Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368 (1987)
Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368 (1987)
368
107 S.Ct. 1807
95 L.Ed.2d 328
Syllabus
The federal statute governing the Aid to Families With Dependent
Children (AFDC) program requires participating States to consider a
family's "income and resources" in determining whether it is needy, and
prohibits the payment of benefits in any month in which either income or
resources exceed state-prescribed limits. Because income and resources
are separately computed and generally subject to different state limits,
whether and for how long a family that acquires a sum of money is
rendered ineligible for AFDC benefits may depend on whether the sum is
classified as income or as a resource. Prior to 1981, the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) required that States treat any income
acquired in a given month as a resource in following months. However,
because of HHS' concern that recipients that acquired a large amount of
income had an incentive to spend it as quickly as possible in order to
reduce their resources to a level beneath the state limit, Congress amended
the AFDC statute to provide that recipients who receive income exceeding
the State's standard of need are ineligible for benefits for as many months
as that income would last if the recipients spent an amount equal to the
State's standard each month. In response to this amendment, the Virginia
Department of Social Services (VDSS) revised its AFDC regulations to
treat various lump-sum payments, including personal injury awards, as
income rather than resources, although the regulations continued to treat
property damage awards as resources. Respondents, personal injury award
recipients who were thereby rendered ineligible for AFDC benefits under
Virginia's revised regulations, filed a class action in Federal District Court
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
a state social-services agency could not lawfully treat personal injury awards as
income when determining the eligibility of families seeking Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits. Reed v. Health & Human Services,
774 F.2d 1270 (1985). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion. Watkins v. Blinzinger, 789 F.2d
474 (1986). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 477 U.S. 903, 106
S.Ct. 3271, 91 L.Ed.2d 561 (1986).
2
Because the OBRA amendment applies by its terms only to income, the
distinction between income and resources took on new importance. If a given
sum of money were treated as a resource, the family that received the sum
would be ineligible only until it spent enough of the sum to bring its resources
down to the State's resource limit; but if the sum were treated as income, no
matter how much was spent, the family would remain ineligible for the
statutory period. In response to the OBRA amendment, the Virginia
Department of Social Services (the agency responsible for administering
Virginia's AFDC program) revised its regulations to treat various lump-sum
payments, including personal injury awards, as income rather than as resources.
Virginia Department of Social Services, ADC Manual (Va. ADC Manual)
305.4C (Jan. 1983), App. to Pet. for Cert. 71.1 It did not, however, alter its
policy of treating the proceeds of the sale or conversion of real or personal
propertyincluding property damage awardsas resources. 303.3, App. 25.
Respondents, who had received personal injury awards and were disqualified
from Virginia's AFDC program for varying periods pursuant to Virginia's
revised regulations, filed a class action against the Secretary and petitioner
Lukhard, the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Social Services, in
the United States District Court for the District of Western Virginia. They
alleged that treating personal injury awards as income was inconsistent with the
federal AFDC statute, and they sought monetary, injunctive, and declaratory
relief under Rev.Stat. 1979, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 5 U.S.C. 701706, and 28 U.S.C. 2201-2202. After certifying a class of those whose
AFDC benefits had been or would be decreased as a result of Virginia's revised
regulations, the District Court granted summary judgment in the class' favor. It
held that the common meaning of the term "income" precluded application of
that term to personal injury awards, and that it was irrational for Virginia to
treat personal injury awards as income but at the same time treat awards for
property loss as resources. The District Court therefore issued an injunction
forbidding Lukhard to apply the revised regulations to recipients of personal
injury awards, ordering him to begin paying AFDC benefits to the named
plaintiffs and other class members who would presently have been receiving
them but for application of the revised regulations, and requiring him to notify
AFDC recipients who had been deprived of past AFDC benefits as a result of
the revised regulations. The court declined, however, to order Lukhard to pay
retroactive AFDC benefits, and stayed the injunction pending appeal except
insofar as it required Lukhard to begin paying AFDC benefits to the named
plaintiffs. Lukhard and the Secretary appealed and the respondents crossappealed. After the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
judgment in all respects, Reed v. Health & Human Services, 774 F.2d 1270
(1985), Lukhard filed this petition. The Secretary did not file a separate petition
but supported Lukhard's petition and supports Lukhard's position on the merits.
II
6
AFDC statute. Id., at 202, 105 S.Ct., at 1148. Although that conclusion was
based in part on a provision not involved in this case, it demonstrates that the
AFDC statute itself contradicts the theory that payments that do not constitute
gain (as respondents use the term) to their recipients cannot reasonably be
described as "income." Thus, contrary to respondents' assertion, Virginia's
revised regulations are consistent with a perfectly natural use of "income."
