a
well-entrenched doctrine that the trial courts findings are entitled to the highest degree of
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. Also, minor inconsistencies or discrepancies in the
testimony of prosecution witnesses refer merely to minor details and does not impair the
credibility of witnesses. Witnesses are not expected to remember everything that happened in
exact detail, since a long time has already lapsed.
PEOPLE v. CONSEJERO
GR No. 118334; Feb 20, 2001
Accused-appellant was charged and found guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether
accused-appellant
was
guilty
beyond
reasonable
doubt?
HELD: The circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
conclusion, that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances or a
combination thereof should point to overt acts of the appellant that would logically lead to the
conclusion that the appellant is guilty. Rule 113, Sec 4 of the Rules of Court provides the
requisites for the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence: a) there is more than one circumstance;
b) facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and c) combination of all the
circumstances is such to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. However, the crime
committed was not robbery with homicide; in this case, the primary purpose of the accused was
not to rob but to take the life of the victim, the taking of property came only as an afterthought
subsequent to the killings. The crimes committed are separate offenses of homicide, murder,
and theft.
PEOPLE v. TIO
GR Nos. 132482-83; Feb 20, 2001
Accused was charged and found guilty of committing the crime of murder qualified by treachery
and with the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua.
HELD: NO. Relationship per se does no give rise to a presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor
does it ipso facto impair the credibility or tarnish the testimony of the witnesses. The
eyewitnesses were not shown to have any ill feeling or resentment against the appellant as to
prevaricate and impute upon him a heinous crime. Besides, there is also a mere chance witness
that pointed to the appellant as the assailant and whose account of the incident coincided with
the accounts of the other witnesses. Moreover, the eyewitness accounts of the prosecution
witnesses not only reinforced and corroborated each other but were also confirmed by the
physical evidence.
PEOPLE v. ENDINO
GR. No. 133026; Feb 20, 2001
The crime of murder was charged against accused Endino and accused-appellant Galgarin.
Galgarin was arrested and convicted for the crime of murder qualified by treachery, while on the
other hand Endino remained at large.
HELD: Admission of videotaped confessions is proper. The interview was recorded on video and
it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence
of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation, as it was not given
to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the
public.
PEOPLE v. DE LEON
GR No. 124297; Feb 21, 2001
Accused-appellant was charge and convicted of several counts of the crime of rape and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.
HELD: GUILTY. Rule 110, Sec. 11 provides that it is not necessary for the information to allege
the exact date and the time of the commission of the crime is such is not an essential ingredient
of the offense. In the crime of rape, the date of the commission is not an essential element. The
delay in reporting the crime committed can also be attributed to the tender age of the victim and
the moral ascendancy of the accused over the victim. Oftentimes, a rape victim's actions are
moved by fear rather than by reason, and because of this, failure of the victim to report the
crime immediately is not indicative of fabrication. Also, victims are not expected to recall the
exact and accurate account of their traumatic experiences. However, accused cannot be
sentenced to death because the information against him failed to allege victims minority and
her relationship to the accused. RA 7659 enumerates the circumstances that justify the
imposition of the death penalty. Consistent with the accuseds right to be informed of the nature
and the cause of the accusation against him, these circumstances must be specifically pleaded
or alleged with certainty in the information and proven during the trial. Accused is guilty only of
simple rape and sentenced only to reclusion perpetua on each count of rape.
PEOPLE V. ZUNIEGA
GR 126117; Feb. 21,2001
HELD: Accused is guilty of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua (since the accused was
found guilty by the trial court prior to the effectivity of the death penalty law the proper penalty is
reclusion perpetua). The facts show that the accused perpetrated the crime in such a way that
he easily rendered his victim totally defenseless, with no opportunity to escape or defend
himself, and without the slightest provocation. NOTE: 1)The circumstance that the judge who
penned the decision did not personally hear the testimonies of witnesses does not disturb the
decision more so when the judgment is supported by evidence on record such as the transcript
of stenographic notes. 2) Failure of a witness to reveal at once the identity of the perpetrator of
a felony does not impair the credibility of the witness more so if the delay has been adequately
explained, such as due to fear of a great danger to his life and/or his family.
PEOPLE V. BOLIVAR
GR130597; Feb. 21, 2001
Three accused were charged of murder.
HELD: The accused were guilty of murder and were sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The
accused alibi cannot prosper against positive identification of prosecution witnesses. For alibi to
prosper 2 requisites must concur: 1) accused must prove that he was at another place at the
time of the crime; and 2)the accused must demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. The court also found that there
was conspiracy, as inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the crime,
which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments.
PEOPLE V. VELASQUEZ
GR132635 & 143872-75; Feb. 21, 2001
Accused was found guilty by the trial court of Acts of Lasciviousness against his 2 yr. old
granddaughter and the crime of Rape against his alleged stepdaughter who is a minor. He was
sentenced to death for the rape.
HELD: SC found the accused guilty of acts of lasciviousness and simple rape which modified
his sentence for the rape to reclusion perpetua. NOTE: (A)On the 1st charge: acts of
lasciviousness... 1)By failing to invoke the lack of a preliminary investigation during the trial, the
court deems that the accused has waived the same; 2)The testimony of the mother of the 2 yr.
Old child/victim is sufficient considering the victim's age and the medical examination
conducted. B) On 2nd charge: rape of his alleged minor stepdaughter...1)The sole testimony of
the victim is sufficient; 2) The three yr. delay in the filing of a complaint does not necessarily
mean that the charge was fabricated. The delay was due to fear; 3) The penalty for the rape is
reclusion perpetua since the court found the marriage of the accused to the victim's mother as
doubtful, the information against the accused being different from what was actually proven, that
the relationship of the accused to the victim is one of daughter of a common law spouse, the
crime was considered as only simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE V. MANALO
GR 135964-71; Feb. 21, 2001
Accused was charged of 8 counts of rape of two minors (4 counts of rape for each child). One
was 6 yrs. old and the other 7.
HELD: The accused is guilty and is sentenced to death. According to art.335 of the RPC, the
death penalty shall be imposed if rape is committed on a child below seven yrs. of age.
Accused was convicted of incestuous rape (raped 12-yr old daughter), and meted out with the
supreme penalty of death.
HELD:
The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court, but lowered the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
The settled rule is that when the issue involves the credibility of a witness, the trial court's
assessment is entitled to great weight, even finality, unless it is shown that it was tainted with
arbitrariness or there was an oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.
It must be stressed that the law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving
resistance, particularly when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits
herself to the rapist's will for fear for life or personal safety. It suffices that the threat or
intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that if she resists or does not
yield to the desires of the accused-appellant, the threat would be carried out.
Accused was meted out with the penalty of reclusion perpetua, since the special circumstance
of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender was not alleged and proven. In the
case at bar, the information alleged the special qualifying circumstance of relationship and
minority. The prosecution evidence, however, is insufficient to prove the minority of the victim.
