350 U.S.

179
76 S.Ct. 281
100 L.Ed. 185

UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner,

v.
Abraham MINKER. Salvatore FALCONE and Joseph Falcone,
Petitioners, v. Harold E. BARNES, Officer in Charge of
Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Nos. 35, 47.
Argued Nov. 14, 15, 1955.
Decided Jan. 16, 1956.

No. 35:
Mr. Marvin E. Frankel, Washington, D.C., for the United States.
Mr. Jacob Kossman, Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent Minker.
No. 47:
Mr. George Morris Fay, Washington, D.C., for Falcone.
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Because of conflicting constructions by the Courts of Appeals for the Second

and Third Circuits of 235(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
66 Stat. 163, 198, 8 U.S.C.A. 1101 et seq., 1225(a), we brought these cases
here. 349 U.S. 904, 75 S.Ct. 582; 349 U.S. 927, 75 S.Ct. 774. They were heard
in sequence, and, since minor differences in their facts are irrelevant to the
problems now before us, they may be disposed of in one opinion.

Section 235(a)1 provides that any immigration officer 'shall have power to
require by subpena the attendance and testimony of witnesses before
immigration officers * * * relating to the privilege of any person to enter,
reenter, reside in, or pass through the United States or concerning any matter
which is material and relevant to the enforcement of this Act and the

administration of the Service, and to that end may invoke the aid of any court
of the United States.' The controlling issue presented by these cases is whether
this section empowers an immigration officer to subpoena a naturalized citizen
who is the subject of an investigation by the Service, where the purpose of the
investigation is to determine if good cause exists for the institution of
denaturalization proceedings under 340(a) of the Act.2
3

In No. 35, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
at Philadelphia, in accordance with 340.11 of the Service's regulation,3
instituted an investigation of respondent for the aforementioned purpose. In
furtherance of this inquiry into the legality of Minker's naturalization the
Director subpoenaed him to give testimony at the offices of the Service. Prior
to the required date of his appearance, he moved to quash the subpoena in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania upon the
ground, inter alia, that it was unauthorized by the Act. This motion was denied,
In re Minker, D.C., 118 F.Supp. 264, and no appeal was taken. When
respondent thereafter failed to obey the subpoena, the District Court, on
application of the District Director, ordered respondent to appear before the
Service and testify. He disregarded this order. After a hearing he was adjudged
in contempt for so doing and fined $500. The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed, holding that while the power to subpoena under 235(a) was
available for investigations directed toward denaturalization proceedings,
respondent as a putative defendant in such a proceeding was not a 'witness'
within the meaning of the section, and the Service was, therefore, without
power to subpoena him.4 217 F.2d 350.

In No. 47, each petitioner was served with a subpoena issued by the officer in
charge of the Immigration and Naturalization Service at Syracuse, New York.
The subpoenas commanded petitioners' appearance and testimony, and required
them to produce specified documents. They appeared with documents as
ordered, but refused to be sworn or to testify. Thereupon an application for an
order of compliance was made by the Service in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of New York; but the court, denying the
Service's authority, refused to compel petitioners to appear and give testimony.
Application of Barnes, D.C., 116 F.Supp. 464. On appeal, to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, this judgment was reversed. 219 F.2d 137. The
court held that 235(a) of the Act permitted the immigration officer to
subpoena the petitioners in furtherance of the Service's investigation of them
under 340.11 of the regulations. The decision assumed, although the court did
not discuss the question, that each petitioner, even though a subject of
investigation, was a 'witness' within the meaning of 235(a).5

This brings us to an examination of the scope of 235(a). It had its genesis in

16 of the Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 874, 885, which dealt with the
examination of entering aliens by the Immigration Service. With respect to
subpoenas the section provided: 'Any commissioner of immigration or
inspector in charge shall also have power to require by subpoena the attendance
and testimony of witnesses before said inspectors and the production of books,
papers, and documents touching the right of any alien to enter, reenter, reside
in, or pass through the United States, and to that end may invoke the aid of any
court of the United States * * *.' Obviously, this provision strictly defined the
purposes for which officers of the Service could subpoena witnesses. It did not
give them power to issue subpoenas as aids in investigating potential
naturalization offenses.

