Professional Documents
Culture Documents
New Lamp Chimney Company v. Ansonia Brass and Copper Company
New Lamp Chimney Company v. Ansonia Brass and Copper Company
656
23 L.Ed. 336
Service being made, the defendants appeared, and set up as a defence in their
answer, that they, the defendants, had on their own application been declared
bankrupt, and that the plaintiffs had proved the claim in suit in the bankrupt
proceedings, and had been paid a dividend on the same, and that they were
thereby prevented under the Bankrupt Act from recovering the claim or any
part of the same in a subsequent action.
Issue being joined, the parties went to trial; and, the bankrupt proceedings
having been introduced in evidence, the defendants moved the court to dismiss
the suit, insisting that the plaintiffs, having proved the claim in the bankrupt
proceedings and received a dividend on the same, had waived the cause of
action; but the presiding justice denied the motion, and directed the jury to
render a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for the balance due on the notes.
Exceptions were duly filed by the defendants, and they appealed to the general
term, where the judgment was affirmed; the court holding that the bankrupt
court had no jurisdiction to adjudge the defendant corporation bankrupt, and
that the proceedings in bankruptcy were void. Brass and Copper Company v.
Lamp Chimney Company, 64 Barb. 436.
Still dissatisfied, the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals of the State,
where the parties were again fully heard; and the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment rendered by the court sitting in general term, holding that the decree
of the Bankrupt Court adjudging the defendant corporation bankrupt, and the
subsequent proceedings in pursuance of the same, did not have the effect to
discharge the corporation from the claim in suit beyond the amount paid to the
plaintiffs as dividends, even though the claim was proved by the plaintiffs in
the bankrupt proceedings. Same v. Same, 53 N.Y. 124.
Nothing being alleged to the contrary, it must be assumed that the corporation
was duly organized. It appears that a meeting of the trustees was duly called
and notified to inquire into the condition of the affairs of the corporation; that
the meeting was regularly held, and, it having been ascertained to the
satisfaction of the meeting that the corporation was insolvent, it was voted and
resolved, by a majority of the trustees present, that the president of the
company be required to file a petition in the District Court that the corporation
may be adjudged bankrupt. Such a petition was accordingly filed; and, if the
president of the company was duly authorized to sign and file it, the plaintiffs
do not deny that the bankrupt proceedings were regular.
Two objections are taken to the jurisdiction of the Bankrupt Court, which, in
point of fact, involve the same considerations. They are, that the majority of the
stockholders did not sign the petition filed in the District Court, and that the
president of the corporation was not authorized to sign it; which is a mere
inference from the fact that the meeting, when the vote and resolution were
adopted, was a regular meeting of the trustees: but inasmuch as the statute of
the State requires that the trustees shall be stockholders, and no objection is
made to the organization of the company, it may well be presumed that the
trustees were stockholders as required by law.
9
As before remarked, three persons may form such a corporation. The record
shows that a majority of the trustees present adopted the vote and resolution,
which necessarily implies that a minority did not concur; and if not, then
certainly there must have been three or more present. The record does not show
that the whole capital stock of the company is not owned by three persons.
10
Viewed in the light of these suggestions, it follows that the want of jurisdiction
in the Bankrupt Court is not clearly shown, and that the case is plainly one
where every presumption should be that the action of the court was rightful.
11
Due notice, it is conceded, was given to all concerned, and that the defendants
appeared in the Bankrupt Court, and that they never made any objection to the
jurisdiction of the court; and, in view of these circumstances, the rule is that
every presumption is in favor of the legal character of the proceedings.
Voorhees v. Bank, 10 Pet. 473.
12
Concede that, still it is said that courts created by statute cannot have
jurisdiction beyond what the statute confers; which is true: but no such question
arises in the case before the court, as all concede that the District Court had
jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and that the defendants appeared, and
claimed and exercised every right which the Bankrupt Act confers. They are,
therefore, estopped to deny the jurisdiction of the court; nor are the plaintiffs in
any better condition, unless it appears that the bankrupt proceedings are
actually void. Void proceedings, of course, bind no one not estopped to set up
the objection; and, in order to establish the theory that the proceedings in this
case are void, the plaintiffs deny that the president of the corporation was
authorized to make and file the petition in the District Court. McCormick v.
Pickering, 4 Comst. 279.
