Professional Documents
Culture Documents
G.R. No. 194948 September 2, 2013 People of The Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, Freddy Salonga Y Afiado, Accused-Appellant
G.R. No. 194948 September 2, 2013 People of The Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, Freddy Salonga Y Afiado, Accused-Appellant
September 2, 2013
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision18 finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and
11, Article II of R.A. 9165. The trial court ruled that corpus delicti was
presented in the form of shabu samples and the chemistry report. The
testimony of prosecution witness PO2 Suarez was found by the trial court
as having presented a clear picture detailing the transaction. The
testimonies of the police officers were given credence in consideration of
the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. On the
other hand, the denials of the accused were found to be negative, weak,
and self-serving. The RTC likewise observed that apart from her
incredible testimony, witness Agbulos demeanour in court of being quick
to answer, though questions were not yet finished, indicated coaching,
which added to her lack of credibility. Indubitably, the accused was
caught in flagrante delicto of selling shabu which led to a warrantless
arrest and search which yielded the possession of more illegal drugs.
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC and
dismissed the appeal.19 The appellate court ruled that the prosecution
was able to sufficiently bear out the statutory elements of the crime. It
held that in the absence of proof of any odious intent on the part of the
police operatives to falsely impute a serious crime against the accused,
the court will not allow the testimonies of the prosecution to be overcome
by a self-serving claim of frame-up. 20 Factual findings of the trial court
are accorded respect and great weight, unless there is a
misapprehension of facts.21
With respect to the question on chain of custody, the appellate court
found that the drugs confiscated from the accused were properly
accounted for and forthrightly submitted to the Crime Laboratory. The CA
further ruled that nothing invited the suspicion that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized articles were jeopardized.22
The Issue
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the evidence of
the prosecution was sufficient to convict the accused of the alleged sale
and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, in violation of
Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of R.A. 9165.
The Ruling of the Court
The accused maintains that there was no clear and convincing evidence
warranting his conviction, as the prosecution failed to establish the actual
exchange of the alleged shabu and the buy-bust money. It was not
clearly shown how the buy-bust operation transpired.23
The accused further argues that the prosecution failed to prove that the
subject items allegedly confiscated from him were the same ones
submitted to the forensic chemist for examination;24 thus, they were not
able to establish the unbroken chain of custody of the illegal drugs.25
After a careful scrutiny of the records, the Court finds the appeal to be
impressed with merit.
It has been consistently ruled that the elements needed to be proven to
successfully prosecute a case of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.26
Simply put, the prosecution must establish that the illegal sale of the
dangerous drugs actually took place together with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the dangerous drugs seized in
evidence.27 Central to this requirement is the question of whether the
drug submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was
actually recovered from the accused.28
The Court has adopted the chain of custody rule, a method of
authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. "It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to
the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession,
the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same."29
Contrary to the claim of accused, the prosecution was able to clearly
recount how the buy-bust operation was conducted. However, the Court
finds that the chain of custody was broken in view of several infirmities in
the procedure and the evidence presented.
(1)
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
xxx.
In People v. Salonga,30 we held that it is essential for the prosecution to
prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect
is the very same substance offered in court as an exhibit. This Court,
however, finds reasonable doubt on the evidence presented to prove an
unbroken chain of custody.
First, it is not clear from the evidence that the marking, which was done in
the police station, was made in the presence of the accused or his
representative. Although we have previously ruled that the marking upon
"immediate" confiscation of the prohibited items contemplates even that
which was done at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team,31 the same must always be done in the presence of
the accused or his representative. Thus, there is already a gap in
determining whether the specimens that entered into the chain were
actually the ones examined and offered in evidence.
"Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or
other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused.
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is
Q
Who received the specimens?