The 1952 Act in 235(a) retained the substance of this language in 16. But
the word 'alien' was changed to 'person,' and additional language extended the
subpoena power to 'any matter which is material and relevant to the
enforcement of this Act and the administration of the Service.' If the additional
clause, following the portion 'relating to the privilege of any person to enter,
reenter, reside in, or pass through the United States', had merely read 'and any
other matter which is material and relevant,' the doctrine of ejusdem generis
would appropriately be invoked to limit the subpoena power to an investigation
pertaining to questions of admission and deportation. The comprehensive
addition of the clause 'or concerning any matter which is material and relevant
to the enforcement of this Act and the administration of the Service', precludes
such narrowing reading. 'Act' encompasses the full range of subjects covered
by the statute. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 brought together in
one statute the previously atomized subjects of immigration, nationality and
naturalization. The unqualified use of the word 'Act' in 235(a), if read as
ordinary English, embraces all of these subjects even though 235(a) is itself in
the immigration title of the statute. But 'the title of a statute and the heading of
a section cannot limit the plain meaning * * *.' Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528 529, 67 S.Ct. 1387,
13911392, 91 L.Ed. 1646. Throughout this statute the word 'Act' is given its
full significance. The word embraces the entire statute.6 On the other hand,
when only a particular title is referred to, it is designated as such, and when the
reference is to a section, that word is employed.7 No justification appears for
treating 'Act' in 235(a) as meaning 'section.' Thus far the Second and Third
Circuits are in agreement.

We come then to the question upon which the two Courts of Appeals part ways
in their construction of 235(a), namely, whether Salvatore and Joseph Falcone
in the one case and Abraham Minker in the other, although each the subject of a

denaturalization investigation under 340.11 of the regulations, were

'witnesses' within the meaning of the power given to 'any immigration officer'
to require 'by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses' before
immigration officers.
8

If the answer to the question merely depended upon whether, as a matter of

allowable English usage, the word 'witness' may fairly describe a person in the
position of Minker and the Falcones, it could not be denied that the word could
as readily be deemed to cover persons in their position as not. In short, the word
is patently ambiguous: it can fairly be applied to anyone who gives testimony
in a proceeding, although the proceeding immediately or potentially involves
him as a party, or it may be restricted to the person who gives testimony in
another's case.

It is pertinent to note the breadth of 235(a) not only with respect to the type of
investigation in which a subpoena may be issued ('any matter which is material
and relevant to the enforcement of this Act'), but also with respect to the
member of the Service empowered to issue it. The power is granted 'any
immigration officer,' who in turn is defined in 101(a)(18) of the Act as 'any
employee or class of employees of the Service or of the United States
designated by the Attorney General, individually or by regulation, to perform
the functions of an immigration officer specified by this Act or any section
thereof.' This extensive delegated authority reinforces the considerations
inherent in the nature of the power sought to be exercised that make for a
restrictive reading of the Janus-faced word 'witness.' The subpoena power 'is a
power capable of oppressive use, especially when it may be indiscriminately
delegated and the subpoena is not returnable before a judicial officer. * * *
True, there can be no penalty incurred for contempt before there is a judicial
order of enforcement. But the subpoena is in form an official command, and
even though improvidently issued it has some coercive tendency, either because
of ignorance of their rights on the part of those whom it purports to command or
their natural respect for what appears to be an official command, or because of
their reluctance to test the subpoena's validity by litigation.' Cudahy Packing
Co., Ltd. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 363364, 62 S.Ct. 651, 654655, 86
L.Ed. 895.

10

These concerns, relevant to the construction of this ambiguously worded power,

are emphatically pertinent to investigations that constitute the first step in
proceedings calculated to bring about the denaturalization of citizens. See
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796;
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 64 S.Ct. 1240, 88 L.Ed. 1525.
This may result in 'loss of both property and life, or of all that makes life worth

living.' Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284, 42 S.Ct. 492, 495, 66 L.Ed.
938. In such a situation where there is doubt it must be resolved in the citizen's
favor. Especially must we be sensitive to the citizen's rights where the
proceeding is nonjudicial because of '(t)he difference in security of judicial over
administrative action * * *.' Ng Fung Ho v. White, supra, 259 U.S. at page 285,
42 S.Ct. at page 495.
11

