349 U.S.

29
75 S.Ct. 544
99 L.Ed. 789

Alexander NORWOOD, Joseph F. Tunstall, and John E.

Smallwood, Petitioners,
v.
Honorable William H. KIRKPATRICK, etc.
No. 337.
Argued March 4, 1955.
Decided April 11, 1955.

Mr. Joseph S. Lord, III, Philadelphia, Pa., for petitioners.

Mr. H. Francis De Lone, Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent.
Mr. Justice MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court.

The three petitioners, dining car employees, filed separate suits in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, against the
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. They sued under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. 51 et seq., for injuries received upon the
derailment of one of defendant's trains near Dillon, South Carolina. The
defendant filed motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer the cases to
the Florence Division of the Eastern District of South Carolina. The District
Court denied the motions to dismiss and granted the motions to transfer under
28 U.S.C. 1404(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 1404(a).*

Since the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had held, in All States Freight
v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, that the order for transfer was not appealable, the
petitioners filed applications for mandamus or prohibition to the district judge
in order to require him to set aside his orders of transfer. The Court of Appeals
denied the applications, and we granted certiorari. 348 U.S. 870, 75 S.Ct. 107.

The cases of the three petitioners present identical questions of law, were
consolidated for argument here, and will be disposed of in this opinion.

The district judge in granting the motions to transfer stated that if he had been
free to construe 1404(a) as he did in the case of Naughton v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 85 F.Supp. 761, he would have denied the transfers because, in his view, it
called for an application of the stricter rule of forum non conveniens as
recognized in decisions of this Court. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055. But since the Naughton case, the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had held, in All States Freight v.
Modarelli, supra, that the district judge had a broader discretion in the
application of the statute than under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The
district judge, therefore, followed the rule laid down in the All States Freight
case, supra. We think the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the narrower
doctrine of forum non conveniens and properly construed the statute. As Judge
Goodrich, speaking for the court, appropriately pointed out, 196 F.2d at page
1011:

'The forum non conveniens doctrine is quite different from Section 1404(a).
That doctrine involves the dismissal of a case because the forum chosen by the
plaintiff is so completely inappropriate and inconvenient that it is better to stop
the litigation in the place where brought and let it start all over again
somewhere else. It is quite naturally subject to careful limitation for it not only
denies the plaintiff the generally accorded privilege of bringing an action where
he chooses, but makes it possible for him to lose out completely, through the
running of the statute of limitations in the forum finally deemed appropriate.
Section 1404(a) avoids this latter danger. Its words should be considered for
what they say, not with preconceived limitations derived from the forum non
conveniens doctrine.'

Judge Maris, who was Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on the
revision of the Code and approved the text submitted to Congress, sat on the
Court of Appeals en banc when All States Freight was decided. And Judge
Parker of the Fourth Circuit, consultant to the Advisory Committee, writing for
the court in Jiffy Lubricator Co., Inc., v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360,
362, also construed the statute as we understand it:

'* * * A dismissal in application of that (forum non conveniens) or any other

principle puts an end to the action and hence is final and appealable. An order
transferring it to another district does not end but preserves it as against the
running of the statute of limitations and for all other purposes. The notion that
28 U.S.C.A. 1404(a) was a mere codification of existing law relating to forum
non conveniens is erroneous. It is perfectly clear that the purpose of this section
of the Revised Judicial Code was to grant broadly the power of transfer for the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, whether

dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens would have been
appropriate or not.'
8

See also Moore, Commentary on the Judicial Code (1949 ed.), p. 208.

When Congress adopted 1404(a), it intended to do more than just codify the
existing law on forum non conveniens. As this Court said in Ex parte Collett,
337 U.S. 5561, 69 S.Ct. 944, 947, 93 L.Ed 1207, Congress, in writing
1404(a), which was an entirely new section, was revising as well as codifying.
The harshest result of the application of the old doctrine of forum non
conveniens, dismissal of the action, was eliminated by the provision in
1404(a) for transfer. When the harshest part of the doctrine is excised by
statute, it can hardly be called mere codification. As a consequence, we believe
that Congress, by the term 'for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice,' intended to permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser
showing of inconvenience. This is not to say that the relevant factors have
changed or that the plaintiff's choice of forum is not to be considered, but only
that the discretion to be exercised is broader.

