Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Robinson vs. Villafuerte 1911
Robinson vs. Villafuerte 1911
MARCELINO
appears thereon, may not be rejected without positive and conclusive proof that their
statements were false; this for the reason that a notarial documents, guaranteed by
public attestation in accordance with the law, must be sustained in full force and effect
so long as he who impugns it does not present strong, complete, and conclusive proof
of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaw or defect provided against by law.
3. ATTORNEY-AT-LAW; INTERVENTION BY ONE NOT AN
AUTHORIZED PRACTICING ATTORNEY. There are no legal provisions
authorizing a private person to intervene at the hearing of a suit, even though he be a
clerk for the attorneys of one of the litigants, if he does not process the qualifications
of a practicing attorney, and is not one of the parties interested in the litigation; his
intervention was improperly allowed, even though an attorney acting in place of
original counsel was present at the hearing; therefore, upon objection being raised to
the presence of the said private person and to his intervention in the suit and to the
performance by him of acts incumbent upon an attorney-at-law, the judge should have
sustained such objection by the attorney for the opponents and should have refused to
allow the private party to conduct the trial.
4. ID.; ID.; INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES. Even though the
questions addressed by a private person to the witnesses of the litigating party whom
he endeavored to represent be considered as stricken out, yet no reason, based upon
any positive prohibition of the law is submitted to authorize the striking out of the
answers given by the witnesses interrogated, even though such answers may have
been provoked by questions by a person not authorized by law, and there is much less
reason for rejecting the cross-questions put to the same witnesses by the attorney for
the other side, and the answers thereto.
5. ID.; ID.; INTRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. The
exhibition of documents of probative character by a person who does not possess the
qualifications of an attorney-at-law may not be held to be improper when such
exhibition was authorized by an attorney who was the legal representative of the
interested party and was present at the hearing, and who, after the attorney for the
other side had consented that the documents exhibited should continue to be attached
to the record, proceeded to discuss and assails their authenticity and validity and
concluded by asking that the said documents, as well as the inscription of some of
them, be declared null and void. The intervention of the said person, unauthorized by
law, can not be considered to have in any manner prejudiced the rights and interests of
the adverse party, for the judgment afterwards rendered in the case was a result of the
merits of the evidence, as a whole, adduced by the party in whose favor it was
pronounced, as well as a result of the inefficacy and worthlessness of the testimony
Copyright 1994-2009
DECISION
TORRES, J :
p
On April 30, 1908, W. W. Robinson entered suit in the Court of First Instance
of Tayabas against Marcelino Villafuerte y Raola, alleging as a first cause of action:
That the plaintiff was engaged, in the city of Manila and at the time specified further
on, in the importation and sale of flour and other products from abroad, with an office
in the city of Manila, a business which he still continued, through the agency of Castle
Brothers, Wolf & Sons, established therein; that the defendant, a resident of Lucena,
Tayabas, by an instrument duly executed on October 19, 1906, by his attorney in fact
and legal representative, Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, who was fully empowered and
authorized for the purpose, and ratified on the same date before the notary public of
Manila, D. R. Williams, acknowledged and confessed that he owed the plaintiff the
net sum of P3,852.50; that by the said instrument duly executed the defendant bound
and pledged himself to pay to the plaintiff the said sum of P3,852.50 in four monthly
installments from that date, at the rate of P1,000 for each of the first three installments
and P852.50 for the last one, and likewise the interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent
per annum, to be adjusted and paid at the time of paying each of the installments
fixed; that in the said instrument the defendant moreover bound himself to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P500 for costs and expenses, in case the latter should recur to
judicial process for the collection of the aforementioned debt; and that, as security for
the payment of the said debt, of the interest thereon and of the amount for costs and
expenses, the defendant voluntarily executed, by means of the said instrument and in
favor of the plaintiff, a special mortgage upon the properties of his absolute ownership
and control, which are:
A., p. 72, back. A rural estate, No. 433, consisting of land planted in coconut
trees, in the barrio of Dumacaa of the municipality of Lucena, and containing an area
of 2 hectares, 57 ares, and 73 centares.
