FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 194948

September 2, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

vs.
FREDDY SALONGA Y AFIADO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03754 affirming in toto the Decision2 in
Criminal Case Nos. 03-336 and 03-337. The Regional Trial Court of
Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67 (RTC) Decision found Freddy Salonga y
Afiado guilty of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 (R.A. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
The accused was charged under two separate Informations3 docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 03-336 and 03-337 for violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (illegal sale and possession of
dangerous drugs, respectively).
Version of the Prosecution
Police Officer (PO) 3 Gabriel Santos (PO3 Santos) testified that
confidential information was obtained that the accused was selling illegal
drugs at his residence in Barangay Libis, Wawa, Binangonan, Rizal.
Consequently, a buy-bust operation was conducted on 7 October 2003,
whereupon the accused was arrested for selling methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.4
PO2 Bernardo T. Suarez (PO2 Suarez), who acted as poseur-buyer,
went to the house of the accused accompanied by a police "asset." The
asset told the accused that they were going to buy drugs, and upon
agreement, PO2 Suarez gave accused two (2) marked P100 bills. In
return, the accused gave PO2 Suarez a deck of shabu. PO2 Suarez then
lit a cigarette, which was the agreed signal that the transaction was
completed. Thereafter, the accused was arrested by the team.5

The police officers, who introduced themselves as members of the CIDG,

informed the accused of the reason of his arrest, after which accused
was frisked and three (3) more sachets of shabu were seized from him.
Thereafter, they proceeded to the police station, where the sachets of
shabu were marked and later brought to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory.6
PO2 Suarez testified that he was the one who marked the sachets with
his own initials and who prepared the letter-request for laboratory
examination of the specimens.7 The seized sachets were then delivered
to Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for examination.8 Police
Senior Inspector Annalee R. Forro (P/S Insp. Forro), PNP Forensic
Chemical Officer, admitted in her testimony that she personally received
the drug specimens9which tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.10
Version of the Defense
The defense presented the accused and Virginia Agbulos (Agbulos) as
their witnesses.
Accused testified that at around 5 oclock in the afternoon of 7 October
2003, while he was in front of his elder brothers house with Larry Ocaya
and a certain Apple,11 two persons arrived looking for his brother Ernie
Salonga (Ernie).12 The accused was held by the shirt by one named
Suarez and was forced to point to the house of his elder brother.13 Upon
reaching the house of Ernie, they were informed that Ernie was not there.
Thereafter, the police officers arrested the accused.14
To corroborate the testimony of the accused, Agbulos testified that she
was with the buy-bust operation team together with Myleen Cerda, who
was a police asset, and two police officers. The team was initially looking
for Ernie, and it was to her surprise that accused was arrested when
Ernie was not found. The accused was then brought to and detained at
the CIDG at Karangalan, Cainta, Rizal.15
After the parties stipulated that the testimony of the proposed witness
Larry Ocaya was corroborative of the statements given by the accused,
the defense dispensed with his testimony.16
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges.17
The RTC Ruling

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision18 finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and
11, Article II of R.A. 9165. The trial court ruled that corpus delicti was
presented in the form of shabu samples and the chemistry report. The
testimony of prosecution witness PO2 Suarez was found by the trial court
as having presented a clear picture detailing the transaction. The
testimonies of the police officers were given credence in consideration of
the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. On the
other hand, the denials of the accused were found to be negative, weak,
and self-serving. The RTC likewise observed that apart from her
incredible testimony, witness Agbulos demeanour in court of being quick
to answer, though questions were not yet finished, indicated coaching,
which added to her lack of credibility. Indubitably, the accused was
caught in flagrante delicto of selling shabu which led to a warrantless
arrest and search which yielded the possession of more illegal drugs.
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC and
dismissed the appeal.19 The appellate court ruled that the prosecution
was able to sufficiently bear out the statutory elements of the crime. It
held that in the absence of proof of any odious intent on the part of the
police operatives to falsely impute a serious crime against the accused,
the court will not allow the testimonies of the prosecution to be overcome
by a self-serving claim of frame-up. 20 Factual findings of the trial court
are accorded respect and great weight, unless there is a
misapprehension of facts.21
With respect to the question on chain of custody, the appellate court
found that the drugs confiscated from the accused were properly
accounted for and forthrightly submitted to the Crime Laboratory. The CA
further ruled that nothing invited the suspicion that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized articles were jeopardized.22
The Issue
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the evidence of
the prosecution was sufficient to convict the accused of the alleged sale
and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, in violation of
Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of R.A. 9165.
The Ruling of the Court

The accused maintains that there was no clear and convincing evidence
warranting his conviction, as the prosecution failed to establish the actual
exchange of the alleged shabu and the buy-bust money. It was not
clearly shown how the buy-bust operation transpired.23
The accused further argues that the prosecution failed to prove that the
subject items allegedly confiscated from him were the same ones
submitted to the forensic chemist for examination;24 thus, they were not
able to establish the unbroken chain of custody of the illegal drugs.25
After a careful scrutiny of the records, the Court finds the appeal to be
impressed with merit.
It has been consistently ruled that the elements needed to be proven to
successfully prosecute a case of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.26
Simply put, the prosecution must establish that the illegal sale of the
dangerous drugs actually took place together with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the dangerous drugs seized in
evidence.27 Central to this requirement is the question of whether the
drug submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was
actually recovered from the accused.28
The Court has adopted the chain of custody rule, a method of
authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. "It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to
the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession,
the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same."29
Contrary to the claim of accused, the prosecution was able to clearly
recount how the buy-bust operation was conducted. However, the Court
finds that the chain of custody was broken in view of several infirmities in
the procedure and the evidence presented.

Section 21 of R.A. 9165 delineates the mandatory procedural safeguards

in buy-bust operations, which reads:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA
shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as
well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:

vital that the seized contrabands are immediately marked because

succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as
reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked
evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the
time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the
end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence."32
Second, the prosecution failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of
Inventory and to take photos of the seized items pursuant to the abovestated provision. There is nothing in the records that would show at least
an attempt to comply with this procedural safeguard; neither was there
any justifiable reason propounded for failing to do so.

(1)
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
xxx.
In People v. Salonga,30 we held that it is essential for the prosecution to
prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect
is the very same substance offered in court as an exhibit. This Court,
however, finds reasonable doubt on the evidence presented to prove an
unbroken chain of custody.
First, it is not clear from the evidence that the marking, which was done in
the police station, was made in the presence of the accused or his
representative. Although we have previously ruled that the marking upon
"immediate" confiscation of the prohibited items contemplates even that
which was done at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team,31 the same must always be done in the presence of
the accused or his representative. Thus, there is already a gap in
determining whether the specimens that entered into the chain were
actually the ones examined and offered in evidence.
"Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or
other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused.
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is

Third, we find conflicting testimony and glaring inconsistencies that would

cast doubt on the integrity of the handling of the seized drugs. The
material inconsistency of who actually received the specimens in the
Crime Laboratory creates a cloud of doubt as to whether the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved.
PO3 Santos testified on direct examination:
Q
What did you do with the 3 plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance recovered from the accused?
A
We brought them to the office and we made some markings on the
specimens and they were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory.33
To corroborate the same, P/S Insp. Forro, the Forensic Chemical Officer,
testified as follows:
Q
Who brought those specimens to your office?
A
It was a certain PO2 Santos.

Q
Who received the specimens?
A
I received it personally.34 (Emphasis supplied)
However, a perusal of the Request for Laboratory Examination presented
by the prosecution shows:
EPD CRIME LABORATORY
SAINT FRANCIS ST. MANDALUYONG CITY
CONTROL NR. 3392-03
CASE NR: D-1908-03
TIME & DATE RECVD: 1315H 08 OCT 03
RECORDED BY: PO3 KAYAT
RECEIVED BY: PSI CARIO
D/by: PO3 SANTOS 35(Emphasis supplied)
The marked discrepancy between the testimony of P/S Insp. Forro and
the documentary evidence, which shows that a certain PSI Cario
received the specimens, was not explained by the prosecution. This
material and glaring inconsistency creates doubt as to the preservation of
the seized items.
Moreover, although PO2 Suarez testified that he was the one who
marked the specimens with his own initials,36he did not identify the seized
items in open court to prove that the ones he marked were the same
specimens brought to the laboratory for testing and eventually presented
in open court. Neither did PO3 Santos, the one who delivered the request
and the specimens to the laboratory, identify in open court that the
specimens presented are the same specimens he delivered to the
laboratory for testing.

While P/S Insp. Forro testified that the specimens she received for testing
were the same ones presented in court,37 this Court cannot accurately
determine whether the tested specimens were the same items seized
from the accused and marked by PO2 Suarez. The failure of the police
officers to identify the seized drugs in open court created another gap in
the link. Thus, the identity of the corpus delicti was not proven.
The gaps in the chain of custody creates a reasonable doubt as to
whether the specimens seized from the accused were the same
specimens brought to the laboratory and eventually offered in court as
evidence. Without adequate proof of the corpus delicti, the conviction
cannot stand.
In People v. De Guzman,38 this Court ruled:
Accordingly, the failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the
integrity of the seized items has been adequately preserved through an
unbroken chain of custody is enough to engender reasonable doubt on
the guilt of an accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by
an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such
investigation to let the mind rest upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute
certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a person charged
with a crime, but moral certainty is required as to every proposition of
proof requisite to constitute the offense. A conviction cannot be sustained
if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug.39
Finally, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
cannot be invoked by the prosecution where the procedure was tainted
with material lapses. These lapses effectively produced serious doubts
on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in the face of
allegations of frame-up which was testified to by a third party
witness.40 The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute
proof beyond reasonable doubt.41
The inconsistency in the evidence and the weak presentation of the
prosecution leaves a gaping hole in the chain of custody, which creates a
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In view of the prosecutions
failure to adduce justifiable grounds on their procedural lapses and the
unexplained conflicting inconsistencies in the evidence presented, we are
constrained to reverse the finding of the court a quo.
1wphi 1

