Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982)

454 U.S.
364
102 S.Ct. 700
70 L.Ed.2d 551
Donald G. BOAG
v.
Ellis MacDOUGALL, Director, Arizona Department of
Corrections.
No. 80-6845.
Jan. 11, 1982.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner, who was then an inmate of the Arizona Department of Corrections

Reception and Treatment Center, filed a crudely written complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona, in which he alleged,
inter alia, that he had been placed in solitary confinement on March 3, 1980,
without any notice of charges or any hearing, that he was threatened with
violence when he asked what the charges were, and that he was still in "the
hole" a week later. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground
that the case was moot because petitioner had been transferred to another
facility.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals did not endorse the District Court's mootness
rationale, and rightfully so, since the transfer did not moot the damages claim.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals affirmed, 642 F.2d 455 (1981), concluding
that first, district courts have "especially broad" discretion to dismiss frivolous
actions against prison officials under 28 U.S.C. 1915(d), and second,
petitioner's action is frivolous because it does not state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. We need not address the permissible contours of the
Court of Appeals' first conclusion, for its second conclusion is erroneous as a
matter of law. Construing petitioner's inartful pleading liberally, as Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), instructs the
federal courts to do in pro se actions, it states a cause of action. See Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-572, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974-2982, 41 L.Ed.2d 935
(1974). On the basis of the record before us, we cannot find a sufficient ground
for affirming the dismissal of the complaint.*

3
The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition
for certiorari are granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered. JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring.
I join in the per curiam, but write separately to emphasize two points. First,
nothing in the Court's opinion prevents the District Court on remand from
dismissing this suit under 28 U.S.C. 1915(d) if it finds grounds to believe that
the complaint is "malicious or frivolous." This Court only requires the District
Court to articulate briefly its reasons for dismissal in order to facilitate appellate
review. Second, I find merit in Justice REHNQUIST's comments that this
Court is not equipped to correct every perceived error coming from the lower
federal courts. The effectiveness of this Court rests in part on its practice of
deciding cases of broad significance and of declining to expend limited judicial
resources on cases, such as the present one, whose significance is limited to the
parties. In exercising our discretionary certiorari jurisdiction, we should not be
influenced solely by the merits of the petitioner's case.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE

WHITE join, dissenting.
The per curiam reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case
because neither it nor the District Court articulated a proper basis for dismissing
the petitioner's complaint. While I agree with the per curiam's conclusion that
the case is not moot and that the complaint, construed liberally, alleges a cause
of action, I find a sufficient basis to support the decision below. More
importantly, I find this to be a good example of the kind of cases the Court
should not decide.
The record shows that petitioner failed to comply with the local rules of the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix Division, in
which his complaint was filed. As part of his claim, petitioner filed a
typewritten document entitled "From To Be Used By Prisoner In Filing a
Complaint Under The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983." Section I of the
document was headed "Previous Lawsuits," and subsection A required the
plaintiff to answer:
"Have you begun other lawsuits in state or federal court dealing with the same
facts in this action or otherwise relating to your imprisonment? Yes (____) No