These considerations of policy, which determined the Court's decisions in

requiring judicial as against administrative adjudication of the issue of
citizenship in a deportation proceeding and those defining the heavy criterion of
proof to be exacted by the lower courts from the Government before decreeing
denaturalization, are important guides in reaching decision here. They give
coherence to law and are fairly to be assumed as congressional presuppositions,
unless by appropriate explicitness the lawmakers make them inapplicable. Cf.
Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622. It does not bespeak
depreciation of official zeal, nor does it bring into question disinterestedness, to
conclude that compulsory ex parte administrative examinations, untrammelled
by the safeguards of a public adversary judicial proceeding, afford too ready
opportunities for unhappy consequences to prospective defendants in
denaturalization suits.

12

These general considerations find specific reinforcement in the language of

other provisions of the Act, wherein the person who is the subject of an
investigation is referred to with particularity. The most striking example of this
is to be found in 335 and its legislative history which pertains to the
investigation of an alien who petitions for naturalization. Section 335(b)
provides: 'The Attorney General shall designate employees of the Service to
conduct preliminary examinations upon petitions for naturalization * * *. For
such purposes any such employee so designated is hereby authorized to take
testimony concerning any matter touching or in any way affecting the
admissibility of any petitioner for naturalization, to administer oaths, including
the oaths of the petitioner for naturalization and the oaths of petitioner's
witnesses to the petition for naturalization, and to require by subpena the
attendance and testimony of witnesses, including petitioner * * *.' Contrast this
with 335(b)'s predecessor, 333(a) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat.
1137, 1156: '* * * any such designated examiner is hereby authorized to take
testimony concerning any matter touching or in any way affecting the
admissibility of any petitioner for naturalization, to subpena witnesses, and to
administer oaths, including the oath of the petitioner to the petition for
naturalization and the oath of petitioner's witnesses.'8 Other examples of
Congress' careful differentiation between a witness who is not the subject of an
investigation and the person who is, may be found in 236(a),9 242(b)10 and

336(d)11 of the 1952 Act.

13

All these considerations converge to the conclusion that Congress has not
provided with sufficient clarity that the subpoena power granted by 235(a)
extends over persons who are the subject of denaturalization investigations;
therefore Congress is not to be deemed to have done so impliedly. Since this is
so, we are not called upon to consider whether Congress may employer an
immigration officer to secure evidence, under the authority of a subpoena, from
a citizen who is himself the subject of an investigation directed toward his
denaturalization. The judgment in No. 35 is affirmed; in No. 47, the judgment
is reversed.

14

Affirmed and reversed respectively.

15

Mr. Justice BLACK, concurring.

16

The respondent Minker is a naturalized citizen of the United States. 1 He was

subpoenaed by an immigration officer to appear and give testimony as a
'witness.' But Minker was not to be a witness within the traditional meaning of
that word, that is, one who testifies in a court proceeding or in a public quasijudicial hearing of some kind. The immigration officer summoning Minker was
not a judge or 'grand jury' of any kind, nor was he at the time acting in any
quasi-judicial capacity. Cf. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed.
682. He was acting under his broad power as a law enforcement officer to
follow up clues and find information that might be useful in later civil or
criminal prosecutions brought against persons suspected of violating the
immigration and naturalization laws. See, e.g., 287, Immigration and
Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 233, 8 U.S.C. 1357, 8 U.S.C.A. 1357; 8 CFR
287.1287.5. The object in summoning Minker was to interrogate him in the
immigration officer's private chambers to try to elicit information 'relating to
the possible institution of proceedings seeking the revocation of * * *
(Minker's) naturalization. * * *' Information so obtained might be used under
some circumstances in court to take away Minker's American citizenship or
convict him of perjury or some other crime.2 Thus the capacity in which this
immigration officer was acting was precisely the same as that of a policeman,
constable, sheriff, or Federal Bureau of Investigation agent who interrogates a
person, perhaps himself a suspect, in connection with murder or some other
crime. Apparently Congress has never even attempted to vest FBI agents with
such private inquisitorial power. Indeed, this Court has construed congressional
enactments as designed to safeguard persons against compulsory questioning
by law enforcement officers behind closed doors. McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819; Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S.