As held in People v. Umipang,42 "x x x, we reiterate our past rulings

calling upon the authorities to exert greater efforts in combating the drug
menace using the safeguards that our lawmakers have deemed
necessary for the greater benefit of our society. The need to employ a
more stringent approach to scrutinizing the evidence of the prosecution
especially when the pieces of evidence were derived from a buy-bust
operation redounds to the benefit of the criminal justice system by
protecting civil liberties and at the same time instilling rigorous discipline
on prosecutors."
WHEREFORE, the appealed CA Decision dated 3 June 2010 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 03754 affirming the RTC Decision in Crim. Case Nos. 03336 and 03-337 dated 29 November 2008 is SET ASIDE. Accused
Freddy Salonga y Afiado is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges on the
ground of reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
hereby ORDERED to immediately RELEASE the accused from custody,
unless he is detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 168338

right, as in Adiong v. COMELEC,1 Burgos v. Chief of Staff,2 Social

Weather Stations v. COMELEC,3 and Bayan v. Executive Secretary
Ermita.4 When on its face, it is clear that a governmental act is nothing
more than a naked means to prevent the free exercise of speech, it must
be nullified.
B. The Facts
1. The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004
national and local elections. On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio
Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to destabilize the
administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation
allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wiretapping.5 Later, in a Malacaang press briefing, Secretary Bunye
produced two versions of the tape, one supposedly the complete version,
and the other, a spliced, "doctored" or altered version, which would
suggest that the President had instructed the COMELEC official to
manipulate the election results in the Presidents favor. 6 It seems that
Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was that of President Arroyo, but
subsequently made a retraction. 7

February 15, 2008

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Justice; and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION (NTC), respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
A. Precis
In this jurisdiction, it is established that freedom of the press is crucial and
so inextricably woven into the right to free speech and free expression,
that any attempt to restrict it must be met with an examination so critical
that only a danger that is clear and present would be allowed to curtail it.
Indeed, we have not wavered in the duty to uphold this cherished
freedom. We have struck down laws and issuances meant to curtail this

2. On June 7, 2005, former counsel of deposed President Joseph

Estrada, Atty. Alan Paguia, subsequently released an alleged authentic
tape recording of the wiretap. Included in the tapes were purported
conversations of the President, the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo,
COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano, and the late Senator Barbers.8
3. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary
Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the
compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents
could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons
included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense,
subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime
was committed or was being committed in their presence.9
4. On June 9, 2005, in another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales
ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after
media organizations "found to have caused the spread, the playing and
the printing of the contents of a tape" of an alleged wiretapped
conversation involving the President about fixing votes in the 2004

national elections. Gonzales said that he was going to start

with Inq7.net, a joint venture between the Philippine Daily Inquirer and
GMA7 television network, because by the very nature of the Internet
medium, it was able to disseminate the contents of the tape more widely.
He then expressed his intention of inviting the editors and managers of
Inq7.net and GMA7 to a probe, and supposedly declared, "I [have] asked
the NBI to conduct a tactical interrogation of all concerned." 10

are false and/or fraudulent after a prosecution or appropriate

investigation, the concerned radio and television companies are
hereby warned that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be just
cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of
the licenses or authorizations issued to the said companies.
In addition to the above, the [NTC] reiterates the pertinent NTC
circulars on program standards to be observed by radio and
television stations. NTC Memorandum Circular 111-12-85
explicitly states, among others, that "all radio broadcasting and
television stations shall, during any broadcast or telecast, cut off
from the air the speech, play, act or scene or other matters being
broadcast or telecast the tendency thereof is to disseminate false
information or such other willful misrepresentation, or to propose
and/or incite treason, rebellion or sedition." The foregoing
directive had been reiterated by NTC Memorandum Circular No.
22-89, which, in addition thereto, prohibited radio, broadcasting
and television stations from using their stations to broadcast or
telecast any speech, language or scene disseminating false
information or willful misrepresentation, or inciting, encouraging or
assisting in subversive or treasonable acts.

5. On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued this press release: 11

NTC GIVES FAIR WARNING TO RADIO AND TELEVISION
OWNERS/OPERATORS TO OBSERVE ANTI-WIRETAPPING
LAW AND PERTINENT CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM
STANDARDS
xxx xxx xxx
Taking into consideration the countrys unusual situation, and in
order not to unnecessarily aggravate the same, the
NTC warns all radio stations and television network
owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and
permits issued to them by Government like the Provisional
Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that
said companies shall not use [their] stations for the broadcasting
or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation.
Relative thereto, it has come to the attention of the [NTC] that
certain personalities are in possession of alleged taped
conversations which they claim involve the President of the
Philippines and a Commissioner of the COMELEC regarding
supposed violation of election laws.
These personalities have admitted that the taped conversations
are products of illegal wiretapping operations.
Considering that these taped conversations have not been duly
authenticated nor could it be said at this time that the tapes
contain an accurate or truthful representation of what was
recorded therein, it is the position of the [NTC] that the continuous
airing or broadcast of the said taped conversations by radio and
television stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or
Certificate of Authority issued to these radio and television
stations. It has been subsequently established that the said tapes

The [NTC] will not hesitate, after observing the requirements

of due process, to apply with full force the provisions of said
Circulars and their accompanying sanctions on erring radio
and television stations and their owners/operators.
6. On June 14, 2005, NTC held a dialogue with the Board of Directors of
the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP). NTC allegedly
assured the KBP that the press release did not violate the constitutional
freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, and the right to
information. Accordingly, NTC and KBP issued a Joint Press
Statement which states, among others, that: 12

NTC respects and will not hinder freedom of the press and the
right to information on matters of public concern. KBP & its
members have always been committed to the exercise of press
freedom with high sense of responsibility and discerning
judgment of fairness and honesty.
NTC did not issue any MC [Memorandum Circular] or Order
constituting a restraint of press freedom or censorship. The NTC
further denies and does not intend to limit or restrict the interview
of members of the opposition or free expression of views.

What is being asked by NTC is that the exercise of press freedom

[be] done responsibly.
KBP has program standards that KBP members will observe in
the treatment of news and public affairs programs. These include
verification of sources, non-airing of materials that would
constitute inciting to sedition and/or rebellion.
The KBP Codes also require that no false statement or willful
misrepresentation is made in the treatment of news or
commentaries.
The supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity
and handled responsibly giving due consideration to the process
being undertaken to verify and validate the authenticity and actual
content of the same."
C. The Petition

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC, "praying for the
issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal
remedies, to annul void proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful,
unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority by the
respondents."13
Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom on
expression and of the press, and the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern,14 petitioner specifically asked this Court:
[F]or [the] nullification of acts, issuances, and orders of
respondents committed or made since June 6, 2005 until the
present that curtail the publics rights to freedom of expression
and of the press, and to information on matters of public concern
specifically in relation to information regarding the controversial
taped conversion of President Arroyo and for prohibition of the
further commission of such acts, and making of such issuances,
and orders by respondents. 15
Respondents16 denied that the acts transgress the Constitution, and
questioned petitioners legal standing to file the petition. Among the
arguments they raised as to the validity of the "fair warning" issued by
respondent NTC, is that broadcast media enjoy lesser constitutional
guarantees compared to print media, and the warning was issued
pursuant to the NTCs mandate to regulate the telecommunications
industry. 17 It was also stressed that "most of the [television] and radio

stations continue, even to this date, to air the tapes, but of late within the
parameters agreed upon between the NTC and KBP." 18
D. The Procedural Threshold: Legal Standing
To be sure, the circumstances of this case make the constitutional
challenge peculiar. Petitioner, who is not a member of the broadcast
media, prays that we strike down the acts and statements made by
respondents as violations of the right to free speech, free expression and
a free press. For another, the recipients of the press statements have not
come forwardneither intervening nor joining petitioner in this action.
Indeed, as a group, they issued a joint statement with respondent NTC
that does not complain about restraints on freedom of the press.
It would seem, then, that petitioner has not met the requisite legal
standing, having failed to allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 19
But as early as half a century ago, we have already held that where
serious constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside if we must, technicalities of
procedure." 20 Subsequently, this Court has repeatedly and consistently
refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and
resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public
interest,21 in keeping with the Court's duty under the 1987 Constitution to
determine whether or not other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them.
Thus, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a
case involves an issue of overarching significance to our society,22 we
therefore brush aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of
this petition,23 seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all
the civil rights, the freedom of expression.The petition raises other
issues like the extent of the right to information of the public. It is
fundamental, however, that we need not address all issues but only
the most decisive one which in the case at bar is whether the acts of
the respondents abridge freedom of speech and of the press.

But aside from the primordial issue of determining whether free

speech and freedom of the press have been infringed, the case at
bar also gives this Court the opportunity: (1) to distill the essence of
freedom of speech and of the press now beclouded by the vagaries
of motherhood statements; (2) to clarify the types of speeches and
their differing restraints allowed by law; (3) to discuss the core
concepts of prior restraint, content-neutral and content-based
regulations and their constitutional standard of review; (4) to
examine the historical difference in the treatment of restraints
between print and broadcast media and stress the standard of
review governing both; and (5) to call attention to the ongoing
blurring of the lines of distinction between print and broadcast
media.
E. Re-examining The law on freedom of speech,
of expression and of the press
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.24
Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle
of every democratic government, and given a preferred right that stands
on a higher level than substantive economic freedom or other liberties.
The cognate rights codified by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution,
copied almost verbatim from the First Amendment of the U.S. Bill of
Rights,25 were considered the necessary consequence of republican
institutions and the complement of free speech.26 This preferred status of
free speech has also been codified at the international level, its
recognition now enshrined in international law as a customary norm that
binds all nations.27
In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem accorded freedom of
expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. 28 This
right was elevated to constitutional status in the 1935, the 1973 and the
1987 Constitutions, reflecting our own lesson of history, both political and
legal, that freedom of speech is an indispensable condition for nearly
every other form of freedom.29 Moreover, our history shows that the
struggle to protect the freedom of speech, expression and the press was,
at bottom, the struggle for the indispensable preconditions for the
exercise of other freedoms.30 For it is only when the people have
unbridled access to information and the press that they will be capable of

rendering enlightened judgments. In the oft-quoted words of Thomas

Jefferson, we cannot both be free and ignorant.
E.1. Abstraction of Free Speech
Surrounding the freedom of speech clause are various concepts that we
have adopted as part and parcel of our own Bill of Rights provision on
this basic freedom.31 What is embraced under this provision was
discussed exhaustively by the Court in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, 32 in which it was held:
At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified
with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
public interest without censorship and punishment. There is to be
no previous restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition,
or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be
a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has
a right to prevent. 33
Gonzales further explained that the vital need of a constitutional
democracy for freedom of expression is undeniable, whether as a means
of assuring individual self-fulfillment; of attaining the truth; of assuring
participation by the people in social, including political, decision-making;
and of maintaining the balance between stability and change.34 As early
as the 1920s, the trend as reflected in Philippine and American decisions
was to recognize the broadest scope and assure the widest latitude for
this constitutional guarantee. The trend represents a profound
commitment to the principle that debate on public issue should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. 35
Freedom of speech and of the press means something more than the
right to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to
lend support to official measures, and to take refuge in the existing
climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence.36 When
atrophied, the right becomes meaningless.37 The right belongs as well -- if
not more to those who question, who do not conform, who differ.38 The
ideas that may be expressed under this freedom are confined not only to
those that are conventional or acceptable to the majority. To be truly
meaningful, freedom of speech and of the press should allow and even
encourage the articulation of the unorthodox view, though it be hostile to
or derided by others; or though such view "induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to