10

It is conceded by the petitioners that if the district judge was correct in

exercising his discretion to transfer these cases under 1404(a) without regard
to the stringent requirements of forum non conveniens, then the Court of
Appeals properly denied the applications for mandamus and prohibition. Since
we agree that the district judge correctly construed the statute in evaluating the
evidence, we do not find it necessary to detail the facts considered by him in
reaching his judgment. It was correct in law and warranted by the facts.

11

Since we find that the district judge properly construed 1404(a), it is

unnecessary to pass upon the question of whether mandamus or prohibition is a
proper remedy.

12

The judgment is affirmed.

13

Affirmed.

14

Mr. Justice HARLAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

15

Mr. Justice CLARK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice
DOUGLAS concur, dissenting.

16

Under this judgment, Alexander Norwood, who lives in Philadelphia where he

16

Under this judgment, Alexander Norwood, who lives in Philadelphia where he

filed this suit for damages against the railroad, will have to go to South Carolina
if he wishes to prosecute it. Joseph Tunstall and John Smallwood, both of
whom live in Washington, D.C., will likewise have to go all the way to South
Carolina if they hope to recover any damages against the railroad. All three
allegedly suffered permanent injuries when a passenger train on which they
were employed was derailed. The derailment, with which the plaintiffs had no
connection whatever, is sufficient in itself to support a finding of negligence.
See Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 329 U.S. 452, 67 S.Ct. 401, 91
L.Ed. 416. Despite these circumstances, the district judge deprived Norwood of
a trial in his home town, and Tunstall and Smallwood of one within 150 miles
of theirs. This Court's decision, sustaining that result, sends the case to South
Carolina, perhaps preventing it from ever being prosecuted because of the
financial condition of the plaintiffs.

17

This is thought justified by an interpretation of 1404(a) of the 1948 revision

of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 1404(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 1404(a). It provides:

18

'For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought.' As words on a page torn from the history of our
judicial development, this direction is utterly meaningless. How great must be
the inconvenience before a judge could feel justified in ordering a transfer?
When would it be 'in the interest of justice' to do so? It is not difficult to
imagine the baffled reactions of our judiciary were this mandate not
accompanied by some explanation, were it not preceded by some experience in
dealing with pleas to decline suits because of inconvenience and injustice.
Compare the gropings of this Court and the remainder of the federal judiciary
when confronted with the blank pages presented by the celebrated 301 of
Taft-Hartley, 29 U.S.C.A. 185. See Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 346 U.S. 437, 75 S.Ct. 488.

19

But, fortunately, the command of 1404(a) is accompanied by both history and

explanation. The Reviser's Notes state:

20

'Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even though the
venue is proper. As an example of the need of such a provision, see Baltimore
& Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 1941, 314 U.S. 44, 62 S.Ct. 6, 86 L.Ed. 28, which
was prosecuted under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in New York,
although the accident occurred and the employee resided in Ohio. The new
subsection requires the court to determine that the transfer is necessary for

convenience of the parties and witnesses, and further, that it is in the interest of
justice to do so.'
21

The federal courts, in exercising their discretion under this provision, are thus
not set adrift on an uncharted sea, to order transfers according to their personal
notions of justice. They are explicitly referred to the body of doctrine in AngloAmerican law known as forum non conveniens, a doctrine which was certainly
well developed at the time of the passage of the new Code. Indeed, shortly
before the revision was introduced in Congress, this Court handed down two
decisions setting forth the considerations which should govern the exercise of
the trial judge's discretion. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct.
839, 91 L.Ed. 1055; Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,
330 U.S. 518, 67 S.Ct. 828, 91 L.Ed. 1067. These opinions clearly evinced the
attitude with which these matters should be approached, the standard to be
applied:

22

'It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum,
'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or
trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy. But unless the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed.' Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at page 508, 67 S.Ct. at
page 843.