Besides the bare declaration of the victim as to her age, there was no independent evidence
presented by the prosecution that could accurately show her age. We have held that the
minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself.
Failure to sufficiently establish the victim's age will bar any finding of rape in its qualified form.
Accused was convicted of murder (with circumstances of treachery and conspiracy), and meted
out with the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
HELD:
The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court. It is well settled that conspiracy exists when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to
commit it. The presence of the element of conspiracy among the accused can be proven by
their conduct before, during or after the commission of the crime showing that they acted in
unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design. In such case, the act of one
becomes the act of all, and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the
crime committed. The prosecution was able to establish that accused and the other suspects,
by their acts at the time of the aggression, manifested a common intent or desire to kill the
victim, so that the act of Visaya became also the act of appellant Ocampo. Moreover, their
coordinated escape from the crime scene when somebody shouted "sibat na" confirmed the
existence of conspiracy.
With regard to the circumstance of treachery, it exists when the offender employs means,
methods, or forms in the execution of the offense which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
In the case at bar, the evidence showed that the unsuspecting victim was completely
unprepared for the unexpected attack as he was facing a wall and totally deprived of a chance
to ward off or escape from the criminal assault.
Accused was found guilty of murder attended by the generic aggravating circumstance that the
crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party (morada), but offset by the alternative
mitigating circumstance of intoxication. He was sentenced to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
HELD:
The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court. Two witnesses, Vilma and Maricris, positively
identified accused-appellant as the assailant. Accused's alibi cannot overcome the eyeball
testimonies, especially since it has not been shown that it was impossible for him to be
physically at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. For the defense of alibi to
prosper, it is not enough that the accused can prove his being at another place at the time of its
commission; it is likewise essential that he can show physical impossibility for him to be at the
locus delicti.
The trial court found accused guilty of raping his 11-yr old daughter and sentenced him to death.
He was also found guilty of attempted rape in the other case, and sentenced to seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum.
HELD:
With regard to the first criminal case, the SC convicted the accused of simple rape, punishable
by reclusion perpetua. In the case at bar, although the Information did properly allege the
complainant's minority, it failed to specify the relationship between the complainant and
accused-appellant. It is not enough that the relationship was subsequently proved during the
trial. Both relationship and minority must be alleged in the Information to qualify the crime as
punishable by death.
With regard to the second criminal case, the SC ruled that the evidence on record cannot
sustain a conviction for attempted rape. There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. Applying the above definition to the facts of the case, it would be
stretching the imagination to construe the act of the accused of throwing the victim to her bed as
an overt act that will "logically and necessarily ripen" into rape. The external act must have a
direct and necessary connection with the crime that the accused intended to commit. Whether
accused indeed intended to commit the crime of rape cannot be seen merely from this particular
act. Thus, accused should be acquitted of the charge of attempted rape.
Accused was convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide, and sentenced to the penalty of
death. The core issue now before us is whether the three (3) killings should be appreciated as
separate aggravating circumstances to warrant the imposition of the penalty of death.
HELD:
The SC found the accused guilty of robbery with homicide, but imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or
homicide/s should be considered as aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating
circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the
enumeration in Article 13 of the same Code regarding mitigating circumstances where there is
specific paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous circumstances.
It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the occasion of
the robbery) would result in an "anomalous situation" where from the standpoint of the gravity of
the offense, robbery with one rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes.
However, the remedy lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in favor of the
offender and no person should be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the
statute.
The accused was convicted of 3 counts of rape (rape of his 12-yr old stepdaughter), and
sentenced to death for each count.
HELD:
The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court. In qualified rape, the concurrence of the
minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must both be alleged and proved with
certainty, otherwise the death penalty cannot be imposed.
Since the allegation of minority (twelve 12 years old) in the Informations was established by the
complainant herself, who is considered competent to testify on her age as it constitutes an
assertion of family tradition, 67 and by the open admission of the accused as well as the
categorical finding of the trial court, then such fact is deemed established with certainty. In this
case, the birth certificate or any other official document proving minority serves no other
purpose than to corroborate the testimonies of the competent witnesses and the categorical
finding of the trial court.
The second circumstance to be established is the relationship of the accused to the complaining
witness. In this case, such a relationship was also shown by the testimonies of witnesses.
Accused was convicted for the crime of rape, aggravated by the fact that the victim was the
minor daughter of the accused. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
HELD:
The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court. In imposing the penalty of death, the trial court
took into consideration the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced. The SC agreed that
it has been duly established that the victim is the daughter of accused-appellant and that she
was only thirteen years old at the time of her sexual assault. Proof of these circumstances are
the marriage contract between accused-appellant and Adeluisa ("Adel") Biato Agos, and the
certificate of live birth of victim indicating therein that she was the second child of accusedappellant and Adeluisa ("Adel") Biato Agos, and that she was born on June 13, 1983. Accusedappellant never disowned this relationship when he was put on the stand during the trial. There
was likewise no competent evidence presented by accused-appellant to rebut the documents
presented by the prosecution.
Accused was found guilty of the crime of rape, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
HELD:
The SC upheld the decision of the lower court. The issues raised by accused-appellant boil
down to a question of the credibility of the complainant's testimony. The SC found the
contentions to be without merit. First. The SC found no reason to reverse the findings of the trial
court that complainant was raped. It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the
testimony of a witness is accorded the highest respect because the trial court had the
opportunity to observe the facial expression, gesture, and voice tone of a witness while
testifying and, therefore, competent to determine whether or not the witness is telling the
truth. Furthermore, the alleged inconsistency is minor and inconsequential in nature and does
not detract from the fact that complainant was raped.
Second. In rape cases, the prosecution is not bound to present witnesses other than
complainant herself, as accused-appellant may be convicted solely on the testimony of
complainant, provided the same is credible, natural, convincing, and otherwise consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things. The testimony of complainant complied with
such standards.
Third. The failure of complainant to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not imply her
submission to accused-appellant's desires. To be sure, it is not required that the victim of rape
resists her assailant unto death. All that is necessary is that the force or intimidation employed
against complainant enabled the assailant to effect sexual penetration.
Fourth. The absence of fresh injuries in complainant's private part does not negate rape as
proof of hymenal lacerations is not an element of rape. Fifth. Accused-appellant's contention
that he and complainant were lovers is not worthy of any consideration at all. He presented no
witness to corroborate his claim. Sixth. While it is true that flight raises the presumption of guilt
on the part of an accused, the converse does not necessarily mean innocence. There is no rule
that, in every instance, the fact that the accused did not flee is a proof of his innocence. It is not
unnatural for a criminal, as in this case, to desist from leaving the place where the crime was
committed to feign innocence.
In the first criminal case, accused was found guilty of the crime of rape, and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death. He was also found guilty of 45 counts of acts of lasciviousness,
there being the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship. He was sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, both of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each of the forty-five (45) cases and to pay the costs of the
suit.