anger."39 To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the thought that

we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us. 40
The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection
to nearly all forms of communication. It protects speech, print and
assembly regarding secular as well as political causes, and is not
confined to any particular field of human interest. The protection covers
myriad matters of public interest or concern embracing all issues, about
which information is needed or appropriate, so as to enable members of
society to cope with the exigencies of their period. The constitutional
protection assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech and free
press for religious, political, economic, scientific, news, or informational
ends, inasmuch as the Constitution's basic guarantee of freedom to
advocate ideas is not confined to the expression of ideas that are
conventional or shared by a majority.
The constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas. The
protection afforded free speech extends to speech or publications that
are entertaining as well as instructive or informative. Specifically,
in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans,41 this Court stated
that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the
broad protection of the clause on freedom of speech and of expression.
While all forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of
freedom of expression clause, the freedom of film, television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom
accorded to newspapers and other print media, as will be
subsequently discussed.
E.2. Differentiation: The Limits & Restraints of Free Speech
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear
that the right to free speech and a free press is not susceptible of any
limitation. But the realities of life in a complex society preclude a literal
interpretation of the provision prohibiting the passage of a law that would
abridge such freedom. For freedom of expression is not an
absolute, 42 nor is it an "unbridled license that gives immunity for every
possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who
abuse this freedom."
Thus, all speech are not treated the same. Some types of speech may
be subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive police
power, in order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or

those of the community or society.43 The difference in treatment is

expected because the relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g.,
political speech, may vary from those of another, e.g., obscene speech.
Distinctions have therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and
evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on various categories
of speech. 44 We have ruled, for example, that in our jurisdiction slander
or libel, lewd and obscene speech, as well as "fighting words" are not
entitled to constitutional protection and may be penalized.45
Moreover, the techniques of reviewing alleged restrictions on speech
(overbreadth, vagueness, and so on) have been applied differently to
each category, either consciously or unconsciously. 46 A study of free
speech jurisprudencewhether here or abroadwill reveal that courts
have developed different tests as to specific types or categories of
speech in concrete situations; i.e., subversive speech; obscene speech;
the speech of the broadcast media and of the traditional print media;
libelous speech; speech affecting associational rights; speech before
hostile audiences; symbolic speech; speech that affects the right to a fair
trial; and speech associated with rights of assembly and petition. 47
Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated
by either or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous
tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a rational
connection has been established between the speech restrained and the
danger contemplated; 48 (b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a
standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and
individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration
of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of
situation; 49 and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial
danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a
right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to
be prevented must be substantive, "extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high." 50
As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied either
the dangerous tendency doctrine or clear and present danger test to
resolve free speech challenges. More recently, we have concluded that
we have generally adhered to the clear and present danger test. 51
E.3. In Focus: Freedom of the Press

Much has been written on the philosophical basis of press freedom as

part of the larger right of free discussion and expression. Its practical
importance, though, is more easily grasped. It is the chief source of
information on current affairs. It is the most pervasive and perhaps most
powerful vehicle of opinion on public questions. It is the instrument by
which citizens keep their government informed of their needs, their
aspirations and their grievances. It is the sharpest weapon in the fight to
keep government responsible and efficient. Without a vigilant press, the
mistakes of every administration would go uncorrected and its abuses
unexposed. As Justice Malcolm wrote in United States v. Bustos:52
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand
a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the
conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp
incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public
life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be
assuaged with the balm of clear conscience.
Its contribution to the public weal makes freedom of the press deserving
of extra protection. Indeed, the press benefits from certain ancillary
rights. The productions of writers are classified as intellectual and
proprietary. Persons who interfere or defeat the freedom to write for the
press or to maintain a periodical publication are liable for damages, be
they private individuals or public officials.
E.4. Anatomy of Restrictions: Prior Restraint, Content-Neutral and
Content-Based Regulations
Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935
Constitution, has recognized four aspects of freedom of the press. These
are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from punishment
subsequent to publication; 53 (3) freedom of access to information; 54 and
(4) freedom of circulation.55
Considering that petitioner has argued that respondents press statement
constitutes a form of impermissible prior restraint, a closer scrutiny of this
principle is in order, as well as its sub-specie of content-based (as
distinguished from content-neutral) regulations.
At this point, it should be noted that respondents in this case deny that
their acts constitute prior restraints. This presents a unique tinge to the
present challenge, considering that the cases in our jurisdiction involving
prior restrictions on speech never had any issue of whether the

governmental act or issuance actually constituted prior restraint. Rather,

the determinations were always about whether the restraint was justified
by the Constitution.
Be that as it may, the determination in every case of whether there is an
impermissible restraint on the freedom of speech has always been based
on the circumstances of each case, including the nature of the
restraint. And in its application in our jurisdiction, the parameters of
this principle have been etched on a case-to-case basis, always
tested by scrutinizing the governmental issuance or act against the
circumstances in which they operate, and then determining the
appropriate test with which to evaluate.
Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or
other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination.56 Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from
government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship,
and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or
judicial branch of the government. Thus, it precludes governmental acts
that required approval of a proposal to publish; licensing or permits as
prerequisites to publication including the payment of license taxes for the
privilege to publish; and even injunctions against publication. Even the
closure of the business and printing offices of certain newspapers,
resulting in the discontinuation of their printing and publication, are
deemed as previous restraint or censorship. 57 Any law or official that
requires some form of permission to be had before publication can be
made, commits an infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy
can be had at the courts.
Given that deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility
against all prior restraints on speech, and any act that restrains speech is
presumed invalid,58 and "any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the
presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows," 59 it
is important to stress not all prior restraints on speech are invalid. Certain
previous restraints may be permitted by the Constitution, but
determined only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act as
against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against.
Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act
constitutes some form of restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction has
to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation, i.e.,
merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely
controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards;60 or
(2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based

on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. 61 The cast of the

restriction determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed
with.
When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral
regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required for its
validity.62 Because regulations of this type are not designed to suppress
any particular message, they are not subject to the strictest form of
judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approachsomewhere between
the mere rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling
interest standard applied to content-based restrictions.63 The test is
called intermediate because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the
validity of a law but also require that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored
to promote an important or significant governmental interest that is
unrelated to the suppression of expression. The intermediate approach
has been formulated in this manner:
A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 64
On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of
speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest
scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the
challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it
pass constitutional muster,65 with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the contentbased restraint will be struck down.66
With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also
show the type of harm the speech sought to be restrained would bring
about especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm
otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech
based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, "but only by
showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a
reality already on ground."67 As formulated, "the question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about

the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question

of proximity and degree."68
The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an
important or substantial government interest, which is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. 69
Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no greater than what is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. 70 A restriction that is so broad
that it encompasses more than what is required to satisfy the
governmental interest will be invalidated. 71 The regulation, therefore,
must be reasonable and narrowly drawn to fit the regulatory purpose,
with the least restrictive means undertaken. 72
Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral
regulation, it is subjected to an intermediate review. A content-based
regulation,73 however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is
measured against theclear and present danger rule. The latter will pass
constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the
restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague. 74
Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged acts in the case at
bar need to be subjected to the clear and present danger rule, as they
are content-based restrictions. The acts of respondents focused solely
on but one objecta specific content fixed as these were on the
alleged taped conversations between the President and a COMELEC
official. Undoubtedly these did not merely provide regulations as to the
time, place or manner of the dissemination of speech or expression.
E.5. Dichotomy of Free Press: Print v. Broadcast Media
Finally, comes respondents argument that the challenged act is valid on
the ground that broadcast media enjoys free speech rights that are lesser
in scope to that of print media. We next explore and test the validity of
this argument, insofar as it has been invoked to validate a content-based
restriction on broadcast media.
The regimes presently in place for each type of media differ from
one other. Contrasted with the regime in respect of books, newspapers,
magazines and traditional printed matter, broadcasting, film and video
have been subjected to regulatory schemes.

The dichotomy between print and broadcast media traces its origins in
the United States. There, broadcast radio and television have been held
to have limited First Amendment protection,75 and U.S. Courts
have excludedbroadcast media from the application of the "strict
scrutiny" standard that they would otherwise apply to content-based
restrictions.76 According to U.S. Courts, the three major reasons why
broadcast media stands apart from print media are: (a) the scarcity of the
frequencies by which the medium operates [i.e., airwaves are physically
limited while print medium may be limitless]; 77 (b) its "pervasiveness" as
a medium; and (c) its unique accessibility to children.78 Because cases
involving broadcast media need not follow "precisely the same approach
that [U.S. courts] have applied to other media," nor go "so far as to
demand that such regulations serve compelling government
interests,"79 they are decided on whether the "governmental
restriction" is narrowly tailored to further a substantial
governmental interest,"80 or the intermediate test.
As pointed out by respondents, Philippine jurisprudence has also echoed
a differentiation in treatment between broadcast and print
media. Nevertheless, a review of Philippine case law on broadcast
media will show thatas we have deviated with the American
conception of the Bill of Rights81 we likewise did not adopt
en masse the U.S. conception of free speech as it relates to broadcast
media, particularly as to which test would govern content-based
prior restraints.
Our cases show two distinct features of this dichotomy. First, the
difference in treatment, in the main, is in the regulatory scheme applied to
broadcast media that is not imposed on traditional print media, and
narrowly confined to unprotected speech (e.g., obscenity, pornography,
seditious and inciting speech), or is based on a compelling government
interest that also has constitutional protection, such as national security
or the electoral process.
Second, regardless of the regulatory schemes that broadcast media is
subjected to, the Court has consistently held that the clear and present
danger test applies to content-based restrictions on media, without
making a distinction as to traditional print or broadcast media.
The distinction between broadcast and traditional print media was first
enunciated in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v.
Dans,82 wherein it was held that "[a]ll forms of media, whether print or
broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech

and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression

continues to be the clear and present danger rule"83
Dans was a case filed to compel the reopening of a radio station which
had been summarily closed on grounds of national security. Although the
issue had become moot and academic because the owners were no
longer interested to reopen, the Court still proceeded to do an analysis of
the case and made formulations to serve as guidelines for all inferior
courts and bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions. Particularly, the
Court made a detailed exposition as to what needs be considered in
cases involving broadcast media. Thus:84
xxx xxx xxx
(3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to
the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression
clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression
continues to be the clear and present danger rule, that words
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent, In
his Constitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570)
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our
decisions which apply the test. More recently, the clear and
present danger test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in behalf of
the Anti-Bases Coalition v. Bagatsing. (4) The clear and present
danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all
embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.
Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot
simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for
government regulation or for the rights of others.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of
the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the
freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser
in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print
media.
The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v.
Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S. 726), confronted with a patently
offensive and indecent regular radio program, explained why

radio broadcasting, more than other forms of communications,

receives the most limited protection from the free expression
clause. First, broadcast media have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens, Material presented
over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in
the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters
may be prohibited from making certain material available to
children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or
television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and
out.
Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.
The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Filipinos. Newspapers and current
books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the
poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular
transportation. Even here, there are low income masses who find
the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their
humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy
high priorities.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The
television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be
simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of
listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be
within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials
broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age,
persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of
different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions
to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor
or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and
immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience
has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject the
utterance.
(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the
particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The
supervision of radio stations-whether by government or through
self-regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent
and sophisticated handling.