23

'Where there are only two parties to a dispute, there is good reason why it
should be tried in the plaintiff's home forum if that has been his choice. He
should not be deprived of the presumed advantages of his home jurisdiction
except upon a clear showing of facts which either (1) establish such
oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant as to be out of all proportion to
plaintiff's convenience, which may be shown to be slight or nonexistent, or (2)
make trial in the chosen forum inappropriate because of considerations
affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems. In any balancing of
conveniences, a real showing of convenience by a plaintiff who has sued in his
home forum will normally outweigh the inconvenience the defendant may have
shown.' Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Co., 330 U.S., at page 524, 67 S.Ct. at
page 831.

24

There was a direct reference to the Koster decision in hearings before the
Senate Committee considering the 1948 Code. Hearings before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3214, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7374.
The basic issue in this case is whether the district judge should exercise his

25

The basic issue in this case is whether the district judge should exercise his
discretion in the light of these opinions, and in the light of forum non
conveniens doctrine generally (of which these Supreme Court decisions are a
particularization), or whether 1404(a) expands the range of his discretion to
an as yet unstated degree, and removes these decisions and other forum non
conveniens cases as guiding precedents. The Courts of Appeals have divided on
the issue. With the opinions cited by the majority, compare Ford Motor Co. v.
Ryan, 2 Cir., 182 F.2d 329; Nicol v. Koscinski, 6 Cir., 188 F.2d 537; Wiren v.
Laws, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 105, 194 F.2d 873. But see Amalgamated Ass'n of St.,
Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emp. of America, etc., v. Southern Bus Lines, 5 Cir.,
172 F.2d 946, 948. The section itself is merely a restatement, in very
generalized form, of the considerations thought to govern the question of forum
non conveniens. The particular words or their equivalents recur in the cases and
literature on the subject. 1 The Reviser's Notes repeat these factors and refer
explicitly to forum non conveniens. Ordinarily, these considerations, standing
alone, would afford cogent grounds for finding that the old doctrine was to
continue as the prevailing rule. This Court said as much in Ex parte Collett, 337
U.S. 55, 56, 69 S.Ct. 944, 93 L.Ed. 1207, when it posed the issue:

26

'In this case we must decide whether the venue provisions of the Judicial Code
render applicable the doctrine of forum non conveniens to actions under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act.' (Emphasis supplied.)

27

We held the doctrine was applicable to such cases.

28

But now it is argued that since 1404(a) has changed the judicial response to
the inconvenient forum, providing for transfer rather than dismissal, the trial
judge may exercise a broader discretion than was permissible under the old
rule. The opinion of the Court, adopting this view, goes far toward assigning to
the trial judge the choice of forums, a prerogative which has previously rested
with the plaintiff. In so doing, the majority completely ignores the judicial and
legislative background of forum non conveniens in cases arising under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act.

29

Section 6 of the FRLA was amended in 1910 to permit suits to be brought 'in
the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action
arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of
commencing' the action. 36 Stat. 291, as amended, 45 U.S.C. 56, 45 U.S.C.A.
56. We held that the congressional purpose manifested by this provision
precluded the application of forum non conveniens to suits under the Act.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 62 S.Ct. 6, 86 L.Ed. 285;
Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U.S. 698, 62 S.Ct. 827, 86 L.Ed. 1129.