HELD:
The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court. With regard to the credibility of witnesses,
settled is the rule that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of the testimony of witnesses is
entitled to great respect. Unless shown that it has overlooked some facts which would affect the
result of the case, the trial court's factual findings will not be disturbed by the appellate court.
With regard to the defense of alibi, it is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, there must
be proof not only that the accused was at some other place at the time the crime was committed
but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the
alleged crime.
Under Art. 335, par. 7(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, if the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim, the imposable penalty is death. In these cases, the information for rape alleges that the
victim was under 18 years of age at the time she was raped and that accused-appellant is the
common-law spouse of her mother. Her birth certificate was offered as evidence in this case. It
was also proven during the trial that accused-appellant is the common-law spouse of the
victims mother. Considering the foregoing, the SC was constrained to affirm the death sentence
imposed by the trial court on accused-appellant.
Accused was convicted for the crime of rape of a mental retardate, and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death.
HELD:
With regard to the contention of accused that the prosecution failed to prove that force or
intimidation was used against complainant, the SC found the contention to be unmeritorious. To
begin with, under Art. 266-A (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, 34 the crime of
rape may be committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through force,
threat, or intimidation. The force necessary in rape is relative. The intimidation must be judged in
the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime, and
not by any hard and fast rule. It must be stressed that complainant in this case does not
possess the intelligence of an average individual. Indisputably, her mental faculties are different
from those of a fully-functioning adult; hence, the degree of force or intimidation needed to
overwhelm her is less than what it would take to frighten an ordinary woman.
Furthermore, it is erroneous for accused-appellant to contend that no rape was committed
because the prosecution failed to prove that the mental age of the victim was equivalent to a girl
below 12 years old. It must be emphasized that this requirement is necessary if the charge is
statutory rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1(d). In this case, complainant was deprived of reason,
and, under Art. 266-A, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, having sexual intercourse with her,
even if accomplished without the use of force or intimidation, constitutes rape.
However, the trial court erred when it imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant under
Art. 266-B (10) of the RPC. True enough, accused-appellant knew of the mental condition of the
victim prior to and at the time of the incident, as evidenced by his own admission in open court.
Be that as it may, accused-appellant cannot be meted the death penalty. Under Art. 266-B in
relation to Art. 266-A, par. (1), of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, simple rape is
punishable by reclusion perpetua. When rape is committed by an assailant who has knowledge
of the victim's mental retardation, the penalty is increased to death. This circumstance must,
however, be alleged in the information because it is a qualifying circumstance which increases
the penalty and changes the nature of the offense. In this case, while accused-appellant
admitted that he knew complainant to be a mental retardate, this fact was not alleged in the
information. Therefore, even if it was proved, it cannot be appreciated as a qualifying, but only
as a generic aggravating, circumstance. Accordingly, accused-appellant must be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of simple rape.
MARCH 2001
PEOPLE v. ROBERT NUEZ y LAGASCA
G.R. No. 112092. March 1, 2001.
Accused was found guilty of Illegal possession of firearm resulting to the death of the victim and
pursuant to P.D. 1866 in relation to the 1987 Constitution the court sentences the said accused
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and with costs.
HELD:
Appellant was convicted of "illegal possession of firearms resulting to the death of the victim." At
the time of the commission of the crime, the existing jurisprudence was People v. Quijada. The
SC held then that the use of an unlicensed firearm in a killing results in two separate crimes
one for the aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm and two, for homicide or murder. In
the meantime, however, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8294, 27 which lowered the
penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Further, Section 1, third par. of R.A. No. 8294
provides If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use
of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
In the present case, there were four cases filed against appellant which were all separately
tried. Hence, the evidence as to the homicide and frustrated homicide cases were neither
adopted nor presented before the trial court trying the illegal possession case. For this reason,
there is a dearth of evidence on record to support the finding of homicide and/or frustrated
homicide.
The Court held that accordingly, appellant should only be convicted of simple illegal possession
of firearms. The lowered penalties as provided in R.A. No. 8294, being favorable to the
accused, should be applied retroactively.
The trial court found both Pedro Saspa and Rafael Sumiling principally liable for the murder of
Isidro Hayo, and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, together
with its accessory penalties, and ordered them to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount
of P50,000.00.
HELD:
The SC affirmed the trial court's holding that appellants employed superior strength in the
execution of the crime, thus qualifying the killing to murder. When appellants attacked the victim,
they had the advantage of numerical superiority and were carrying high-powered firearms;
whereas the victim was unarmed and utterly defenseless, not to mention that he was taken by
surprise by the swiftness of the assault. Clearly, there was a notorious inequality between the
strength of the victim and his assailants. The Court, however, did not sustain the trial court's
appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of band and ignominy. A band consists of at least
four armed malefactors acting together in the commission of an offense. The prosecution failed
to prove that there were at least four armed men Thelma testified that three of Isidro's
assailants were armed, while Sulpicio did make any declaration as to how many of his son's
attackers were actually armed. Neither did the prosecution prove the existence of ignominy,
which is a circumstance that adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by the
crime. There was no showing that appellants deliberately employed means which would cause
more suffering or humiliation to the victim.
At the time the crime was committed the penalty for death was reclusion temporal in the
maximum period to death. In the absence of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the
penalty should be imposed in its medium period, or reclusion perpetua. The SC found
appellants guilty of the crime of murder, and sentenced them each to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs.
Accused was found guilty of raping his 15-yr old daughter. He was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death.
HELD:
The SC found accused guilty, but sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua instead of death.
The Court said that when a victim of rape says she has been defiled, she says in effect all that
is necessary to show that rape has been inflicted on her and so long as her testimony meets the
test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. As in most rape cases,
accused-appellant assails the credibility of the victim. However, the SC has consistently held
that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of complainant's testimony is entitled to great
weight, absent any showing that some facts were overlooked which, if considered, would affect
the outcome of the case.
Nevertheless, while the guilt of the accused-appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt, the
Court finds the imposition of the death penalty against him unwarranted. The circumstances
under the amendatory provisions of R.A. No. 7659, Section 11, are in the nature of qualifying
circumstances which can not be proved as such unless alleged in the information. Even if such
circumstances are proved, the death penalty can not be imposed where the sane were not
properly alleged in the Information.
However, while the qualifying circumstance of relationship has been alleged in the Information, it
is devoid of any averment on private complainant's minority. Since one of the twin requirements
mentioned, namely, minority, was not alleged in the Information, accused-appellant can neither
be convicted for qualified rape nor could the death penalty be meted upon him because to do so
would be to deprive him of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
Accused was found guilty of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery as charged in the
Information and sentenced to suffer the penalty reclusion perpetua.
HELD:
The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court. With regard to the issue of conspiracy, the SC
held that it was amply and sufficiently proven in this case. Accused-appellants approached the
victim from behind. When accused-appellant Quiambao told Peralta to stab the victim, accusedappellant Peralta yanked the left shoulder of Ramon and immediately stabbed the latter on his
chest. After the stabbing, both accused-appellants fled and were apprehended only after more
than nine (9) years from the filing of the criminal case in court. These acts taken together, are
sufficient to establish the existence of a common design among accused-appellants to commit
the offense charged.
