Professional Documents
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Legal Ethics Cases
Legal Ethics Cases
Cases 1-13
1. FIDELA VDA DE ENRIQUEZ V. ATTY MANUEL G.SAN JOSE
SECOND DIVISION
FIDELA VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ,
Complainant,
- versus -
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an administrative complaint [1] for disbarment filed by Fidela Vda. De Enriquez against
respondent Atty. Manuel G. San Jose for gross negligence.
Complainant alleged that on August 28, 1989, she hired the services of respondent Atty. San Jose for the
purpose of filing an unlawful detainer case against one Rugerio Alipante, who defaulted in the payment
of monthly rentals on complainants property in Taban, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. According to the
complainant, respondent failed to file the appropriate civil case, despite payment to him of P2,000
attorneys fees, so she decided to withdraw the case from respondent. She demanded the return of the
pertinent documents but despite repeated demands, respondent refused and failed to return the
documents. As a result, the action for unlawful detainer prescribed. Complainant alleged further, that
her daughter who worked for respondent was not paid her salary. Complainant prayed that Atty. San
Jose be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.
In his Comment,[2] respondent denied being negligent. He alleged that he received a letter from
the complainant informing him that the lessee had already agreed to vacate the premises, and thus, the
filing of an unlawful detainer case had become unnecessary. Respondent also explained that he did not
file the case even before receiving complainants letter because there was a vacancy in the sala of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Libmanan-Cabusao, Camarines Sur. He claimed that he informed
complainant that the case could not be filed until a new judge was appointed, but he promised to file
the case before the action prescribed. Respondent claimed further that the attorneys fee wasP3,000
and that he had paid complainants daughter P700 per month.
The Court referred[3] the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation by the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The investigating officer
found that respondent was indeed remiss in the performance of his professional duties as
counsel. According to Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo, the only complete work respondent rendered to
his client was sending a demand letter for the lessee to vacate the subject premises within ten days
from receipt of the demand letter. The Commissioner also found respondents explanation for his failure
to file the case unsatisfactory and concluded that respondent was guilty of negligence in the
performance of his duty as a lawyer for abandonment of his clients cause. The Commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months. [4]
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation of the Commissioner
finding respondent liable for negligence but only imposed the penalty of one-month suspension from
the practice of law.[5]
On December 17, 1997, respondent filed a petition seeking the dismissal of the case against him
and prayed that he be exonerated. He denied being negligent. He claimed that the IBP Board of
Governors misinterpreted the complainants letter, which stated that the complainant and her lessee
Cases 1-13
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1636
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-1662-MTJ]
Present:
- versus -
JUDGE MANUEL E.
CONTRERAS, Municipal Trial
Court, Ocampo, Camarines Sur,
Respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,*
CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA,JJ.
Promulgated:
March 12, 2007
RESOLUTION
Before us is a Verified Complaint [1] dated December 30, 2004 of Julio B. Verzosa (complainant) charging
Judge Manuel E. Contreras (respondent), Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Ocampo, Camarines Sur with
Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave Misconduct (Harassment and Oppression), and Violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, relative to Criminal Case No. 2071, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodrigo
E. Candelaria.
Complainant alleges: he is a forest ranger of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Protected Area Office. On April 14, 2004, while conducting surveillance on treasure hunting
activities in Mt. Isarog Natural Park, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, he and his co-forest rangers discovered an
open pit left in damaged condition, allegedly in violation of Republic Act No. 7586. They likewise found
and confiscated in favor of the Government two metal chains used to overturn huge stones in the
treasure hunting site. He found out later that the alleged treasure hunters were led by a certain Jose
Credo (Credo) a.k.a. Labaw and Basilio Sumalde (Sumalde) a.k.a. Moren. The Executive Director of the
DENR Region V Office thereafter ordered the complainant to continue monitoring the said treasure
hunting site. Because of his involvement in the treasure hunting activities and on the basis of the
testimony of Credo, he was implicated as an accessory in Criminal Case No. 2071 against
Rodrigo Candelaria (Candelaria), et al. for robbery. The said case arose from the alleged information
relayed by respondent to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Officers of Ocampo, Camarines Sur in the
morning of April 18, 2004, which led to the arrest of the principal accused. Respondent did not inhibit
himself from conducting the preliminary investigation despite his proven bias against all of the accused,
in apparent violation of the guiding principles of Judicial Ethics and Responsibilities. Complainant was
not among the persons on board the truck when the same was apprehended by members of the PNP
on April 18, 2004. On the basis of the affidavit executed by Credo, respondent hastily issued an order
for complainant's arrest. After the information reducing the charge from robbery to simple theft was
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur, Judge NiloMalanyaon, in an
Order dated September 13, 2004 dismissed the case due to lack of probable cause. Respondent is the
mastermind behind the treasure hunting activities inOcampo, Camarines Sur and the robbery case for
which complainant was implicated as an accessory was a way of harassing anybody who opposes the
activities.