B., p. 73. A rural estate, No. 434, consisting of coconut land in the barrio of
Canlorang Mayao, Lucena, 2 hectare, 4 ares, and 78 centares in area.
C., p. 73. A rural estate, No 435, consisting of unirrigated land containing
Copyright 1994-2009
1,200 coconut trees, in the same barrio of Lucena, and with and are of 7 hectares, 81
ares, and 4 centares.
D., p. 74. A rural estate, No 436, consisting of coconut land containing 700
coconut trees, in the barrio of Silangan Mayao, Lucena, and with and area of 1 hectare
and 84 centares.
E., p. 74. back. A rural estate, No 438, consisting of land planted with 300
coconut trees, in the barrio of Cotta, Lucena, and measuring 52 ares and 66 centares in
area.
F., p. 75. A rural estate, No. 439, consisting of coconut land containing 500
coconut trees, in the same barrio and pueblo, with an area of 98 ares and 66 centares.
G., p. 75, back. A rural estate, No. 440, consisting of coconut land containing
800 coconut trees, in the same barrio and pueblo, with an area of 36 ares and 5
centares.
H., p. 75, back. A rural estate, No. 441, consisting of coconut land containing
300 coconut trees, in the same barrio and pueblo, measuring 50 ares and 73 centares.
I., p. 73. A rural estate, No. 914, consisting of improved land, planted with
1,000 coconut trees situated in the barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena, of 7 hectares, 12 ares,
and 60 centares in area.
J., p. 75. A rural estate, No. 915, consisting of improved land, planted with 100
coconut trees and situated in the barrio Cotta, Lucena, of 93 ares and 22 centares in
area.
K., p. 79. A rural estate, No. 916, consisting of improved land, planted with
200 coconut trees and situated in the same barrio and pueblo, of 13 ares and 4 centares
in area.
The respective bounderies of each one of the estates above enumerated were
set fourth in the said instrument of mortgage, which was duly inscribed in the property
registry of Tayabas. This deed does not appear to have been canceled, and constitutes
an encumbrance on the properties described in favor of the plaintiff. It was stated in
the instrument referred to, that the liability of the property mortgaged was distributed
in the following manner:
The estate described under letter A responded for
Copyright 1994-2009
P875.00
240.00
200.00
170.00
122.50
190.00
320.00
290.00
1,475.00
300.00
170.00
4,352.50
No. 12, p. 76. Estate No. 915, volume 106 general register; an improved piece
of land, 93 ares and 22 centares in area, containing 800 coconut trees and situated in
the barrio of Cotta, Lucena.
No. 13, p. 79. Estate No. 916, volume 106 general register; an improved piece
of land, 13 ares and 4 centares in area, containing 200 coconut trees and situated in
the same barrio and pueblo.
No. 14, p. 127. Estate No. 932, volume 106 general register; an improved piece
of coconut land, 2 hectares, 79 ares, and 49 centares in area, containing 2,000 coconut
trees and located in the barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena.
The respective boundaries of each of the estates above enumerate were set
forth in the said instrument of mortgage, which was duly inscribed in the property
registry of Tayabas, and does not appear to have been cancelled, and constitutes an
encumbrance on the properties described, in favor of the plaintiff. It was stated, in the
instrument referred to, that the liability of the property mortgaged was distributed in
the following manner:
The estate described under No. 1 responded for
P800 of the debt and for the sum of P90
as costs
Estate No. 2, liability P420, costs P40
Estate No. 3, liability P420, costs P40
Estate No. 4, liability P120, costs P40
Estate No. 5, liability P100, costs P30
Estate No. 6, liability P100, costs P30
Estate No. 7, liability P120, costs P40
Estate No. 8, liability P110, costs P40
Estate No. 9, liability P110, costs P40
Estate No. 10, liability P110, cost P40
Estate No. 11, liability P80, costs P25
Estate No. 12, liability P80, costs P25
Estate No. 13, liability P90, costs P30
Estate No. 14, liability P900, costs P90
Total
P890.00
460.00
460.00
160.00
130.50
130.00
160.00
150.00
150.00
150.00
105.00
150.00
120.00
999.00
4,160.00
That the aforementioned mortgage was executed as security for the payment to
the plaintiff of the sum or sums which the defendant might owe him by reason of the
Copyright 1994-2009
said credit, which was granted under the following terms and conditions:
1. That the said credit should not exceed the sum of P3,560 and was granted
for the period of six months from the 20th of November, 1906, and defendant was to
make use of it in taking flour from the plaintiff's warehouse, at current prices, by
means of written duebills or orders signed by the defendant or by his attorney in fact.