410, 69 S.Ct. 170, 93 L.Ed. 100. And we have frequently set aside state
criminal convictions as a denial of due process of law because of coercive
questioning of suspects by public prosecutors and other law enforcement
officers in their official chambers. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69
S.Ct. 1347, 93 L.Ed. 1801; Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 69 S.Ct.
1354, 93 L.Ed. 1815; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84
L.Ed. 716. Yet power of the Attorney General and immigration officers to
compel persons, including suspects, to appear and subject themselves to
questioning by law enforcement officers in their private chambers is precisely
what the Department of Justice claims here. This is no less true because a
federal judge must be called on to 'aid' the immigration officer in subjecting a
summoned person to questioning. 235(a), 66 Stat. 198, 8 U.S.C. 1225(a), 8
U.S.C.A. 1225(a). For after a court order, as before, the person summoned
must go to an immigration officer's private chambers for questioning by him,
out of which may come a prosecution against the 'witness' for perjury or some
other crime. A purpose to subject aliens, much less citizens, to a police practice
so dangerous to individual liberty as this should not be read into an Act of
Congress in the absence of a clear and unequivocal congressional mandate. I
think the Act relied on here by the Department of Justice should not be so read.
I would hold that immigration officers are wholly without statutory authority to
summon persons, whether suspects or not, to testify in private as 'witnesses' in
denaturalization matters. For this reason I concur in the Court's judgment in this
case.
17

The Department of Justice finds the sweeping power it claims in 235 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 198, 8 U.S.C. 1101,
1225, 8 U.S.C.A. 1101, 1225. That Act is a comprehensive codification of
laws relating to entry, exclusion, domestic control, deportation and
naturalization of aliens; the Act also provides the controlling rules and
procedures for denaturalizing naturalized citizens. Primary responsibility for
administration and enforcement of the Act is vested in the Attorney General,
acting chiefly through his subordinates in the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. 103, 66 Stat. 173, 8 U.S.C. 1103, 8 U.S.C.A. 1103.

18

This Court has drawn sharp and highly important distinctions between the
constitutional power of Congress to bar and exclude aliens and congressional
power to strip citizens of their citizenship. Former cases have held that
Congress has full power to bar or exclude aliens from the country. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 25 S.Ct. 644, 49 L.Ed. 1040; Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586; Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956. But
citizenship, whether acquired by birth or by naturalization, cannot be taken

away without a judicial trial in which the Government carries a heavy burden.
See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 42 S.Ct. 492, 66 L.Ed. 938;
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 64 S.Ct. 1240, 88 L.Ed. 1525;
Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920, 76 S.Ct. 210. Congress, apparently taking
note of these basic distinctions, divided the Act into different 'Titles' and
'Chapters.' Section 235, on which the Government relies here, appears in
Chapter IV of Title II. Title II as a whole contains provisions relating to
'Immigration' and Chapter IV of that Title contains the 'Provisions Relating to
Entry and Exclusion.' It is in the context of Chapter IV that 235 gives the
Attorney General and immigration officers, 'including special inquiry officers',
broad power to subpoena and require testimony of 'witnesses' as to 'the privilege
of any person to enter, reenter, reside in, or pass through the United States or
concerning any matter which is material and relevant to the enforcement of this
Act and the administration of the Service * * *.' I think that context indicates
that 235 was designed to apply only to the examination of 'witnesses' by
immigration officers in relation to 'entry and exclusion' of aliens, and matters
material and relevant to entry and exclusion. Such a reading makes the
subpoena power given fit into the carefully devised pattern of Title II, which
deals with aliens and immigration, not with naturalization or denaturalization.
Even if limited to matters pertaining to the entry and exclusion of aliens,
compulsory private examination of 'witnesses' might be invalid. The broad
powers here claimed by the Attorney General and his immigration officers
could be more nearly defended, if they can be defended at all, by confining use
of the powers to the field of treatment of aliens, where this Court has said
Congress has most power.
19