Agitation in Congress to limit venue under the FELA culminated in the

attempted passage of the Jennings Bill, H.R. 1639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; the
bill passed the House by a narrow margin, 93 Cong.Rec. 91939194, only to
die in the Senate. But the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, characterized by
its legislative leaders as a noncontroversial revision and codification, see Ex
parte Collett, supra, 337 U.S. at page 62, 69 S.Ct. 944, was held to overturn the
Kepner and Miles decisions and make forum non conveniens applicable to
actions under the FELA. In applying 1404(a) to FELA cases, this Court said
in Collett:
30

'The Code, therefore, does not repeal 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. We agree with petitioner that Congress had no such intention, as
demonstrated by its failure to list the section in the meticulously prepared
schedule of statutes repealed. We cannot agree that the order before us
effectuates an implied repeal. The inapplicability of forum non conveniens to
Liability Act suits derives from the Kepner decision. * * * Congress chose to
remove its judicial gloss via another statute.' Id., 337 U.S. at pages 6061, 69
S.Ct. at page 947.

31

Removal of the 'judicial gloss' would merely repeal the Kepner doctrine and
thus make FELA suits, along with any civil action, subject to forum non
conveniens. This Court asserted just that in Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
345 U.S. 379, 383, 73 S.Ct. 749, 751, 97 L.Ed. 1094:

32

'We have heretofore held that 1404(a) makes the doctrine of forum non
conveniens applicable to Federal Employers' Liability Act cases brought in
federal courts and provides for the transfer of such actions to a more convenient
forum. Ex Parte Collett, 1949, 337 U.S. 55, 69 S.Ct. 944, 959, 93 L.Ed. 1207.'
(Emphasis supplied.)

33

Again in Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180,
186, 72 S.Ct. 219, 222, 96 L.Ed. 200, we said:

34

'And if the manufacturer is joined as an unwilling defendant in a forum non

conveniens, he has available upon an appropriate showing the relief provided
by 1404(a) of the Judicial Code. 62 Stat. 869, 937, 28 U.S.C. 1404(a), 28
U.S.C.A. 1404(a).'

35

And as late as 1953, Justices JACKSON, BLACK, and MINTON, dissenting in

Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 522, 73 S.Ct. 856, 860, 97 L.Ed.
1211, made this statement:

36

'28 U.S.C. 1404(a) authorizes certain transfers of any civil action from state to
state for the convenience of witnesses or of parties, or in the interests of justice.
The purpose was to adopt for federal courts the principles of forum non
conveniens. Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 69 S.Ct. 944, 93 L.Ed. 1207. These
are broad and imprecise and involve such considerations as the state of the
court's docket. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed.
1055.' (Emphasis supplied.)

37

None of these cases is even mentioned by the majority. In each is implicit the
principle that 1404(a) embodies the doctrine of forum non conveniens; in
each there is the uniform understanding of members of this Court that the
language of 1404(a) is merely a paraphrase of that rule. Instead, the majority
applies a variation of the old Jennings Bill, which Congress refused to adopt at
the same session in which it inserted 1404(a) into the new Code. There is
certainly nothing even remotely connected with the enactment of 1404(a) to
indicate that when the section and the Reviser's Notes referred to forum non
conveniensparticularly as articulated in the then-recent Gulf Oil and Koster
casesthey meant the Jennings Bill or anything like it. Still the majority
adopts a slight modification of that rejected provision.

38

Much is made of the fact that there is no legislative record of opposition to the
adoption of 1404(a). This, if true, is explained by the fact that the Reviser's
Notes, as well as Congress' refusal to adopt the Jennings Bill, may well have
lulled any opposition into a false feeling of security. The statements in Gulf Oil
and Koster that the plaintiff's choice could be disturbed only if 'the balance is
strongly in favor of the defendant' and that this 'rarely' is the case, together with
the defeat of the Jennings Bill, is certainly sufficient evidence that Congress
had no intention of seriously interfering with an FELA plaintiff's choice of
forum. In this connection, we note the emphasis in Collett, 337 U.S. at page 64,
69 S.Ct. 949, on the difference between the Jennings Bill and 1404(a); this is
narrowed considerably if we permit a larger discretion in the district judge than
was available under forum non conveniens.