The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts

which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and
television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the
start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a
right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason
for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or
pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the most
convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on
public issues, they also deserve special protection.
(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the
vitality of a representative democracy. In the 1918 case of United
States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) this Court was already stressing
that.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of
free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the
abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a
hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged
with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be
too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts.
Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be
exalted.
(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all
forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression
clauses of the Constitution. [Citations omitted]
It is interesting to note that the Court in Dans adopted the arguments
found in U.S. jurisprudence to justify differentiation of treatment (i.e., the
scarcity, pervasiveness and accessibility to children), but only after
categorically declaring that "the test for limitations on freedom of
expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule," for
all forms of media, whether print or broadcast. Indeed, a close
reading of the above-quoted provisions would show that the
differentiation that the Court in Dans referred to was narrowly restricted to
what is otherwise deemed as "unprotected speech" (e.g., obscenity,
national security, seditious and inciting speech), or to validate a licensing
or regulatory scheme necessary to allocate the limited broadcast
frequencies, which is absent in print media. Thus, when this Court
declared in Dans that the freedom given to broadcast media was
"somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and

print media," it was not as to what test should be applied, but the context
by which requirements of licensing, allocation of airwaves, and
application of norms to unprotected speech. 85
In the same year that the Dans case was decided, it was reiterated
in Gonzales v. Katigbak,86 that the test to determine free expression
challenges was the clear and present danger, again without
distinguishing the media.87 Katigbak, strictly speaking, does not treat of
broadcast media but motion pictures. Although the issue involved
obscenity standards as applied to movies,88 the Court concluded its
decision with the following obiter dictum that a less liberal approach
would be used to resolve obscenity issues in television as opposed to
motion pictures:
All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the
concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the
consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a less
liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike
motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way,
television reaches every home where there is a set. Children then
will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs therein
shown..It cannot be denied though that the State as parens
patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the
welfare of the young.
More recently, in resolving a case involving the conduct of exit polls and
dissemination of the results by a broadcast company, we reiterated that
the clear and present danger rule is the test we unquestionably adhere to
issues that involve freedoms of speech and of the press.89
This is not to suggest, however, that the clear and present danger
rule has been applied to all cases that involve the broadcast
media. The rule applies to all media, including broadcast, but only when
the challenged act is a content-based regulation that infringes on free
speech, expression and the press. Indeed, in Osmena v.
COMELEC,90 which also involved broadcast media, the Court refused to
apply the clear and present danger rule to a COMELEC regulation of time
and manner of advertising of political advertisements because the
challenged restriction was content-neutral.91 And in a case involving due
process and equal protection issues, the Court inTelecommunications
and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. COMELEC92 treated a
restriction imposed on a broadcast media as a reasonable condition for
the grant of the medias franchise, without going into which test would
apply.

That broadcast media is subject to a regulatory regime absent in print

media is observed also in other jurisdictions, where the statutory regimes
in place over broadcast media include elements of licensing, regulation
by administrative bodies, and censorship. As explained by a British
author:
The reasons behind treating broadcast and films differently from
the print media differ in a number of respects, but have a
common historical basis. The stricter system of controls seems to
have been adopted in answer to the view that owing to
their particular impact on audiences, films, videos and
broadcasting require a system of prior restraints, whereas it is
now accepted that books and other printed media do not. These
media are viewed as beneficial to the public in a number of
respects, but are also seen as possible sources of harm.93
Parenthetically, these justifications are now the subject of
debate. Historically, the scarcity of frequencies was thought to provide a
rationale. However, cable and satellite television have enormously
increased the number of actual and potential channels. Digital
technology will further increase the number of channels available. But
still, the argument persists that broadcasting is the most influential means
of communication, since it comes into the home, and so much time is
spent watching television. Since it has a unique impact on people and
affects children in a way that the print media normally does not, that
regulation is said to be necessary in order to preserve pluralism. It has
been argued further that a significant main threat to free expressionin
terms of diversitycomes not from government, but from private
corporate bodies. These developments show a need for a reexamination
of the traditional notions of the scope and extent of broadcast media
regulation. 94
The emergence of digital technology -- which has led to the convergence
of broadcasting, telecommunications and the computer industry -- has
likewise led to the question of whether the regulatory model for
broadcasting will continue to be appropriate in the converged
environment.95 Internet, for example, remains largely unregulated, yet the
Internet and the broadcast media share similarities, 96 and the rationales
used to support broadcast regulation apply equally to the Internet.97 Thus,
it has been argued that courts, legislative bodies and the government
agencies regulating media must agree to regulate both, regulate neither
or develop a new regulatory framework and rationale to justify the
differential treatment. 98

F. The Case At Bar

Having settled the applicable standard to content-based restrictions on
broadcast media, let us go to its application to the case at bar. To
recapitulate, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of
the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with
the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule
applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as
it spells out the following: (a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the burden
of proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden; and (e) the quantum of
evidence necessary. On the basis of the records of the case at bar,
respondents who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge
freedom of speech and of the press failed to hurdle the clear and present
danger test. It appears that the great evil which government wants to
prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the antiwiretapping law. The records of the case at bar, however, are confused
and confusing, and respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the
clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the
Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape
recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also
suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one
supposed to be a "complete" version and the other, an "altered"
version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the whos and the
hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the
tapes different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of
its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the
invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the
tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the antiwiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of
different kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct
which even if violated have only an adverse effect on a persons private
comfort but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great
significance but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot
support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of
law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in
adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press.
The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and public
interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the

Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of

speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated
measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine
compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not
be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means,
violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they
breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent
their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and
free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater
evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the
clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the
exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the
feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers
the national security of the State.
This is not all the faultline in the stance of the respondents. We slide to
the issue of whether the mere press statements of the Secretary of
Justice and of the NTC in question constitute a form of content-based
prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. In resolving this
issue, we hold that it is not decisive that the press statements made
by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal
orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were
made by respondents while in the exercise of their official
functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as
Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory
body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on
behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the
rule on prior restraint. The concept of an "act" does not limit itself to
acts already converted to a formal order or official circular.
Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or
circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on
prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be
struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on
the right to free speech and press.
There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on
record. The warnings given to mediacame from no less the NTC, a
regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of the radio
and broadcast media. They also came from the Secretary of Justice, the
alter ego of the Executive, who wields the awesome power to prosecute
those perceived to be violating the laws of the land. After the
warnings, the KBP inexplicably joined the NTC in issuing an ambivalent
Joint Press Statement. After the warnings, petitioner Chavez was left
alone to fight this battle for freedom of speech and of the press. This

silence on the sidelines on the part of some media practitioners is too

deafening to be the subject of misinterpretation.
The constitutional imperative for us to strike down unconstitutional acts
should always be exercised with care and in light of the distinct facts of
each case. For there are no hard and fast rules when it comes to slippery
constitutional questions, and the limits and construct of relative freedoms
are never set in stone. Issues revolving on their construct must be
decided on a case to case basis, always based on the peculiar shapes
and shadows of each case. But in cases where the challenged acts are
patent invasions of a constitutionally protected right, we should be
swift in striking them down as nullities per se. A blow too soon struck
for freedom is preferred than a blow too late.
In VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The writs
of certiorari and prohibition are hereby issued, nullifying the official
statements made by respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005 warning the
media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the
President and other personalities, for constituting unconstitutional prior
restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 148965

7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense.

Respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion.

February 26, 2002

JOSE "JINGGOY" E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application to a particular
party may be unconstitutional. This is the submission of the petitioner
who invokes the equal protection clause of the Constitution in his bid to
be excluded from the charge of plunder filed against him by the
respondent Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings
against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic of the
Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and
members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed
with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint
Resolution1 finding probable cause warranting the filing with the
Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former
President and the other respondents therein. One of the Informations
was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the
respondents was herein petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as
Criminal Case No. 26558, the case was assigned to respondent Third
Division of the Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused was set
on July 10, 2001 and no bail for petitioners provisional liberty was fixed.
On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the
Amended Information on the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No.

On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for
petitioner and his co-accused. On its basis, petitioner and his co-accused
were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus
Motion"2 alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial and
hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly
involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series or combination of overt or
criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail
as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the
Amended Information and be discharged from custody. In the alternative,
petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to be
fixed by respondent court.3
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose
Jinggoy Estradas Motion To Fix Bail On Grounds That An Outgoing
Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts
Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As
To Him."4
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Strike Out So-Called Entry
of Appearance, To Direct Ombudsman To Explain Why He Attributes
Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve Pending Incidents."5
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
denying petitioners "Motion to Quash and Suspend" and "Very Urgent
Omnibus Motion."6 Petitioners alternative prayer to post bail was set for
hearing after arraignment of all accused. The court held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for
lack of merit the following: (1) MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND
dated April 24, 2001 filed by accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada; (2)
MOTION TO QUASH dated June 7, 2001 filed by accused Joseph
Ejercito Estrada; and (3) MOTION TO QUASH (Re: Amended Information
dated 18 April 2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by accused Edward S.
Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of
accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada, his VERY URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION, praying that he be: (1) dropped from the information for plunder

for want of probable cause and (2) discharged from custody immediately
which is based on the same grounds mentioned in this MOTION TO
QUASH AND SUSPEND is hereby DENIED. Let his alternative prayer in
said OMNIBUS MOTION that he be allowed to post bail be SET for
hearing together with the petition for bail of accused Edward S. Serapio
scheduled for July 10, 2001, at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon after the
arraignment of all the accused."7
The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of
the Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to
arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea prompting
respondent court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.8
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:
"1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face
and, as applied to petitioner, and denying him the equal
protection of the laws;
2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete
and sufficient standards;
3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses,
and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not
even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal
liability is personal, not vicarious - results in the denial of
substantive due process;
4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in
one count of the information which amounts to cruel and unusual
punishment totally in defiance of the principle of proportionality."9
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim.
I.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and
as applied to him and denies him the equal protection of the laws.10
The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A.
No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law, has been settled in the case of Estrada

v. Sandiganbayan.11 We take off from the Amended Information which

charged petitioner, together with former President Joseph E. Estrada,
Atty. Edward Serapio, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and
others, with the crime of plunder as follows:
"AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB
Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. "ASIONG
SALONGA" AND a.k.a "JOSE VELARDE", together with Jose
Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES &
Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under
R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed
as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING
THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACYwith his coaccused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth
in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION
NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO
THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of
overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly,
on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL

GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,

KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accusedCHARLIE
ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, AN (sic)JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS
OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
[P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of
theTWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000] tobacco
excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocor Sur
under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie Atong
Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS
PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000
SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR
LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF
MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION
NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50]
AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY,
OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY
REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN
THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00],
MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH

BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI

BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS,
GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER
HIS ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001"12
Petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to
him is principally perched on the premise that the Amended Information
charged him with only one act or one offense which cannot constitute
plunder. He then assails the denial of his right to bail.
Petitioners premise is patently false. A careful examination of the
Amended Information will show that it is divided into three (3) parts: (1)
the first paragraph charges former President Joseph E. Estrada with the
crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie
"Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the
second paragraph spells out in general terms how the accused conspired
in committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four subparagraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts constitutive of
the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and
state the names of the accused who committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in subparagraph (a) of the Amended Informationwhich is of "receiving or
collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the
aggregate amount ofP545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of
gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x."
In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy with former President
Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from
illegal gambling amounting to P545 million. Contrary to petitioners
posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal

gambling "on several instances." The phrase "on several instances"

means the petitioner committed the predicate act in series. To insist
that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission
of only one act or offense despite the phrase "several instances" is to
indulge in a twisted, nay, "pretzel" interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words
"combination" or "series" as they appear in R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada
v. Sandiganbayan,13 we held that where these two terms are to be taken
in their popular, not technical, meaning, the word "series" is synonymous
with the clause "on several instances." "Series" refers to a repetition of
the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The
word "combination" contemplates the commission of at least any two
different predicate acts in any of said items.Plainly, sub-paragraph (a)
of the Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder
committed by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1 (d)
(2) of the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioners stand that in the Ombudsman
Resolution of April 4, 2001 finding probable cause to charge him with
plunder together with the other accused, he was alleged to have received
only the sum of P2 million, which amount is way below the minimum of
P50 million required under R.A. No. 7080. The submission is not borne
out by the April 4, 2001 Resolution of the Ombudsman, recommending
the filing of charges against petitioner and his co-accused, which in
pertinent part reads:
"x x x

xxx

xxx

Respondent Jose Jinggoy Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan,

Metro Manila, appears to have also surreptitious collection of protection
money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is gleaned from the
statements of Gov. Singson himself and the fact that Mayor Estrada, on
at least two occasions, turned over to a certain Emma Lim, an emissary
of the respondent governor, jueteng haul totalling P2 million, i.e., P1
million in January, 2000 and another P1 million in February, 2000. An
alleged "listahan" of jueteng recipients listed him as one "Jingle Bell," as
affirmed by Singson [TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000
SBRC/SCI]."14
Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman
made the finding that P2 million was delivered to petitioner as "jueteng
haul" on "at least two occasions." The P2 million is, therefore, not the

entire sum with which petitioner is specifically charged. This is further

confirmed by the conclusion of the Ombudsman that:
"x x x

xxx

xxx

It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose

Jinggoy Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio and Yolanda Ricaforte,
demanded and received, as bribe money, the aggregate sum of P545
million from jueteng collections of the operators thereof, channeled thru
Gov. Luis Chavit Singson, in exchange for protection from arrest or
interference by law enforcers; x x x."15
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the
Ombudsman failed to establish any probable cause against him for
plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has found probable cause
against the petitioner for which reason it issued a warrant of arrest
against him. Petitioner then underwent arraignment and is now on trial.
The time to assail the finding of probable cause by the Ombudsman has
long passed. The issue cannot be resurrected in this petition.
II.
Next, petitioner contends that "the plunder law does not provide sufficient
and complete standards to guide the courts in dealing with accused
alleged to have contributed to the offense."16 Thus, he posits the following
questions:
"For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at least ten
criminal acts, what penalty do we impose on one who is clearly involved
in only one such criminal act? Is it reclusion perpetua? Or should it be a
lesser penalty? What if another accused is shown to have participated in
three of the ten specifications, what would be the penalty imposable,
compared to one who may have been involved in five or seven of the
specifications? The law does not provide the standard or specify the
penalties and the courts are left to guess. In other words, the courts are
called to say what the law is rather than to apply what the lawmaker is
supposed to have intended."17
Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under
the impression that: (1) he is charged with only one act or offense and (2)
he has not conspired with the other accused named in sub-paragraphs
(b) to (d) of the Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on
him ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A. No.

7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on an accused

similarly situated as he is. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the second
paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to have conspired
with former President Estrada in committing the crime of plunder. His
alleged participation consists in the commission of the predicate acts
specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. If these
allegations are proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will
be no different from that of the former President for in conspiracy, the act
of one is the act of the other. The imposable penalty is provided in
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, viz:
"Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount
or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating
and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court."
III.
Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for "sustaining the
charge against petitioner for alleged offenses and with alleged
conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely
connected contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not
vicarious results in the denial of substantive due process."18
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is
charged not only with the predicate act in sub-paragraph (a) but also with
the other predicate acts in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) & (d) because he is
indicted as a principal and as co-conspirator of the former President. This
is purportedly clear from the first and second paragraphs of the Amended
Information.19
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the
Amended Information vis--vis the provisions of R.A. No. 7080.

The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner

and his other co-accused with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph
names all the accused, while the second paragraph describes in general
how plunder was committed and lays down most of the elements of the
crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate
acts that constitute the crime and name in particular the coconspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act. The
predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond
to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Subparagraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several
instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or
protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of
those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the
offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in
item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Subparagraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or
misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for
the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in item [1] in
the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not
mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators of the former
President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social
Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation,
and collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the
Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde"
account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall under
items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly
committed by the former President in connivance with John Does and
Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the
former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts,
kickbacks, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and deposited
the same under his account name "Jose Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI
Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the
enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear
that all the accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their
individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the
latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is
worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused in subparagraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the former
President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of
clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by

the other accused with the former President as related in the second
paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs
(b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the
predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of
the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with
the former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth
amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman
cannot be faulted for including the predicate acts alleged in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in
four, separate Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will
show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing
multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath
of the Marcos regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed
against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies.Government
prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and
magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former President
to acquire illegal wealth.20 They also found that under the then existing
laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal
Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions,
different time and different personalities. Every transaction constituted
a separate crime and required a separate case and the over-all
conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal and graft
charges. The preparation of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare
but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed
against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan.21 R.A.
No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law22 was enacted precisely to address this
procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate
Bill No. 733, viz:
"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like
kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the use of high office for
personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the
public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may
involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many
states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be
penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public
funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an
entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine
statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a
safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the

previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to

succumb to the corrupting influence of power."
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting
in material damage to the national economy" is made up of a complex
and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore,
different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at
bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a
commonalityto help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information
alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy.
The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each
accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that
each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each
accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle
Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each
unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather,
it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition
of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in
multiple conspiracies commonly involves two structures: (1) the so-called
"wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group
(the "hub") dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups
(the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving the
distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate
business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then
wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.23
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears
similar to a "wheel" conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada
while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the
spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing,
accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge against
the petitioner on the ground that the allegation of conspiracy in the
Amended Information is too general. The fear is even expressed that it

could serve as a net to ensnare the innocent. Their dissents appear to be

inspired by American law and jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in
American criminal law and in common law. Under Philippine law,
conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general rule,
conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a
crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as
in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition. In contrast,
under American criminal law, the agreement or conspiracy itself is
the gravamen of the offense.24 The essence of conspiracy is the
combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish
a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or
unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means.25 Its elements are: agreement to
accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in
furtherance of the illegal purpose; and requisite intent necessary to
commit the underlying substantive offense.26
A study of the United States Code ought to be instructive. It
principally punishes two (2) crimes of conspiracy27 conspiracy to
commit any offense or to defraud the United States, and conspiracy to
impede or injure officer. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the
United States is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371,28 as follows:
"Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United
States. If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency
thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such
persons to any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the
conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy
shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such
misdemeanor."
Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec.
372, viz:
"Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or more persons
in any State, Territory, Possession, or District conspire to prevent, by
force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any

office, trust or place of confidence under the United States, or from

discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like means any officer of
the United States to leave the place, where his duties as an officer are
required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on
account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while
engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to
molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official
duties, each of such persons shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than six years, or both."
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy to commit
any offense against the United States; and (2) conspiracy to defraud the
United States or any agency thereof. The conspiracy to "commit any
offense against the United States" refers to an act made a crime by
federal laws.29 It refers to an act punished by statute.30Undoubtedly,
Section 371 runs the whole gamut of U.S. Federal laws, whether
criminal or regulatory.31These laws cover criminal offenses such as
perjury, white slave traffic, racketeering, gambling, arson, murder, theft,
bank robbery, etc. and also include customs violations, counterfeiting of
currency, copyright violations, mail fraud, lotteries, violations of antitrust
laws and laws governing interstate commerce and other areas of federal
regulation.32 Section 371 penalizes the conspiracy to commit any of
these substantive offenses. The offense of conspiracy is generally
separate and distinct from the substantive offense,33 hence, the court
rulings that acquittal on the substantive count does not foreclose
prosecution and conviction for related conspiracy.34
The conspiracy to "defraud the government" refers primarily to cheating
the United States out of property or money. It also covers interference
with or obstruction of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or
trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.35 It comprehends
defrauding the United States in any manner whatever, whether the fraud
be declared criminal or not.36
The basic difference in the concept of conspiracy notwithstanding, a
study of the American case law on howconspiracy should be alleged will
reveal that it is not necessary for the indictment to include
particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes, in stating the
manner and means of effecting the object of the conspiracy. Such
specificity of detail falls within the scope of a bill of particulars.37 An
indictment for conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the
agreement; (2) the offense-object toward which the agreement was
directed; and (3) the overt acts performed in furtherance of the
agreement.38 To allege that the defendants conspired is, at least, to state