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The complainant, in branding the respondent Judge as the mastermind of the alleged
treasure hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur, relied heavily on the narrations of
and affidavits executed by Myrna Dacer, Daisy Moran, Salvacion Candelaria, Analiza and
Mary Ann Candelaria. Clearly, these narrations/affidavits are not based on the
complainant's own personal knowledge but rather on the personal knowledge of the said
persons. The same are, thus, considered hearsay because their probative force depends,
in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other tha[n] the
complainant. (Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, April 3, 2001). For being
hearsay, the same are insufficient and inconclusive to determine the participation of the
respondent Judge in the alleged treasure hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur. In
this light, the complainant failed to submit substantial evidence to support his imputation
that the respondent Judge is the mastermind behind the treasure hunting activities
in Ocampo, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the issuance of warrant of arrest, such issue is judicial and may be best
resolved through judicial adjudication. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Judge, if
there are irregularities in the issuance of warrant against the complainant, the latter has
all available judicial remedies, such as filing a motion to quash, an action for habeas
corpus, or a special civil action for certiorari. However, the complainant chose not to avail
of any judicial remedy.
To merit disciplinary sanction, the error or mistake committed by a judge should be
patent, gross, malicious, deliberate, or done in bad faith and absent a clear showing that
the judge has acted errantly; the issue becomes judicial in character and would not
properly warrant the imposition of administrative punishment (Godinez vs. Alano, 303
SCRA 259).
At any rate, the respondent Judge followed the letter of the law, specifically Rule 112,
Section 6, paragraph b, when, prior to the issuance of warrant of arrest against the
complainant, he personally conducted preliminary examination in the form of searching
questions and answers on witness Jose Credo and upon finding probable cause and the
necessity to place the complainant under custody in order [not] to frustrate the ends of
justice.
Anent the respondent Judge's failure to inhibit himself in conducting the preliminary
investigation in Criminal Case No. 2071, he violated Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct (now Canon 3, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct) for taking part in a
proceeding where he has personal knowledge of the disputed evidentiary
facts. Respondent Judge admitted having prior knowledge of the looting and dismantling
of the PLDT Tower in Ocampo, Camarines Sur. As a matter of fact, he was able to visually
confirm the said activities which he later relayed to the local PNP and led to the arrest of
the principal accused in the said case. [The] Judge still conducted the preliminary
investigation.
It should be noted, however, that while no motion for inhibition of respondent judge was
filed by the complainant during the preliminary investigation stage of the case, this does
not mean that respondent can freely act on the same despite the lingering doubt created
in the minds of the parties that he would not be impartial in his judgment.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. While the first
paragraph of Article 137 provides for the specific grounds for disqualification and gives
the judicial officer no discretion to sit in a case, the second paragraph leaves the matter
of inhibition to the sound discretion of the judge (People vs. Serrano, 203 SCRA 17).
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It does not explicitly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition but provides a broad
policy-oriented ground for disqualification of judges for just and valid reasons other than
those enumerated in the first paragraph (Geotina vs. Gonzales, 41 SCRA 66).
The judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case for just and valid reasons (Parayno vs. Meneses, 231 SCRA 807) other than those
mentioned in Rule 137, Section 1. The ultimate test in determining the validity of the
court's inhibition is whether or not the petitioner is deprived of fair and impartial trial
(Associacion de Agricultures deTalisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., 88 SCRA
294) and the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable
Court are our recommendations that:
1.
2.
On September 5, 2006 and September 26, 2006, complainant and respondent manifested their
willingness to submit the case for decision/ resolution based on the pleadings filed, respectively.
We agree with the findings of the OCA except that respondent should be reprimanded instead of being
merely admonished.
Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.[4]
The issue of whether a judge should voluntarily inhibit himself is addressed to his sound discretion
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, which provides that a judge may, in the
exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for a just or valid reason other
than those mentioned in the first paragraph.[5]
However, respondent failed to consider the proscription under Rule
3.12(a) of Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
Rule 3.12. - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding.
In Oktubre v. Velasco,[6] citing Perez v. Suller,[7] we held that the rule on disqualification of judges under
Rule 3.12 and Section 1, Rule 137 [S]tems from the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly
free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A Judge should not handle a case in which
he might be perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule is intended to
preserve the peoples faith and confidence in the courts of justice. [8]
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Anent the allegation that respondent is the mastermind behind the treasure hunting activities
in Ocampo, Camarines Sur, we find the allegation to be devoid of merit.
In Espaol v. Mupas,[22] we held that in administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of
proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints. Thus, when the complainant relies
mainly on second-hand information to prove the charges against the respondent, the complaint is
reduced into a bare indictment or mere speculation. [23] The Court cannot give credence to charges
based on mere suspicion or speculation. In this case, complainant failed to discharge that burden. As
aptly observed by the OCA, complainant has no personal knowledge of the treasure hunting by
respondent as he relied only on the information relayed to him by the relatives of the
accused Candelaria in the robbery case.
Furthermore,
we
find
that
the
affidavits
of
Myrna Dacer,
Daisy
Moran, Salvacion Candelaria, Analiza Candelaria, and Mary Ann Candelaria relate to the incident
surrounding the arrest of Dante Dacer, one of the accused in the robbery case. The police blotter which
is not even a certified true copy is an alleged threat made by respondent against Mary
AnnCandelaria. Nowhere in the said documents do we find that respondent was being tagged as the
mastermind of the treasure hunting. Taken all together, these documents have noprima
facie evidentiary value as to warrant further investigation on the matter.