A
I received it personally.34 (Emphasis supplied)
However, a perusal of the Request for Laboratory Examination presented
by the prosecution shows:
EPD CRIME LABORATORY
SAINT FRANCIS ST. MANDALUYONG CITY
CONTROL NR. 3392-03
CASE NR: D-1908-03
TIME & DATE RECVD: 1315H 08 OCT 03
RECORDED BY: PO3 KAYAT
RECEIVED BY: PSI CARIO
D/by: PO3 SANTOS 35(Emphasis supplied)
The marked discrepancy between the testimony of P/S Insp. Forro and
the documentary evidence, which shows that a certain PSI Cario
received the specimens, was not explained by the prosecution. This
material and glaring inconsistency creates doubt as to the preservation of
the seized items.
Moreover, although PO2 Suarez testified that he was the one who
marked the specimens with his own initials,36he did not identify the seized
items in open court to prove that the ones he marked were the same
specimens brought to the laboratory for testing and eventually presented
in open court. Neither did PO3 Santos, the one who delivered the request
and the specimens to the laboratory, identify in open court that the
specimens presented are the same specimens he delivered to the
laboratory for testing.
While P/S Insp. Forro testified that the specimens she received for testing
were the same ones presented in court,37 this Court cannot accurately
determine whether the tested specimens were the same items seized
from the accused and marked by PO2 Suarez. The failure of the police
officers to identify the seized drugs in open court created another gap in
the link. Thus, the identity of the corpus delicti was not proven.
The gaps in the chain of custody creates a reasonable doubt as to
whether the specimens seized from the accused were the same
specimens brought to the laboratory and eventually offered in court as
evidence. Without adequate proof of the corpus delicti, the conviction
cannot stand.
In People v. De Guzman,38 this Court ruled:
Accordingly, the failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the
integrity of the seized items has been adequately preserved through an
unbroken chain of custody is enough to engender reasonable doubt on
the guilt of an accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by
an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such
investigation to let the mind rest upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute
certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a person charged
with a crime, but moral certainty is required as to every proposition of
proof requisite to constitute the offense. A conviction cannot be sustained
if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug.39
Finally, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
cannot be invoked by the prosecution where the procedure was tainted
with material lapses. These lapses effectively produced serious doubts
on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in the face of
allegations of frame-up which was testified to by a third party
witness.40 The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute
proof beyond reasonable doubt.41
The inconsistency in the evidence and the weak presentation of the
prosecution leaves a gaping hole in the chain of custody, which creates a
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In view of the prosecutions
failure to adduce justifiable grounds on their procedural lapses and the
unexplained conflicting inconsistencies in the evidence presented, we are
constrained to reverse the finding of the court a quo.
1wphi 1
NTC respects and will not hinder freedom of the press and the
right to information on matters of public concern. KBP & its
members have always been committed to the exercise of press
freedom with high sense of responsibility and discerning
judgment of fairness and honesty.
NTC did not issue any MC [Memorandum Circular] or Order
constituting a restraint of press freedom or censorship. The NTC
further denies and does not intend to limit or restrict the interview
of members of the opposition or free expression of views.
stations continue, even to this date, to air the tapes, but of late within the
parameters agreed upon between the NTC and KBP." 18
D. The Procedural Threshold: Legal Standing
To be sure, the circumstances of this case make the constitutional
challenge peculiar. Petitioner, who is not a member of the broadcast
media, prays that we strike down the acts and statements made by
respondents as violations of the right to free speech, free expression and
a free press. For another, the recipients of the press statements have not
come forwardneither intervening nor joining petitioner in this action.
Indeed, as a group, they issued a joint statement with respondent NTC
that does not complain about restraints on freedom of the press.
It would seem, then, that petitioner has not met the requisite legal
standing, having failed to allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 19
But as early as half a century ago, we have already held that where
serious constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside if we must, technicalities of
procedure." 20 Subsequently, this Court has repeatedly and consistently
refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and
resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public
interest,21 in keeping with the Court's duty under the 1987 Constitution to
determine whether or not other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them.
Thus, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a
case involves an issue of overarching significance to our society,22 we
therefore brush aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of
this petition,23 seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all
the civil rights, the freedom of expression.The petition raises other
issues like the extent of the right to information of the public. It is
fundamental, however, that we need not address all issues but only
the most decisive one which in the case at bar is whether the acts of
the respondents abridge freedom of speech and of the press.