39

It is said that we must uphold a clear change in the statute made by the
Congress. We certainly agree. But the language of 1404(a), considered
against the background of judicial discussion in this area, could mean nothing
but the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and the Reviser's Notes state that the
purpose of the change was to apply forum non conveniens rules to the transfer
of civil cases in the federal courts. The direction of Congress is clear and
unmistakable. Our duty is so to interpret 1404(a), not to expand and enlarge
upon it. Changes of this type should be made by the legislative branch. And the
fact that Congress has through codification extended a previously recognized

procedure to civil cases generally, with one slight change (i.e., transfer rather
than dismissal), does not give this Court a blank check to recast the underlying
law to suit its fancy.
40

Concluding that the prior tenets of forum non conveniens apply, embracing the
standards laid down in Gulf Oil and Koster, we cannot help but agree with the
district judge that his discretion would have been exercised differently in the
instant case if he had applied the law of those decisions. Without detailing all
the facts here involved, we note that one of the plaintiffs resided in the district
where this suit was brought. Under the usual forum non conveniens approach,
this would virtually suffice, in and of itself, to preclude a refusal to retain the
case for trial. See Barrett, supra, at 413; Braucher, supar, at 916917, 919;
Dainow, supra, at 880. After all, the forum non conveniens situation generally
envisaged is one involving a foreign cause of action and nonresident parties.
See Blair, supra, at 34; Foster, supra, at 53. Apparently but one jurisdiction
stands squarely behind the proposition that a court may decline to hear a
personal injury suit, brought by a bona fide resident, in order to spare the
defendant inconvenience and expense. Williamson v. North-Eastern R. Co.,
supra. That is the law in Scotland, a jurisdiction long noted for its distinctive
doctrines in this area.2 Forum non conveniens has no such impact in this
country, and, in fact, Koster may be regarded as an extreme decision in
depriving a plaintiff of his home forum. 3 With this the state of the law, both
now and in 1948 when the Code was adopted, we certainly should require a
more explicit direction from Congress before depriving an injured party of his
privilege under the FELA of bringing suit in his own districtat least when the
standards of Koster have not been applied.

41

The district judge admitted that he had not exercised his discretion in light of
Koster and Gulf Oil, the applicable decisions of this Court; he felt bound by a
contrary decision of the Court of Appeals. He indicated very clearly that his
decision would have been otherwise if he were free to follow the opinions we
consider controlling. We should reverse and give the trial judge an opportunity
to exercise his discretion under the proper standards.

42

The question is one of considerable importance in the administration of the

lower federal courts, and, considering the inadequacy of appeal, should be
settled in this case if it is to be settled at all in the near future. Every appellate
court which has passed on 1404(a) implicitly recognizes the necessity for
settling issues of law under the section. Even those courts which have refused
relief, expressing the view that mandamus is an inappropriate remedy, have
gone on to discuss the merits of the question presented. In re Josephson, 1 Cir.,
218 F.2d 174; All States Freight, Inc., v. Modarelli, 3 Cir., 196 F.2d 1010; cf.

Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 4 Cir., 177 F.2d 360. The Court's
opinion in this case, by reserving the mandamus issue, follows the same course.
We note, further, that the majority of Court of Appeals decisions dealing with
1404(a) find mandamus appropriate in circumstances less compelling than
these. Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, supra; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Davis, 5
Cir., 185 F.2d 766; Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 9 Cir., 185 F.2d 777; Wiren
v. Laws, supra; Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Igoe, 7 Cir., 212 F.2d 378; cf. Nicol
v. Koscinski, supra.
43

I would reverse and direct that the transfer application be determined under
forum non conveniens, and particularly the Gulf Oil and Koster decisions. The
answer to the majority's contention that this would unduly curtail a desirable
reform is simply that this dispute involves not merely 'forum shopping,' but the
whittling away by judicial interpretation of the privileges and benefits of
working men under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The battle over the
scope of their rights should be fought out in the Congressas it was in the case
of the Jennings Billand not in the courts.

44

The Reviser's Notes say that 1404(a) goes no further than forum non
conveniens. That was what Congress acted upon, not the private opinion of
some of the members of the Reviser's Committee. These distinguished
participants may have thought their reform went beyond Collett. If so, they
should have communicated their thought to the Congress where the final
responsibility rests.