In Mataga v. Rosete,[24] we held that any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always
be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are by their nature highly penal,
such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation
of judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same will never be countenanced.
[25]
If a judge should be disciplined for misconduct, the evidence against him should be competent. [26]
In fine, we find that respondent is merely guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct in
not recusing himself from conducting preliminary investigation.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Manuel E. Contreras, MTC, Ocampo, Camarines Sur guilty of
violation of Rule 3.12(a), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and isREPRIMANDED with warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
3. PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or OLIVARES REALTY CORPORATION V. ATTY. ARSENIO C.
VILLALON JR.
FIRST DIVISION
PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or A.C. No. 6323
OLIVARES REALTY
CORPORATION,
Complainants, Present:
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
ATTY. ARSENIO C.
VILLALON, JR.,
Respondent. Promulgated:
April 13, 2007
Cases 1-13
R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint[1] for disbarment and suspension[2] against respondent Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. by
Pablo R. Olivares and/or Olivares Realty Corporation for violation of Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the rule on forum shopping.
In his complaint, Olivares alleged that respondents client, Sarah Divina Morales Al-Rasheed, repeatedly
sued him for violations of the lease contract which they executed over a commercial apartment in
Olivares Building in Paraaque.[3]
In 1993, Al-Rasheed filed an action for damages and prohibition with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.[4] The case was dismissed for improper venue.[5]
Six years later, on July 1, 1999, Al-Rasheed filed an action for breach of contract with damages in
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274. [6] The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0233, was
dismissed for failure to prosecute. [7] Al-Rasheed, through counsel Atty. Villalon, sought a review of the
order dismissing Civil Case No. 99-0233 but the Court of Appeals did not give due course to her appeal.
[8]
The subsequent petition for review on certiorari filed in the Supreme Court was likewise denied. [9]
On January 29, 2004, Al-Rasheed re-filed the 1999 suit in the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque,
Branch 274[10] where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 0J-04-009. [11] It was dismissed on the grounds
of res judicata and prescription.[12]
Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he was only performing his legal obligation as a
lawyer to protect and prosecute the interests of his client. [13] He denied that he was forum shopping as
his client, in her certificate of non-forum shopping, [14] disclosed the two previous cases involving the
same cause of action which had been filed and dismissed. [15] Respondent further claims he could not
refuse his clients request to file a new case because Al-Rasheed was the oppressed party in the
transaction.[16]
This Court referred the complaint, together with respondents comment, to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [17]
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP found that respondent assisted Al-Rasheed in
repeatedly suing Olivares for the same cause of action and subject matter. [18] It opined that respondent
should have noted that the 1999 case was dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute. [19] Under Rule 17,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court, such dismissal had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. [20] The
CBD recommended the suspension of respondent for six months with a warning that any similar
infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely.[21]
The IBP adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the proscription on forum shopping. It, however,
modified the recommended penalty to reprimand.[22]
We adopt the findings of the IBP except its recommendation as to the penalty.
All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality.
When they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice. They accept the
sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. [23] As the first Canon of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states, [a] lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes. [24] Moreover, according to the lawyers oath they took, lawyers
should not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same.[25]
With all this in mind, respondent should have refrained from filing the second complaint against
Olivares. He ought to have known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice since it had the effect
10
Everything considered, this Court finds that a reprimand is insufficient and rules instead that
CBDs recommendation for a six-month suspension from the practice of law to be more commensurate
to the violation committed. However, in view of respondents death on September 27, 2006, [30] the
penalty can no longer be imposed on him. This development has, in effect, rendered this disciplinary
case moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
4. FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA V. ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO
FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA, A.C. No. 7298
Complainant, [Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565]
Present:
- versus - QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:
June 25, 2007
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand letter the contents of which threatened
complainant with the filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents.
11
12
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Based on the records, there is truth to complainants assertion that he filed his position paper
on 21 December 2005, after serving a copy of the same to respondent. The IBP stamp on the front page
of said document shows that it was received by the IBP on 21 December 2005. The registry receipt
attached to the same document also shows that it was sent by registered mail to respondent on the
same date. [14]
Complainant, however, omitted to offer any explanation in his petition before this Court for his
failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in his complaint against respondent.
The requirement of a certification against forum shopping was originally required by Circular No.
28-91, dated 8 February 1994, issued by this Court for every petition filed with the Court or the Court of
Appeals. Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification
requirement to include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below this Court and the Court
of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No. 0494 tobecome Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [15] Said rule states that a violation
thereof would constitute contempt of court and be cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions
without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned. [16]
The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took against complainant his
failure to attach the certification against forum shopping to his complaint and consequently dismissed
his complaint. This Court, however, disagrees and, accordingly, grants the petition. However, a remand
of the case to the IBP would unduly prolong its adjudication.
The Courts determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of disbarment proceedings, the
reasons for the certification against forum shopping requirement, complainants subsequent compliance
with the requirement, and the merit of complainants complaint against respondent.
The Court, in the case of In re Almacen,[17] dwelt on the sui generis character of disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, thus:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather
an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to
the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to
speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.[18] [Emphasis supplied]
In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against forum shopping to be
attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such proceedings, must refer to another
administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against the same respondent, because such other
proceedings or action is one that necessarily involves the same issues as the one posed in the
disbarment complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be attached.
Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is to apprise
the Court of the pendency of another action or claim involving the same issues in another court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation. Filing
multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes, [19] which tends to degrade the
13
14
15
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16
On October 7, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline came out
with a Report and Recommendation, stating that the information related by complainant to the
respondent is protected under the attorney-client privilege communication. Prescinding from this
postulate, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal ethics when
she [revealed] information given to her during a legal consultation, and accordingly recommended that
respondent be reprimanded therefor, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty.
Roceles Madianda be reprimanded for revealing the secrets of the complainant.
On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 reading as
follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and , finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering the actuation of revealing information given to respondent during a legal
consultation, Atty. Roceles Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED.
We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding it together.
As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a friend, to
bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek
legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes
upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of
the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate
confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end
of the day, not inclined to handle the clients case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too, is the
fact that no formal professional engagement follows the consultation.Nor will it make any difference
that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship. As we said
in Burbe v. Magulta,[6] -
17
18
versus
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A.C. No. 7136
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 1, 2007
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment[1] before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel
M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the
lawyers oath.
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann)
Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March
2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which
read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you at Megamall.
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the
morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her
whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with
her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two
occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal
house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday celebration at which he saw her
and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation,
he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off
all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words I Love
You on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the
day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
19
20
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21
in
unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or
22
23
24
25
26
27
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28
29
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30
DISCUSSION
31
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Copy of Rae Gammad 32
The Provincial Prosecutor informed the group about the purpose of the
meeting. He said that the prosecutor assigned in RTC Branch 9, Prosecutor
Maria Miranda-Gojar will soon be transferring to the Office of the Regional
State Prosecutor. He asked suggestions from the group on how to go about
the matter of assigning a prosecutor in Branch 9 considering that all
prosecutors have their own court assignment and considering further that the
Presiding Judge of said Branch has a behavioral and attitudinal problem.
Considering that the matter to be discussed involves the problem with the
Presiding Judge, the Provincial Prosecutor requested those prosecutors
[present] to share their experiences in the court with the Presiding Judge.
Prosecutor [Eduardo B.] Quinzon remarked that the judge has a sudden
burst of temper and wild moods, insulting and humiliating lawyers in front of
their clients even in the presence of other people.
Prosecutor Gojar added that the Presiding Judge has a volatile temper and
is fond of insulting and humiliating witnesses and also lawyers. She also said
that during arraignment or trial of cases, he would even call her attention and
would insult the prosecutor who made the Information and Resolution of the
case and even the Chief who approved the same.
III.
Prosecutor [Maria Teresa A.] Mahiwo added that she observed one hearing
[where] the Presiding Judge [scolded] the two private lawyers who [were]
much older than him. She said that being assigned in Branch 9 will not be
good for the health of any prosecutor.
RECOMMENDATION/AGREEMENT
Prosecutor [Elmer M.] Lanuzo opined that because the judge
temperamental, he should be given a fiscal who is not temperamental.
is
Judge Daas also received a letter [13] from city prosecutor Palmarin E. Rubio of Legazpi City. City
prosecutor Rubio stated that the prosecutor assigned to the sala of respondent judge did not want to
comment on the conduct of respondent judge. He suggested that members of an audit team from this
Court be made to observe the proceedings in Branch 9 to see and feel the tension[-]charged
atmosphere in the sala once the trial started.[14]
To his report, Judge Daas attached copies of the comments of the lawyers he interviewed, the
letter of provincial prosecutor Tolosa enclosing the minutes of the meeting of the public prosecutors in
Albay and the letter of city prosecutor Rubio. [15] He concluded that the charges against respondent judge
were true. However, he refrained from recommending any definite action against him and left the
matter to the sound discretion of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). [16]
In its report,[17] the OCA adopted the findings of Judge Daas and made the following
recommendation:
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the
Honorable Court is our recommendation that respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Legazpi City be ADVISED to observe proper judicial
32
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Cases 1-13
Against this backdrop, respondent judge indeed appears arrogant and boastful not only in the
eyes of the anonymous complainant but also to the lawyers who practice in his sala. He revealed a hint
of arrogance in his comment when he professed exasperation over minor procedural mistakes [28] or even
negligible lapses (such as the confusion in the use of collaborate and corroborate). He also displayed a
condescending attitude toward lawyers in the provinces when he implied that they were inferior to
lawyers from Manila. As a judge, he should ensure that his conduct is always above reproach and
perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. He must never show conceit or even an appearance
thereof, or any kind of impropriety.
The dispensation of justice is a joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer. [29] A sense of
shared responsibility which is a crucial factor in the administration of justice is expected of them.
[30]
They should co-exist in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect, not animosity and derision.
Respondent judge antagonized the lawyers (private practitioners, public attorneys and public
prosecutors alike) appearing in his sala by his perceived arrogance and insulting remarks.
Consequently, he impaired the administration of justice.
Respondent judge unduly intervened in the presentation of evidence. He asked more questions
than counsel and conducted direct and cross-examination of witnesses. In so doing, he contravened
Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: [31]
RULE 3.06 While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear
up some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it
should be borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of
the cause or the ascertainment of truth.