With regard to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the SC also agreed
with the lower court. In crimes against persons, treachery exists when the accused employs,
means, methods, and forms which directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. To rule that treachery
exists in the commission of the crime it must be shown that at the time of the attack, the victim
was not in a position to defend himself and accused-appellants consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods or forms of the attack employed by him. In the instant
case, the victim was stabbed on his chest. While the stab wound appears frontal, it was shown
that accused-appellants came from behind and yanked the victim's shoulder in order to inflict
the fatal blow. The manner of attack was duly proven and the infliction of the stab wound was
the result of a deliberate act. At the time of the fatal attack, the victim was standing in front of
the parlor while waiting for his wife. The victim, at that moment was unaware of what would
befall him and was not given an opportunity to defend himself or retaliate.
Accused was found guilty of raping his 14-yr old daughter, and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death. For humanitarian reasons, however, the trial court recommended that the
DEATH penalty be commuted to RECLUSION PERPETUA.
HELD:
The SC found accused guilty, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. The
concurrence of the two special qualifying circumstances, namely the victim's minority and the
relationship between the victim and the culprit, increases the penalty of rape to one (1) degree,
thus resulting in the imposition of the death penalty. In order to be appreciated as qualifying
circumstances, however, these must be properly pleaded in the indictment. In addition, the
qualifying circumstances should be duly proved during the trial.
The SC held that these requirements were met in this case. The Information sufficiently alleges
that accused-appellant is the father of the victim, and that the latter was fourteen (14) years old
at the time of commission of the rape. These elements, furthermore, were categorically affirmed
by Elizabeth Nardo, the victim's mother and the most competent witness. Moreover, the victims
birth date and her relationship to accused-appellant were shown by her Certificate of
Baptism. This was presented by her mother, Elizabeth, in lieu of her Certificate of Live Birth,
which was destroyed by fire. The baptismal certificate, coupled by her mother's testimony, is
sufficient to establish victims age.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of statutory rape and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Likewise, it found him guilty of three (3) counts of acts of
lasciviousness and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correctional
in its maximum period for each count. It also ordered him to indemnify the private complainant in
the amount of P50,000.00, and P100,000.00 for moral damages.
HELD:
The trial court was correct in finding accused-appellant guilty of three (3) counts of acts of
lasciviousness. The SC took however to its finding that statutory rape was committed by him on
5 June 1993. A thorough evaluation of the records will show that accused-appellant should only
be convicted for acts of lasciviousness and not for consummated rape.
The SC held that absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.
touching of either the labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape;
at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
The SC found accused guilty of 4 counts of acts of lasciviousness, aggravated by obvious
ungratefulness. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant was sentenced to
an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and twenty (20) days of arresto mayor
maximum as minimum, to four (4) years six (6) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional
maximum as maximum, in each count of Acts of Lasciviousness. Accused-appellant was further
directed to pay the private complainant P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P40,000.00 for moral
damages, P20,000.00 for exemplary damages, in each of the four (4) counts of Acts of
Lasciviousness, and to pay the costs.
Accused was found guilty as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
R. A. 7659. The following ordinary aggravating circumstances were present in the commission
of the crime:
1.
Abuse of public office due to the use of his service firearm in the killing;
2.
Use of motor vehicle which facilitated the commission of the crime; and
3.
HELD:
The SC held that with respect to the attendant circumstances, the use of a motor vehicle cannot
be considered as an aggravating circumstance, as the police vehicle used to reach the Sanicas
residence was not used directly or indirectly to facilitate the criminal act.
Neither may the aggravating circumstance of aid of armed men be appreciated in this case. The
trial court found that during the shooting, an armed companion was on board the patrol car
pointing his rifle in the direction of Dejoras. In the first place, this aggravating circumstance
contemplates more than one armed man, as the use of the plural form easily suggests. In the
second place, the requisites of this aggravating circumstance are: 1) that armed men or persons
took part in the commission of the crime, directly or indirectly, and 2) that the accused availed
himself of their aid or relied upon them when the crime was committed. Neither circumstance
was proven present; it is clear from the evidence that the accused-appellant carried out the
killing all by himself and did not rely on his companion for assistance.
The SC also did not agree that the fact that accused-appellant used his service firearm in
shooting Vaflor should be considered as an aggravating circumstance as he took advantage of
his public position. There is authority to the effect that for public position to be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance, the public official must use his influence, prestige and ascendancy
which his office gives him in realizing his purpose. In the absence of proof that advantage was
taken by appellant, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of position could not be properly
appreciated against him.
In view of the absence of aggravating circumstances and the presence of one mitigating
circumstance, the penalty imposed by the trial court should be modified. The penalty for murder
Under Article 248 is reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Article 63, in case of two indivisible
penalties, when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and
there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Hence the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua.
Accused was found guilty of raping a 12-yr old, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Appellant is the common-law husband of the victim's mother.
HELD:
Having examined the entire record, the SC found that the totality of the evidence presented by
the prosecution proved beyond doubt all the elements of rape. Private complainant testified as
to how appellant had carnal knowledge of her. The carnal knowledge took place under
circumstances of violence and intimidation. Her testimony is supported by the results of the
medico-legal examination conducted upon her at the police crime laboratory. Moreover, she
positively pointed to appellant in open court as the person responsible for her defilement.
Against said positive identification, appellant's puerile defense of denial will not hold water, for
he does not even deny that he was with the offended party at the time of the commission of the
crime. Moreover, his attempts to cast ill motive on private complainant or her family for
fabricating the charge of rape against him have no evidentiary weight. It would be most
unnatural for a young and immature girl to fabricate a story of rape by her mother's common-law
spouse; allow a medical examination of her genitalia; and subject herself to a public trial and
possible ridicule, all because her maternal relatives want her mother to separate from her
common-law spouse. Perforce, appellant's conviction must stand.
As to the penalty imposed, the SC held that the trial court correctly sentenced appellant to
reclusion perpetua. Note that the rape complained of in this case took place on May 31, 1990 or
way before the restoration of the death penalty for cases of qualified rape by virtue of R.A. No.
7659. The death penalty law took effect only on December 31, 1993, as per the Courts holding
in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, 569 (1994).
Appellant was convicted of the crime of murder, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
HELD:
The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court. The SC held that both of the accused acted in
concert in the assault on the victim. They had the same purpose and were united in its
execution. Conspiracy exists at the time of the commission of the offense. Their actuation could
only point to the existence of a pre-conceived plan to maim and kill the victim. Where the acts
of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the
perpetrators will be liable as principals.