2. That the said written duebills or orders should be paid within thirty days
from their date, and it was stipulated that the amount or value of each one of them
should bear an annual interest of 8 per cent from the date of their maturity, if not paid
before.
3. That total amount of what the defendant might be owing, by reason of the
said credit, should be settled and entirely paid, together with the interest thereon, by
the 20th of May, 1907, on which date all the orders or duebills issued by the defendant
against the said credit should be considered as matured, even though the extension
above mentioned should not have expired.
4. That it should be optional be optical on the part of the plaintiff to honor
the duebills or orders which the defendant Marcelino Villafuerte might issue against
the said credit, in the event that the latter should fail to pay the amount of his previous
duebills or orders at the time they should respectively fall due, or should fail to
comply with and observe any of the conditions and stipulations contained in the said
instrument of October 19, 1906, ratified before notary Williams; that the defendant
should be bound to pay to the plaintiff P600, in case of litigation, and also to pay all
the expenses that might be occasioned by the execution of the said instrument of
December 21, 1906, those of its inscription in the registry, cancellation, and release,
as well as the expenses incurred by the plaintiff on account of the instrument of
October 19, 1906, referred to in the first cause of action, together with those of its
inscription in the registry; provided, moreover, that the aforementioned instrument of
December 21, 1906, should be retroactive in its effect from the 20th of November of
the same year, and that the flour which the said defendant, through his attorney in fact,
Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, had withdrawn from the plaintiff's warehouses since the
20th of November, 1906, should be include in the credit opened; that the estates
described under the Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13, bore a first mortgage in
favor of the plaintiff executed as security for the obligation, the fulfillment of which is
demanded in the first cause of action; that, by clause 14 of the said instrument of
December 21, 1906, it was stipulated that in case W. W. Robinson, the plaintiff,
should have to institute foreclosure proceedings against the property above described,
either by reason of the mortgage hereby placed on the same, or of the obligation
Copyright 1994-2009
affecting the said property, in his favor, by virtue of the said instrument of October 19
of the present year, Robinson should be entitled to take charge of the management of
all or any of the said realities until they should be sold, and to collect their revenues,
rentals, fruits, and products for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of the
judgment; that, by clause 15 of the said instrument of December 21, 1906, it was also
stipulated that it was expressly covenanted that, in case Robinson should have to
proceed judicial against the property therein mentioned in order to collect any amount
to the payment of which they were subject, all the orders or duebills issued on account
of the credit granted in the said instrument should be considered as matured and
payable, and Robinson should be entitled forthwith to demand the payment of any
balance found to be due him by Marcelino Villafuerte y Raola, with the privilege of
levying upon all or any of the realities comprised with the mortgage mentioned in the
said instrument; that the amount credited for the expenses referred to in No. 7 of the
fifth paragraph of this cause of action reached P174.95; that the defendant, availing
himself of the credit granted in the aforementioned instrument of December 21, 1906,
took and withdrew from the plaintiff's warehouses, on different dates between the
20th of November and the 19th of December, 1906, inclusive, various quantities of
flour, the total value of which amounted to P5,588.15; that the defendant had not paid
any part of this amount, except the sum of P375.00, and was owing a balance of
P5,213.15; that at the time of the complaint the said defendant owed the plaintiff the
sums of P174.95 and P5,213.15, in addition to P503.79 as interest due up to the date
of the complaint; that the plaintiff was then the legal owner of the mortgage above
referred to, and that none of the sums mentioned nor any part thereof had been paid to
him: wherefore the plaintiff asked that judgment be rendered in his favor against the
defendant, for the following amounts: (1) For the sum of P3,302.50, the principal
demanded in the first course of action, and interest thereon at 8 per cent per annum
from date until its payment; (2) for the sum of P385.57, as interest due on the
principal mentioned in the preceding paragraph and remaining unpaid, and, in
addition, the interest on this sum at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of
the complaint until paid; (3) for the sum of P5,213.15, the amount of the debt claimed
in the second cause of action, together with the interest thereon at the rate of 8 per
cent per annum from date until it's payment; (4) for the sum of P503.79, the interest
due on the principal mentioned in the preceding paragraph, with interest thereon at 6
per cent per annum from date until payment; (5) for the sum of P174.95, claimed in
paragraph 9 of the second cause of action, with interest thereon at 6 per cent per
annum from the date of the complaint until payment; and, (6) for the sum of 1,000 for
costs and attorney's fees.