Limitation of the subpoena and investigatory powers in 235 to matters relating

to entry, control and exclusion of aliens is strengthened by consideration of
Title III of the Act which covers 'Nationality and Naturalization.' That Title
provides procedures for investigation and trial of naturalization and
denaturalization cases, wholly adequate in themselves without reliance on the
subpoena and examination powers of immigration officers under 235. The
naturalization and denaturalization procedures of Title III are not merely
adequate, but are in a measure inconsistent with 235 procedure. Looking first
at naturalization procedure under 332336, 66 Stat. 252258, 8 U.S.C.
14431447, 8 U.S.C.A. 14431447, it appears that Congress with
meticulous care provided a procedure for investigation of naturalization cases.
These sections provide their own way for summoning and examining
witnesses. Without mentioning immigration officers, the sections provide for
investigations, etc., to be carried on by any employee of the Service or of the
United States designated by the Attorney General. An examination under this
Title is carried on by a public hearing at which an applicant for citizenship can

produce his own witnesses.3 The designated hearing examiner is given the
power to subpoena witnesses by 335(b), 66 Stat. 255, 8 U.S.C. 1446(b), 8
U.S.C.A. 1446(b), and the naturalization judge is authorized to compel
compliance with the subpoena. After the hearing the examiner reports his
findings and recommendations to the Attorney General. The views of the
designated examiner, and of the Attorney General if in conflict, are then
reported to the naturalization court for its consideration. All of this persuades
me that reliance on the subpoena and private examination powers of
immigration officers under 235 would actually conflict with the public
hearing procedure Congress and the Attorney General have provided for
naturalization cases in 332335, 66 Stat. 252257, 8 U.S.C. 1443
1446, 8 U.S.C.A. 14431446, and 8 CFR 335.11335.13.
20

It seems even clearer that immigration officers' powers under 235 are not
applicable in denaturalization cases. Section 340 of Title III of the Act, 66 Stat.
260, 8 U.S.C. 1451, 8 U.S.C.A. 1451, provides for revocation of
naturalization. Responsibility for initiating such cases is placed on district
attorneys 'upon affidavit showing good cause therefor * * *.' Many of the
grounds for denaturalization are also grounds for felony prosecutions. Under
these circumstances it is not surprising that Congress expressly placed
responsibility for instituting denaturalization proceedings on district attorneys,
leaving them to summon persons to appear as witnesses in the traditional
manner before grand juries or courts. It would have been surprising had
Congress attempted to authorize the Nation's chief prosecuting officer and his
subordinates to compel a citizen to appear in government private offices to
answer questions in secret about that citizen's conduct, associations and beliefs.
Some countries give such powers to their officials. It is to be hoped that this
country never will.

21

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, concurring.

22

While I agree with the result reached by the Court, I do not think this case is
comparable to those controversies that frequently rege over the scope of the
investigative power in support of administrative action. Cf. Cudahy Packing
Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 62 S.Ct. 651, 86 L.Ed. 895 with United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 70 S.Ct. 357, 94 L.Ed. 401. Congress has
provided a special judicial procedure which must be followed, if a citizen is
denaturalized. That procedure is contained in 340 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952. 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. 1451, 8 U.S.C.A. 1451. It
provides for canceling a certificate of naturalization on the ground that it was
procured 'by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.'
340(a). Suit may be brought by the United States Attorney in the District Court

'upon affidavit showing good cause.' Id. The citizen whose citizenship is
challenged has 60 days 'in which to make answers to the petition of the United
States.' 340(b). There is no pretrial administrative procedure provided in the
section governing denaturalization. One can search 340 in vain for any
suggestion that the judicial procedure is supplemented by a pretrial procedure.
So to hold would make the 60-day period for answer 'empty words,' as Judge
Foley ruled in Application of Barnes, D.C., 116 F.Supp. 464, 469. As Judge
Hastie, writing for the court below in the Minker case, said, the administrative
pretrial procedure is not consistent with the safeguards which Congress has
provided in the judicial proceedings. 3 Cir., 217 F.2d 350, 352. I agree with that
view and would, therefore, read s 235(a) to exclude witnesses who are potential
defendants in 340 cases.
23

There is another reason for reading the section narrowly. When we deal with
citizenship we tread on sensitive ground. The citizenship of a naturalized
person has the same dignity and status as the citizenship of those of us born
here, save only for eligibility to the Presidency. He is a member of a
community included within the protection of all the guarantees of the
Constitution. Those safeguards would be imperiled if prior to the institution of
the proceedings the citizen could be compelled to be a witness against himself
and furnish out of his own mouth the evidence used to denaturalize him. I
would require the Government to proceed with meticulous regard for the basic
notions of Due Process which protect every vital right of the American eitizen.