The SC also held that the acts of appellant indicate that he and Bakunawa had planned the
attack in a manner that would catch the victim unaware. Their move initially was in the guise of
a conciliatory overture. It served to cover their nefarious plot. Even if it was Bakunawa who
inflicted the fatal wound, liability also exists on the part of appellant notwithstanding nonparticipation in every detail in the execution of the crime. The deceptive manner by which the
two accused fatally assaulted the victim shows that they had intended to catch him off guard, to
insure the success of the attack. An unexpected and sudden attack under circumstances which
render the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and
severity of the attack constitutes alevosia.
As treachery attended the killing of the victim, the offense committed by appellant and his coaccused Bakunawa is murder. However, the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength alleged in the information to be attendant cannot
be appreciated, as the elements of the former were not proven, and the latter is deemed
absorbed by treachery.
Accused was found guilty of the crime of murder, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Accused Jamila, on the other hand, was acquitted for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
The SC agreed with appellant that nowhere in the assailed judgment is it shown how the trial
court arrived at its conclusion that the killing of the victim was attended by treachery. There was
absolutely no showing from the testimony of the witness how the attack commenced; no indicia
whether the attack was so sudden and unexpected that it afforded the victim no chance to
defend himself. In the absence of this information, treachery cannot be established from the
circumstances. Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence as clearly as the killing itself. Where the attack was not treacherous, the number of
aggressors would constitute abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superior strength, therefore,
qualifies the killing as murder.
In finding the killing aggravated by evident premeditation, the trial court characterized the
method of attack as deliberately and consciously adopted by the three attackers. For evident
premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be proven: (1) the time when the accused
decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow
the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. In the instant case, however, there is
no showing of the time when appellant and his confederates decided to commit the crime.
Neither is there proof to show how appellant and the other two assailants planned the killing of
the victim. Nor is there any evidence showing how much time elapsed before the plan was
executed. Absent all these, the conclusion by the trial court that evident premeditation qualified
the killing of Delara is devoid of any factual mooring.
With regard to the issue of conspiracy, there was a transparent manifestation of their common
sentiment to inflict harm and injury upon the victim. First, while Rene and Edmund were hacking
and stabbing the victim, appellant was with them, pounding him with a concrete hollow block.
Evidently, appellant was performing overt acts, which directly or indirectly contributed to the
execution of the crime. Second, after the victim somehow managed to fend off his attackers and
flee, all three attackers pursued him.
Clearly, the aforementioned acts point to a common purpose, concert of action, and community
of interest among the assailants. In conspiracy, it is immaterial who inflicted the fatal blows. A
conspirator, no matter how minimal his participation, is as guilty as the principal perpetrator of
the crime.
Accused was convicted of the crime of murder, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
HELD:
The SC affirmed the decision of the lower court. The court found that there was treachery in the
taking of the life of the victim as without any warning, accused-appellant suddenly and
unexpectedly shot the victim in front of his family right in his own home. Neither the victim nor
his family had any opportunity to put up any defense. The mode of attack was executed in such
a manner that retaliation was not possible. The victim did not even have an inkling of the danger
to his life, the attack against him being sudden and unexpected. The prosecution has effectively
shown that the shooting was calculated as to ensure the infliction of the fatal wounds without
giving the victim and his family any opportunity to put up a defense. The qualifying circumstance
of treachery having been likewise proven beyond reasonable doubt, the accused-appellant is
guilty of the crime of murder.
At the time of the commission of the crime in 1995, the penalty for murder was reclusion
perpetua to death. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the SC held that the
trial court correctly sentenced accused-appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused was found guilty of the crime of murder. After considering in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of surrender, the accused was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.
HELD:
The accused admits the killing of the victim but denies any liability by invoking self-defense.
Taking into account the version of the prosecution, the theory of self-defense is not tenable. At
the outset, we mentioned that for self-defense to prosper, all the essential elements thereof
must be adequately proven by the accused. Unlawful aggression, the first of these three
essential elements, presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger
on the life and limb of the person defending himself. Without this element, there can be no
successful invocation of self-defense. When the accused stabbed the victim, the latter and his
companions were conversing and sorting "bulang". They posed no threat or danger to the
accused. If there is any aggression present in this case, it would be that authored by the
accused which resulted in the death of Castillo. Absent the element of unlawful aggression, the
theory of self-defense of the accused collapses. Inevitably, the result would be the conviction of
the accused springing from his own admission that he killed the victim.
Anent the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the SC held that it was duly proven by the
prosecution. In this case, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was established by the
prosecution witness who testified that he and the victim, together with two other companions,
were conversing and sorting "bulang" when the accused suddenly and without provocation
stabbed the victim. The location of the wound indicates that the victim was stabbed by the
accused from the back. After the victim fell to his side, the accused-appellant made a follow-up
thrust. The witness, who was shocked by the suddenness of the attack, was likewise stabbed by
the accused three times.
The SC held that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly appreciated
by the trial court. Prosecution witness SPO4 Patrocinio Abesia himself testified that the mother
of the accused interceded for the latter's surrender, and subsequently, the accused voluntarily
surrendered to him.
All of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the crime of murder, and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
HELD:
With regard to the claim of self-defense of Samudio, he failed to discharge this burden
convincingly for he did not adequately support his allegation of self-defense. No one
corroborated his testimony that the aggression was initiated by the victim. Thus, his testimony is
self-serving. An accused who invokes self-defense has to rely on the strength of his evidence
and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could
not be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the killing.
It is alleged in the Information that the killing was qualified by treachery, evident premeditation,
abuse of superior strength and disregard of respect due to the offended party on account of his
rank. However, the SC held that the trial court failed to make a finding as to the existence of any
of these qualifying circumstances.
In the instant case, treachery cannot be appreciated considering that the only eyewitness to the
actual stabbing, did not see the initial stage and particulars of the attack on the victim. Similarly,
the prosecution failed to establish the attendance of evident premeditation. There was no proof
or showing of (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse
of time between the determination to commit and the execution thereof, to allow the offender to
reflect on the consequence of his act. None of these elements of evident premeditation can be
fairly inferred from the evidence adduced by the prosecution in the case at bar.
Neither can abuse of superior strength be appreciated. Mere superiority in number is not
enough to constitute superior strength. The prosecution did not present any direct proof that
there was a deliberate intent on the part of the accused-appellants to take advantage of the
obvious inequality of force between the victim and the accused-appellants.
The qualifying circumstance of "disregard of respect due to the offended party on account of his
rank, being a barangay captain" alleged in the information is likewise unavailing. The
prosecution failed to establish proof of the specific facts demonstrating that Samudio's act of
killing the victim was deliberately intended to disregard or insult the respect due him on account
of his rank as a barangay captain.
Absent any of the above qualifying circumstances, the crime committed is not murder, but only
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code which is punishable by reclusion
temporal. It appears, however, that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
appreciated in Samudio's favor. To be thus considered, three (3) requisites must be proven,
namely, (a) the offender had not actually been arrested; (b) the offender surrender himself to a
person in authority; and (c) the surrender was voluntary.