The dichotomy between print and broadcast media traces its origins in
the United States. There, broadcast radio and television have been held
to have limited First Amendment protection,75 and U.S. Courts
have excludedbroadcast media from the application of the "strict
scrutiny" standard that they would otherwise apply to content-based
restrictions.76 According to U.S. Courts, the three major reasons why
broadcast media stands apart from print media are: (a) the scarcity of the
frequencies by which the medium operates [i.e., airwaves are physically
limited while print medium may be limitless]; 77 (b) its "pervasiveness" as
a medium; and (c) its unique accessibility to children.78 Because cases
involving broadcast media need not follow "precisely the same approach
that [U.S. courts] have applied to other media," nor go "so far as to
demand that such regulations serve compelling government
interests,"79 they are decided on whether the "governmental
restriction" is narrowly tailored to further a substantial
governmental interest,"80 or the intermediate test.
As pointed out by respondents, Philippine jurisprudence has also echoed
a differentiation in treatment between broadcast and print
media. Nevertheless, a review of Philippine case law on broadcast
media will show thatas we have deviated with the American
conception of the Bill of Rights81 we likewise did not adopt
en masse the U.S. conception of free speech as it relates to broadcast
media, particularly as to which test would govern content-based
prior restraints.
Our cases show two distinct features of this dichotomy. First, the
difference in treatment, in the main, is in the regulatory scheme applied to
broadcast media that is not imposed on traditional print media, and
narrowly confined to unprotected speech (e.g., obscenity, pornography,
seditious and inciting speech), or is based on a compelling government
interest that also has constitutional protection, such as national security
or the electoral process.
Second, regardless of the regulatory schemes that broadcast media is
subjected to, the Court has consistently held that the clear and present
danger test applies to content-based restrictions on media, without
making a distinction as to traditional print or broadcast media.
The distinction between broadcast and traditional print media was first
enunciated in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v.
Dans,82 wherein it was held that "[a]ll forms of media, whether print or
broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech
print media," it was not as to what test should be applied, but the context
by which requirements of licensing, allocation of airwaves, and
application of norms to unprotected speech. 85
In the same year that the Dans case was decided, it was reiterated
in Gonzales v. Katigbak,86 that the test to determine free expression
challenges was the clear and present danger, again without
distinguishing the media.87 Katigbak, strictly speaking, does not treat of
broadcast media but motion pictures. Although the issue involved
obscenity standards as applied to movies,88 the Court concluded its
decision with the following obiter dictum that a less liberal approach
would be used to resolve obscenity issues in television as opposed to
motion pictures:
All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the
concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the
consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a less
liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike
motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way,
television reaches every home where there is a set. Children then
will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs therein
shown..It cannot be denied though that the State as parens
patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the
welfare of the young.
More recently, in resolving a case involving the conduct of exit polls and
dissemination of the results by a broadcast company, we reiterated that
the clear and present danger rule is the test we unquestionably adhere to
issues that involve freedoms of speech and of the press.89
This is not to suggest, however, that the clear and present danger
rule has been applied to all cases that involve the broadcast
media. The rule applies to all media, including broadcast, but only when
the challenged act is a content-based regulation that infringes on free
speech, expression and the press. Indeed, in Osmena v.
COMELEC,90 which also involved broadcast media, the Court refused to
apply the clear and present danger rule to a COMELEC regulation of time
and manner of advertising of political advertisements because the
challenged restriction was content-neutral.91 And in a case involving due
process and equal protection issues, the Court inTelecommunications
and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. COMELEC92 treated a
restriction imposed on a broadcast media as a reasonable condition for
the grant of the medias franchise, without going into which test would
apply.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148965
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for
petitioner and his co-accused. On its basis, petitioner and his co-accused
were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus
Motion"2 alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial and
hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly
involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series or combination of overt or
criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail
as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the
Amended Information and be discharged from custody. In the alternative,
petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to be
fixed by respondent court.3
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose
Jinggoy Estradas Motion To Fix Bail On Grounds That An Outgoing
Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts
Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As
To Him."4
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Strike Out So-Called Entry
of Appearance, To Direct Ombudsman To Explain Why He Attributes
Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve Pending Incidents."5
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
denying petitioners "Motion to Quash and Suspend" and "Very Urgent
Omnibus Motion."6 Petitioners alternative prayer to post bail was set for
hearing after arraignment of all accused. The court held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for
lack of merit the following: (1) MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND
dated April 24, 2001 filed by accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada; (2)
MOTION TO QUASH dated June 7, 2001 filed by accused Joseph
Ejercito Estrada; and (3) MOTION TO QUASH (Re: Amended Information
dated 18 April 2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by accused Edward S.
Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of
accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada, his VERY URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION, praying that he be: (1) dropped from the information for plunder
for want of probable cause and (2) discharged from custody immediately
which is based on the same grounds mentioned in this MOTION TO
QUASH AND SUSPEND is hereby DENIED. Let his alternative prayer in
said OMNIBUS MOTION that he be allowed to post bail be SET for
hearing together with the petition for bail of accused Edward S. Serapio
scheduled for July 10, 2001, at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon after the
arraignment of all the accused."7
The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of
the Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to
arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea prompting
respondent court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.8
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:
"1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face
and, as applied to petitioner, and denying him the equal
protection of the laws;
2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete
and sufficient standards;
3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses,
and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not
even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal
liability is personal, not vicarious - results in the denial of
substantive due process;
4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in
one count of the information which amounts to cruel and unusual
punishment totally in defiance of the principle of proportionality."9
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim.
I.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and
as applied to him and denies him the equal protection of the laws.10
The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A.
No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law, has been settled in the case of Estrada
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
the other accused with the former President as related in the second
paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs
(b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the
predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of
the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with
the former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth
amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman
cannot be faulted for including the predicate acts alleged in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in
four, separate Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will
show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing
multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath
of the Marcos regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed
against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies.Government
prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and
magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former President
to acquire illegal wealth.20 They also found that under the then existing
laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal
Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions,
different time and different personalities. Every transaction constituted
a separate crime and required a separate case and the over-all
conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal and graft
charges. The preparation of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare
but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed
against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan.21 R.A.
No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law22 was enacted precisely to address this
procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate
Bill No. 733, viz:
"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like
kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the use of high office for
personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the
public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may
involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many
states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be
penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public
funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an
entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine
statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a
safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the
that they agreed to do the matters which are set forth as the substance of
their conspiracy. To allege a conspiracy is to allege an agreement.39 The
gist of the crime of conspiracy is unlawful agreement, and where
conspiracy is charged, it is not necessary to set out the criminal
object with as great a certainty as is required in cases where such
object is charged as a substantive offense.40
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how
Philippine courts and American courts deal with cases challenging
Informations alleging conspiracy on the ground that they lack
particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes. In our
jurisdiction, as aforestated, conspiracy can be alleged in the
Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as
constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a
crime in itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information
charging the offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It requires that the information
for this crime must contain the following averments:
"Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them
shall be included in the complaint or information."
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the
accused, designate the offense given by statute, state the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party,
the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place
where the offense was committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions
constituting the offense should be made in order to meet the standard of
sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its name given by
statute or by reference to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it.41 The information must also state the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances.42 The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in
such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
xxx
xxx
xxx
x x x."
V.
We now come to petitioners plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the
pendency of the instant petition before this Court, petitioner filed with
respondent Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Second Motion for Bail for
Medical Reasons." Petitioner prayed that he be allowed to post bail due
to his serious medical condition which is life-threatening to him if he goes
back to his place of detention. The motion was opposed by respondent
Ombudsman to which petitioner replied.
