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Ex Parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876)
Ex Parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876)
18
23 L.Ed. 787
EX PARTE PARKS.
October Term, 1876
The petitioner for habeas corpus in this case was convicted of forgery in the
District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, and is in
custody by virtue of a commitment under sentence of imprisonment in the
penitentiary for said offence. Complaining that his conviction was illegal, by
reason that the act for which he was convicted was not a crime against the laws
of the United States, he applied to the circuit judge for a habeas corpus, and,
after a hearing thereon, was remanded into custody. Not being satisfied with
this decision, he now applies to this court for a habeas corpus. His petition is as
follows:
'To the Honorable Morrison R. Waite, Chief Justice, and his Associates,
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:
object; but his honor, the said judge of the Circuit Court, instead of discharging,
remanded him to the custody of the said marshal, as will appear from a
transcript of his order in the said matter, which transcript is likewise herewith
presented. And that your petitioner therefore prays at your honors' hands the
benefit of the writ of habeas corpus, to be directed to the said marshal,
commanding him to have before your honors, at a day and place to be named
therein, the body of your petitioner, together with the cause of his capture and
detention, to undergo and receive whatsoever your honors shall then and there
consider of him in that behalf.
4
'RICH'D S. PARKS.'
10
One count of the indictment charges that Parks committed the forgery for the
purpose of authenticating the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy in
the case of J. D. Martin. Another count alleges the purpose to have been to
authenticate a proceeding in the said case; namely, the filing of the paper with
the register. There was a third count, which did not state the purpose.
11
The petitioner contends that the forging of this receipt is not a crime by any act
of Congress, and that, as the courts of the United States have no common-law
jurisdiction of crimes, the District Court had no jurisdiction to try him for the
offence. The indictment is founded on the forty-sixth section of the Bankrupt
Act (re-enacted and made more general in sect. 5419 of the Revised Statutes),
which declares, that 'if any person shall forge the signature of a judge, register,
or other officer of the court, or knowingly concur in using any such forged or
counterfeited signature . . . for the purpose of authenticating any proceeding or
document, . . . such person shall be guilty of felony,' &c. The petitioner insists
that the paper whose forgery is charged is not a document which could be used
in evidence in any proceeding, by reason of its being authenticated by the
official signature of the register. This proposition may be questioned. But
suppose it were true, the receipt could be used in evidence, if genuine, for the
purpose of showing the fact stated therein as against the signer in his official as
well as private capacity. At all events, it is not clear and free from all doubt that
the forgery is not within the terms of the statute.
12
But the question whether it was or was not a crime within the statute was one
which the District Court was competent to decide. It was before the court, and
within its jurisdiction. No other court, except the Circuit Court for the same
district, having concurrent jurisdiction, was as competent to decide the question
as the District Court.
13
14
The general principles upon which the writ of habeas corpus is issued in
England were well settled by usage and statutes long before the period of our
national independence, and must have been in the mind of Congress when the
power to issue the writ was given to the courts and judges of the United States.
These principles, subject to the limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution
and laws, are to be referred to for our guidance on the subject. A brief reference
to the principal authorities will suffice on this occasion.
15
Lord Coke, before the Habeas Corpus Act was passed, excepted from the
privilege of the writ persons imprisoned upon conviction for a crime, or in
execution. 2 Inst. 52; Com. Dig., Hab. Corp. B.
16
The Habeas Corpus Act itself excepts those committed or detained for treason
or felony plainly expressed in the warrant, and persons convict, or in execution
by legal process. Com. Dig., Hab. Corp. B.
17
Lord Hale says, 'If it appear by the return of the writ that the party be
wrongfully committed, or by one that hath not jurisdiction, or for a cause for
which a man ought not to be imprisoned, he shall be discharged or bailed.' 2
Hale's H. P. C. 144.
18
Chief Baron Gilbert says, 'If the commitment be against law, as being made by
one who had no jurisdiction of the cause, or for a matter for which by law no
man ought to be punished, the court are to discharge. Bac. Abr., Hab. Corp. B,
10.
19
20
The courts of the United States derive their jurisdiction on this subject from the
Constitution and laws of the United States. The fourteenth section of the
Judiciary Act granted to all the courts power to issue writs of scire facias,
habeas corpus, and all other writs necessary for the exercise of their respective
jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law; and to the
justices and judges, power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of
inquiry into the cause of commitment; but it added a proviso, that the writ
should not extend to prisoners in jail, unless in custody under or by color of
authority of the United States, or committed for trial before some court of the
same, or necessary to be brought into court to testify. It was found necessary to
relax the limitation contained in this proviso; and this was done in several
The power of the Supreme Court is subject to a further limitation, arising from
its constitutional want of original jurisdiction on the subject; from whence it
follows that, except in aid of some other acknowledged jurisdiction, it can only
issue the writ to review the action of some inferior court or officer. Ex parte
Barry, 2 How. 65.
22
From this review of the law it is apparent, therefore, as before suggested, that in
a case like the present, where the prisoner is in execution upon a conviction, the
writ ought not to be issued, or, if issued, the prisoner should at once be
remanded, if the court below had jurisdiction of the offence, and did no act
beyond the powers conferred upon it. The court will look into the proceedings
so far as to determine this question. If it finds that the court below has
transcended its powers, it will grant the writ and discharge the prisoner, even
after judgment. Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38; Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307;
Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163. But if the court had jurisdiction and power to
convict and sentence, the writ cannot issue to correct a mere error. We have
shown that the court below had power to determine the question before it: and
that this is so, is further manifest from the language of Chief Justice Marshall
in the case of Tobias Watkins, 3 Pet. 203. He there says, 'To determine whether
the offence charged in the indictment be legally punishable or not, is among the
most unquestionable of its [the court's] powers and duties.'
23
But after the thorough investigation which has been given to this subject in
previous cases, particularly those of Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, and Ex parte
Lange, 18 id. 163, it is unnecessary to pursue the subject further at this time.
24
25
But, in the case before us, the District Court had plenary jurisdiction, both of
the person, the place, the cause, and every thing about it. To review the
decision of that court by means of the writ of habeas corpus would be to
convert that writ into a mere writ of error, and to assume an appellate power
which has never been conferred upon this court.
26
Since the cause was submitted to the court, the learned counsel for the
petitioner has called its attention to the case of Booth and Rycroft, 3 Wis. 157,
as a case precisely in point in favor of granting the writ. It had probably
escaped the recollection of counsel that this very case was reversed by this
court in Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, in which Chief Justice Taney
delivered one of his most elaborate and able opinions.
27
As the entire record has been brought before us by the petition, and we are
clear as to our want of authority to discharge the prisoner, the application for
the writ is
28
Denied.