The acts of Samudio vis-a-vis those of his co-accused failed to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the presence of conspiracy. Since the sole prosecution witness to the actual killing, did
not see its inception and the details as to how it progressed, the prosecution failed to adduce
sufficient evidence to completely establish the existence of conspiracy among the accused. It
bears stressing that conspiracy must be proved as convincingly and indubitably as the crime
itself. Nonetheless, the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence of conspiracy does not
eliminate any criminal liability on the part of the other accused-appellants. Although they could
not be convicted as a co-principal, they are liable as accomplices.
Accused was found guilty of the crime of murder, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.
HELD:
The SC noted that appellant faults the trial court for its reliance on circumstantial evidence.
However, it is well-settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only
matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Conviction may still
be proper if factual circumstances duly proven by the prosecution constitute an unbroken chain
which lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty to the exclusion of all
others. To support a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the concurrence of the
following requisites is essential: (a) there must be more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inference of guilt is based must be proved; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Even if there is no
eyewitness to the crime, responsibility therefor can be established by the totality of the duly
proven facts that yield an inevitable conclusion consistent with the guilt of the accused.
The offense committed is not murder. Appellant cannot be held liable for the crime of murder as
charged in the information, but only for homicide, which was the offense proved. As observed by
the OSG, there is no evidence as to the manner in which the assault was made or how the
stabbing began and developed. Although the deceased sustained five wounds, some of which
were at the back, this fact by itself does not constitute treachery which would qualify the killing
to murder. There being no eyewitness to the killing or evidence on the mode of attack adopted
by appellant, treachery could not be appreciated in this case as a qualifying circumstance.
Likewise, there is a dearth of evidence to establish evident pre-meditation as either a qualifying
or generic aggravating circumstance. While the witnesses may have testified regarding
incidents prior to the killing, there is no evidence that appellant had ever conceived or
expressed a resolve to kill the victim.
Accused was convicted of three (3) counts of rape for raping his 13-yr old niece. Taking into
account the qualifying circumstance of the minority of the victim and her relationship to accusedappellant, the lower court meted three (3) death penalties pursuant to RA 7659. The trial court
also found accused-appellant guilty of attempted rape, and sentenced him to serve an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum, as
maximum.
HELD:
The SC said that the victims failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make
voluntary her submission to the criminal acts of the accused-appellant. They held that the
"(i)ntimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of
the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it
produces fear fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused
something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened
with death if she reports the incident." The failure to shout or offer resistance was not because
she consented to the deed but because she honestly believed she would be killed if she
shouted or resisted. Such threat is sufficient intimidation as contemplated by our jurisprudence
on rape. And be that as it may, if resistance would nevertheless be futile because of a
continuing intimidation, then offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault as to
make the victim's participation in the sexual act voluntary.
However, the lower court erred in imposing the death penalty. In People v. Ramos 20 the
concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender, being special
qualifying circumstances should be alleged in the information, otherwise, the death penalty
cannot be imposed. In the case at bar, although the prosecution did prove complainant's
minority and relationship to accused-appellant, it failed to implead both minority and relationship
in the four (4) Informations filed against accused-appellant. It is not enough that the relationship
was subsequently proved during the trial. Both relationship and minority must be alleged in the
Information to qualify the crime as punishable by death. To hold otherwise would deny accusedappellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him. Thus, he can only be convicted of simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua.
The imposition of an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal minimum as maximum, in attempted rape is also erroneous. The proper penalty for
rape in the attempted stage should be two (2) degrees lower than the penalty for consummated
rape, or prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum imposable
penalty should be taken from prision mayor in its medium period and the minimum from prision
correccional.
Accused was found guilty for 5 counts of rape, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death for
each count. He was found guilty for raping his 16-yr old niece.
HELD:
The SC found the accused guilty, but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua for each count.
In the case at bench, the trial court apparently relied on the 1st special circumstance introduced
by R.A. 7659, that of minority of the victim and relationship with the offender, in imposing the
death penalty. However, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the
offender should be specifically alleged in the information conformably with the right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Even though the
minority of Marites and her relationship with accused-appellant were proven beyond doubt, the
death penalty cannot be imposed because both of these qualifying circumstances were not
alleged in the information. Therefore, despite the five (5) counts of rape committed by accusedappellant, he cannot be sentenced to the supreme penalty of death. Accordingly, the penalty of
death imposed by the trial court should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The SC held that the trial court likewise correctly imposed the amount of P25,000 for each count
of rape, or a total of P125,000.00, as and by way of exemplary damages. Under Article 2230 of
the New Civil Code, "(I)n criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability
may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances."
In the case at bench, the aggravating circumstances of relationship, dwelling, and, for two of the
charges, nighttime were proven to have attended the commission of the crime. Relationship,
that of uncle and niece, was proven by the testimony of the victim and by the admission of
accused-appellant himself. Dwelling was likewise proven as it was shown that the five incidents
of rape were all committed inside the house of the family of the victim where accused-appellant
was staying as a houseguest. Finally, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime was likewise
proven in two of the five rape incidents as it was shown that accused-appellant waited until late
in the night when the other family members were in deep slumber before consummating his
carnal desire for the victim.
Accused-appellants were found guilty for the crime of murder, and both were sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim.
HELD:
The accused appellants invoke the "equipoise" rule because their guilt had not been established
beyond reasonable doubt. The SC said that it has enumerated the requisites for credible
identification in the case of
People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995) as follows:
5)
1)
the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
2)
3)
4)
the length of time between the crime and the identification; and
6)
The Court held that in their view, these requirements were met. In the instant case, there is no
question that both witnesses had the opportunity to view the incident as it unfolded before them
with a degree of attention that allowed them to take in the important details and recall them
clearly. Moreover, as repeatedly stressed, appellate court should accord to the factual findings
of trial courts and their evaluation great weight and respect concerning the credibility of
witnesses. The conditions of visibility being favorable and these witnesses not appearing to be
biased, the conclusion of trial courts regarding the identity of the malefactors should normally be
accepted.
The SC also held that the trial court did not err in qualifying the killing as murder. There was
treachery in this case since, as testified to by prosecution witness Fernandez, the victim had
already dismissed the appellants after they talked to him. The victim was deliberately allowed to
enjoy a false sense of security. They shot the victim when the latter had his hands raised. The
SC therefore affirmed the ruling of the lower court, but made modifications with the costs to be
paid by the accused.
Accused was found guilty of the crime of murder, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs
HELD:
The SC held that the inconsistencies in Rowena Junio's testimony do not refer to incidental or
collateral matters. The basis of her identification of accused-appellant as the victim's assailant
was precisely her purported familiarity with accused-appellant. She did not pick him out of a
police line-up nor did she provide the police with a description of the assailant. She pointed to
accused-appellant because she allegedly knew him prior to the killing. If the witness was not at
all familiar with accused-appellant, the prosecution's whole case collapses for such familiarity
was its very foundation.