34
35
Cases 1-13
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty.
Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing
a spurious last will and testament.
In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never
executed the contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano
Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its execution.
In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee,
save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965.
Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificate [2] of the testator noted in the
acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962. [3] Furthermore, the signature of the testator was
not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation [4] (containing his purported genuine
signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed of
donation were in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed from (sic) one another in all angle[s].
[1]
[5]
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the
purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and
merely copied from their respective voters affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives
division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the
Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the certification of the chief of the archives division dated September
19, 1999 stated:
Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT executed by
BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and is available in this Office[s] files.[6]
Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the complaint against him contained
false allegations: (1) that complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in
question was fake and spurious. He alleged that complainant was not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee,
Sr. and the last will and testament was validly executed and actually notarized by respondent per
affidavit[7] of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint
affidavit[8] of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N. Lee, Jr. xxx. [9]
36
37
38
Cases 1-13
Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries
pertaining to the will in his notarial register. The old Notarial Law required the entry of the following
matters in the notarial register, in chronological order:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule, respondent contended
that he had crossed out a prior entry and entered instead the will of the decedent. As proof, he
presented a photocopy of his notarial register. To reinforce his claim, he presented a photocopy of a
certification[28] stating that the archives division had no copy of the affidavit of Bartolome Ramirez.
A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is shown that the
original is unavailable. The proponent must first prove the existence and cause of the unavailability of
the original,[29] otherwise, the evidence presented will not be admitted. Thus, the photocopy of
respondents notarial register was not admissible as evidence of the entry of the execution of the will
because it failed to comply with the requirements for the admissibility of secondary evidence.
In the same vein, respondents attempt to controvert the certification dated September 21,
1999[30] must fail. Not only did he present a mere photocopy of the certification dated March 15, 2000;
[31]
its contents did not squarely prove the fact of entry of the contested will in his notarial register.
Notaries public must observe with utmost care[32] and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized
deeds will be undermined.[33]
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. This
carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will, considering
that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to
confirm its contents.[34] Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The validity of
the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty. [35]
In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided:
Grounds for revocation of commission. The following derelictions of duty on the part of a
notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient
ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register
touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates. [36]
These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath as a lawyer
and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court [37] and Canon 1[38] and
Rule 1.01[39] of the CPR.
39
Cases 1-13
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.[40] For a lawyer is the servant of the
law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the
dispensation of justice.[41]
While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation imposed on every
citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a
servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover make himself an example for others to emulate. [42] Being a
lawyer, he is supposed to be a model in the community in so far as respect for the law is concerned. [43]
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. [44] A breach of these conditions
justifies disciplinary action against the erring lawyer. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer
upon a finding or acknowledgment that he has engaged in professional misconduct. [45] These sanctions
meted out to errant lawyers include disbarment, suspension and reprimand.
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. [46] We have held in a number of
cases that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution [47] and should not be decreed if any
punishment less severe such as reprimand, suspension, or fine will accomplish the end desired. [48] The
rule then is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. [49]
Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties of his
office. Contrary to his claims that he exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due
regard to the provision of existing law and had complied with the elementary formalities in the
performance of his duties xxx, we find that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question.
Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law. It is, as
well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission [50] and his perpetual disqualification to be
commissioned as a notary public.[51]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of professional
misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyers Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of
the old Notarial Law.
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year and his
notarial commission REVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as
a notary public and as an officer of the court, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment
as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as made part of the personal records of
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
40
Cases 1-13
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
ATTY. CORNELIUS M. GONZALES, Promulgated:
Respondent. February 12, 2008
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a complaint Vivian Villanueva (complainant) filed against Atty. Cornelius M. Gonzales
(respondent) for failure to render legal services and failure to return the money, Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT), and other documents he received from complainant.
The Facts
Sometime in 2000, complainant engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of transferring the
title over a piece of property located in Talisay, Cebu. Complainant, as mortgagee, wanted to transfer
the title to her name because the mortgagor failed to redeem the property within the redemption period
and the sheriff had already issued a sheriffs definite deed of sale in complainants favor. Complainant
gave respondent P8,000 as acceptance fee, the propertys TCT, and other pertinent documents. [1]
After receiving the money, TCT, and other documents, respondent began to avoid
complainant. Whenever complainant went to respondents office at BPI Building, Escario St.,Cebu City,
respondents secretary would tell her that respondent could not be disturbed because he was either
sleeping or doing something important.[2]
In a letter dated 2 July 2003,[3] complainant told respondent that she had lost her trust and confidence in
him and asked him to return the P8,000, TCT, and other documents.Respondent refused to return the
money, TCT, and other documents. After some time and after complainants daughter confronted him,
respondent finally returned the money.However, until now, respondent has not returned the TCT and
other documents.[4] Thus, complainant filed a complaint[5] dated 10 September 2003 against respondent
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
41
42
Cases 1-13
His Clients TCT and Other Documents
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall hold in trust all properties
of his client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.03 of the Code states that a lawyer shall deliver
the property of his client when due or upon demand.