that they agreed to do the matters which are set forth as the substance of
their conspiracy. To allege a conspiracy is to allege an agreement.39 The
gist of the crime of conspiracy is unlawful agreement, and where
conspiracy is charged, it is not necessary to set out the criminal
object with as great a certainty as is required in cases where such
object is charged as a substantive offense.40
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how
Philippine courts and American courts deal with cases challenging
Informations alleging conspiracy on the ground that they lack
particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes. In our
jurisdiction, as aforestated, conspiracy can be alleged in the
Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as
constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a
crime in itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information
charging the offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It requires that the information
for this crime must contain the following averments:
"Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them
shall be included in the complaint or information."
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the
accused, designate the offense given by statute, state the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party,
the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place
where the offense was committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions
constituting the offense should be made in order to meet the standard of
sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its name given by
statute or by reference to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it.41 The information must also state the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances.42 The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in
such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to

know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to

pronounce proper judgment.43 No information for a crime will be sufficient
if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged.44 Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information.45 What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included
therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials
of the specified crimes.46 The requirement of alleging the elements of a
crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his
defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.47
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of
conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set forth in
the complaint or information. For example, the crime of "conspiracy to
commit treason" is committed when, in time of war, two or more persons
come to an agreement to levy war against the Government or to adhere
to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and decide to commit
it.48 The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender owes allegiance
to the Government of the Philippines; (2) that there is a war in which the
Philippines is involved; (3) that the offender and other person or persons
come to an agreement to: (a) levy war against the government, or (b)
adhere to the enemies, to give them aid and comfort; and (4) that the
offender and other person or persons decide to carry out the agreement.
These elements must be alleged in the information.
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when
conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode
of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less
necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because
conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged.The
conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all
the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as coprincipals regardless of the degree of their participation in the
crime.49 The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant
will be equally responsible for the acts of others,50 for the act of one is the
act of all.51 In People v. Quitlong,52 we ruled on how conspiracy as the
mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the
Information, viz:
"x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the
information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a
bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused
can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or

circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that

of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact
which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected
or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy,
or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act
of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person,
regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally
guilty with the other or others in the commission of the
crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the
individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary
importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others (People v.
Ilano, 313 SCRA 442). Verily, an accused must know from the
information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts
but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the
components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the
part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence
proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused
with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it
necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of
particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is
enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied upon
to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language,
with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a
manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know
what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may
plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based
on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held
sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the
accused of the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to
commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient
statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges
both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the
respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S. 842-844).
xxx

xxx

xxx

x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree,
expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to actually
pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the accused have
confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a

community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit

the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of
the usual usage of the words "conspired" or "confederated" or the
phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the information
in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the
agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the
community of design among the accused must be conveyed such
as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and
synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the
conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the
information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a
matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of
evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy
when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be
shown by direct proof but may beinferred from shown acts and conduct of
the accused.
xxx

xxx

x x x."

Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough

to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in
either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word "conspire," or its
derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc;53 or
(2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner
that a person of common understanding would know what is intended,
and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently
enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.54
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be
confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be required to
prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of
acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a
concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and
actually pursue it.55 A statement of this evidence is not necessary in the
information.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended
Information alleged in general terms how the accused committed
the crime of plunder. It used the words "in connivance/conspiracy with
his co-accused." Following the ruling in Quitlong, these words are
sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former
President in committing the crime of plunder.

V.
We now come to petitioners plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the
pendency of the instant petition before this Court, petitioner filed with
respondent Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Second Motion for Bail for
Medical Reasons." Petitioner prayed that he be allowed to post bail due
to his serious medical condition which is life-threatening to him if he goes
back to his place of detention. The motion was opposed by respondent
Ombudsman to which petitioner replied.
1wphi1

For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001, respondent

Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion for bail. Dr. Roberto V.
Anastacio, a cardiologist of the Makati Medical Center, testified as sole
witness for petitioner.
On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court an
"Urgent Motion for Early/Immediate Resolution of Jose Jinggoy
Estradas Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations."
Petitioner reiterated the motion for bail he earlier filed with respondent
Sandiganbayan.56
On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the motion to
respondent Sandiganbayan for resolution and requiring said court to
make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of December 21, 2001.
On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its Report. Attached
to the Report was its Resolution dated December 20, 2001 denying
petitioners motion for bail for "lack of factual basis."57 Basing its finding
on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the Sandiganbayan found that
petitioner "failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court that
the medical condition of the accused requires that he be confined at
home and for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail."58
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by
Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt
is strong, to wit:
"Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,

regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution."59
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based
on Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital
offenses hinge on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of
the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail
hearings wherein both the prosecution and the defense are afforded
sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence. The burden of
proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt.60
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter
requires evidentiary hearing that should be conducted by the
Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based its
Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the reception of medical
evidence only and which evidence was given in September 2001, five
months ago. The records do not show that evidence on petitioners guilt
was presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should
conduct hearings to determine if the evidence of petitioners guilt is
strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the
respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176944

SECOND DIVISION

a. Lt. Gen. Ligot and immediate family

March 6, 2013

The Ombudsmans complaint alleges that Lt. Gen. Ligot served in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 33 years and 2 months, from
April 1, 1966 as a cadet until his retirement on August 17, 2004.9 He and
Mrs. Ligot have four children, namely: Paulo Y. Ligot, Riza Y. Ligot,

RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, ERLINDA Y. LIGOT, PAULO Y.

LIGOT, RIZA Y. LIGOT, and MIGUEL Y. LIGOT, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNCIL, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
In this petition for certiorari,1 retired Lieutenant General (Lt. Gen.) Jacinto
C. Ligot, Erlinda Y. Ligot (Mrs. Ligot), Paulo Y. Ligot, Riza Y. Ligot, and
Miguel Y. Ligot (petitioners) claim that the Court of Appeals (CA) acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it issued its January 12, 2007 resolution2 in CA G.R. SP No. 90238.
This assailed resolution affirmed in toto the CAs earlier January 4, 2006
resolution3 extending the freeze order issued against the Ligots
properties for an indefinite period of time.

George Y. Ligot and Miguel Y. Ligot, who have all reached the age of
majority at the time of the filing of the complaint.10
Lt. Gen. Ligot declared in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net
Worth (SALN) that as of December 31, 2003, he had assets in the total
amount of Three Million Eight Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand and Three
Pesos (P3,848,003.00).11 In contrast, his declared assets in his 1982
SALN amounted to only One Hundred Five Thousand Pesos
(P105,000.00).12
Aside from these declared assets, the Ombudsmans investigation
revealed that Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family had other properties and bank
accounts, not declared in his SALN, amounting to at least Fifty Four
Million One Thousand Two Hundred Seventeen Pesos (P54,001,217.00).
These undeclared assets consisted of the following:

BACKGROUND FACTS
On June 27, 2005, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), filed an
Urgent Ex-Parte Application for the issuance of a freeze order with the
CA against certain monetary instruments and properties of the
petitioners, pursuant to Section 104 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9160, as
amended (otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001).
This application was based on the February 1, 2005 letter of the Office of
the Ombudsman to the AMLC, recommending that the latter conduct an
investigation on Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family for possible violation of RA
No. 9160.5
In support of this recommendation, the Ombudsman attached the
Complaint6 it filed against the Ligots for perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code, and for violations of Section 87 of RA No. 67138 and
RA No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Ombudsmans Complaint

Undeclared Assets
Jacinto Ligots undeclared assets
Jacinto Ligots childrens assets

Amount
P
41,185,583.5313
1,744,035.6014

Tuition fees and travel expenses

P 2,308,047.8715

Edgardo Yambaos assets relative to the real

properties

P 8,763,550.0016

Total

P 54,001,217.00

Bearing in mind that Lt. Gen. Ligots main source of income was his
salary as an officer of the AFP,17 and given his wife and childrens lack of
any other substantial sources of income,18 the Ombudsman declared the
assets registered in Lt. Gen. Ligots name, as well as those in his wifes
and childrens names, to be illegally obtained and unexplained wealth,
pursuant to the provisions of RA No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeiture in
Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired

by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings

Therefor).
b. Edgardo Tecson Yambao
The Ombudsmans investigation also looked into Mrs. Ligots younger
brother, Edgardo Tecson Yambao. The records of the Social Security
System (SSS) revealed that Yambao had been employed in the private
sector from 1977 to 1994. Based on his contributions to the SSS,
Yambao did not have a substantial salary during his employment. While
Yambao had an investment with Mabelline Foods, Inc., the Ombudsman
noted that this company only had a net income of P5,062.96 in 2002
and P693.67 in 2003.19 Moreover, the certification from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue stated that Yambao had no record of any annual
Individual Income
Tax Return filed for the calendar year 1999 up to the date of the
investigation.
Despite Yambaos lack of substantial income, the records show that he
has real properties and vehicles registered in his name, amounting to
Eight Million Seven Hundred Sixty Three Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Pesos (P8,763,550.00), which he acquired from 1993 onwards. The
Office of the Ombudsman further observed that in the documents it
examined, Yambao declared three of the Ligots addresses as his own.

On May 25, 2005, the AMLC issued Resolution No. 52, Series of 2005,
directing the Executive Director of the AMLC Secretariat to file an
application for a freeze order against the properties of Lt. Gen. Ligot and
the members of his family with the CA.22 Subsequently, on June 27,
2005, the Republic filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Application with the appellate
court for the issuance of a Freeze Order against the properties of the
Ligots and Yambao.
The appellate court granted the application in its July 5, 2005 resolution,
ruling that probable cause existed that an unlawful activity and/or money
laundering offense had been committed by Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family,
including Yambao, and that the properties sought to be frozen are related
to the unlawful activity or money laundering offense. Accordingly, the CA
issued a freeze order against the Ligots and Yambaos various bank
accounts, web accounts and vehicles, valid for a period of 20 days from
the date of issuance.
On July 26, 2005, the Republic filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of
Effectivity of Freeze Order, arguing that if the bank accounts, web
accounts and vehicles were not continuously frozen, they could be
placed beyond the reach of law enforcement authorities and the
governments efforts to recover the proceeds of the Ligots unlawful
activities would be frustrated. In support of its motion, it informed the CA
that the Ombudsman was presently investigating the following cases
involving the Ligots:

From these circumstances, the Ombudsman concluded that Yambao Case Number
acted as a dummy and/or nominee of the Ligot spouses, and all the
properties registered in Yambaos name actually belong to the Ligot OMB-P-C-05- 0523
family.
OMB-P-C-05- 0003
Urgent Ex-Parte Freeze Order Application

OMB-P-C-05- 0184

Complainant(s)

Nature

Wilfredo Garrido

Plunder

AGIO Gina Villamor, et al.