13
Such a petition might properly be made by the president of the company, and
be by him presented to the District Court, if he was thereto duly authorized at a
legal meeting called for the purpose by a vote of a majority of the corporators;
and whether he was so authorized or not was a question of fact to be determined
by the District Court to which the petition was presented; and the rule in such
cases is, that if there be a total defect of evidence to prove the essential fact, and
the court find it without proof, the action of the court is void; but when the
Jurisdiction is certainly conferred upon the District Court in such a case, if the
petition presented sets forth the required facts expressly or by necessary
implication, and the court, upon proof of service thereof, finds the facts set
forth in the petition to be true; and it is equally certain that the District Court
has jurisdiction of 'all acts, matters, and things' to be done under and in virtue of
the bankruptcy until the final distribution and settlement of the estate of the
bankrupt and the close of the bankrupt proceedings. 14 Stat. 518.
15
Power, it is true, is vested in the circuit courts in certain cases to revise the
doings of the district courts, and in certain other cases an appeal is allowed
from the District Court to the Circuit Court; but it is a sufficient answer to every
suggestion of that sort that no attempt was made in the case to seek a revision
of the decree in any other tribunal. Nothing of the kind is suggested, nor can it
be, as the record shows a regular decree unreversed and in full force.
16
Grant that, and still the proposition is submitted that the decree was rendered
without jurisdiction, for the reason assigned; and that that question is open to
the defendants, even though the decree was introduced as collateral evidence in
a suit at law or in equity in another jurisdiction. But the court here is entirely of
a different opinion, as the district courts are created by an act of Congress
which confers and defines their jurisdiction; from which it follows that their
decrees rendered in pursuance of the power conferred are entitled in every other
court to the same force and effect as the judgments or decrees of any domestic
tribunal, so long as they remain unreversed and are not annulled. Shawhan v.
Merritt, 7 How. 643; Huff v. Hutchinson, 14 id. 588; Parker v. Danforth, 16
Mass. 299; Pecks v. Barnum, 24 Vt. 76; 2 Smith's Lead. Cas. (7th ed.) 814.
17
Judgments or decrees rendered in the district courts may be impeached for the
purpose of showing that the particular judgment or decree was procured for the
purpose of avoiding the effect and due operation of the Bankrupt Act, and
competent evidence is admissible for that intent and purpose; but the judgment
or decree of the District Court, in a case like the present, is no more liable to
19
20
Suppose that is so: then it is insisted by the defendants that the case before the
court is controlled by the twenty-first section of the Bankrupt Act, which,
among other things, provides that no creditor proving his debt or claim shall be
allowed to maintain any suit at law or in equity therefor against the bankrupt,
but shall be deemed to have waived all right of action and suit against the
bankrupt, &c. 14 Stat. 526.
21
23
24
Words and phrases are often found in different provisions of the same statute,
which, if taken literally, without any qualification, would be inconsistent, and
sometimes repugnant, when, by a reasonable interpretation,as by qualifying
both, or by restricting one and giving to the other a liberal construction, all
become harmonious, and the whole difficulty disappears; and in such a case the
rule is, that repugnancy should, if practicable, be avoided, and that, if the
natural import of the words contained in the respective provisions tends to
establish such a result, the case is one where a resort may be had to
construction for the purpose of reconciling the inconsistency, unless it appears
that the difficulty cannot be overcome without doing violence to the language
of the law-maker.
25
Sect. 21, if taken literally, would require that the whole claim of every creditor
proving his claim, who is included within its operation, should be for ever
discharged; but the thirty-third section of the act provides that no debt created
by the fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt, or by his defalcation as a public
officer, or while acting in a fiduciary character, shall be discharged under the
Bankrupt Act. Such debts may be proved, and the provision is that the dividend
shall be a payment on account of the debt; but it is incorrect to suppose that the
creditor, by proving such a debt, waives 'all right of action and suit against the
bankrupt.' On the contrary, it is well settled that no consequences can be
allowed to flow from proving a debt which are inconsistent with the provisions
of sect. 33. Ex parte Robinson, 6 Blatch. 253; In re Rosenberg, 2 N. B. R. 81.
26
Where the bankrupt has in all things conformed to his duty under the Bankrupt
Act, he is entitled to receive a discharge; and the thirty-fourth section provides
that a discharge duly granted shall, with the exceptions specified in the
preceding section, release the bankrupt from all debts, claims, liabilities, and
demands which were or might have been proved against his estate in
bankruptcy.
27
Debts due to the United States are not enumerated in the exceptions contained
in sect. 33; but all admit that such debts may be proved in the bankrupt
proceedings; and yet it is settled law that the certificate of discharge does not
release any debt which the bankrupt owes to the United States. United States v.
Herron, 20 Wall. 253.
