Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 (1986)
Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140 (1986)
140
106 S.Ct. 1745
90 L.Ed.2d 116
Syllabus
Petitioners, husband and wife, who owned a building housing a restaurant
and apartments, were charged with various crimes in connection with a
fire in the building that resulted in the killing of two tenants. At the close
of the prosecution's case in chief at their bench trial in a Pennsylvania
state court, petitioners challenged the sufficiency of the evidence by filing
a demurrer pursuant to a Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure. The
trial court sustained the demurrer, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court
quashed the Commonwealth's appeal on the ground that it was barred by
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the granting of a demurrer is not the functional equivalent of
an acquittal and that, for purposes of considering a plea of double
jeopardy, a defendant who demurs at the close of the prosecution's case in
chief "elects to seek dismissal on grounds unrelated to his factual guilt or
innocence."
Held: The trial judge's granting of petitioners' demurrer was an acquittal
under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the Commonwealth's appeal was
barred because reversal would have led to further trial proceedings.
Whether the trial is to a jury or, as here, to the bench, subjecting the
defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or
innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Pp. 144-146.
507 Pa. 344, 490 A.2d 394 (1985), reversed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
At the close of the prosecution's case in chief, the trial court dismissed certain
charges against petitioners on the ground that the evidence presented was
legally insufficient to support a conviction. The question presented is whether
the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the prosecution from appealing this ruling.
"As the trier of fact and law, the court was not satisfied, after considering all of
the facts together with all reasonable inferences which the Commonwealth's
evidence tended to prove, that there was sufficient evidence from which it
could be concluded that either of the defendants was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of setting or causing to be set the fire in question." App. to Pet. for Cert.
101a-102a.
2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91, 98 S.Ct.
2187, 2193, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) (dicta); Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40,
101 S.Ct. 970, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981). Second, when a trial court enters such a
judgment, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars an appeal by the prosecution not
only when it might result in a second trial, but also if reversal would translate
into further proceedings devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the
elements of the offense charged. The Superior Court concluded that because
reversal of the trial court's granting of petitioners' demurrer would necessitate
further trial proceedings, the Commonwealth's appeal was improper under
Martin Linen.
5
"In deciding whether to grant a demurrer, the court does not determine whether
or not the defendant is guilty on such evidence, but determines whether the
evidence, if credited by the jury, is legally sufficient to warrant the conclusion
that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
reverse.4
II
10
11
12
13
We hold, therefore, that the trial judge's granting of petitioners' demurrer was
an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and that the Commonwealth's
appeal was barred because reversal would have led to further trial proceedings.
14
15
Reversed.
See also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1
(1978), where a Court of Appeals' reversal of the defendant's conviction on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury verdict
"unquestionably . . . 'represente[d] a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of
the factual elements of the offense charged.' " Id. at 10, 98 S.Ct., at 2147
(quoting Martin Linen, 430 U.S., at 571, 97 S.Ct., at 1354).
The status of the trial court's judgment as an acquittal is not affected by the
Commonwealth's allegation that the court "erred in deciding what degree of
recklessness was . . . required to be shown under Pennsylvania's definition of
[third-degree] murder." Tr. of Oral Arg. 24. "[T]he fact that 'the acquittal may
result from erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous interpretations of
governing legal principles' . . . affects the accuracy of that determination but it
does not alter its essential character." United States v. Scott, 437 U.S., at 98, 98
S.Ct., at 2197 (quoting id., at 106, 98 S.Ct., at 2201 (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting)). Accord, Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57
L.Ed.2d 43 (1978) supra; Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81
L.Ed.2d 164 (1984).
The fact that the "further proceedings" standard which the Superior Court
quoted from Martin Linen was first articulated in United States v. Jenkins, 420
U.S. 358, 370, 95 S.Ct. 1006, 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975), does not detract
from its authority. United States v. Scott, supra, overrules Jenkins only insofar
as Jenkins bars an appeal by the government when a defendant successfully
moves for dismissal on a ground "unrelated to factual guilt or innocence. . . ."
Scott, supra, 437 U.S., at 99, 98 S.Ct., at 2198. The issue before us in Scott was
what constitutes an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause; the question of
the circumstances under which an acquittal is appealable was not presented.