1wphi1
SECOND DIVISION
March 6, 2013
The Ombudsmans complaint alleges that Lt. Gen. Ligot served in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 33 years and 2 months, from
April 1, 1966 as a cadet until his retirement on August 17, 2004.9 He and
Mrs. Ligot have four children, namely: Paulo Y. Ligot, Riza Y. Ligot,
George Y. Ligot and Miguel Y. Ligot, who have all reached the age of
majority at the time of the filing of the complaint.10
Lt. Gen. Ligot declared in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net
Worth (SALN) that as of December 31, 2003, he had assets in the total
amount of Three Million Eight Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand and Three
Pesos (P3,848,003.00).11 In contrast, his declared assets in his 1982
SALN amounted to only One Hundred Five Thousand Pesos
(P105,000.00).12
Aside from these declared assets, the Ombudsmans investigation
revealed that Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family had other properties and bank
accounts, not declared in his SALN, amounting to at least Fifty Four
Million One Thousand Two Hundred Seventeen Pesos (P54,001,217.00).
These undeclared assets consisted of the following:
BACKGROUND FACTS
On June 27, 2005, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), filed an
Urgent Ex-Parte Application for the issuance of a freeze order with the
CA against certain monetary instruments and properties of the
petitioners, pursuant to Section 104 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9160, as
amended (otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001).
This application was based on the February 1, 2005 letter of the Office of
the Ombudsman to the AMLC, recommending that the latter conduct an
investigation on Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family for possible violation of RA
No. 9160.5
In support of this recommendation, the Ombudsman attached the
Complaint6 it filed against the Ligots for perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code, and for violations of Section 87 of RA No. 67138 and
RA No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Ombudsmans Complaint
Undeclared Assets
Jacinto Ligots undeclared assets
Jacinto Ligots childrens assets
Amount
P
41,185,583.5313
1,744,035.6014
P 2,308,047.8715
P 8,763,550.0016
Total
P 54,001,217.00
Bearing in mind that Lt. Gen. Ligots main source of income was his
salary as an officer of the AFP,17 and given his wife and childrens lack of
any other substantial sources of income,18 the Ombudsman declared the
assets registered in Lt. Gen. Ligots name, as well as those in his wifes
and childrens names, to be illegally obtained and unexplained wealth,
pursuant to the provisions of RA No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeiture in
Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired
On May 25, 2005, the AMLC issued Resolution No. 52, Series of 2005,
directing the Executive Director of the AMLC Secretariat to file an
application for a freeze order against the properties of Lt. Gen. Ligot and
the members of his family with the CA.22 Subsequently, on June 27,
2005, the Republic filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Application with the appellate
court for the issuance of a Freeze Order against the properties of the
Ligots and Yambao.
The appellate court granted the application in its July 5, 2005 resolution,
ruling that probable cause existed that an unlawful activity and/or money
laundering offense had been committed by Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family,
including Yambao, and that the properties sought to be frozen are related
to the unlawful activity or money laundering offense. Accordingly, the CA
issued a freeze order against the Ligots and Yambaos various bank
accounts, web accounts and vehicles, valid for a period of 20 days from
the date of issuance.
On July 26, 2005, the Republic filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of
Effectivity of Freeze Order, arguing that if the bank accounts, web
accounts and vehicles were not continuously frozen, they could be
placed beyond the reach of law enforcement authorities and the
governments efforts to recover the proceeds of the Ligots unlawful
activities would be frustrated. In support of its motion, it informed the CA
that the Ombudsman was presently investigating the following cases
involving the Ligots:
From these circumstances, the Ombudsman concluded that Yambao Case Number
acted as a dummy and/or nominee of the Ligot spouses, and all the
properties registered in Yambaos name actually belong to the Ligot OMB-P-C-05- 0523
family.
OMB-P-C-05- 0003
Urgent Ex-Parte Freeze Order Application
OMB-P-C-05- 0184
Complainant(s)
Nature
Wilfredo Garrido
Plunder
Perjury
In opposition, the Republic claims that the CA can issue a freeze order
upon a determination that probable cause exists, showing that the
monetary instruments or properties subject of the freeze order are related
to the unlawful activity enumerated in RA No. 9160. Contrary to the
petitioners claims, it is not necessary that a formal criminal charge must
have been previously filed against them before the freeze order can be
issued.
