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  • Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942)

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    The Supreme Court granted a prisoner's petition for habeas corpus to challenge his kidnapping conviction on the grounds that his guilty plea was coerced by threats from a federal agent. Specifically, the prisoner alleged that he pleaded guilty due to threats by an FBI agent to fabricate evidence and incite public anger, which stood undenied in the record. While the lower courts denied relief, finding the allegations incredible and that representation by counsel waived the claim, the Supreme Court ruled the prisoner was entitled to a hearing on whether his constitutional rights were violated by a coerced guilty plea.

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    Filed: 1942-04-27 Precedential Status: Precedential Citations: 316 U.S. 101 Docket: 1006

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    The Supreme Court granted a prisoner's petition for habeas corpus to challenge his kidnapping conviction on the grounds that his guilty plea was coerced by threats from a federal agent. Specifically, the prisoner alleged that he pleaded guilty due to threats by an FBI agent to fabricate evidence and incite public anger, which stood undenied in the record. While the lower courts denied relief, finding the allegations incredible and that representation by counsel waived the claim, the Supreme Court ruled the prisoner was entitled to a hearing on whether his constitutional rights were violated by a coerced guilty plea.

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    42 views3 pages

    Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    The Supreme Court granted a prisoner's petition for habeas corpus to challenge his kidnapping conviction on the grounds that his guilty plea was coerced by threats from a federal agent. Specifically, the prisoner alleged that he pleaded guilty due to threats by an FBI agent to fabricate evidence and incite public anger, which stood undenied in the record. While the lower courts denied relief, finding the allegations incredible and that representation by counsel waived the claim, the Supreme Court ruled the prisoner was entitled to a hearing on whether his constitutional rights were violated by a coerced guilty plea.

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    of 3

    316 U.S.

    101
    62 S.Ct. 964
    86 L.Ed. 1302

    WALEY
    v.
    JOHNSTON, Warden.
    No. 1006.

    Subnitted on Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis April 6,


    1942.
    Decided April 27, 1942.
    Harmon M. Waley, pro se.
    PER CURIAM.

    Petitioner filed his petition for habeas corpus in the district court, alleging upon
    oath that he had been cocerced, by intimidation and threats by an agent of the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation, to plead guilty to an indictment for kidnapping,
    and that he is held in custody by respondent under the consequent judgment of
    conviction and commitment.

    The petition stated generally that threats of Federal Bureau of Investigation


    agents to throw petitioner out of a window and 'beat me up' 'didn't bother me'.
    But it specifically alleged that petitioner's plea of guilty had been induced by
    the threats of a named Federal Bureau of Investigation agent to publish false
    statements and manufacture false evidence that the kidnapped person had been
    injured, and by such publications and false evidence to incite the public and to
    cause the State of Washington to hang the petitioner and the other defendants.

    The district court ordered respondent to show cause why a writ should not issue
    and appointed counsel to represent petitioner. Respondent's return to the order
    included certified copies of the docket entries, indictment, transcript of
    proceedings on arraignment, entry of plea, judgment and sentence, and
    commitment papers. The transcript discloses that the trial court had explained
    to petitioner his right to be assisted by counsel and had appointed counsel who

    represented him at the trial. The return also included an affidavit of a special
    agent of the Bureau of Investigation, not the one mentioned in the petition,
    stating that petitioner, in affiant's presence, voluntarily signed two statements
    confessing his guilt, and that no threat or promise to petitioner of any kind was
    made in affiant's presence. The return made no denial of the allegations of
    coercion specifically set forth and relied on in the petition.
    4

    The district court denied the application for the writ without hearing evidence
    and without directing the production of the prisoner in court. It concluded that
    the allegations of coercion by threatening to publish false statements and
    manufacture false evidence were inconsistent with petitioner's statement that
    threats by Government agents to throw him out of the window and beat him up
    'didn't bother' him; that the transcript filed with the return showed that
    petitioner was neither 'actuated nor induced by fear'; and that an earlier decision
    of the sentencing judge denying petitioner's application for a writ of coram
    nobis was res judicata.

    The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the order of the district
    court, 124 F.2d 587, 588. In view of the fact that petitioner when he pleaded
    guilty had been represented by counsel, a majority of the court thought he could
    not by habeas corpus attack his sentence on the ground that his plea was
    coerced. The opinion states that petitioner 'waived the defense and the
    constitutional right if any he had, and cannot assert it now on habeas corpus
    proceedings'. The case is before us on a motion of petitioner to proceed in
    forma pauperis on his petition for certiorari and the Government's confession of
    error. We grant the motion and the petition for certiorari.

    The Government confesses error for the reason that the habeas corpus petition
    raises the material issue whether the plea was in fact coerced by the particular
    threats alleged which stand undenied on the record, and that upon that issue
    petitioner is entitled to a hearing in accordance with Walker v. Johnston, 312
    U.S. 275, 61 S.Ct. 574, 85 L.Ed. 830.

    True, petitioner's allegations in the circumstances of this case may tax


    credulity. But in view of their specific nature, their lack of any necessary
    relation to the other threats alleged, and the failure of respondent to deny or to
    account for his failure to deny them specifically, we cannot say that the issue
    was not one calling for a hearing within the principles laid down in Walker v.
    Johnston, supra. If the allegations are found to be true, petitioner's
    constitutional rights were infringed. For a conviction on a plea of guilty coerced
    by a federal law enforcement officer is no more consistent with due process
    than a conviction supported by a coerced confession. Bram v. United States,

    168 U.S. 532, 543, 18 S.Ct. 183, 187, 42 L.Ed. 568; Chambers v. Florida, 309
    U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716. And if his plea was so coerced as to
    deprive it of validity to support the conviction, the coercion likewise deprived it
    of validity as a waiver of his right to assail the conviction. Johnson v. Zerbst,
    304 U.S. 458, 467, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461.
    8

    The issue here was appropriately raised by the habeas corpus petition. The facts
    relied on are dehors the record and their effect on the judgment was not open to
    consideration and review on appeal. In such circumstances the use of the writ in
    the federal courts to test the constitutional validity of a conviction for crime is
    not restricted to those cases where the judgment of conviction is void for want
    of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it. It extends also to those exceptional
    cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of
    the accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his
    rights. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543; Mooney v.
    Holphan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406; Bowen v.
    Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 24, 59 S.Ct. 442, 444, 83 L.Ed. 455.

    The principle of res judicata does not apply to a decision on habeas corpus
    refusing to discharge a prisoner, Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 44 S.Ct. 519,
    68 L.Ed. 989. It does not appear that on petitioner's earlier application for a writ
    of coram nobis the same issue was raised as that now presented. The earlier
    application was denied for insufficiency upon its face and without a hearing.
    There is thus no basis for the holding of the district court that the denial is res
    judicata of the present petition.

    10

    The judgment below will be vacated and the cause remanded for a hearing in
    conformity to Walker v. Johnston, supra. So ordered.

    11

    Judgment vacated and cause remanded.

    12

    Mr. Justice JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this


    case.

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