Perjury

Field Investigation Office

Violation of RA No. 3019, Section

3(b); Perjury under Article 183,
Revised Penal Code in relation to
Section 11 of RA No. 6713;
Forfeiture Proceedings in Relation
RA No. 1379

As a result of the Ombudsmans complaint, the Compliance and

Investigation staff (CIS) of the AMLC conducted a financial investigation,
which revealed the existence of the Ligots various bank accounts with
several financial institutions.20 On April 5, 2005, the Ombudsman for the
Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers issued a resolution holding
OMB-P-C-05-0352
David Odilao
Malicious Mischief; Violation of
that probable cause exists that Lt. Gen. Ligot violated Section 8, in
Section 20, RA No. 7856
relation to Section 11, of RA No. 6713, as well as Article 18321 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Finding merit in the Republics arguments, the CA granted the motion in
its September 20, 2005 resolution, extending the freeze order until after

all the appropriate proceedings and/or investigations have been

terminated.
On September 28, 2005, the Ligots filed a motion to lift the extended
freeze order, principally arguing that there was no evidence to support
the extension of the freeze order. They further argued that the extension
not only deprived them of their property without due process; it also
punished them before their guilt could be proven. The appellate court
subsequently denied this motion in its January 4, 2006 resolution.
Meanwhile, on November 15, 2005, the "Rule of Procedure in Cases of
Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary
Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to
an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense under Republic Act
No. 9160, as Amended"23 (Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases) took effect.
Under this rule, a freeze order could be extended for a maximum period
of six months.
On January 31, 2006, the Ligots filed a motion for reconsideration of the
CAs January 4, 2006 resolution, insisting that the freeze order should be
lifted considering: (a) no predicate crime has been proven to support the
freeze orders issuance; (b) the freeze order expired six months after it
was issued on July 5, 2005; and (c) the freeze order is provisional in
character and not intended to supplant a case for money laundering.
When the CA denied this motion in its resolution dated January 12, 2007,
the Ligots filed the present petition.
THE PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
Lt. Gen. Ligot argues that the appellate court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it extended
the freeze order issued against him and his family even though no
predicate crime had been duly proven or established to support the
allegation of money laundering. He also maintains that the freeze order
issued against them ceased to be effective in view of the 6-month
extension limit of freeze orders provided under the Rule in Civil Forfeiture
Cases. The CA, in extending the freeze order, not only unduly deprived
him and his family of their property, in violation of due process, but also
penalized them before they had been convicted of the crimes they stand
accused of.
THE REPUBLICS ARGUMENTS

In opposition, the Republic claims that the CA can issue a freeze order
upon a determination that probable cause exists, showing that the
monetary instruments or properties subject of the freeze order are related
to the unlawful activity enumerated in RA No. 9160. Contrary to the
petitioners claims, it is not necessary that a formal criminal charge must
have been previously filed against them before the freeze order can be
issued.
The Republic further claims that the CAs September 20, 2005 resolution,
granting the Republics motion to extend the effectivity of the freeze
order, had already become final and executory, and could no longer be
challenged. The Republic notes that the Ligots erred when they filed what
is effectively a second motion for reconsideration in response to the CAs
January 4, 2006 resolution, instead of filing a petition for review on
certiorari via Rule 45 with this Court. Under these circumstances, the
assailed January 4, 2006 resolution granting the freeze order had already
attained finality when the Ligots filed the present petition before this
Court.
THE COURTS RULING
We find merit in the petition.
I. Procedural aspect
a. Certiorari not proper remedy to assail freeze order; exception
Section 57 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases explicitly provides the
remedy available in cases involving freeze orders issued by the CA:
Section 57. Appeal. - Any party aggrieved by the decision or ruling of the
court may appeal to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appeal shall not stay the
enforcement of the subject decision or final order unless the Supreme
Court directs otherwise. [italics supplied]
From this provision, it is apparent that the petitioners should have filed a
petition for review on certiorari, and not a petition for certiorari, to assail
the CA resolution which extended the effectivity period of the freeze order
over their properties.
Even assuming that a petition for certiorari is available to the petitioners,
a review of their petition shows that the issues they raise (i.e., existence

of probable cause to support the freeze order; the applicability of the 6month limit to the extension of freeze orders embodied in the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture) pertain to errors of judgment
allegedly committed by the CA, which fall outside the Courts limited
jurisdiction when resolving certiorari petitions. As held in People v. Court
of Appeals:24

Without challenging the validity of the fixed 6-month extension period, the
Republic nonetheless asserts that the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases does
not apply to the present case because the CA had already resolved the
issues regarding the extension of the freeze order before the

In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It

is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and
resolve questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of
judgment. Errors of judgment of the trial court are to be resolved by the
appellate court in the appeal by and of error or via a petition for review on
certiorari in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Certiorari will
issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a remedy to correct
errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one in which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only
by an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was
issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is
correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be
issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence
of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its
conclusions of law. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any
alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to
nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.25 (citations
omitted; italics supplied)

This reasoning fails to convince us.

Clearly, the Ligots should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and
not what is effectively a second motion for reconsideration (nor an
original action of certiorari after this second motion was denied), within
fifteen days from receipt of the CAs January 4, 2006 resolution. To
recall, this resolution denied the petitioners motion to lift the extended
freeze order which is effectively a motion for reconsideration of the CA
ruling extending the freeze order indefinitely.26

c. Subsequent events

However, considering the issue of due process squarely brought before

us in the face of an apparent conflict between Section 10 of RA No. 9160,
as amended, and Section 53(b) of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases, this
Court finds it imperative to relax the application of the rules of procedure
and resolve this case on the merits in the interest of justice.27
b. Applicability of 6-month extension period under the Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases

Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect.

Notably, the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect on December
15, 2005. Section 59 provides that it shall "apply to all pending civil
forfeiture cases or petitions for freeze order" at the time of its effectivity.
A review of the record reveals that after the CA issued its September 20,
2005 resolution extending the freeze order, the Ligots filed a motion to lift
the extended freeze order on September 28, 2005. Significantly, the CA
only acted upon this motion on January 4, 2006, when it issued a
resolution denying it.
While denominated as a Motion to Lift Extended Freeze Order, this
motion was actually a motion for reconsideration, as it sought the
reversal of the assailed CA resolution. Since the Ligots motion for
reconsideration was still pending resolution at the time the Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases came into effect on December 15, 2005, the Rule
unquestionably applies to the present case.

During the pendency of this case, the Republic manifested that on

September 26, 2011, it filed a Petition for Civil Forfeiture with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. On September 28, 2011, the RTC,
Branch 22, Manila, issued a Provisional Asset Preservation Order and on
October 5, 2011, after due hearing, it issued an Asset Preservation
Order.
On the other hand, the petitioners manifested that as of October 29,
2012, the only case filed in connection with the frozen bank accounts is
Civil Case No. 0197, for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under
RA No. 1379 (entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Lt. Gen. Jacinto
Ligot, et. al."), pending before the Sandiganbayan.
These subsequent developments and their dates are significant in our
consideration of the present case, particularly the procedural aspect.

Under Section 56 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases which provides that
after the post-issuance hearing on whether to modify, lift or extend the
freeze order, the CA shall remand the case and transmit the records to
the RTC for consolidation with the pending civil forfeiture proceeding.
This provision gives the impression that the filing of the appropriate cases
in courts in 2011 and 2012 rendered this case moot and academic.
A case is considered moot and academic when it "ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of
mootness."28 However, the moot and academic principle is not an ironclad rule and is subject to four settled exceptions,29 two of which are
present in this case, namely: when the constitutional issue raised
requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public, and when the case is capable of repetition, yet
evading review.
The apparent conflict presented by the limiting provision of the Rule in
Civil Forfeiture Cases, on one hand, and the very broad judicial discretion
under RA No. 9160, as amended, on the other hand, and the uncertainty
it casts on an individuals guaranteed right to due process indubitably call
for the Courts exercise of its discretion to decide the case, otherwise
moot and academic, under those two exceptions, for the future guidance
of those affected and involved in the implementation of RA No. 9160, as
amended.
Additionally, we would be giving premium to the governments failure to
file an appropriate case until only after six years (despite the clear
provision of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases) were we to dismiss the
petition because of the filing of the forfeiture case during the pendency of
the case before the Court. The sheer length of time and the constitutional
violation involved, as will be discussed below, strongly dissuade us from
dismissing the petition on the basis of the "moot and academic" principle.
The Court should not allow the seeds of future violations to sprout by
hiding under this principle even when directly confronted with the glaring
issue of the respondents violation of the petitioners due process right30 an issue that the respondent itself chooses to ignore.
We shall discuss the substantive relevance of the subsequent
developments and their dates at length below.
II. Substantive aspect

a. Probable cause exists to support the issuance of a freeze order

The legal basis for the issuance of a freeze order is Section 10 of RA No.
9160, as amended by RA No. 9194, which states:
Section 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. The Court of
Appeals, upon application ex parte by the AMLC and after determination
that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in
any way related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section
3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall be effective immediately.
The freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless
extended by the court. [italics supplied]
The Ligots claim that the CA erred in extending the effectivity period of
the freeze order against them, given that they have not yet been
convicted of committing any of the offenses enumerated under RA No.
9160 that would support the AMLCs accusation of money-laundering
activity.
We do not see any merit in this claim. The Ligots argument is founded
on a flawed understanding of probable cause in the context of a civil
forfeiture proceeding31 or freeze order application.32
Based on Section 10 quoted above, there are only two requisites for the
issuance of a freeze order: (1) the application ex parte by the AMLC and
(2) the determination of probable cause by the CA.33 The probable cause
required for the issuance of a freeze order differs from the probable
cause required for the institution of a criminal action, and the latter was
not an issue before the CA nor is it an issue before us in this case.
As defined in the law, the probable cause required for the issuance of a
freeze order refers to "such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious man to believe that an unlawful
activity and/or a money laundering offense is about to be, is being or has
been committed and that the account or any monetary instrument or
property subject thereof sought to be frozen is in any way related to said
unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense."34
In other words, in resolving the issue of whether probable cause exists,
the CAs statutorily-guided determinations focus is not on the probable
commission of an unlawful activity (or money laundering) that the Office
of the Ombudsman has already determined to exist, but on whether the

bank accounts, assets, or other monetary instruments sought to be

frozen are in any way related to any of the illegal activities enumerated
under RA No. 9160, as amended.35 Otherwise stated, probable cause
refers to the sufficiency of the relation between an unlawful activity and
the property or monetary instrument which is the focal point of Section 10
of RA No. 9160, as amended. To differentiate this from any criminal case
that may thereafter be instituted against the same respondent, the Rule
in Civil Forfeiture Cases expressly provides
SEC. 28. Precedence of proceedings. - Any criminal case relating to an
unlawful activity shall be given precedence over the prosecution of any
offense or violation under Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, without
prejudice to the filing of a separate petition for civil forfeiture or the
issuance of an asset preservation order or a freeze order. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. [italics
supplied; emphases ours]
Section 10 of RA No. 9160 (allowing the extension of the freeze order)
and Section 28 (allowing a separate petition for the issuance of a freeze
order to proceed independently) of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases are
only consistent with the very purpose of the freeze order, which
specifically is to give the government the necessary time to prepare its
case and to file the appropriate charges without having to worry about the
possible dissipation of the assets that are in any way related to the
suspected illegal activity. Thus, contrary to the Ligots claim, a freeze
order is not dependent on a separate criminal charge, much less does it
depend on a conviction.
That a freeze order can be issued upon the AMLCs ex parte application
further emphasizes the laws consideration of how critical time is in these
proceedings. As we previously noted in Republic v. Eugenio, Jr.,36 "to
make such freeze order anteceded by a judicial proceeding with notice to
the account holder would allow for or lead to the dissipation of such funds
even before the order could be issued."
It should be noted that the existence of an unlawful activity that would
justify the issuance and the extension of the freeze order has likewise
been established in this case.
From the ex parte application and the Ombudsmans complaint, we glean
that Lt. Gen. Ligot himself admitted that his income came from his salary
as an officer of the AFP. Yet, the Ombudsmans investigation revealed
that the bank accounts, investments and properties in the name of Lt.