The Republic further claims that the CAs September 20, 2005 resolution,
granting the Republics motion to extend the effectivity of the freeze
order, had already become final and executory, and could no longer be
challenged. The Republic notes that the Ligots erred when they filed what
is effectively a second motion for reconsideration in response to the CAs
January 4, 2006 resolution, instead of filing a petition for review on
certiorari via Rule 45 with this Court. Under these circumstances, the
assailed January 4, 2006 resolution granting the freeze order had already
attained finality when the Ligots filed the present petition before this
Court.
THE COURTS RULING
We find merit in the petition.
I. Procedural aspect
a. Certiorari not proper remedy to assail freeze order; exception
Section 57 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases explicitly provides the
remedy available in cases involving freeze orders issued by the CA:
Section 57. Appeal. - Any party aggrieved by the decision or ruling of the
court may appeal to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appeal shall not stay the
enforcement of the subject decision or final order unless the Supreme
Court directs otherwise. [italics supplied]
From this provision, it is apparent that the petitioners should have filed a
petition for review on certiorari, and not a petition for certiorari, to assail
the CA resolution which extended the effectivity period of the freeze order
over their properties.
Even assuming that a petition for certiorari is available to the petitioners,
a review of their petition shows that the issues they raise (i.e., existence
of probable cause to support the freeze order; the applicability of the 6month limit to the extension of freeze orders embodied in the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture) pertain to errors of judgment
allegedly committed by the CA, which fall outside the Courts limited
jurisdiction when resolving certiorari petitions. As held in People v. Court
of Appeals:24
Without challenging the validity of the fixed 6-month extension period, the
Republic nonetheless asserts that the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases does
not apply to the present case because the CA had already resolved the
issues regarding the extension of the freeze order before the
Clearly, the Ligots should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and
not what is effectively a second motion for reconsideration (nor an
original action of certiorari after this second motion was denied), within
fifteen days from receipt of the CAs January 4, 2006 resolution. To
recall, this resolution denied the petitioners motion to lift the extended
freeze order which is effectively a motion for reconsideration of the CA
ruling extending the freeze order indefinitely.26
c. Subsequent events
Notably, the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect on December
15, 2005. Section 59 provides that it shall "apply to all pending civil
forfeiture cases or petitions for freeze order" at the time of its effectivity.
A review of the record reveals that after the CA issued its September 20,
2005 resolution extending the freeze order, the Ligots filed a motion to lift
the extended freeze order on September 28, 2005. Significantly, the CA
only acted upon this motion on January 4, 2006, when it issued a
resolution denying it.
While denominated as a Motion to Lift Extended Freeze Order, this
motion was actually a motion for reconsideration, as it sought the
reversal of the assailed CA resolution. Since the Ligots motion for
reconsideration was still pending resolution at the time the Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases came into effect on December 15, 2005, the Rule
unquestionably applies to the present case.
Under Section 56 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases which provides that
after the post-issuance hearing on whether to modify, lift or extend the
freeze order, the CA shall remand the case and transmit the records to
the RTC for consolidation with the pending civil forfeiture proceeding.
This provision gives the impression that the filing of the appropriate cases
in courts in 2011 and 2012 rendered this case moot and academic.
A case is considered moot and academic when it "ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of
mootness."28 However, the moot and academic principle is not an ironclad rule and is subject to four settled exceptions,29 two of which are
present in this case, namely: when the constitutional issue raised
requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public, and when the case is capable of repetition, yet
evading review.
The apparent conflict presented by the limiting provision of the Rule in
Civil Forfeiture Cases, on one hand, and the very broad judicial discretion
under RA No. 9160, as amended, on the other hand, and the uncertainty
it casts on an individuals guaranteed right to due process indubitably call
for the Courts exercise of its discretion to decide the case, otherwise
moot and academic, under those two exceptions, for the future guidance
of those affected and involved in the implementation of RA No. 9160, as
amended.
