Ex Parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876)

93 U.S.
18
23 L.Ed. 787
EX PARTE PARKS.
October Term, 1876
MR. WILLIAM GREEN presented the petition of Richard S. Parks

praying for a writ of habeas corpus.
The petition is set forth, and the facts in the case are stated, in the opinion
of the court.
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.
The petitioner for habeas corpus in this case was convicted of forgery in the
District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, and is in
custody by virtue of a commitment under sentence of imprisonment in the
penitentiary for said offence. Complaining that his conviction was illegal, by
reason that the act for which he was convicted was not a crime against the laws
of the United States, he applied to the circuit judge for a habeas corpus, and,
after a hearing thereon, was remanded into custody. Not being satisfied with
this decision, he now applies to this court for a habeas corpus. His petition is as
follows:
'To the Honorable Morrison R. Waite, Chief Justice, and his Associates,
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:
'The petition of Richard S. Parks respectfully represents, that your petitioner is

illegally confined in jail, at Harrisonburg, in Virginia, being in the custody of
A. S. Gray, as Marshal of the United States for the Western District of Virginia,
by virtue of a commitment under an illegal sentence of the District Court of the
United States for the said district, the same (sentence) being void and in law a
nullity, for want of jurisdiction in the said court to pass it upon and against your
petitioner, which said sentence was pronounced in a case of the United States
against your petitioner, a transcript of the record whereof is herewith presented.
That your petitioner heretofore made application to the honorable judge of
Circuit Court of the United States for the said district, that he would order the
discharge of your petitioner upon a writ of habeas corpus sued out for that
object; but his honor, the said judge of the Circuit Court, instead of discharging,
remanded him to the custody of the said marshal, as will appear from a
transcript of his order in the said matter, which transcript is likewise herewith
presented. And that your petitioner therefore prays at your honors' hands the
benefit of the writ of habeas corpus, to be directed to the said marshal,
commanding him to have before your honors, at a day and place to be named
therein, the body of your petitioner, together with the cause of his capture and
detention, to undergo and receive whatsoever your honors shall then and there
consider of him in that behalf.
4
'And your petitioner will ever pray, &c.
'RICH'D S. PARKS.'
The transcript of the record of conviction, which accompanies the petition,

shows that the petitioner was indicted for forging the signature of C. Douglass
Gray, register in bankruptcy, to the following receipt:
'HARRISONBURG, July 30, 1872.
'Received of J. D. Martin, by R. S. Parks, his attorney, the application, with

necessary papers, for adjudication in bankruptcy of said Martin; also, $50,
amount of required deposit.
'C. DOUGLASS GRAY, Register.'
10
One count of the indictment charges that Parks committed the forgery for the
purpose of authenticating the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy in
the case of J. D. Martin. Another count alleges the purpose to have been to
authenticate a proceeding in the said case; namely, the filing of the paper with
the register. There was a third count, which did not state the purpose.
11
The petitioner contends that the forging of this receipt is not a crime by any act
of Congress, and that, as the courts of the United States have no common-law
jurisdiction of crimes, the District Court had no jurisdiction to try him for the
offence. The indictment is founded on the forty-sixth section of the Bankrupt
Act (re-enacted and made more general in sect. 5419 of the Revised Statutes),
which declares, that 'if any person shall forge the signature of a judge, register,
or other officer of the court, or knowingly concur in using any such forged or
counterfeited signature . . . for the purpose of authenticating any proceeding or
document, . . . such person shall be guilty of felony,' &c. The petitioner insists
that the paper whose forgery is charged is not a document which could be used
in evidence in any proceeding, by reason of its being authenticated by the
official signature of the register. This proposition may be questioned. But
suppose it were true, the receipt could be used in evidence, if genuine, for the
purpose of showing the fact stated therein as against the signer in his official as
well as private capacity. At all events, it is not clear and free from all doubt that
the forgery is not within the terms of the statute.
12
But the question whether it was or was not a crime within the statute was one
which the District Court was competent to decide. It was before the court, and
within its jurisdiction. No other court, except the Circuit Court for the same
district, having concurrent jurisdiction, was as competent to decide the question
as the District Court.
13
Whether an act charged in an indictment is or is not a crime by the law which

the court administers (in this case the statute law of the United States), is a
question which has to be met at almost every stage of criminal proceedings; on
motions to quash the indictment, on demurrers, on motions to arrest judgment,
& c. The court may err, but it has jurisdiction of the question. If it errs, there is
no remedy after final judgment, unless a writ of error lies to some Superior
Court; and no such writ lies in this case. It would be an assumption of authority
for this court, by means of the writ of habeas corpus, to review every case in
which the defendant attempts to controvert the criminality of the offence
charged in the indictment. It having been held that the regulation of the
appellate power of this court was conferred upon Congress, and Congress
having given an appeal or writ of error in only certain specified cases, the
implication is irresistible, that those errors and irregularities, which can only be
reviewed by appeal or writ of error, cannot be reviewed in this court in any
other cases than those in which those processes are given. Now, it has always
been held that a mere error in point of law, committed by a court in a case
properly subject to its cognizance, can only be reviewed by the ordinary
methods of appeal or writ of error; but that where the proceedings are not only
erroneous, but entirely void,as where the court is without jurisdiction of the
person or of the cause, and a party is subjected to illegal imprisonment in
consequence, the Superior Court, or judge invested with the prerogative power
of issuing a habeas corpus, may review the proceedings by that writ, and
discharge from illegal imprisonment. This is one of the modes in which this
court exercises supervisory power over inferior courts and tribunals; but it is a
special mode, and confined to a limited class of cases.
14
The general principles upon which the writ of habeas corpus is issued in
England were well settled by usage and statutes long before the period of our
national independence, and must have been in the mind of Congress when the
power to issue the writ was given to the courts and judges of the United States.
These principles, subject to the limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution
and laws, are to be referred to for our guidance on the subject. A brief reference
to the principal authorities will suffice on this occasion.
15
Lord Coke, before the Habeas Corpus Act was passed, excepted from the
privilege of the writ persons imprisoned upon conviction for a crime, or in
execution. 2 Inst. 52; Com. Dig., Hab. Corp. B.
16
The Habeas Corpus Act itself excepts those committed or detained for treason
or felony plainly expressed in the warrant, and persons convict, or in execution
by legal process. Com. Dig., Hab. Corp. B.
17
Lord Hale says, 'If it appear by the return of the writ that the party be
wrongfully committed, or by one that hath not jurisdiction, or for a cause for
which a man ought not to be imprisoned, he shall be discharged or bailed.' 2
Hale's H. P. C. 144.
18
Chief Baron Gilbert says, 'If the commitment be against law, as being made by
one who had no jurisdiction of the cause, or for a matter for which by law no
man ought to be punished, the court are to discharge. Bac. Abr., Hab. Corp. B,
10.
19
These extracts are sufficient to show, that, when a person is convict or in