(____)."
10
Petitioner failed to check either the "Yes" or the "No" space and did not answer
the next seven questions about previous filings, thereby violating the local rules
of the District Court. Rule 53(a), Local Rules of the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona. There appears to have been good reason for this
omission. Records of the District Court, of which we may take judicial notice,
Wells v. United States, 318 U.S. 257, 260, 63 S.Ct. 582, 584, 87 L.Ed. 746
(1943), indicate that petitioner had in the past filed at least 10 prisoner civil
rights suits and had been denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis in at least 2
others.
11
In my view, the District Court was justified in dismissing the complaint, if for
no other reason, on the ground that petitioner had simply refused to comply
with local rules regarding the disclosure of previous lawsuits. The fact that
neither lower court relied upon this ground for dismissal does not remove it
from our consideration. A respondent may seek affirmance in this Court on any
ground disclosed by the record which would not expand the relief granted.
United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 166, n. 8, 98 S.Ct.
364, 369, n. 8, 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
475 n. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1156-57 n. 6, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); Ryerson v.
United States, 312 U.S. 405, 408, 61 S.Ct. 656, 657-58, 85 L.Ed. 917 (1941).
By reversing the decision below without first permitting the parties to brief the
merits of this case, the per curiam precludes respondent from seeking
affirmance on this or any other basis.
12
Even if there were no grounds for affirmance, I would find this case unworthy
of the Court's attention. In our zeal to provide "equal justice under law," we
must never forget that this Court is not a forum for the correction of errors. As
was said by Chief Justice Vinson:
13
"The Supreme Court is not, and never has been, primarily concerned with the
correction of errors in lower court decisions. In almost all cases within the
Court's appellate jurisdiction, the petitioner has already received one appellate
review of his case. The debates in the Constitutional Convention make clear
that the purpose of the establishment of one supreme national tribunal was, in
the words of John Rutledge of South Carolina, 'to secure the national rights &
uniformity of Judgmts.' The function of the Supreme Court is, therefore, to
resolve conflicts of opinion on federal questions that have arisen among lower
courts, to pass upon questions of wide import under the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States, and to exercise supervisory power over the lower
federal courts. If we took every case in which an interesting legal question is

raised, or our prima facie impression is that the decision below is erroneous, we
could not fulfill the Constitutional and statutory responsibilities placed upon
the Court. To remain effective, the Supreme Court must continue to decide only
those cases which present questions whose resolution will have immediate
importance far beyond the particular facts and parties involved."*
14
It cannot be doubted that this case will have no importance beyond the facts
and parties involved.
15
Finally, it is worth emphasizing what the Court is not saying in this case. The
statutory provision under which petitioner was permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis, 28 U.S.C. 1915(d), expressly authorizes courts to dismiss such suits
"if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." This especially broad
dismissal power, recognized in the footnote to the per curiam, safeguards the
public and the courts from abuses of the in forma pauperis privilege by those
who are not restrained by the costs of litigation. I do not read the per curiam as
narrowing that power. Nor does the per curiam equate the dismissal power of
1915(d) with that of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rather, the per curiam simply holds that the legal conclusions of the lower
courts were erroneous. From reversal on that basis, in this case, I respectfully
dissent.
Neither the Court of Appeals nor the District Court relied upon the argument
advanced in the dissenting opinion. Indeed, the dissent's information that
petitioner had attempted to file a dozen previous civil rights actions is not
disclosed in the record, the opinions below, or the briefs filed with this Court.
We recognize that 28 U.S.C. 1915(d) vests the federal courts with broad
discretion to take judicial notice of such information and to identify and dismiss
frivolous complaints, but it does not appear from the papers before us that any
such discretion was exercised by either the Court of Appeals or the District
Court; both courts relied solely upon erroneous legal grounds for dismissing the
complaint. We are in no position to decide, on the basis of these legal errors
and this record, whether the argument advanced in the dissenting opinion
would have "satisfied [the District Court] that the action is frivolous or
malicious." 28 U.S.C. 1915(d). A question of that character must be
addressed in the first instance by the District Court. If a dismissal is to be based
on the ground that petitioner failed to comply with the local rule, or that his
prior filings justify the conclusion that his action is frivolous or malicious, a
brief statement explaining that ground should be made by the District Court to
facilitate intelligent appellate review.

*
Address of Chief Justice Vinson before the American Bar Association, Sept. 7,
1949 (quoted in R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 258 (5th ed.
1978)).

Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982)

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454 U.S.

Petitioner, who was then an inmate of the Arizona Department of Corrections

for affirming the dismissal of the complaint.*

It is so ordered. JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring.

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE

facts in this action or otherwise relating to your imprisonment? Yes (____) No

federal courts. If we took every case in which an interesting legal question is

facilitate intelligent appellate review.

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