Additionally, we would be giving premium to the governments failure to
file an appropriate case until only after six years (despite the clear
provision of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases) were we to dismiss the
petition because of the filing of the forfeiture case during the pendency of
the case before the Court. The sheer length of time and the constitutional
violation involved, as will be discussed below, strongly dissuade us from
dismissing the petition on the basis of the "moot and academic" principle.
The Court should not allow the seeds of future violations to sprout by
hiding under this principle even when directly confronted with the glaring
issue of the respondents violation of the petitioners due process right30 an issue that the respondent itself chooses to ignore.
We shall discuss the substantive relevance of the subsequent
developments and their dates at length below.
II. Substantive aspect
Gen. Ligot and his family amount to more than Fifty-Four Million Pesos
(P54,000,000.00). Since these assets are grossly disproportionate to Lt.
Gen. Ligots income, as well as the lack of any evidence that the Ligots
have other sources of income, the CA properly found that probable cause
exists that these funds have been illegally acquired. On the other hand,
the AMLCs verified allegations in its ex parte application, based on the
complaint filed by the Ombudsman against Ligot and his family for
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, clearly sustain the
CAs finding that probable cause exists that the monetary instruments
subject of the freeze order are related to, or are the product of, an
unlawful activity.
b. A freeze order, however, cannot be issued for an indefinite period
Assuming that the freeze order is substantively in legal order, the Ligots
now assert that its effectiveness ceased after January 25, 2006 (or six
months after July 25, 2005 when the original freeze order first expired),
pursuant to Section 53(b) of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases (A.M. No.
05-11-04-SC). This section states:
Section 53. Freeze order.
xxxx
(b) Extension. On motion of the petitioner filed before the expiration of
twenty days from issuance of a freeze order, the court may for good
cause extend its effectivity for a period not exceeding six months. [italics
supplied; emphasis ours]
We find merit in this claim.
A freeze order is an extraordinary and interim relief37 issued by the CA to
prevent the dissipation, removal, or disposal of properties that are
suspected to be the proceeds of, or related to, unlawful activities as
defined in Section 3(i) of RA No. 9160, as amended.38 The primary
objective of a freeze order is to temporarily preserve monetary
instruments or property that are in any way related to an unlawful activity
or money laundering, by preventing the owner from utilizing them during
the duration of the freeze order.39 The relief is pre-emptive in character,
meant to prevent the owner from disposing his property and thwarting the
States effort in building its case and eventually filing civil forfeiture
proceedings and/or prosecuting the owner.
the freeze order over the Ligots various bank accounts and personal
properties "until after all the appropriate proceedings and/or
investigations being conducted are terminated."45 By its very terms, the
CA resolution effectively bars the Ligots from using any of the property
covered by the freeze order until after an eventual civil forfeiture
proceeding is concluded in their favor and after they shall have been
adjudged not guilty of the crimes they are suspected of committing.
These periods of extension are way beyond the intent and purposes of a
freeze order which is intended solely as an interim relief; the civil and
criminal trial courts can very well handle the disposition of properties
related to a forfeiture case or to a crime charged and need not rely on the
interim relief that the appellate court issued as a guarantee against loss
of property while the government is preparing its full case. The term of
the CAs extension, too, borders on inflicting a punishment to the Ligots,
in violation of their constitutionally protected right to be presumed
innocent, because the unreasonable denial of their property comes
before final conviction.
In more concrete terms, the freeze order over the Ligots properties has
been in effect since 2005, while the civil forfeiture case per the
Republics manifestation was filed only in 2011 and the forfeiture case
under RA No. 1379 per the petitioners manifestation was filed only in
2012. This means that the Ligots have not been able to access the
properties subject of the freeze order for six years or so simply on the
basis of the existence of probable cause to issue a freeze order, which
was intended mainly as an interim preemptive remedy.
As correctly noted by the petitioners, a freeze order is meant to have a
temporary effect; it was never intended to supplant or replace the actual
forfeiture cases where the provisional remedy - which means, the remedy
is an adjunct of or an incident to the main action of asking for the
issuance of an asset preservation order from the court where the petition
is filed is precisely available. For emphasis, a freeze order is both a
preservatory and preemptive remedy.