The TCT and other documents are the properties of complainant. Since respondent did not render any
legal service to complainant, he should have returned complainants properties to her. However, he
refuses without any explanation to return them. Respondent has kept the TCT and other documents in
his possession since 2000. He refuses to return them despite receiving a written demand and being
confronted by complainants daughter. In Vda. De Enriquez v. San Jose,[20] the Court held that failure to
return the documents to the client is reprehensible: this Court finds reprehensible respondents failure to
heed the request of his client for the return of the case documents. That respondent gave no reasonable
explanation for that failure makes his neglect patent.
Respondent Failed to Serve His Client
with Fidelity, Competence, and Diligence
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client. Canon 18 of the Code states that [a] lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence. Rule 18.03 of the Code states that [a] lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Clearly, respondent did not serve complainant with fidelity, competence, or diligence. He totally
neglected complainants cause. An attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant
was established when respondent accepted the acceptance fee. Since then, he should have exercised
due diligence in furthering his clients cause and given it his full attention. [21] Respondent did not
render any service.
Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, he is bound by the Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In Emiliano Court Townhouses v. Atty. Dioneda,[22] the Court held that the act of receiving
money as acceptance fee for legal services and subsequently failing to render such service is a clear
violation of Canons 17 and 18.
Respondent Did Not Keep His Client Informed
of the Status of Her Case and Refused to Respond
to Her Requests for Information
Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that [a] lawyer shall keep the client
informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for
information.
Respondent avoided complainant for three years and kept her in the dark. He did not give
her any information about the status of her case or respond to her request for information. After giving
the money, complainant never heard from respondent again. Complainant went to respondents
office several times to request for information. Every time, respondent avoided complainant and gave
her the run-around. In her affidavit, complainant stated that:
I often visited him in his office to make a [follow up] of the progress of the transfer
x x x only [to be] told by his secretary that he [was] sleeping and not to be disturbed or
[was] doing something important;
x x x For three agonizing years, I x x x never received a feedback from Atty.
Gonzales so much so that I was forced [to write him] a letter which up to present
remain[s] unanswered[.][23](Emphasis ours)
43
Cases 1-13
Respondent unjustifiably denied complainant of her right to be fully informed of the status of her case,
and disregarded his duties as a lawyer.[24]
Respondent Did Not File an Answer or
Attend the Mandatory Hearing Before the IBP
Respondents repeated failure to file an answer to the complaint and to appear at the 2 June
2004 mandatory conference aggravate his misconduct. These demonstrate his high degree of
irresponsibility[25] and lack of respect for the IBP and its proceedings. [26] His attitude stains the nobility of
the legal profession.[27]
On the Appropriate Penalty
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based
on the surrounding facts.[28] The Court finds the recommended penalty inadequate. In Rollon,[29] the
Court suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for two years for failing to render any legal service
after receiving money and for failing to return the money and documents he received. In that case, the
Court held that:
The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount
of P8,000 as x x x partial service fee, respondent failed to render any legal service in
relation to the case of complainant. His continuous inaction despite repeated follow-ups
from her reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference toward his clients cause,
in brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Not only that. Despite her repeated
demands, he also unjustifiably failed to return to her the files of the case that had been
entrusted to him. To top it all, he kept the money she had likewise entrusted to him. [30]
In Small,[31] the Court suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for two years for failing to render any
legal service after receiving money, failing to inform his client of the status of the case, and failing to
promptly account for and return the money he received.
The Court notes that respondent does not have to return any amount to complainant. Complainant gave
respondent only P8,000, not P10,000, and respondent has returned the total amount he received. As
stated in complainants affidavit:
For the legal service[s] sought, Atty. Gonzales asked an acceptance fee of P10,000 to
which I gave him P8,000 together with the pertinent [mortgage] documents needed by
him for the transfer including the Transfer Certificate of Title;
xxxx
[D]ue to the persistence of my daughter, Lurina Villanueva, Atty. Gonzales returned
the acceptance fee of P8,000 on August 5, 2003 but never returned the documents
mentioned in my letter.[32] (Emphasis ours)
Lawyers are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility because an attorney-client relationship is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost
fidelity and good faith. Those who violate the Code must be disciplined. [33] Respondent failed to live up
to these standards.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Cornelius M. Gonzales GUILTY of violating Canons 16,
17, and 18, and Rules 16.01, 16.03, 18.03, and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two years effective
44
45
Cases 1-13
CORONA, J.:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot [1] and the building erected thereon located at 959
San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested
the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu [2] and Antonio Pastor[3] of one of the units in the building. The
latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them
in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila[4] where the parties
reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation
meetings.[5] When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the
defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,
[6]
claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he
stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings
between the litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints
referred to the barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and
Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost
objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to
amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth
sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was
financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of
the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. [7]
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the
conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor.
Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them
by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer
with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
46
Cases 1-13
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened while
in said service.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)
(2) of RA 6713:[8]
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official ands
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from the practice
of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely.[9] This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.[10]
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.
RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY TO
FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in
connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,
[11]
we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service.