28
Other examples of the kind might be referred to where it has become necessary
to qualify, restrict, or limit certain provisions of the Bankrupt Act, in order to
reconcile seeming incongruities and inconsistencies; but those mentioned will
be sufficient for the present investigation.
29
Beyond all question, corporations of the kind and joint-stock companies are
brought within the provisions of the Bankrupt Act by the thirty-seventh
section; and the whole administrative proceedings in respect to such bankrupt
corporations and joint-stock companies are specifically regulated by that
section as a separate feature of the bankruptcy system. Much of the system
applicable to such corporations and companies, it is true, is borrowed by
general phrases from the other sections of the same act; but only such portions
of the same as are expressly or impliedly adopted by that section are applicable
to such corporations and companies as clearly appears from the distinct features
of the regulations prescribed, which are as follows:
30
(1.) That the officer signing the petition for voluntary bankruptcy must be duly
authorized by a vote of the majority of the corporators at a legal meeting called
for the purpose. (2.) That the petition for involuntary bankruptcy may be made
and presented by any creditor or creditors in the manner provided in respect to
debtors, without any specification as to the number of the creditors or the
amount of their debts. (3.) That the like proceedings shall be had and taken as
provided in the case of debtors. (4.) That all the provisions in the act which
apply to the debtor, or set forth his duties in regard to furnishing schedules and
inventories, executing papers, submitting to examination, disclosing, making
over, secreting, concealing, conveying, assigning, or paying away his money or
property, shall in like manner, and with like force, effect, and penalties, apply to
each and every officer of such corporation or company in relation to the same
matters concerning the corporation or company, and the money and property
thereof. (5.) That all payments, conveyances, and assignments declared
fraudulent and void by the act, when made by a debtor, shall in like manner,
and to the like extent, and with like remedies, be fraudulent and void when
made by a corporation or company. (6.) That no allowance or discharge shall be
granted to any corporation or joint-stock company, or to any person or officer
or member thereof. (7.) That all the property and assets of any corporation
declared bankrupt by proceedings under the Bankrupt Act shall be distributed to
the creditors of the corporation in the manner therein provided in respect to
natural persons. 14 Stat. 535.
31
32
By the terms of the section, corporations adjudged bankrupt are also made
subject to the same duties as individual bankrupt debtors in regard to all the
matters therein specified; but the emphatic exception to all those general
regulations is that no allowance or discharge shall be granted to any corporation
or joint-stock company, or to any person, officer, or member thereof.
33
Good and sufficient reasons may be given for granting a discharge from prior
indebtedness to individual bankrupts which do not exist in the case of
corporations, and equally good and sufficient reasons may be given for
withholding such a discharge from corporations which do not in any sense
apply to individual bankrupts. Certificates of discharge are granted to the
individual bankrupt 'to free his faculties from the clog of his indebtedness,' and
to encourage him to start again in the business pursuits of life with fresh hope
and energy, unfettered with past misfortunes, or with the consequences of
antecedent improvidence, mismanagement, or rashness.
35
Many corporations, it is known, are formed under laws which affix to the
several stockholders an individual liability to a greater or less extent for the
debts of the corporation, which, in case certain steps are taken by the creditors,
become in the end the debts of the stockholders. Such a liability does not, in
most cases, attach to the stockholder until the corporation fails to fulfil its
contract, nor in some cases until judgment is recovered against the corporation,
and execution issued, and return made of nulla bona. Stockholders could not be
held liable in such a case if the corporation is discharged, nor could the creditor
recover judgment against the corporation as a necessary preliminary step to the
stockholder's individual liability.
36
Consequences such as these were never contemplated by Congress; and the fact
that they would flow from the theory of the defendants, if adopted, goes very
far to show that the theory itself is unfounded and unsound. Instances of such
individual liability are not rare; and it appears that the law under which the
defendants were organized makes the several stockholders individually liable to
the creditors of the company, in an amount equal to the amount of their stock,
for all debts and contracts of the company, until the whole amount of the
capital stock is subscribed and paid. Sess. Laws of N. Y. 1848, p. 56, sect. 10.
37
Mass. 494; Wilson v. Capuro, 41 Cal. 545; In re Wright, 36 How. Pr. 174.
38
Since this litigation was commenced, Congress has amended the twenty-first
section of the Bankrupt Act, and provided that where a discharge has been
refused, or the proceedings have been determined without a discharge, a
creditor proving his debt or claim shall not be held to have waived his right of
action or suit against the bankrupt. 18 Stat. 179.
39
40
Judgment affirmed.