In the face of doubts regarding the familiarity of the witness with the alleged assailant, the
distance of the witness from the scene and the visibility conditions thereat assume greater
significance. The prosecution did not show, however, whether the intensity of the defective lamp
was sufficient to enable the witness to see accused-appellant's face, considering her distance
from the scene.
Accused was found guilty of raping a 12-yr old girl, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
HELD:
Accused assails the credibility of the witness and the supposed inconsistencies in the
testimonies. The SC still affirmed the ruling of the lower court.
First. It is doctrinal that the evaluation by the trial court of the testimony of a witness is accorded
with highest respect because the trial court had the direct and singular opportunity to observe
the facial expression, gesture and tone of voice of a witness while testifying and therefore,
competent to determine whether or not the witness is telling the truth.
Second. The alleged inconsistency between the testimony of Eliza (victim) and Emma, that is,
that the latter testified that Eliza shouted, is trivial and cannot affect the veracity of their
testimonies. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to minor and
insignificant details do not destroy their credibility. Such minor inconsistencies even manifest
truthfulness and candor and erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.
Third. The inconsistencies in Emma's statement before the police authorities and her testimony
in open court cannot detract from Eliza's testimony that she was raped on July 20, 1996 by
accused-appellant. Discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness' affidavit and
testimony in open court do not impair credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and are often
incomplete or inaccurate for lack of or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer.
In any event, we find that Emma's testimony in court sufficiently corroborates that of Eliza on
material points.
Lastly, with or without the medical certificate, the testimony of Eliza, as corroborated by her
sister Emma is sufficient to convict. This Court has ruled that a medical examination of the
victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape; and that a victim's testimony alone if
credible is sufficient to convict the appellant of the crime.
Accused was found guilty of raping a 12-yr old girl, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.
In the Information that was filed, it was indicated that there was abuse of confidence and trust,
the accused being the husband of complainant's half-sister.
HELD:
Accused-appellant maintains that he should only be convicted for acts of lasciviousness
because there was no sexual intercourse. The SC held that it is well-settled that where the
accused tried to insert his penis into his victim's vagina, that was all that was necessary to
commit consummated rape. Full penetration of the victim's genital organ is not required in order
to sustain a conviction for rape. In fact, so long as there was an attempt to insert, even without
rupture of the hymen, rape is considered to have already been consummated. In this case,
undoubtedly, there is no issue as to whether or not there was insertion or penetration which
calls for a fine distinction between mere brushing or "epidermal contact" and actual touching or
sliding into the female organ as enunciated in the case of People v. Campuhan.
The SC found the accused guilty, but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua. Minority and
relationship under the first paragraph are special qualifying circumstances which qualify rape to
warrant the mandatory penalty of death. As such, they must both be specifically pleaded in the
Information and proven during trial. These two circumstances, minority and relationship, must
concur; otherwise, if only one is proven during trial, even if the Information alleged both, the
death penalty cannot be imposed. And, as special qualifying circumstances, the same must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt as the crime itself.
In the case under review, the SC found that evidence is wanting as to the special qualifying
circumstance of minority. The only proof as to the minority of the complainant is her testimony
during direct examination that she was 13 years old and a Grade VI student. No other proof,
was presented by the prosecution to establish complainant's minority at the time of the incident.
Even complainant's mother failed to testify as to her daughter's age on the witness stand.
As to filiation, the Court notes that the circumstance of relationship by affinity within the third civil
degree was properly alleged in the Information which stated that accused-appellant "is the
husband of complainant's half-sister and likewise duly proven during trial. Complainant herself
declared that accused-appellant was the husband of her elder sister. The mother of the
complainant and mother in-law of the accused also testified that accused-appellant is his son-inlaw. Moreover, the accused himself admitted that the victim is his sister-in-law. This
notwithstanding, for failure of the prosecution to establish minority by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, the death penalty cannot be imposed.
Accused was convicted of illegal recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate, and
sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine. She was also convicted for two counts of estafa, and
sentenced to (a) in Criminal Case No. 13999-R, to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of
prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the offended party Joan Merante, in the amount of
P40,000.00 as actual damages, and costs; (b) in Criminal Case No. 14000-R, to six (6) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and
twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the offended party, Nancy
Oidi, in the amount of P21,000.00 as actual damages, and costs.
HELD:
The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are: (1) that the accused
engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of workers as defined under Article 13 (b) or in
any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) that the accused had not
complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with
respect to the requirement to secure a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers,
either locally or overseas; and (3) that the accused committed the unlawful acts against three
(3) or more persons, individually or as a group.
Accused-appellant contends that she was not involved in recruitment but was merely an
employee of a recruitment agency. An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal
recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he
actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. In this case, accused was the one
who informed complainants of job prospects in Korea and the requirements for deployment. She
also received money from them as placement fees. All of the complainants testified that they
personally met accused-appellant and transacted with her regarding the overseas job
placement offers. Complainants parted with their money, evidenced by receipts signed by
accused Cabais and accused Forneas. Thus, accused-appellant actively participated in the
recruitment of the complainants.
Furthermore, accused-appellant did not possess any license to engage in recruitment activities,
as evidenced by a certification from the POEA and the testimony of a representative of said
government agency. Her acts constituted recruitment, and considering that she admittedly had
no license or authority to recruit workers for overseas employment, accused-appellant is guilty
of illegal recruitment. Despite the fact that she was just an ordinary employee of the company,
her criminal liability would still stand for being a conspirator with the corporate officers in
undertaking illegal recruitment activities. Since the recruitment involves three or more persons,
accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment in a large scale punishable under Article 39 of
the Labor Code with life imprisonment and a fine of one hundred thousand pesos.
As to the charges of estafa, accused-appellant contends that she is not liable for the offenses
charged because she did not appropriate for her own use the money given to her by
complainants as placement and passport fees. The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused
defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. From
the foregoing, the fact that the money was appropriated by accused for her own use is not an
element of the crime of estafa. Thus, accused-appellant Cabais' contention under such ground
is untenable. Moreover, accused-appellant misrepresented herself to complainants as one who
can make arrangements for job placements in Korea. Complainants were successfully induced
to part with their money, causing them damage and prejudice. Consequently, accused-appellant
is guilty of estafa.
Facts:
Accused-appellants were found guilty as principals by direct participation of the crime of robbery
with homicide, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They were also found
guilty of illegal possession of firearms, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine
(9) months and eleven (11) days to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days of
prision correctional sic.
HELD:
The Court finds that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the existence of a
conspiracy between accused-appellants and the deceased. In conspiracy, direct proof of a
previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and
manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest. Conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during or after the
commission of the crime. In this case, there were several circumstances immediately before,
during and after the robbery indubitably which show that the perpetrators were one in their
purpose to rob the victim. Where conspiracy is shown, the precise extent of participation of each
accused in the crime is secondary and the act of one may be imputed to all the conspirators.
