188 U.S.

314
23 S.Ct. 395
47 L.Ed. 487

JOHN D. HOOKER and A. E. Pomeroy, Plffs. in Err.,

v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES.
No. 149.
Argued January 23, 1903.
Decided February 23, 1903.

This is a writ of error to the supreme court of the state of California to

review a judgment of that court affirming the judgment of the superior
court of the county of Los Angeles, California, in favor of the city of Los
Angeles, and against Hooker and Pomeroy. The city brought suit against
Hooker and Pomeroy, to condemn all their 'estate, right, title, and interest'
in and to certain tracts of land, described in the complaint, for the purpose
of enabling the city 'to construct and maintain thereon the 'headworks' of
its projected system for supplying water to its inhabitants for private and
municipal purposes.' All questions except the amount of compensation to
be awarded were by stipulation tried by the court. The jury returned a
verdict awarding $23,000 as the value 'of an estate in fee simple in the
lands described in the complaint, including all their elements of value,
subject to the paramount right of the city of Los Angeles to take from the
Los Angeles river, from time to time, all the water that may be needed at
such time for the use of the inhabitants of said city, and for all municipal
and public uses and purposes therein,' and $2,000 as damages to the
remaining portion of the tract of which that land formed a part. Judgment
was rendered thereon for the amount so found, and costs. The case was
carried to the supreme court, and the judgment affirmed. 124 Cal. 597, 57
Pac. 585.
Messrs. J. S. Chapman, John Garber, R. H. F. Variel, and J. G. North for
plaintiffs in error.
Messrs. John F. Dillon, J. R. Scott, Henry T. Lee, Harry Hubbard, John
M. Dillon, and W. B. Mathews for defendants.

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court:

We cannot find in the pleadings or other proceedings in the trial court, or in the
supreme court, that any statute of California was asserted to be in conflict with
the Constitution, or any law or treaty of the United States, or that any right was
claimed by plaintiffs in error under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of
the United States.

The city alleged in its complaint that the Los Angeles river was a nonnavigable
stream, rising a few miles to the north and northwest of the city, and fed by
streams rising to the surface in or near the bed of the river; that that bed was
composed of sandy soil, into which the water sank and formed subterranean
streams flowing beneath the bed and then rising to the surface; that the river
flowed through the land sought to be condemned before reaching the city; that
the city was the owner of the exclusive right to the use of all the water of the
river in trust for the public purposes of supplying the inhabitants of the city
with water for domestic use, supplying water for the irrigation of land
embraced within the pueblo lands of the city, and other municipal uses; that
plaintiffs in error were owners of the fee simple of the lands described, subject
to the rights of the city to the water of the river; and the prayer was for the
condemnation in fee simple of all the estate, right, title, and interest of plaintiffs
in error in the land.

The answer of plaintiffs in error denied that the river was fed by springs rising
to the surface in or adjoining the bed of the river; admitted that the bed was
composed of sandy soil, but denied that the waters of the river formed welldefined subterranean streams flowing in channels beneath the bed, or that such
subterranean waters rose before reaching the city, or became a part of the
surface water of the river; and denied that the city was the owner of any right to
the use of all the water of the river, in trust, or otherwise; denied that the city
had any right in the water or to the use thereof, other than as a riparian owner of
lands through which the river flowed, and rights acquired by appropriation; and
denied that the city owned the right to the water of the river to the exclusion of
plaintiffs in error. On the contrary, the answer alleged that the lands of
plaintiffs in error were riparian lands situated far above the north boundary of
the city, and that, as riparian owners, plaintiffs in error were entitled to the use
of the waters of the river for all lawful purposes, and, to a reasonable extent, for
irrigating those lands, and for domestic and other uses. And it set up grants of
part of the land to the predecessors of plaintiffs in error in 1843 by the governor
of both Californias, and of the remainder of the land by grant in 1784; that
confirmation was petitioned for before the board of land commissioners

appointed under the act of Congress of March 3, 1851 (9 Stat. at L. 631, chap.
41), the grants confirmed, and the decrees of the board affirmed by the district
court of the United States for the southern district of California, and patents
duly issued; and averred that plaintiffs in error claimed title 'under and through
the aforesaid Mexican and Spanish grants, and the proceedings for the
confirmation thereof, and the said patents issued by the United States founded
thereon;' and that as owners of the land plaintiffs in error were also owners of
the waters percolating in the soil thereof, and riparian owners, having the rights
of riparian proprietors in the waters of the river.
4