The plaintiff further prayed that an order be issued directing the delivery to the
Copyright 1994-2009
plaintiff of the properties described in the complaint, in order that he might administer
them during the course of this suit and until they should ultimately be sold, and
authorizing him to collect and receive the revenues, rentals, fruits, and other products
of the said estates and to retain them in his possession in order to satisfy the judgment
that would be rendered in this case, and that in case the said judgment be not satisfied
thereby, the sale of the said properties be ordered and the proceeds thereof be applied
to the purpose.
The defendant, in his answer, made a general and specific denial of each and
all of the allegations of the plaintiff for each and all of the actions instituted by him in
each and all of the paragraphs of the complaint, and as a special defense, and in his
crosscomplaint, alleged: That the defendant did not execute, consent to, nor authorize
the execution of a power of attorney of any kind whatsoever in favor of Vicente
Marcelo Concepcion, empowering the latter to mortgage, pledge, or otherwise dispose
of, to the plaintiff or to any person whatever, any of the properties mentioned in the
complaint, nor to accept from and open with the plaintiff any credit nor establish with
him any business in flour; nor execute any power of attorney nor grant any authority
whatever in favor of the said Concepcion so that the latter might represent him and
accept in his name credit, or moneys whatsoever from any person; nor dispose of,
mortgage, or encumber any of the properties described in the complaint; that the
defendant received no sum whatever from the plaintiff nor was he in the latter's debt
for the amount claimed in the complaint, nor for any other sum of money; that he did
not give his consent to all of to any one of the mortgages alleged in the complaint, and
that all the said mortgages on the properties therein mentioned were founded on a
supposed power of attorney said to have been executed by the defendant in favor of
Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, which power of attorney was fictitious, false,
fraudulent, null and void, that it was not executed by the defendant, nor did the latter
intervene therein and that the said power of attorney had no true reason for existence;
wherefore the defendant asked that judgment be rendered absolving him from the
complaint with the costs against the plaintiff, by annulling each and all of the
mortgages alleged in the complaint and the inscription of each of them in the office of
the register of property of Tayabas, and by ordering the cancellation of all the
inscriptions of the said mortgages and encumbrances of the aforementioned
properties.
The plaintiff, in answering to the counter complaint, set up a general and
specific denial of each and all of the allegations of the defendant with respect to each
and all of the actions brought by him in each and all of the paragraphs of the counter
complaint, and prayed that judgment be pronounced in his favor, and against the
Copyright 1994-2009
10
11
certain sums specified in the said instruments on account of their not having been paid
within the periods therein stipulated, and consequently the real properties offered as
security for the solvency of the debts contracted by the debtor are duly liable for the
satisfaction of the same; and although the credit of P3,852.50, the value of the flour
furnished to Camilio C. Gomez, in account with the defendant, and referred to in the
instrument lettered A, was to have been paid in four installments from October 19,
1906, at the rate of P1,000 in each one of the three first months and P852.50 in the
fourth and last month, yet since the debtor, notwithstanding the demands made upon
him, did not comply with his obligation nor pay his debt in conformity with the tenor
of the said instrument, letter A, for he only paid the creditor the sum of P550 delivered
partially on different dates, the default of payment of any of the installments agreed
upon produces the effect that all of these must be deemed to have matured and entitles
the creditor to demand the payment of his entire credit and to proceed against the
mortgaged properties for the purpose of collecting his credit, which amounts to
P3,302.50, after the deduction of the said P550 from the principal, with the interest
due from the 6th of December, 1906, amounting to P385.57.
