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Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942)
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942)
101
62 S.Ct. 964
86 L.Ed. 1302
WALEY
v.
JOHNSTON, Warden.
No. 1006.
Petitioner filed his petition for habeas corpus in the district court, alleging upon
oath that he had been cocerced, by intimidation and threats by an agent of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, to plead guilty to an indictment for kidnapping,
and that he is held in custody by respondent under the consequent judgment of
conviction and commitment.
The district court ordered respondent to show cause why a writ should not issue
and appointed counsel to represent petitioner. Respondent's return to the order
included certified copies of the docket entries, indictment, transcript of
proceedings on arraignment, entry of plea, judgment and sentence, and
commitment papers. The transcript discloses that the trial court had explained
to petitioner his right to be assisted by counsel and had appointed counsel who
represented him at the trial. The return also included an affidavit of a special
agent of the Bureau of Investigation, not the one mentioned in the petition,
stating that petitioner, in affiant's presence, voluntarily signed two statements
confessing his guilt, and that no threat or promise to petitioner of any kind was
made in affiant's presence. The return made no denial of the allegations of
coercion specifically set forth and relied on in the petition.
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The district court denied the application for the writ without hearing evidence
and without directing the production of the prisoner in court. It concluded that
the allegations of coercion by threatening to publish false statements and
manufacture false evidence were inconsistent with petitioner's statement that
threats by Government agents to throw him out of the window and beat him up
'didn't bother' him; that the transcript filed with the return showed that
petitioner was neither 'actuated nor induced by fear'; and that an earlier decision
of the sentencing judge denying petitioner's application for a writ of coram
nobis was res judicata.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the order of the district
court, 124 F.2d 587, 588. In view of the fact that petitioner when he pleaded
guilty had been represented by counsel, a majority of the court thought he could
not by habeas corpus attack his sentence on the ground that his plea was
coerced. The opinion states that petitioner 'waived the defense and the
constitutional right if any he had, and cannot assert it now on habeas corpus
proceedings'. The case is before us on a motion of petitioner to proceed in
forma pauperis on his petition for certiorari and the Government's confession of
error. We grant the motion and the petition for certiorari.
The Government confesses error for the reason that the habeas corpus petition
raises the material issue whether the plea was in fact coerced by the particular
threats alleged which stand undenied on the record, and that upon that issue
petitioner is entitled to a hearing in accordance with Walker v. Johnston, 312
U.S. 275, 61 S.Ct. 574, 85 L.Ed. 830.
168 U.S. 532, 543, 18 S.Ct. 183, 187, 42 L.Ed. 568; Chambers v. Florida, 309
U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716. And if his plea was so coerced as to
deprive it of validity to support the conviction, the coercion likewise deprived it
of validity as a waiver of his right to assail the conviction. Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 467, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461.
8
The issue here was appropriately raised by the habeas corpus petition. The facts
relied on are dehors the record and their effect on the judgment was not open to
consideration and review on appeal. In such circumstances the use of the writ in
the federal courts to test the constitutional validity of a conviction for crime is
not restricted to those cases where the judgment of conviction is void for want
of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it. It extends also to those exceptional
cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of
the accused, and where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his
rights. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543; Mooney v.
Holphan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406; Bowen v.
Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 24, 59 S.Ct. 442, 444, 83 L.Ed. 455.
The principle of res judicata does not apply to a decision on habeas corpus
refusing to discharge a prisoner, Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 44 S.Ct. 519,
68 L.Ed. 989. It does not appear that on petitioner's earlier application for a writ
of coram nobis the same issue was raised as that now presented. The earlier
application was denied for insufficiency upon its face and without a hearing.
There is thus no basis for the holding of the district court that the denial is res
judicata of the present petition.
10
The judgment below will be vacated and the cause remanded for a hearing in
conformity to Walker v. Johnston, supra. So ordered.
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