The trial court decided that the city was, and had been since its organization,
owner in fee simple of the paramount use of the waters of the Los Angeles
river, so far as might be needed from time to time, for the public purposes of
supplying the inhabitants of the city with water for public and domestic
purposes, as described in the complaint; that plaintiffs in error were the owners
of the particular land, and had, subject to the rights of the city, the rights of
riparian proprietors thereof, and the right to use the water of the river for all
purposes for which riparian owners are entitled to use such waters.

The contentions seem to be that the state courts decided against the claim of
plaintiffs in error to the rights of a riparian owner, and to the ownership of
alleged per colating waters, as derived from patents of the United States as well
as from Mexican grants, or under the treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo; that the
statutes of California in authorizing the trial of title in condemnation
proceedings, and the determination of compensation before the determination
of title, amounted to providing for the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation; that certain statutes declaring the city to be vested
with a paramount right to the surface and subterranean waters deprived
plaintiffs in error of their property without due process of law; and that the
statute of the state in providing that compensation and damages should be
deemed to have accrued at the date of the summons, as construed by the state
courts, resulted in taking the property of plaintiffs in error without just
compensation.

Obviously, the question as to the title or right of plaintiffs in error in the land,
and whatever appertained thereto, was one of state law and of general public
law, on which the decision of the state court was final. San Francisco v. Scott,
111 U. S. 768, 28 L. ed. 593, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 688; California Powder Works v.
Davis, 151 U. 389, 38 L. ed. 206, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350. And the question of the
existence of percolating water was merely a question of fact.

The patents were in the nature of a quitclaim, and under the act of March 3,

1851 [ 15], were 'conclusive between the United States and the said claimants
only, and shall not affect the interests of third persons.' The validity of that act
was not drawn in question in the state court, and as the right or title asserted by
plaintiffs in error was derived under Mexican and Spanish grants, the decision
of the state court on the claims asserted by plaintiffs in error to the waters of the
river was not against any title or right claimed under the Constitution, or any
treaty, or statute of, or commission held, or authority exercised, under the
Constitution. If the title of plaintiffs in error were protected by the treaty, still
the suit did not arise thereunder, because the controversy in the state court did
not involve the construction of the treaty, but the validity of the title of Mexican
and Spanish grants prior to the treaty. New Orleans v. De Armas, 9 Pet. 224, 9
L. ed. 109; Iowa v. Rood, 187 U. S. 87, ante, 49, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 49; Phillips
v. Mound City Land & Water Asso. 124 U. S. 605, 31 L. ed. 588, 8 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 651.
8

In Crystal Springs Land & Water Co. v. Los Angeles, 82 Fed. 114, the circuit
court ruled that where both parties claimed under Mexican grants, confirmed
and patented by the United States in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo, and the controversy was only as to what were
the rights thus granted and confirmed, the suit was not one arising under a
treaty so as to confer jurisdiction on a Federal court, and that where the only
ground of Federal jurisdiction was the allegation in a bill that defendant's claim
of title was based in part on certain acts of the legislature of the state, which
attempted to transfer to it, as alleged, the title held by complainant's grantors at
the time of their passage, the court would not retain jurisdiction when an
answer was filed by defendant denying the allegations, and disclaiming any
title or claim of title not held by it before the passage of the acts. The bill was
dismissed, and we affirmed the judgment. 177 U. S. 169, 44 L. ed. 720, 20 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 573.