7
Respondents also seek to derive support from the fact that personal injury
awards are not treated as income under the Internal Revenue Code, the Food
Stamp program, or the HHS poverty guidelines. See 26 U.S.C. 104(a); 91
Stat. 962, 7 U.S.C. 2014(d)(8); 48 Fed.Reg. 7010, 7011 (1983). But in each of
these instances there is an express provision that personal injury awards are not
to be treated as incomewhich causes them not only to fail to support the
proposition that the term "income" automatically excludes personal injury
awards, but to support the opposite proposition that absent express exclusion it
embraces them. Moreover, the fact that Congress was silent in the AFDC
statute but has elsewhere been explicit when it wished to exclude personal
injury awards from income tends to refute rather than support a legislative
intent to exclude them from AFDC computations.3 Cf. Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 300, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983). Nor is there
any merit to respondents' slightly different argument that since the relevant
provisions of the Food Stamp program, the HHS poverty guidelines, and the
AFDC statute have the common goal of defining who is needy, they should be
presumed to have a common definition of "income"one that necessarily
excludes personal injury awards. The explicit differences between the definition
of "income" in the Food Stamp program and the HHS poverty guidelines on the
one hand and the AFDC statute on the other are simply too great to permit any
such presumption. Compare 91 Stat. 962, 7 U.S.C. 2014(d)(8) (Food Stamp
program excludes all nonrecurring lump-sum payments, including retroactive
lump-sum Social Security benefits), and 48 Fed.Reg. 7010, 7011 (1983) (HHS
poverty guidelines exclude capital gains, gifts, and lump-sum inheritances),
with Brief for Respondents 47 (conceding that retroactive Social Security
benefits and other lump-sum payments that represent a true gain are income
under the AFDC statute).
Respondents also make two arguments based upon the legislative history of the
1981 OBRA amendment. First, they argue that the Congress that passed the
OBRA amendment must have been aware of HHS' longstanding position that
"income" excluded personal injury awards, and that its use of "income" in the
OBRA amendment therefore necessarily indicated an intent that the term be
interpreted in that manner. It is of course not true that whenever Congress
enacts legislation using a word that has a given administrative interpretation it
means to freeze that administrative interpretation in place. See Helvering v.
Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 100-101, 60 S.Ct. 18, 24-25, 84 L.Ed. 101
(1939). But if that were the case here, it would damage rather than aid
respondents' cause, since, as we have seen, HHS' position at the time of the
OBRA amendment was that it was permissible for States to treat personal
injury awards as income.
10
11
indeed require) the conclusion that personal injury awards are compensation for
diminution of well-being of a kind not covered by the AFDC statute, except to
the extent they compensate for lost wages (to which extent they clearly are
gain, see supra, at 375) or for economic expenses caused by the injury (to
which extent Virginia permits them to be in large part offset, see n. 1, supra ).
Thus, personal injury awards are almost entirely a gain in well-being, as wellbeing is measured under the AFDC statute, and can reasonably be treated as
income even on respondents' definition of the term.
12
13
It is of course true that, by considering only real and personal property as the
measure of well-being, the AFDC program evaluates need in a way that does
not reflect the fullness of life. That portion of a personal injury award which
constitutes compensation for loss of earnings will not result in a loss of
eligibility, since it merely replaces future income that would otherwise have
been earned; but the portion attributable to pain and suffering replaces no other
economic income, and will reduce AFDC payments. It can reasonably be urged
that a family with monthly pain-and-suffering-award income but with a family
member in physical and emotional pain is not better off than the family without
that additional income but also without that suffering. Physical and emotional
well-being, however, is not what the AFDC statute is designed to take into
accountas is evident from the fact that there is no argument for increasing
AFDC payments above the normal income limit where pain and suffering exists
without a tortfeasor who is compensating it. Compensating for the
noneconomic inequities of life is a task daunting in its complexity, and the
AFDC statute is neither designed nor interpreted unreasonably if it leaves them
untouched.
14
Finally, we do not agree with the dissent's contention that our holding "
'override[s] the States' traditional power to define the measure of damages
applicable to state-created causes of action.' " Post, at 389 (quoting Norfolk &
Western R. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 500, n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 755, 761, n. 3, 62
L.Ed.2d 689 (1980) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting)). That could not possibly be
so, since in this case Virginia wants to treat the proceeds of personal injury
awards as income. It is a peculiar solicitude for States' prerogatives that would
prevent Virginia from striking its own balance between directing limited AFDC
funds to the least wealthy and compensating tort victims. It is true that the
Secretary has now promulgated a regulation requiring States to treat personal
injury awards as income under the AFDC statute. See n. 5, supra. But since this
is not a case in which a State challenges that regulation, the dissent's objection
is simply irrelevant.
