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John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008)
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008)
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
No. 061164
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[January 8, 2008]
It is so ordered.
No. 061164
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[January 8, 2008]
1 In
4 In
5 The majority points out quite rightly, ante, at 8, that the doctrine of
stare decisis has special force in statutory cases. See Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172173 (1989). But the doctrine
should not prevent us from acknowledging when we have already
overruled a prior case, even if we failed to say so explicitly at the time.
In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U. S. 466 (2004), for example, we explained that
in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U. S. 484 (1973), we
had overruled so much of Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U. S. 188 (1948), as
found that the habeas petitioners presence within the territorial reach
of the district court was a jurisdictional prerequisite. Braden held,
contrary to Ahrens, that a prisoners presence within the district courts
territorial reach was not an inflexible jurisdictional rule, 410 U. S., at
500. Braden nowhere stated that it was overruling Ahrens, although
Justice Rehnquist began his dissent by noting: Today the Court
overrules Ahrens v. Clark. 410 U. S., at 502. Thirty years later we
acknowledged in Rasul what was by then clear: Ahrens was no longer
good law. 542 U. S., at 478479, and n. 9.
Moreover, the logic of the special force of stare decisis in the statu
tory context is that Congress remains free to alter what we have done,
Patterson, 491 U. S., at 172173. But the amendment of an obscure
statutory provision is not a high priority for a busy Congress, and we
should remain mindful that enactment of legislation is by no means a
cost-free enterprise.
6 See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897)
(It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past).
7 The majority does gesture toward an application of Irwin, contend
ing that even if Irwins rule is apposite, the presumption of congres
sional intent to allow equitable tolling is rebutted by this Courts
definitive earlier interpretation of 2501, ante, at 7. But the major
itys application of the Irwin rule is implausible, since Irwin itself
compared the language of 2501 with the limitations language of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and found that the comparison did
not reveal a different congressional intent with respect to the availabil
ity of equitable tolling, 498 U. S., at 95.
No. 061164
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[January 8, 2008]