The trial court determined for itself, among other questions, the nature and
extent of the city's interest in the waters of the river, but while it instructed the
jury in relation thereto it did not file its written findings until after the return of
the verdict. And it is argued that the respective rights of the parties were not in
fact adjudicated until after the amount of compensation had been found, and
that in this way plaintiffs in error were deprived of their property without due
process of law. The 14th Amendment does not control the power of a state to
determine the form of procedure by which legal rights may be ascertained, if
the method adopted gives reasonable notice and affords a fair opportunity to be
heard. Iowa C. R. Co. 344; Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.
S. 685, 41 L. ed. 1165, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 718.

10

The construction of a law of a state, that it was competent for the court to try
and determine, in a condemnation proceeding, an adverse claim of the plaintiff
therein to an interest in property sought to be condemned, is conclusive on this
court, and we cannot understand how the entry of the verdict of a jury as to the
amount of compensation prior to the filing of written findings on the other
issues could have the effect of depriving plaintiffs in error of their property
without due process of law. The chief justice of California well said that it was
of no importance in what order the other issues in the case were decided, except
in so far as the determination of one point was necessary as a basis for the
determination of another, and that if the instructions to the jury actually given
were correct, the fact that these findings had not been previously filed was of no
consequence.

11

And so as to certain statutes of the state of California, which declared that the
city of Los Angeles is vested with the paramount right to the surface and
subterranean water of the Los Angeles river. Those statutes were admitted in
evidence merely to show that the city was the successor of the ancient pueblo.
The court held that the right of the city of Los Angeles to take from the Los
Angeles river all of the waters of the river to the extent of its reasonable
domestic and municipal needs was based on the Spanish and Mexican law, and
not on the charters of the city of Los Angeles. The validity of the statutes, on
account of repugnancy to the Federal Constitution, was not drawn in question in
the trial court nor in the supreme court of the state, and both courts held that
they neither granted to the city nor took away from plaintiffs in error any rights
or property.

12

Section 1249 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California provided that for the
purpose of assessing compensation and damages the right thereto should be
taken to have accrued at the time of the summons, 'and its actual value at that
date shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be actually taken,
and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously
affected.' The validity of the statute under the state Constitution had been
repeatedly sustained by the state courts, and those courts held that the value
referred to in the statute was the actual value at that date.

13

Plaintiffs in error asked the court to charge the jury that the date of estimating
the value of the property was the date of the summons, and the supreme court
held that in these circumstances they could not be permitted to attack the
condemnation statute as unconstitutional so far as related to the appraising the
value of the land as provided.

14

Moreover, this court cannot reverse the decisions of state courts in regard to

14

Moreover, this court cannot reverse the decisions of state courts in regard to
questions of general justice and equitable considerations in the taking of
property. Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 41 L. ed. 369, 17
Sup. Ct. Rep. 56.

15

The truth is there is nothing in this record adequately showing that the state
courts were led to suppose that any claim under the Constitution of the United
States was made by plaintiffs in error, or that any ruling involved a decision
against a right set up by them under that instrument.

16

In Sayward v. Denny, 158 U. S. 180, 39 L. ed. 941, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 777, after
stating the contention of plaintiff in error that the effect of the judgment of the
state court was 'to deprive him of his property without due process of law, or to
deny him the equal protection of the laws, and amounted to a decision adverse
to the right, privilege, or immunity of plaintiff in error under the Constitution,
of being protected from such deprivation or denial,' we said: 'But it nowhere
affirmatively appears from the record that such a right was set up or claimed in
the trial court when the demurrer to the complaint was overruled, or evidence
admitted or excluded, or instructions given or refused, or in the supreme court
in disposing of the rulings below. . . . We are not called on to revise these views
of the principles of general law considered applicable to the case in hand. It is
enough that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the state courts were
led to suppose that plaintiff in error claimed protection under the Constitution
of the United States from the several rulings, or to suspect that each ruling as
made involved a decision against a right specially set up under that instrument.
And we may add that the decisions of state tribunals in respect of matters of
general law cannot be reviewed on the theory that the law of the land is
violated unless their conclusions are absolutely free from error.'

17

This case comes within the rule there laid down, and The writ of error must be
dismissed.

18

Mr. Justice McKenna took no part in the decision of this case.