With respect to the credit mentioned in the instrument, Exhibit B, and granted
by the plaintiff to the defendant Villafuerte under agreement that the latter should
make use of the said credit by taking flour from the creditor's warehouse by means of
written duebills or orders signed by the debtor, or his attorney in fact, under condition
that the value or amount of the said duebills should be paid within thirty days from
their date and that these acknowledgments of debts should bear interest of 8 per cent
per annum from the date of their maturity, it was also a condition that the aforesaid
instrument should be deemed to be retroactive in its effect, from November 20, 1906,
that the quantities of flour which were taken from the plaintiff's warehouse since the
said November 20, 1906, should be considered as included, and that the total amount
of whatever the defendant might owe, by reason of the credit mentioned together with
the interest thereon, should be settled and entirely paid on May 20, 1907, on which
date all the orders or duebills issued against the said credit should be deemed to have
matured, even though the thirty days' delay stipulated should not have expired.
In view of the fact that the defendant succeeded in withdrawing flour to the
value of P5,078.15, without his having paid the amount due therefor, except P375, it
can not be denied that there still remains a balance to be paid of P4,703.15 (pp. 5 and
88 of the record).
In the account, Exhibit E, there appears a statement of the sacks of flour which
were taken on account of the said credit by means of the nine duebills, Exhibit F,
attached to the aforementioned account, in which it also appears that the value of the
Copyright 1994-2009
12
13
that he had executed it freely and voluntarily and exhibited for the purpose his cedula,
No. 453963, issued in Lucena, Tayabas, on January 15, 1906.
In order to establish the conclusion, as the logical result of the evidence, that
the said two notaries, falsely, and entirely irrespective of the truth, issued the
certificates which appear under their respective signatures and seals at the foot of the
powers of attorney, letters C and D, it is not sufficient to prove, by means of the
testimony of witnesses, (mostly relatives) and by unauthenticated documents, that on
the dates of the execution of the powers of attorney the persons executing them was
not here in Manila, where the instruments were certified to, but in Lucena, Tayabas;
clear, strong, and irrefutable proof must be adduced to prove that the said notaries
could not have averred that the said person was actually in their presence, that they
heard him ratify the contents of the respective documents, and could have certified to
the number of his cedula, the only one exhibited to both notaries, without having
ostensibly perverted the truth. The defendant himself, who averred that he was in
Lucena on July 11, 1906, the date of the first power of attorney, said that he was not
sure whether on October 29 of the same year, the date of the second, he was in the
said pueblo or in this city of Manila.
Public instruments authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official,
with the formalities required by law, are evidence, even against a third person, of the
fact which gives rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. They shall also be
evidence against the contracting parties and their legal representatives with regard to
the declarations the former may have therein. (Arts. 1216 and 1218, Civil Code.)
"The force of proof of depositions of witnesses shall be weighed by the
courts in accordance with the provisions of the law of civil procedure, taking
care to avoid that, by the simple coincidence of some depositions, unless their
truthfulness be evident, the affairs may be finally decided in which instruments,
private documents, or any basis of written evidence are usually made use of."
(Art. 1248, Civil Code.)
The defendant debtor having been requested by letter, in the beginning of the
year 1907, to pay his debt, were it true that he had not contracted the obligations
contained in the instruments lettered A and B, nor executed in favor of Vicente
Marcelo the powers of attorney lettered C and D, would have at that time made the
proper investigations and taken the necessary steps for the annulment or invalidation
of the said instruments. The defendant did not even attempt to do anything of the kind,
and we do not find any just reason nor any legal ground whatever to warrant a
discussion of the conclusion arrived at by the evidence presented in this suit.