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained
of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA
6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF
ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency,
from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
47
48
49
50
Cases 1-13
12.HEIRS OF LYDIO JERRY FALAME NAMELY MELBA FALEME, LEO FALAME AND JERRY
FALAME V. ATTY EDGAR J. BAGUIO
SECOND DIVISION
HEIRS OF LYDIO JERRY ADM. CASE NO. 6876
FALAME, namely: MELBA
FALAME, LEO FALAME and Present:
JERRY FALAME,
Complainants, CARPIO, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,*
- versus - TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
March 7, 2008
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
On Petition for Review[1] is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of Lydio Jerry Falame (complainants)
against Atty. Edgar J. Baguio (respondent), docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1191.
In their Complaint[2] against respondent, complainants alleged that on 15 July 1991, their father, the late
Lydio Jerry Falame (Lydio), engaged the services of respondent to represent him in an action for forcible
entry docketed as Civil Case No. A-2694 (the first civil case) and entitled Heirs of Emilio T. Sy,
represented by Anastacia Velayo Vda. De Sy and Belen V. Sy vs. Lydio Jerry Falame, Raleigh Falame and
Four (4) John Does, in which Lydio was one of the defendants.[3]
Complainants recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the answer to the
complaint in the first civil case. Subsequently, when the parties to the first civil case were required to
file their respective position papers, respondent used and submitted in evidence the following: (1) a
special power of attorney dated 1 July 1988 executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame,
appointing the latter to be his attorney-in-fact; and (2) the affidavit of Raleigh Falame dated 23 July
1988, executed before respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the
first civil case.[4]
Complainants claimed that even after the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City had ruled in favor of the
defendants in the first civil case, Lydio retained the services of respondent as his legal adviser and
counsel for his businesses until Lydios death on 8 September 1996.[5]
However, on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, respondent filed
a case against complainants allegedly involving the property subject of the first civil case,
entitled Spouses Rally F. Falame and Noemi F. Falame v. Melba A. Falame, Leo A. Falame, Jerry A.
Falame, Jr., Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporations, their representatives, agents and
persons acting in their behalf and docketed as Civil Case No. 5568 (the second civil case) before the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6. The complaint sought the declaration of nullity of the
deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20241 issued as a
consequence of the registration of the deed of sale, and the real estate mortgage on the said property.
Alternatively, it prayed for specific performance and reconveyance or legal redemption and damages
with preliminary injunction and restraining order. [6] Firstly, complainants maintained that by acting as
counsel for the spouses Falame in the second civil case wherein they were impleaded as defendants,
respondent violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney. Plainly, they contended that the
spouses Falames interests are adverse to those of his former client, Lydio.[7]
51
In their Position Paper[16] dated 7 September 2004, in addition to their previous charges against
respondent, complainants claimed that respondent violated Rule 15.03 [17] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he represented the cause of the spouses Falame against that of his former
client, Lydio.[18]
On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-167 adopting and
approving Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuans report and recommendation for the
dismissal of this administrative case, thus:[19]
x x x The charge lacks specification as to what part of the lawyers oath was violated by
the respondent and what confidence was disclosed. The complainants may have in mind
the prohibition against disclosure of secret information learned in confidence, but there is
no specification in the complaint what secret or information learned in confidence under
Civil Case No. A-2694 was disclosed or will be disclosed by respondent in Civil Case No.
5568. In administrative complaints for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the
complainant must specify in the affidavit-complaint the alleged secrets or confidential
information disclosed or will be disclosed in the professional employment (Uy v. Gonzalez,
426 SCRA 422; 431). In the absence of such specification, the complaint must fail.
52
53
54
55
Cases 1-13
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By letter-complaint dated May 19, 2006 [1] which was received by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) on May 26, 2006, Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane (complainant) chargedJudge Medel Arnaldo B.
Belen (respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court, Calamba City, of demean[ing],
humiliat[ing] and berat[ing] him during the hearing on February 27, 2006 of Civil Case No. 3514-2003C, Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samuel Malabanan, et al in which he was counsel for the plaintiff.
To prove his claim, complainant cited the remarks made by respondent in the course of the proceedings
conducted on February 27, 2006 as transcribed by stenographer Elenita C. de Guzman, viz:
COURT:
. . . Sir, are you from the College of Law of the University of the Philippines?
ATTY. MANE:
No[,] [Y]our Honor[,] from Manuel L. Quezon University[,] [Y]our Honor.
COURT:
No, youre not from UP.
ATTY. MANE:
I am very proud of it.
COURT:
Then youre not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a
saying and I know this, not all law students are created equal, not all law schools are
created equal, not alllawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme Being that
we all are created equal in His form and substance.[2] (Emphasis supplied)
56
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Cases 1-13
Judge Belen should bear in mind that all judges should always observe courtesy and
civility. In addressing counsel, litigants, or witnesses, the judge should avoid a
controversial tone or a tone that creates animosity. Judges should always be aware that
disrespect to lawyers generates disrespect to them. There must be mutual concession of
respect. Respect is not a one-way ticket where the judge should be respected
but free to insult lawyers and others who appear in his court. Patience is an
essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. If
a judge desires not to be insulted, he should start using temperate language himself; he
who sows the wind will reap a storm.