Section 235(a) in full provides: 'The inspection, other than the physical and
mental examination, of aliens (including alien crewmen) seeking admission or
readmission to or the privilege of passing through the United States shall be
conducted by immigration officers, except as otherwise provided in regard to
special inquiry officers. All aliens arriving at ports of the United States shall be
examined by one or more immigration officers at the discretion of the Attorney
General and under such regulations as he may prescribe. Immigration officers
are hereby authorized and empowered to board and search any vessel, aircraft,
railway car, or other conveyance, or vehicle in which they believe aliens are
being brought into the United States.
The Attorney General and any immigration officer, including special inquiry
officers, shall have power to administer oaths and to take and consider evidence
of or from any person touching the privilege of any alien or person he believes
or suspects to be an alien to enter, reenter, pass through, or reside in the United
States or concerning any matter which is material and relevant to the
enforcement of this Act and the administration of the Service, and, where such

action may be necessary, to make a written record of such evidence. Any

person coming into the United States may be required to state under oath the
purpose or purposes for which he comes, the length of time he intends to
remain in the United States, whether or not he intends to remain in the United
States permanently and, if an alien, whether he intends to become a citizen
thereof, and such other items of information as will aid the immigration officer
in determining whether he is a national of the United States or an alien and, if
the latter, whether he belongs to any of the excluded classes enumerated in
section 212. The Attorney General and any immigration officer, including
special inquiry officers, shall have power to require by subpena the attendance
and testimony of witnesses before immigration officers and special inquiry
officers and the production of books, papers, and documents relating to the
privilege of any person to enter, reenter, reside in, or pass through the United
States or concerning any matter which is material and relevant to the
enforcement of this Act and the administration of the Service, and to that end
may invoke the aid of any court of the United States. Any United States district
court within the jurisdiction of which investigations or inquiries are being
conducted by an immigration officer or special inquiry officer may, in the event
of neglect or refusal to respond to a subpena issued under this subsection or
refusal to testify before an immigration officer or special inquiry officer, issue
an order requiring such persons to appear before an immigration officer or
special inquiry officer, produce books, papers, and documents if demanded, and
testify, and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by the
court as a contempt thereof.'
2

Section 340(a) provides: 'It shall be the duty of the United States district
attorneys for the respective districts, upon affidavit showing good cause
therefor, to institute proceedings in any court specified in subsection (a) of
section 310 of this title in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen
may reside at the time of bringing suit, for the purpose of revoking and setting
aside the order admitting such person to citizenship and canceling the
certificate of naturalization on the ground that such order and certificate of
naturalization were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful
misrepresentation, and such revocation and setting aside of the order admitting
such person to citizenship and such canceling of certificate of naturalization
shall be effective as of the original date of the order and certificate,
respectively:
Provided, That refusal on the part of a naturalized citizen within a period often
years following his naturalization to testify as a witness in any proceeding
before a congressional committee concerning his subversive activities, in a case
where such person has been convicted of contempt for such refusal, shall be
held to constitute a ground for revocation of such person's naturalization under

this subsection as having been procured by concealment of a material fact or by

willful misrepresentation. If the naturalized citizen does not reside in any
judicial district in the United States at the time of bringing such suit, the
proceeding may be instituted in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia or in the United States district court in the judicial district in which
such person last had his residence.'
3

8 CFR 340.11 provides: 'Investigation and report. Whenever it appears that

any grant of naturalization may have been procured by concealment of a
material fact or by willful misrepresentation, the facts shall be reported to the
district director having jurisdiction over the naturalized person's last known
place of residence. If the district director is satisfied that a prima facie showing
has been made that grounds for revocation exist, he shall cause an investigation
to be made and report the facts in writing to the Commissioner with a
recommendation as to whether revocation proceedings should be instituted. If it
appears that naturalization was procured in violation of section 1425 of Title 18
of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C.A. 1425, the facts in regard thereto may
be presented by the district director to the appropriate United States Attorney
for possible criminal prosecution.'

The question whether respondent was required to obey the order of the District
Court irrespective of that court's power under 235(a) has not been raised. See
United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677,
91 L.Ed. 884.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has taken the same view. Lansky v.
Savoretti, 220 F.2d 906.