To stress, the evils caused by the laws silence on the freeze orders
period of effectivity46 compelled this Court to issue the Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases. Specifically, the Court fixed the maximum allowable
extension on the freeze orders effectivity at six months. In doing so, the
Court sought to balance the States interest in going after suspected
money launderers with an individuals constitutionally-protected right not
to be deprived of his property without due process of law, as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
To our mind, the six-month extension period is ordinarily sufficient for the
government to act against the suspected money launderer and to file the
appropriate forfeiture case against him, and is a reasonable period as
well that recognizes the property owners right to due process. In this
case, the period of inaction of six years, under the circumstances,
already far exceeded what is reasonable.
We are not unmindful that the State itself is entitled to due process. As a
due process concern, we do not say that the six-month period is an
inflexible rule that would result in the automatic lifting of the freeze order
upon its expiration in all instances. An inflexible rule may lend itself to
abuse - to the prejudice of the States legitimate interests - where the
property owner would simply file numerous suits, questioning the freeze
order during the six-month extension period, to prevent the timely filing of
a money laundering or civil forfeiture case within this period. With the
limited resources that our government prosecutors and investigators
have at their disposal, the end-result of an inflexible rule is not difficult to
see.
1wphi1
We observe, too, that the factual complexities and intricacies of the case
and other matters that may be beyond the governments prosecutory
agencies control may contribute to their inability to file the corresponding
civil forfeiture case before the lapse of six months. Given these
considerations, it is only proper to strike a balance between the
individuals right to due process and the governments interest in curbing
criminality, particularly money laundering and the predicate crimes
underlying it.
Thus, as a rule, the effectivity of a freeze order may be extended by the
CA for a period not exceeding six months. Before or upon the lapse of
this period, ideally, the Republic should have already filed a case for civil
forfeiture against the property owner with the proper courts and
accordingly secure an asset preservation order or it should have filed the
necessary information.47 Otherwise, the property owner should already be
able to fully enjoy his property without any legal process affecting it.
However, should it become completely necessary for the Republic to
further extend the duration of the freeze order, it should file the necessary
motion before the expiration of the six-month period and explain the
reason or reasons for its failure to file an appropriate case and justify the
period of extension sought. The freeze order should remain effective prior
to the resolution by the CA, which is hereby directed to resolve this kind
of motion for extension with reasonable dispatch.
In the present case, we note that the Republic has not offered any
explanation why it took six years (from the time it secured a freeze order)
before a civil forfeiture case was filed in court, despite the clear tenor of
the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases allowing the extension of a freeze order
for only a period of six months. All the Republic could proffer is its
temporal argument on the inapplicability of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture
Cases; in effect, it glossed over the squarely-raised issue of due process.
Under these circumstances, we cannot but conclude that the continued
extension of the freeze order beyond the six-month period violated the
Ligots right to due process; thus, the CA decision should be reversed.
We clarify that our conclusion applies only to the CA ruling and does not
affect the proceedings and whatever order or resolution the RTC may
have issued in the presently pending civil cases for forfeiture. We make
this clarification to ensure that we can now fully conclude and terminate
this CA aspect of the case.
As our last point, we commend the fervor of the CA in assisting the
States efforts to prosecute corrupt public officials. We remind the
appellate court though that the governments anti-corruption drive cannot
be done at the expense of cherished fundamental rights enshrined in our
Constitution. So long as we continue to be guided by the Constitution and
the rule of law, the Court cannot allow the justification of governmental
action on the basis of the noblest objectives alone. As so oft-repeated,
the end does not justify the means. Of primordial importance is that the
means employed must be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere
expediency will certainly not excuse constitutional shortcuts.48
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and LIFT
the freeze order issued by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No.
90238. This lifting is without prejudice to, and shall not affect, the
preservation orders that the lower courts have ordered on the same
properties in the cases pending before them. Pursuant to Section 56 of
A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, the Court of Appeals is hereby ordered to remand
the case and to transmit the records to the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 22, where the civil forfeiture proceeding is pending, for
consolidation therewith as may be appropriate.
SO ORDERED.