III
15
16
Reversed.
17
18
I join the judgment of the Court but not the opinion of the plurality, for I would
base my vote to reverse not on an endorsement of the original Virginia
interpretation but, flatly, on the deference that is due the Secretary of Health
and Human Services in his interpretation of the governing statutes. In a
statutory area as complicated as this one, the administrative authorities are far
more able than this Court to determine congressional intent in the light of
experience in the field. If the result is unacceptable to Congress, it has only to
clarify the situation with language that unambiguously specifies its intent.
19
20
Today the Court holds that personal injury awards may be treated as income for
the purpose of determining whether a family is eligible for Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC). Because such treatment is inconsistent with the
compensatory nature of personal injury awards, and may work a substantial
hardship on needy families that Congress intended to assist through the AFDC
program, I dissent.
21
22
II
23
The AFDC statute, as noted above, does not define "income." "A fundamental
canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be
interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Perrin
v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 314, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979).
The plurality recognizes that income commonly is defined as " ' "the gain
derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined," provided it be
understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital
assets. . . .' " Ante, at 375 (quoting Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207, 40
S.Ct. 189, 193, 64 L.Ed. 521 (1920) (quoting Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v.
Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415, 34 S.Ct. 136, 140, 58 L.Ed. 285 (1913); Doyle v.
Mitchell Brothers Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185, 38 S.Ct. 467, 469, 62 L.Ed. 1054
(1918))). In light of Macomber, which held that stock dividends are not taxable
income, the Solicitor of Internal Revenue concluded:
24
"If an individual is possessed of a personal right that is not assignable and not
susceptible of any appraisal in relation to market values, and thereafter receives
either damages or payment in compromise for an invasion of that right, it can
not be held that he thereby derives any gain or profit. It is clear, therefore, that
the Government can not tax him on any portion of the sum received." I-1
Cum.Bull. 93 (1922).
25
In a later tax case, the Court defined income as "accessions to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion."
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431, 75 S.Ct. 473, 476, 99
L.Ed. 483 (1955). In Glenshaw Glass, the Court observed that "[d]amages for
personal injury are by definition compensatory only," id., at 432, n. 8, 75 S.Ct.,
at 477 n. 8, and cited "[t]he long history of departmental rulings holding
personal injury recoveries nontaxable on the theory that they roughly
correspond to a return of capital . . .," ibid. (citing 2 Cum.Bull. 71 (1920); I-1
Cum.Bull. 92, 93 (1922); VII-2 Cum.Bull. 123 (1928); 1954-1 Cum.Bull. 179,
180).
26
Congress continues to exclude personal injury awards from income under the
Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. 104(a). Congress also excludes personal
injury awards from income for the purpose of determining eligibility for food
stamps, 7 U.S.C. 2014(d)(8), and under the HHS poverty guidelines, 48
Fed.Reg. 7010, 7010-7011 (1983).3 Indeed, the plurality does not cite a single
statute in which Congress has defined income to include personal injury
awards, and I am aware of none.
27
do not result in any gain to the recipient. Ante, at 375-376. The plurality
observes that the Internal Revenue Code, the Food Stamp statute, and the HHS
poverty guidelines expressly exclude personal injury awards from income. In
the plurality's view, "the fact that Congress was silent in the AFDC statute but
has elsewhere been explicit when it wished to exclude personal injury awards
from income tends to refute rather than support a legislative intent to exclude
them from AFDC computations." Ante, at 376 (citation omitted; footnote
omitted). This inference from congressional silence is unwarranted. Congress
made a considered decision to exclude personal injury awards from income for
purposes of the Internal Revenue Code and the Food Stamp statute. In contrast,
as the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed, "The inescapable fact
is that Congress wanted to compel recipients of AFDC to budget lump-sum
receipts of 'income' but did not consider what 'income' might be." Watkins v.
Blinzinger, 789 F.2d 474, 480 (1986).
28
The fact that Congress did not define income for purposes of the AFDC statute
hardly justifies an assumption that it considered the narrower question whether
personal injury awards should be included in income. On the contrary, if
Congress had considered the question, it is reasonable to believe that it would
have treated personal injury awards as it has in a variety of other circumstances
and excluded them from income. Finally, as discussed below, the effect of
including personal injury awards in income is to deprive AFDC families of the
benefits of tort and worker's compensation remedies, most of which are
provided by state law. I would not infer from the silence of Congress a "purpose
to override the States' traditional power to define the measure of damages
applicable to state-created causes of action." Norfolk & Western R. Co. v.
Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 500, n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 755, 761 n. 3, 62 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980)
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting).4
29
The plurality also concludes that personal injury awards "can reasonably be
treated as gain." Ante, at 374-375, and n. 2. To be sure, some components of
personal injury awards do result in gain to the plaintiff. Punitive damages, in
the exceptional case in which they are awarded, are a windfall to the plaintiff
rather than compensation. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., supra
(punitive damages are taxable income). As a practical matter, an impoverished
family is unlikely to receive a large award for lost income. If it does, however,
it is reasonable to treat such an award as income. See ante, at 375. I cannot
agree, however, that it is reasonable to treat the entire personal injury award as
income. Damages for pain and suffering, physical injury, disfigurement, loss of
consortium, and the like are intended to compensate the recipient for
nonpecuniary losses. In other contexts, Congress excludes the full amount of
personal injury awards from income, to avoid the necessity for "a complex and
31
The plurality recognizes the elementary fact that "a family with monthly painand-suffering-award income but with a family member in physical and
emotional pain is not better off than the family without that additional income
but also without that suffering." Ante, at 1816 (emphasis in original). The
plurality nevertheless concludes that the AFDC program is not designed to take
into account physical and emotional well-being. But tort law and workers'
compensation statutes are designed to take these into account. The AFDC
statute surely is not designed to deprive impoverished families of remedies for
personal injury, most of which are provided by state law. To be sure, "there is
no argument for increasing AFDC payments above the normal limit where pain
and suffering exists without a tortfeasor who is compensating it." Ibid.
(emphasis in original). By the same token, there is no argument for decreasing
AFDC payments for families who are free of pain and suffering.5
During the period at issue in this case, the Virginia Department of Social
Services also included in income moneys intended for continuing medical and
rehabilitative expenses. See Brief for Petitioner 5, n. 5.6 Thus, the Virginia
regulation put impoverished families to a hard choice between obtaining
medical care and providing for the basic needs of their children. One of the
named respondents, Ona Mae Reed, actually faced this choice: She could not
afford to see a physician while her family was ineligible for AFDC benefits.
App. 15. I cannot accept the Court's conclusion that Congress intended to
permit such a harsh result.
III
32
The revised regulations also permitted recipients to deduct from such a payment
any directly related expenses that were incurred prior to or within 30 days after
receipt of the payment. Va. ADC Manual 305.4C (Jan.1983), App. to Pet. for
Cert. 72. During the pendency of this lawsuit, Congress amended the OBRA
amendment to give States the option of reducing the period of ineligibility
otherwise mandated so as to take into account various expenditures related to
the lump-sum payment. Section 2632(a) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,
98 Stat. 1141, 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(17) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Virginia has since
availed itself of this option. Va. ADC Manual 305.4C (Oct.1984), App. to
Pet. for Cert. 83-86.
Respondents observe that none of the evidence relied upon by Lukhard and the
Secretary antedates the passage of the OBRA amendment. Although true, the
observation is of dubious significance. Older documents demonstrating the
existence of a longstanding interpretation would of course be better evidence
than are recent documents asserting its existence. But in the absence of any
contrary evidence, the latter form of evidence is certainly sufficient to support a
conclusion that the interpretation existed. Similarly, although respondents
observe that the record does not reveal whether any States actually availed
themselves of the option allegedly given them prior to passage of the OBRA
amendment, we see no reason to draw any inference at all from that lacuna.
5
After this suit was filed, the Secretary proposed a rule requiring States to treat
all lump-sum payments as income. 49 Fed.Reg. 45558, 45568 (1984). Such a
rule has since been promulgated. 45 CFR 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F) (1986). Lukhard
and the Secretary argue that the Secretary's determination that this rule is
consistent with the AFDC statute and the OBRA amendment is entitled to
deference, while respondents argue that the rule was invalidly promulgated and
is in any event due no deference. Since we uphold Virginia's practice without
reference to the new HHS regulation, we need not reach these questions.
As has already been noted, since this suit was filed Virginia has altered its
treatment of personal injury awards by adopting a regulation reducing the
ineligibility period established by the OBRA amendment to take into account
various expenditures related to the award and other equitable considerations.