The SC held that the trial court, therefore, did not err in convicting accused-appellants of
robbery with homicide. Whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence or on the
occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held
guilty as principals for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, although they did not
actually take part in the homicide.
In cases involving illegal possession of firearm, the requisite elements are: (a) the existence of
the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does
not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The latter is a negative fact that
constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession, and it is the duty of the
prosecution not only to allege it but also to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. The Court agrees
with accused-appellants and the Solicitor General that the prosecution in this case failed to
prove the second element.
The SC does not agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that since a paltik is a
homemade gun, is illegally manufactured as recognized in People v. Fajardo, and cannot be
issued a license or permit, it is no longer necessary to prove that it is unlicensed. This appears
to be, at first blush, a very logical proposition. The Court, however, yield to it because Fajardo
did not say that paltiks can in no case be issued a license or a permit, and that proof that a
firearm is a paltik dispenses with proof that it is unlicensed.
Posted by James Mamba at 3:48 AM
Reactions:
I-email ItoBlogThis!Ibahagi sa TwitterIbahagi sa FacebookIbahagi sa Pinterest
ISSUE: Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in applying
R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of alias punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142
HELD: No. The Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity
does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have
held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the
alias must be manifest. The presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account
No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. Thus, Estrada could not
be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua
were also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez,
assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estradas representations to these people were made
in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.
Bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy.
Given the private nature of Estradas act of signing the documents as Jose Velarde related to the opening of the trust account,
the People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. Petition
was denied.
FACTS:
-A series of investigation concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by
the Ombudsman and the compliance and Investigation Staff (CIS) of Anti-Money Laundering Council.
-The OSG wrote AMLC requesting the latters assistance in obtaining more evidence to completely
reveal the financial trail of corruption surrounding the NAIA 3 Project.
-The CIS conducted an intelligence database search on the financial transactions of certain individuals
involved in the award, including Pontaleon Alvarez who had been the chairman of the PBAC Technical
committee, NAIA 3 Project.
-The search revealed that Alvarez maintained 8 bank accounts with 6 different banks.
-AMLC issued resolution whereby the council resolved to authorize the executive director of the AMLC to
sign and verify an application to inquire into and/or examine the deposits or investments of Pantaleon
Alvarez et al., and their related web of accounts wherever theses may be found and to authorize the
AMLC Secretariat to conduct an inquiry into the subject accounts once the RTC-Makati grants the
application to inquire into and/or examine bank accounts of those persons. RTC grants the application.
-Pursuant to the order, CIS proceeded to inquire and examine the deposits, investments and related web
accounts.
-Special Prosecutor of the Ombudsman wrote a letter requesting AMLC to investigate the accounts of
Alvarez et al, which AMLC likewise heeded.
-Again, AMLC filed an application, this time with RTC Manila, to inquire into and/or examine 13 accounts
and 2 related web of accounts allegedly having been used to facilitate corruption in NAIA 3 Project.
-RTC stayed the order but soon after, reinstated the same.
HELD:
-There is no need for a pre existing or pending case in court for violation of the Anti- Money Laundering
Law before a bank inquiry order may be issued by the court. However it does not follow that such order
may be availed of ex-parte. A bank inquiry order, unlike a freeze order can not be issued unless notice is
given to the owners of the account, allowing them the opportunity to contest the issuance of such order.
association.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.
(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.
Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is
the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for
a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.)
The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past
conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act
applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and
their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown
thatmembership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by
overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is
the required proof of a members direct participation. Why
is membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the
organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed
after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing
of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in
accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the
necessary changes having been made.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine
Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of
the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of
Freedom of Expression and Association in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute
and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The
court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is
excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL
SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition
to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be
established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization
purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish
a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt
acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose.Membership is willfully
and knowingly done by overt acts.
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The
Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.
thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute primafacie proof of "the making or
issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ...
for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check."
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the
contrary to overcome the said presumptions.
ISSUE: Whether or not (W/N) BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt.
HELD: No.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust
of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is
not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels
of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest.
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making
and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal
sanctions.
ISSUE: W/N BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract.
HELD: No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful"
contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that
checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day
and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and
therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
ISSUE: W/N it violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: No. Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the
check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there
would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should
punish both the swindler and the swindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude classification of
individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no
unreasonable or arbitrary.
Lozano vs Martinez Digest
Filed Under: Bouncing Check Law, BP 22, Non-imprisonment for Debt, Police Power
Facts:
Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law).
They moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did
not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by
the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law
unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected thus appealed.
Issue:
Held:
1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense
punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to
pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making
of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.
Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is
an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on
deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation
to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will
be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as
a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come
to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial
transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is
shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or
may become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be
deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and
the banking community.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to
the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest.
2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into
lawful contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we
must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial
instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for
money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the
regulatory power of the state.
3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of
the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It
is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check,
since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check
there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal
protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners
posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of the laws. The
clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or
arbitrary. (Lozano vs Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986)
- See more at: http://legalvault.blogspot.com/2014/12/lozano-vs-martinezdigest.html#sthash.0RJtzFRP.dpuf
1. Aclaracion vs Gatmaitan
64 SCRA 131, 135 (May 26 1975)
Facts:
Petitioner was assigned as a temporary stenographer in the Gapan branch of the CFI Nueva
Ecija. After said
appointment, he was employed in the Public Assistance and Claims Adjudication Division of
the Insurance
Commission. After he had ceased to be a court stenographer, the CA required
him to transcribe his stenographic notes in two cases decided by Gapan Court which had
been appealed. Because of his failure to
comply with the resolutions of the CA, he was declared in contempt of the court. Arrested
and incarcerated
until he could submit a complete transcript of his noted in the said cases. Petitioner
contends that to compel
him to transcribe his stenographic notes after he ceased to be a court stenographer would
transgress the rule
against involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime
whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted" (Sec. 14, Art. IV, Bill of Rights, 1972 Constitution).
He was averse to being subjected "to involuntary servitude sans compensation". He
desired to be released from the obligation oftranscribing his notes. (He filed his petition
in forma pauperis).
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners contention is tenable?
Held:
No. Involuntary Servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of
one to another or the condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion, or
imprisonment and against his will, to labor for another,
whether he is paid or not. That situation does not obtain in this case. The traditional mode
of exercising the court's coercive power is to hold the recalcitrant or
negligent stenographer in contempt of court if he does not comply with the order for the
transcription of his notes and imprison him until he obeys the order (Sec. 7, Rule 71, Rules of
Court). Another sanction to compel the transcription is to hold in abeyance the transfer,
promotion, resignation or clearance of a stenographer until he completes the transcription of
his notes. This is provided for in Circular No. 63 of the Secretary of Justice. In the instant
case, Aclaracion transcribed his notes in the Muncal and Paderes cases while he
was an employee of the Insurance Commission. During the time that he made the
transcription, he received his salary as such employee.