'For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought.'

See Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., supra, 330 U.S. at page 527,
67 S.Ct. at page 833 ('convenience of the parties and the ends of justice'); Id.,
330 U.S. at page 530, 67 S.Ct. at page 834 ('interests of justice'); Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert, supra, 330 U.S. at page 507, 67 S.Ct. at page 842 ('convenience of
witnesses and the ends of justice'); Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships,
285 U.S. 413, 423, 52 S.Ct. 413, 415, 76 L.Ed. 837 ('decline, in the interest of
justice, to exercise jurisdiction, where the suit is between aliens or
nonresidents'); National Shawmut Bank v. City of Waterville, 285 Mass. 252,
189 N.E. 92, 95 ('ends of justice'); Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland
Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 313, 184 N.E. 152, 158, 87 A.L.R. 1407 ('ends of
justice'); Great Western R. Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305, 315 ('inconveniences
and the danger of injustice'); Jackson & Sons v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty

Co., 86 N.H. 341, 343, 168 A. 895, 896 ('ends of justice'); La Societe du Gaz de
Paris v. La Societe Anonyme de Navigation 'Les Armateurs Francais,' (1926)
Sess.Cas. (H.L.) 13, 16, 18, 22 ('the interests of all the parties, and * * * the
ends of justice'); Logan v. Bank of Scotland, (1906) 1 K.B. 141, 149, 150
('inconvenience' and 'injustice'); Williamson v. North-Eastern R. Co., 11
Sess.Cas. (4th Ser.) 596, 598 ('ends of justice'). These cases and their
terminology are covered in Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens,
35 Cal.L.Rec. 380; Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in AngloAmerican Law, 29 Col.L.Rev. 1; Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum,
60 Harv.L.Rev. 908; Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 Ill.L.Rev. 867;
Foster, Place of Trial Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of
Adjustment, 44 Harv.L.Rev. 41.
2

Commentators, though endorsing the wider use of forum non conveniens, have
been critical of the decision, Dainow, supra, at 884, n. 73, and have pointed up
the civil law basis of its reasoning, Blair, supra, at 21, n. 100.
The reasoning in Gore v. United States Steel Corp., 1954, 15 N.J. 301, 104
A.2d 670, may be consistent with the Williamson result, but that case, decided
after 1404(a) and relying on litigation under that section, involved
nonresidents. And dicta to the same effect in Universal Adjustment Corp. v.
Midland Bank, supra, 281 Mass. at page 315, 184 N.E. at page 159, must be
read in the context of the litigation before the court: suit by a resident assignee
of a foreign claim against a foreign corporation. Compare United States
Merchants' & Shippers' Ins. Co. v. A/S Den Norske Afrika Og Australie Line, 2
Cir., 65 F.2d 392.

See American Ry. Express Co. v. H. Rouw Co., 173 Ark. 810, 294 S.W. 401;
Gamburg v. Ray, 167 La. 865, 120 So. 480; Arizona Commercial Mining Co.
v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 119 Me. 213, 110 A. 429; Peters v. Equitable Life
Assur. Co., 196 Mass. 143, 81 N.E. 964; Tri-State Transit Co. v. Mondy, 194
Miss. 714, 12 So.2d 920; Gregonis v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co., 235
N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223, 32 A.L.R. 1; De la Bouillerie v. De Vienne, 300 N.Y.
60, 89 N.E.2d 15; cf. O'Neill v. Cunard White Star, 2 Cir., 160 F.2d 446; The
Saudades, D.C., 67 F.Supp. 820. Even in those cases where the objection is that
the suit creates an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce, the fact that
suit is brought in the plaintiff's home forum, though it may lack the nearconclusiveness it has in forum non conveniens cases, is nevertheless a fact of
'high significance.' International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transportation Co.,
292 U.S. 511, 520, 54 S.Ct. 797, 78 L.Ed. 1396.