Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc. (2015)
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc. (2015)
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I,
II, and III, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, BREYER, and ALITO,
JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IV, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. SOTOMAYOR, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY, GINSBURG, and KAGAN,
JJ., joined.
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question whether the Boren Amendment could be privately enforced was unsettled at the time of 30(A)s 1989
amendmentso that if Congress was aware of the parallel
(which is highly doubtful) the course that awareness
would have prompted (if any) would not have been legislative silence but rather express specification of the availability of private enforcement (if that was what Congress
intended).
Finally, the dissent speaks as though we leave these
plaintiffs with no resort. That is not the case. Their relief
must be sought initially through the Secretary rather than
through the courts. The dissents complaint that the
sanction available to the Secretary (the cut-off of funding)
is too massive to be a realistic source of relief seems to us
mistaken. We doubt that the Secretarys notice to a
State that its compensation scheme is inadequate will be
ignored.
IV
The last possible source of a cause of action for respondents is the Medicaid Act itself. They do not claim that,
and rightly so. Section 30(A) lacks the sort of rightscreating language needed to imply a private right of action. Sandoval, supra at 286287. It is phrased as a
directive to the federal agency charged with approving
state Medicaid plans, not as a conferral of the right to sue
upon the beneficiaries of the States decision to participate
in Medicaid. The Act says that the Secretary shall approve any plan which fulfills the conditions specified in
subsection (a), the subsection that includes 30(A). 42
U. S. C. 1396a(b). We have held that such language
reveals no congressional intent to create a private right of
action. Sandoval, supra at 289; see also Universities
Research Assn., Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U. S. 754, 772 (1981).
And again, the explicitly conferred means of enforcing
compliance with 30(A) by the Secretarys withholding
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the
Court
CALIA
, J.
Opinion of S
Opinion of BREYER, J.
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Opinion of BREYER, J.
Opinion of BREYER, J.
Procedure Act (APA) whenever a waiver program is renewed or can seek new agency rulemaking); Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U. S. 221, 230,
n. 4, 231 (1986) (APA challenge to the Secretary of Commerces failure to act).
I recognize that the law may give the federal agency
broad discretionary authority to decide when and how to
exercise or to enforce statutes and rules. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U. S. 497, 527 (2007). As a result, it may
be difficult for respondents to prevail on an APA claim
unless it stems from an agencys particularly egregious
failure to act. But, if that is so, it is because Congress
decided to vest broad discretion in the agency to interpret
and to enforce 30(A). I see no reason for this Court to
circumvent that congressional determination by allowing
this action to proceed.
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(1985).
Thus, even though the Court is correct that it is somewhat misleading to speak of an implied right of action
contained in the Supremacy Clause, ante, at 6, that does
not mean that parties may not enforce the Supremacy
Clause by bringing suit to enjoin preempted state action.
As the Court also recognizes, we have long held that
federal courts may in some circumstances grant injunctive
relief against state officers who are violating, or planning
to violate, federal law. Ante, at 5.
B
Most important for purposes of this case is not the mere
existence of this equitable authority, but the fact that it is
exceedingly well establishedsupported, as the Court
puts it, by a long history. Ante, at 6. Congress may, if it
so chooses, either expressly or implicitly preclude Ex parte
Young enforcement actions with respect to a particular
statute or category of lawsuit. See, e.g., 28 U. S. C. 1341
(prohibiting federal judicial restraints on the collection of
state taxes); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S.
44, 7576 (1996) (comprehensive alternative remedial
scheme can establish Congress intent to foreclose Ex parte
Young actions). But because Congress is undoubtedly
aware of the federal courts long-established practice of
enjoining preempted state action, it should generally be
presumed to contemplate such enforcement unless it
affirmatively manifests a contrary intent. Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable
inference, restricts the courts jurisdiction in equity, the
full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395, 398
(1946).
In this respect, equitable preemption actions differ from
suits brought by plaintiffs invoking 42 U. S. C. 1983 or an
implied right of action to enforce a federal statute. Suits
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* That is not to say that the Court of Appeals in this case necessarily
applied 30(A) correctly. Indeed, there are good reasons to think the
court construed 30(A) to impose an overly stringent obligation on the
States. While the Ninth Circuit has understood 30(A) to compel
States to rely on responsible cost studies, and to reimburse for services at rates that approximate the cost of quality care provided
efficiently and economically, Orthopaedic Hospital v. Belshe, 103 F. 3d
1491, 1496 (1997), other courts have read 30(A) to require only that
rates be high enough to ensure that services are available to Medicaid
participants. See Pennsylvania Pharmacists Assn. v. Houstoun, 283
F. 3d 531, 538 (CA3 2002); Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v.
Hood, 235 F. 3d 908, 928929 (CA5 2000); Methodist Hospitals, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 91 F. 3d 1026, 1030 (CA7 1996). This Court declined to grant
certiorari to address whether the Ninth Circuits reading of 30(A) is
correct. See 573 U. S. ___ (2014). But JUSTICE BREYER, in his concurrence, appears to mistake that question about the merits of the Ninth
Circuits standard for the question this Court actually granted certiorari to addressthat is, whether 30 is judicially enforceable at all.
See ante, at 34 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). To answer that question, one need only recognize, as JUSTICE
BREYER does, that federal courts have long become accustomed to
reviewing for reasonableness or constitutionality the rate-setting
determinations made by agencies. Ante, at 3. A private party who
invokes the jurisdiction of the federal courts in order to enjoin a state
agencys implementation of rates that are so unreasonably low as to
violate 30(A) seeks a determination of exactly this sort.
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*
*
*
In sum, far from identifying a carefully crafted . . .
remedial scheme demonstrating that Congress intended
to foreclose Ex parte Young enforcement of 30(A), Seminole Tribe, 517 U. S., at 7374, the Court points only to
two provisions.
The first is 1396c, an agencyenforcement provision that, given our precedent, cannot
preclude private actions. The second is 30(A) itself,
which, while perhaps broad, cannot be understood to manifest congressional intent to preclude judicial involvement.
The Courts error today has very real consequences.
Previously, a State that set reimbursement rates so low
that providers were unwilling to furnish a covered service
for those who need it could be compelled by those affected
to respect the obligation imposed by 30(A). Now, it must
suffice that a federal agency, with many programs to
oversee, has authority to address such violations through
the drastic and often counterproductive measure of withholding the funds that pay for such services. Because a
faithful application of our precedents would have led to a
contrary result, I respectfully dissent.