Va. ADC Manual 305.4C (Oct.1984), App. to Pet. for Cert. 83-86. Moreover,
the Secretary contends that a new regulation he has promulgated, 45 CFR
233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F) (1986), requires Virginia to treat property damages awards
as income, thus rendering prospectively moot respondents' claim that Virginia's
disparate treatment violates the HHS regulation. Respondents claim, however,
that the new regulation is invalid because improperly promulgated, that it does
not require Virginia to alter its treatment of property damages awards, and that
even if it did it would not result in equal treatment of personal injury awards
and property damages awards. We need not consider the consequences of these
subsequent developments. The legality of the original disparity in treatment is
still a live issue, since its resolution will determine whether respondents were
entitled to the AFDC benefits they have received under the injunction issued by
the District Court. And our conclusion that the original disparity was not
unreasonable necessarily implies that the diminished disparity created by
Virginia's subsequently more lenient treatment of personal injury awards is not
unreasonable.
The AFDC statute provides that the States must exclude from resources the
family home and one automobile worth up to $1,500. 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(7)(B);
45 CFR 233.20(a)(3)(i) (1986). The States also are required to disregard
certain earnings of family members and relatives in determining income. 42
U.S.C. 602(a)(8)(A), 602(a)(31). Congress provided no further guidance to
the Secretary and the States in defining "income" and "resources."
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1141, 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(17) (1982 ed.,
Supp. III). The State now provides that the period of ineligibility must be
reduced to reflect future medical expenses. Va. ADC Manual 305.4C
(Oct.1984), App. to Pet. for Cert. 84.
In addition, the Secretary recently promulgated a rule requiring the States to
treat personal injury awards as income. 45 CFR 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F) (1986).
The plurality declines to consider the Secretary's new rule. Ante, at 379, n. 5. It
nevertheless concludes that Virginia's decision to treat personal injury awards as
income during the period at issue in this case was in accord with the Secretary's
prior interpretation of the AFDC statute, and so is entitled to deference. Ante, at
378-379. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-845, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-2783, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).
Prior to the passage of the 1981 amendments, however, the Secretary's only
comment on this subject was that "a settlement of industrial compensation as
the result of loss of hand or foot might represent a 'lump sum' payment." HHS
Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, Part IV, S-3120, Supplement
for Administrative Use (Sept. 6, 1957), App. 58 (emphasis added). Moreover,
as the plurality concedes, there is no evidence in the record that any State
included personal injury awards in income prior to the 1981 amendments. Ante,
at 378, n. 4. Based on this record, I conclude that the Secretary took no position
on the treatment of personal injury awards prior to 1981.
Justice BLACKMUN would defer to the Secretary's interpretation of the
statute. Because I conclude that the Secretary's interpretation is inconsistent
with the statute, I do not think it is entitled to the customary deference.
3
The plurality concludes that "[t]he explicit differences between the definition of
'income' in the Food Stamp program and the HHS poverty guidelines on the
one hand and the AFDC statute on the other are simply too great" to allow a
presumption that they share a common definition of income. Ante, at 377. It is
true that "income" is defined to exclude all nonrecurring lump-sum payments
for purposes of the Food Stamp program, 7 U.S.C. 2014(d)(8), and that the
HHS poverty guidelines exclude capital gains, gifts, and lump-sum
inheritances, 48 Fed.Reg. 7010, 7011 (1983). It also is undisputed that lumpsum payments representing a gain to the family, such as retroactive Social
Security payments, must be included in income under the AFDC program. But
the decision to include some lump-sum gains under the AFDC program that are
excluded under other poverty programs does not indicate that Congress also
intended to include payments that do not represent a gain, and that Congress
has not included in income under any program.
The plurality asserts that this objection is "simply irrelevant," ante, at 383,
because Virginia officials chose to treat personal injury awards as income. But
Congress could not know in advance whether the treatment of personal injury
awards would be left to the States. Indeed, as noted above, the Secretary now
requires the States to include personal injury awards in income. See n. 2, supra.
In my view, the possibility that AFDC families would be deprived of state tort
remedies is sufficient to preclude inclusion of personal injury awards in income.
5
During this period, Virginia excluded from income only those amounts of the
award used for medical care, rehabilitation, and legal services incurred prior to
or within 30 days after the receipt of the award. See supra, at 385; Va. ADC
Manual 305.4C (Jan.1983), App. to Pet. for Cert. 72. Petitioner concedes that
"the amount of a lump sum personal injury award subject to the rule is that
portion representing pain and suffering, loss of earning capacity, future medical
expenses, and punitive damages." Brief for Petitioner 5, n. 5 (emphasis added).
As noted above, n. 2, supra, Virginia has amended its rules to provide that the
period of ineligibility must be reduced to reflect medical expenses incurred
subsequent to receipt of the lump sum. Va. ADC Manual 305.4C (Oct.1984),
App. to Pet. for Cert. 84.