It is also noticeable that during the subject hearing, not only did respondent judge make
insulting and demeaning remarks but he also engaged in unnecessary lecturing and
debating. . .
xxxx
Respondent should have just ruled on the propriety of the motion to inhibit filed by
complainant, but, instead, he opted for a conceited display of arrogance, a conduct that
falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. If respondent judge felt that
there is a need to admonish complainant Atty. Mane, he should have called him in his
chambers where he can advise him privately rather than battering him with insulting
remarks and embarrassing questions such as asking him from what school he came
from publicly in the courtroom and in the presence of his clients. Humiliating a lawyer is
highly reprehensible. It betrays the judges lack of patience and temperance. A highly
temperamental judge could hardly make decisions with equanimity.
Thus, it is our view that respondent judge should shun from lecturing the counsels or
debating with them during court hearings to prevent suspicions as to his fairness and
integrity. While judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and
behave in such manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their
impartiality.[11] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The OCA thus recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violation of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. [12]
By Resolution of January 21, 2008,[13] this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already filed. Respondent
complied on February 26, 2008,[14] manifesting in the affirmative.
The pertinent provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct reads:
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the
inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge
should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for
the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
An author explains the import of this rule:
Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be courteous to
counsel, especially to those who are young and inexperienced and also to all those others
appearing or concerned in the administration of justice in the court. He should be
considerate of witnesses and others in attendance upon his court. He should be
courteous and civil, for it is unbecoming of a judge to utter intemperate
58
The following portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, quoted verbatim, taken during the
February 27, 2006 hearing show that respondent made sarcastic and humiliating, even threatening and
boastful remarks to complainant who is admittedly still young, unnecessary lecturing and debating, as
well as unnecessary display of learning:
COURT:
xxx
Sir do you know the principle or study the stare decisis?
ATTY. MANE:
Ah, with due respect your
COURT:
Tell me, what is your school?
ATTY. MANE:
I am proud graduate of Manuel L. Quezon University.
COURT:
Were you taught at the MLQU College of Law of the principle of Stare Decisis and the
interpretation of the Supreme Court of the rules of procedure where it
states that if there is already a decision by the Supreme Court, when
that decision shall be complied with by the Trial Court otherwise noncompliance thereof shall subject the Courts to judicial sanction,and I
quote the decision. Thats why I quoted the decision of the Supreme Court Sir,
because I know the problem between the bank and the third party claimants and I
state, The fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a
seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled
to buy. Sir, thats very clear, that is what fair market value and that is not
assessment value. In fact even you say assessment value, the Court further state,
the assessed value is the fair market value multiplied. Not mere the basic
assesses value. Sir that is the decision of the Supreme Court, am I just reading the
decision or was I inventing it?
ATTY. MANE:
May I be allowed to proceed.
COURT:
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COURT:
Please answer it.
xxxx
COURT:
Thats why. Sir second, and again I quote from your own pleadings, hale me to the
Supreme Court otherwise I will hale you to the bar. Prove to me that I am
grossly ignorant or corrupt.
ATTY. MANE:
Your Honor when this representation, your Honor . . .
COURT:
No, sir.
ATTY. MANE:
Yes your Honor . . .
COURT:
No sir unless you apologize to the Court I will hale you to the IBP Because hindi naman
ako ganon. I am not that vindictive but if this remains. You cannot take cover from
the instruction of your client because even if the instruction of a client is secret.
Upon consideration, the language of the pleader must still conform with the
decorum and respect to the Court. Sir, thats the rule of practice. In my twenty (20)
years of practice Ive never been haled by a judge to any question of
integrity. Because even if I believed that the Court committed error in judgment or
decision or grave abuse of discretion, I never imputed any malicious or unethical
behavior to the judge because I know and I believe that anyone can commit
errors. Because no one is like God. Sir, I hope sir you understand that this Court,
this Judge is not God but this Judge is human when challenge on his integrity and
honor is lodged. No matter how simple it is because that is the only thing I have
now.
Atty. Bantin, can you please show him my statement of assets and liabilities?
ATTY. MANE:
I think that is not necessary your Honor.
COURT:
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Cases 1-13
ATTY. HILDAWA:
. . . indiscretion.
COURT:
Indiscretion. See, that is the most diplomatic word that an old practitioner could say to
the Court because of respect.
Sir, salamat po.
xxxx
COURT:
Kita po ninyo, iyan po ang matatandang abogado. Indiscretion na lang. Now you
say that is your honest opinion and the old practitioner hammered through years
of practice could only say indiscretion committed by this judge. Much more I who
sits in this bench?
Now is that your honest opinion?[16] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court thus finds the evaluation by the OCA well-taken.
An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the
Bar Examinations which this Court administers, taking of the Lawyers oath, and signing of the Roll of
Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia, an
officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the
fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an engagement in
an argumentum ad hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If respondent
felt that his integrity and dignity were being assaulted, he acted properly when he directed complainant
to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he, as the
above-quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal
and personal discourse.
This Court has reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those
they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of
the court.[17]
Respondent having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge, classified as a light charge under Section
10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is penalized under Section 11(c) of the same Rule by
any of the following: (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3)
reprimand; and (4) admonition with warning, the Court imposes upon him the penalty of reprimand.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch
36, Calamba City,
is
found GUILTY of
conduct
unbecoming
of
a
judge
and
is REPRIMANDED therefor. He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
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