execution by legal process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, no relief
can be had. Of course, a superior court will interfere if the inferior court had
exceeded its jurisdiction, or was not competent to act.
20
The courts of the United States derive their jurisdiction on this subject from the
Constitution and laws of the United States. The fourteenth section of the
Judiciary Act granted to all the courts power to issue writs of scire facias,
habeas corpus, and all other writs necessary for the exercise of their respective
jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law; and to the
justices and judges, power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of
inquiry into the cause of commitment; but it added a proviso, that the writ
should not extend to prisoners in jail, unless in custody under or by color of
authority of the United States, or committed for trial before some court of the
same, or necessary to be brought into court to testify. It was found necessary to
relax the limitation contained in this proviso; and this was done in several
subsequent laws. See act of 1833 (4 Stat. 634), passed in consequence of

nullification proceedings in South Carolina; act of 1842 (5 Stat. 539), passed in
consequence of the McLeod Case; and act of 1867 (14 Stat. 44), passed in
consequence of the state of things that followed the late rebellion.
21
The power of the Supreme Court is subject to a further limitation, arising from
its constitutional want of original jurisdiction on the subject; from whence it
follows that, except in aid of some other acknowledged jurisdiction, it can only
issue the writ to review the action of some inferior court or officer. Ex parte
Barry, 2 How. 65.
22
From this review of the law it is apparent, therefore, as before suggested, that in
a case like the present, where the prisoner is in execution upon a conviction, the
writ ought not to be issued, or, if issued, the prisoner should at once be
remanded, if the court below had jurisdiction of the offence, and did no act
beyond the powers conferred upon it. The court will look into the proceedings
so far as to determine this question. If it finds that the court below has
transcended its powers, it will grant the writ and discharge the prisoner, even
after judgment. Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38; Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307;
Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163. But if the court had jurisdiction and power to
convict and sentence, the writ cannot issue to correct a mere error. We have
shown that the court below had power to determine the question before it: and
that this is so, is further manifest from the language of Chief Justice Marshall
in the case of Tobias Watkins, 3 Pet. 203. He there says, 'To determine whether
the offence charged in the indictment be legally punishable or not, is among the
most unquestionable of its [the court's] powers and duties.'
23
But after the thorough investigation which has been given to this subject in
previous cases, particularly those of Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, and Ex parte
Lange, 18 id. 163, it is unnecessary to pursue the subject further at this time.
24
The last-mentioned case is confidently relied on as a precedent for allowing the

writ in this case. But the two are totally unlike. In Ex parte Lange we
proceeded on the ground, that, when the court rendered its second judgment,
the case was entirely out of its hands. It was functus officio in regard to it. The
judgment first rendered had been executed and satisfied. The subsequent
proceedings were, therefore, according to our view, void.
25
But, in the case before us, the District Court had plenary jurisdiction, both of
the person, the place, the cause, and every thing about it. To review the
decision of that court by means of the writ of habeas corpus would be to
convert that writ into a mere writ of error, and to assume an appellate power
which has never been conferred upon this court.
26
Since the cause was submitted to the court, the learned counsel for the
petitioner has called its attention to the case of Booth and Rycroft, 3 Wis. 157,
as a case precisely in point in favor of granting the writ. It had probably
escaped the recollection of counsel that this very case was reversed by this
court in Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, in which Chief Justice Taney
delivered one of his most elaborate and able opinions.
27
As the entire record has been brought before us by the petition, and we are
clear as to our want of authority to discharge the prisoner, the application for
the writ is
28
Denied.

Ex Parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876)

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Ex Parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876)

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93 U.S.

MR. WILLIAM GREEN presented the petition of Richard S. Parks

'The petition of Richard S. Parks respectfully represents, that your petitioner is

'And your petitioner will ever pray, &c.

The transcript of the record of conviction, which accompanies the petition,

'HARRISONBURG, July 30, 1872.

'Received of J. D. Martin, by R. S. Parks, his attorney, the application, with

'C. DOUGLASS GRAY, Register.'

Whether an act charged in an indictment is or is not a crime by the law which

These extracts are sufficient to show, that, when a person is convict or in

subsequent laws. See act of 1833 (4 Stat. 634), passed in consequence of

The last-mentioned case is confidently relied on as a precedent for allowing the

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