E.g., 215(g): 'Passports, visas, reentry permits, and other documents required
for entry under this Act may be considered as permits to enter for the purposes
of this section.' Section 241(a)(2): 'Any alien in the United States * * * shall,
upon the order of the Attorney General, be deported who* * * entered the
United States without inspection or at any time or place other than as
designated by the Attorney General or is in the United States in violation of this
Act or in violation of any other law of the United States.' Section 290(a): 'There
shall be established in the office of the Commissioner, for the use of the
security and enforcement agencies of the Government of the United States, a
central index, which shall contain the names of all aliens heretofore admitted to
the United States, or excluded therefrom, insofar as such information is
available from the existing records of the Service, and the names of all aliens
hereafter admitted to the United States, or excluded therefrom, the names of
their sponsors of record, if any, and such other relevant information as the
Attorney General shall require as an aid to the proper enforcement of this Act.'

E.g., 284: 'Nothing contained in this title shall be construed so as to limit,

restrict, deny, or affect the coming into or departure from the United States of
an alien member of the Armed Forces of the United States who is in the
uniform of, or who bears documents identifying him as a member of, such
Armed Forces, and who is coming to or departing from the United States under
official orders or permit of such Armed Forces: Provided, That nothing
contained in this section shall be construed to give to or confer upon any such
alien any other privileges, rights, benefits, exemptions, or immunities under this
Act, which are not otherwise specifically granted by this Act.'

'While the Nationality Act ( 333(a) of the 1940 Act) provides for subpena of
witnesses at a preliminary (naturalization) hearing and for calling of witnesses
in any naturalization proceedings in court, specific provision is not made for
subpenaing the petitioner. The subcommittee feels that the proposed bill should
contain the requirement that the petitioner be required to attend hearings and is
so recommending.' S.Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 739.

Section 236(a) provides: 'A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings
under this section, administer oaths, present and receive evidence, and
interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien or witnesses.'

10

Section 242(b) provides: 'A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings
under this section to determine the deportability of any alien, and shall
administer oaths, present and receive evidence, interrogate, examine, and crossexamine the alien or witnesses, and, as authorized by the Attorney General,
shall make determinations, including orders of deportation.'

11

Section 336(d) provides: 'The Attorney General shall have the right to appear
before any court in any naturalization proceedings for the purpose of crossexamining the petitioner and the witnesses produced in support of the petition
concerning any matter touching or in any way affecting the petitioner's right to
admission to citizenship, and shall have the right to call witnesses, including the
petitioner, produce evidence, and be heard in opposition to, or in favor of, the
granting of any petition in naturalization proceedings.'

Minker is respondent in No. 35. He and the petitioners in No. 47, Salvatore and
Joseph Falcone, raise the same questions, and what I say about Minker's case
applies also to that of the Falcones.

See 348, 66 Stat. 267, 8 U.S.C. 1459, 8 U.S.C.A. 1459; 18 U.S.C. 1621,
18 U.S.C.A. 1621. See also Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920, 76 S.Ct. 210,
reversing 9 Cir., 215 F.2d 955. But see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6
S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746; majority and dissenting opinions in Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487, 64 S.Ct. 1082, 88 L.Ed. 1408; Adams v. Maryland, 347

U.S. 179, 74 S.Ct. 442, 98 L.Ed. 608.

3

The Attorney General's regulations for the conduct of these examinations, 8

CFR 335.11335.13, also provide that the petitioner for naturalization may
be represented by counsel and that the petitioner may cross-examine
government witnesses. If petitioner is not represented by counsel, the hearing
examiner must assist him in introducing his evidence. Furthermore the decision
of the examiner may not be based on evidence which is not in the record or
which would be inadmissible in judicial proceedings. Thus the regulations
emphasize the difference between a subpoena to testify before a 335
naturalization hearing officer and a subpoena to testify before a 235
immigration officer seeking to obtain evidence for criminal prosecution or
deportation. And that show that naturalization procedures are completely
independent from entry and exclusion procedures. Cf. 235(c), 236(a), 292,
66 Stat. 199, 200, 235, 8 U.S.C. 1225(c), 1226(a), 1362, 8 U.S.C.A.
1225(c), 1226(a), 1362; 8 CFR 235.15, 236.11236.16.