Gen. Ligot and his family amount to more than Fifty-Four Million Pesos
(P54,000,000.00). Since these assets are grossly disproportionate to Lt.
Gen. Ligots income, as well as the lack of any evidence that the Ligots
have other sources of income, the CA properly found that probable cause
exists that these funds have been illegally acquired. On the other hand,
the AMLCs verified allegations in its ex parte application, based on the
complaint filed by the Ombudsman against Ligot and his family for
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, clearly sustain the
CAs finding that probable cause exists that the monetary instruments
subject of the freeze order are related to, or are the product of, an
unlawful activity.
b. A freeze order, however, cannot be issued for an indefinite period
Assuming that the freeze order is substantively in legal order, the Ligots
now assert that its effectiveness ceased after January 25, 2006 (or six
months after July 25, 2005 when the original freeze order first expired),
pursuant to Section 53(b) of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases (A.M. No.
05-11-04-SC). This section states:
Section 53. Freeze order.
xxxx
(b) Extension. On motion of the petitioner filed before the expiration of
twenty days from issuance of a freeze order, the court may for good
cause extend its effectivity for a period not exceeding six months. [italics
supplied; emphasis ours]
We find merit in this claim.
A freeze order is an extraordinary and interim relief37 issued by the CA to
prevent the dissipation, removal, or disposal of properties that are
suspected to be the proceeds of, or related to, unlawful activities as
defined in Section 3(i) of RA No. 9160, as amended.38 The primary
objective of a freeze order is to temporarily preserve monetary
instruments or property that are in any way related to an unlawful activity
or money laundering, by preventing the owner from utilizing them during
the duration of the freeze order.39 The relief is pre-emptive in character,
meant to prevent the owner from disposing his property and thwarting the
States effort in building its case and eventually filing civil forfeiture
proceedings and/or prosecuting the owner.

Our examination of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended,

from the point of view of the freeze order that it authorizes, shows that
the law is silent on the maximum period of time that the freeze order can
be extended by the CA. The final sentence of Section 10 of the AntiMoney Laundering Act of 2001 provides, "the freeze order shall be for a
period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court." In contrast,
Section 55 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases qualifies the grant of
extension "for a period not exceeding six months" "for good cause"
shown.
We observe on this point that nothing in the law grants the owner of the
"frozen" property any substantive right to demand that the freeze order be
lifted, except by implication, i.e., if he can show that no probable cause
exists or if the 20-day period has already lapsed without any extension
being requested from and granted by the CA. Notably, the Senate
deliberations on RA No. 9160 even suggest the intent on the part of our
legislators to make the freeze order effective until the termination of the
case, when necessary.40
The silence of the law, however, does not in any way affect the Courts
own power under the Constitution to "promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights xxx and procedure in
all courts."41 Pursuant to this power, the Court issued A.M. No. 05-11-04SC, limiting the effectivity of an extended freeze order to six months to
otherwise leave the grant of the extension to the sole discretion of the
CA, which may extend a freeze order indefinitely or to an unreasonable
amount of time carries serious implications on an individuals
substantive right to due process.42 This right demands that no person be
denied his right to property or be subjected to any governmental action
that amounts to a denial.43 The right to due process, under these terms,
requires a limitation or at least an inquiry on whether sufficient
justification for the governmental action.44
In this case, the law has left to the CA the authority to resolve the issue of
extending the freeze order it issued. Without doubt, the CA followed the
law to the letter, but it did so by avoiding the fundamental laws command
under its Section 1, Article III. This command, the Court under its
constitutional rule-making power sought to implement through Section
53(b) of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases which the CA erroneously
assumed does not apply.
The Ligots case perfectly illustrates the inequity that would result from
giving the CA the power to extend freeze orders without limitations. As
narrated above, the CA, via its September 20, 2005 resolution, extended

the freeze order over the Ligots various bank accounts and personal
properties "until after all the appropriate proceedings and/or
investigations being conducted are terminated."45 By its very terms, the
CA resolution effectively bars the Ligots from using any of the property
covered by the freeze order until after an eventual civil forfeiture
proceeding is concluded in their favor and after they shall have been
adjudged not guilty of the crimes they are suspected of committing.
These periods of extension are way beyond the intent and purposes of a
freeze order which is intended solely as an interim relief; the civil and
criminal trial courts can very well handle the disposition of properties
related to a forfeiture case or to a crime charged and need not rely on the
interim relief that the appellate court issued as a guarantee against loss
of property while the government is preparing its full case. The term of
the CAs extension, too, borders on inflicting a punishment to the Ligots,
in violation of their constitutionally protected right to be presumed
innocent, because the unreasonable denial of their property comes
before final conviction.
In more concrete terms, the freeze order over the Ligots properties has
been in effect since 2005, while the civil forfeiture case per the
Republics manifestation was filed only in 2011 and the forfeiture case
under RA No. 1379 per the petitioners manifestation was filed only in
2012. This means that the Ligots have not been able to access the
properties subject of the freeze order for six years or so simply on the
basis of the existence of probable cause to issue a freeze order, which
was intended mainly as an interim preemptive remedy.
As correctly noted by the petitioners, a freeze order is meant to have a
temporary effect; it was never intended to supplant or replace the actual
forfeiture cases where the provisional remedy - which means, the remedy
is an adjunct of or an incident to the main action of asking for the
issuance of an asset preservation order from the court where the petition
is filed is precisely available. For emphasis, a freeze order is both a
preservatory and preemptive remedy.
To stress, the evils caused by the laws silence on the freeze orders
period of effectivity46 compelled this Court to issue the Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases. Specifically, the Court fixed the maximum allowable
extension on the freeze orders effectivity at six months. In doing so, the
Court sought to balance the States interest in going after suspected
money launderers with an individuals constitutionally-protected right not
to be deprived of his property without due process of law, as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.

To our mind, the six-month extension period is ordinarily sufficient for the
government to act against the suspected money launderer and to file the
appropriate forfeiture case against him, and is a reasonable period as
well that recognizes the property owners right to due process. In this
case, the period of inaction of six years, under the circumstances,
already far exceeded what is reasonable.
We are not unmindful that the State itself is entitled to due process. As a
due process concern, we do not say that the six-month period is an
inflexible rule that would result in the automatic lifting of the freeze order
upon its expiration in all instances. An inflexible rule may lend itself to
abuse - to the prejudice of the States legitimate interests - where the
property owner would simply file numerous suits, questioning the freeze
order during the six-month extension period, to prevent the timely filing of
a money laundering or civil forfeiture case within this period. With the
limited resources that our government prosecutors and investigators
have at their disposal, the end-result of an inflexible rule is not difficult to
see.
1wphi1

We observe, too, that the factual complexities and intricacies of the case
and other matters that may be beyond the governments prosecutory
agencies control may contribute to their inability to file the corresponding
civil forfeiture case before the lapse of six months. Given these
considerations, it is only proper to strike a balance between the
individuals right to due process and the governments interest in curbing
criminality, particularly money laundering and the predicate crimes
underlying it.
Thus, as a rule, the effectivity of a freeze order may be extended by the
CA for a period not exceeding six months. Before or upon the lapse of
this period, ideally, the Republic should have already filed a case for civil
forfeiture against the property owner with the proper courts and
accordingly secure an asset preservation order or it should have filed the
necessary information.47 Otherwise, the property owner should already be
able to fully enjoy his property without any legal process affecting it.
However, should it become completely necessary for the Republic to
further extend the duration of the freeze order, it should file the necessary
motion before the expiration of the six-month period and explain the
reason or reasons for its failure to file an appropriate case and justify the
period of extension sought. The freeze order should remain effective prior
to the resolution by the CA, which is hereby directed to resolve this kind
of motion for extension with reasonable dispatch.

In the present case, we note that the Republic has not offered any
explanation why it took six years (from the time it secured a freeze order)
before a civil forfeiture case was filed in court, despite the clear tenor of
the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases allowing the extension of a freeze order
for only a period of six months. All the Republic could proffer is its
temporal argument on the inapplicability of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture
Cases; in effect, it glossed over the squarely-raised issue of due process.
Under these circumstances, we cannot but conclude that the continued
extension of the freeze order beyond the six-month period violated the
Ligots right to due process; thus, the CA decision should be reversed.
We clarify that our conclusion applies only to the CA ruling and does not
affect the proceedings and whatever order or resolution the RTC may
have issued in the presently pending civil cases for forfeiture. We make
this clarification to ensure that we can now fully conclude and terminate
this CA aspect of the case.
As our last point, we commend the fervor of the CA in assisting the
States efforts to prosecute corrupt public officials. We remind the
appellate court though that the governments anti-corruption drive cannot
be done at the expense of cherished fundamental rights enshrined in our
Constitution. So long as we continue to be guided by the Constitution and
the rule of law, the Court cannot allow the justification of governmental
action on the basis of the noblest objectives alone. As so oft-repeated,
the end does not justify the means. Of primordial importance is that the
means employed must be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere
expediency will certainly not excuse constitutional shortcuts.48
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and LIFT
the freeze order issued by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No.
90238. This lifting is without prejudice to, and shall not affect, the
preservation orders that the lower courts have ordered on the same
properties in the cases pending before them. Pursuant to Section 56 of
A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, the Court of Appeals is hereby ordered to remand
the case and to transmit the records to the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 22, where the civil forfeiture proceeding is pending, for
consolidation therewith as may be appropriate.
SO ORDERED.