Copyright 1994-2009
14
Were it true that on the dates of the 11th of July and the 29th of October, 1906,
the defendant Villafuerte was in Lucena, Tayabas, and not in Manila, it is not
understood how two notaries who attested that they personally knew him could have
certified that, on the respective dates aforementioned, the said defendant appeared in
person before them, ratified the instrument of power of attorney which he had
executed, and, to identify his personality, exhibited to the said notaries his certificate
of registration, the only one and the same one which he presented at each of his
appearances on the said dates. Without proof, nor rational, acceptable explanation, it
is impossible to believe that the personal certificate of registration, which identifies a
citizen, was for some four months in the possession of another person residing in a
distant place. It was not proved in a satisfactory manner at the trial how or why the
said cedula, or registration certificate, came to remain for so long a time in the
possession of the Chinaman Sy Chuy Chim or of Vicente Marcelo, as averred by the
defendant or his counsel, and under this supposition, so strange, anomalous, and out
of the ordinary rule that every citizen should necessarily keep his certificate of
identification in his possession, no explanation whatever was given by the defendant's
counsel as to the purpose for which the defendant parted with his cedula and sent it to
either the said Chinaman or Marcelo. The Chinaman was not examined in this
litigation and the attorney in fact, Marcelo, denied that he had received the said cedula
sent by his constituent. So that for the reasons hereinbefore stated, it is evident that the
defendant Villafuerte personally exhibited the said cedula to the two aforementioned
notaries, on his ratification of the respective instrument of power of attorney before
each one of them, and it is not permissible to conclude that the instruments of power
of attorney executed by the defendant, as well as the certifications subscribed by the
notaries Lara and Williams, are false, because of the absolute absence of proof as a
foundation for such a charge; for a notarial document, guaranteed by public attestation
in accordance with the law, must be sustained in full force and affect so long as he
who impugns it shall not have presented strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its
falsity or nullity on account of some flaw or detect provided against by law.
Although the documents exhibited by the defendant's counsel could not, for
lack of proof of their authenticity, destroy or impair the value and force of the notarial
documents or instruments on which the plaintiff's claim is based, it is, however, to be
noted that Pedro Cantero, whose signature appears attached to the papers found on
pages 159, 162, and 170, of the record, was not examined either, even for the purpose
of identifying his signature, he being a Spaniard and an attorney it is not possible to
believe that he wrote the aforementioned documents in the form and style in which
they appear to have been drawn up; wherefore, on account of these circumstances, it is
reasonable to presume that the documents of pages 159 and 170, and the note of page
Copyright 1994-2009
15
16
witnesses and the presentation of documents of various kinds exhibited at the trial be
stricken out for the reason that they were made by a person who was neither a party to
the suit nor counsel for the plaintiff, yet we do not find any reason, based upon any
positive prohibition of the law, to authorize the striking out to the answers given by
the witnesses interrogated by Lacalle, even though the said answers may have been
evoked by questions addressed by a person not authorized by law, and there is much
less reason for rejecting the cross-questions addressed to the same witnesses by the
defendant's attorney, and the answers thereto.
Although the presentation of the documents which support the claims of the
plaintiff party be deemed to be improper, on account of their having been made by a
person who had not the qualifications of a practicing attorney it is nevertheless true
that their presentation was authorized by the attorney Alvarez and the documents
exhibited continued to be united to the record and were not stricken out therefrom on
motion by the other side, but, on the contrary, the attorney for the defendant or his
counsel discussed the authenticity and validity of the said documents, made
allegations against the same and concluded by asking that these documents, and also
the inscription of those designated under letters A and B, be declared null and void.
From the preceding statements it is concluded that the intervention of Jose
Moreno Lacalle in the present suit has in no manner prejudiced the rights and interests
of the defendant and that, if judgment was rendered against him and in favor of the
plaintiff, it was in consequence of the merits of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff
and of the inefficacy and worthlessness of the testimony given by the defendant.
If the defendant Marcelino Villafuerte had presented substantial, strong and
convincing evidence of the falsity of the two powers of attorney executed in favor of
Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, the plaintiff's documentary evidence would have been
totally invalidated and annulled, and this suit would have had a different ending.
For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, to affirm the judgment
appealed from, as we hereby do, with the costs against the appellant, and in
consequence thereof we acquit the plaintiff from the cross complaint relative to the
declaration of nullity of the mortgages and inscriptions, as requested by the defendant.
The first day of the term of court immediately following the date on which the
fulfillment of this judgment is ordered shall be set for the payment of the amounts due
and the foreclosure of the said mortgages. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
Copyright 1994-2009
17