Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Wilson, 213 U.S. 52 (1909)

213 U.S.
52
29 S.Ct. 403
53 L.Ed. 693
WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v.
SID WILSON.
No. 65.
Argued and submitted January 11, 1909.
Decided March 1, 1909.
Messrs. Rush Taggart, John F. Dillon, George H. Fearons, and Francis

Raymond Stark for plaintiff in error.
Mr. James R. Caton for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an action against the telegraph company, in two counts. The first alleges
a failure to transmit a message from Graham, Virginia, to East Radford, in the
same state, as promptly as practicable. The second alleges a failure to deliver
the message as promptly as practicable after its arrival at Fast Radford. Both
seek to recover $100, under statutes of the state imposing a forfeiture of that
sum in such cases to the sender of the dispatch. The declaration was filed in
April, 1906. In June the defendant filed a demurrer and general denial by leave
of court. On February 25 of the next year, when the case was about to be tried,
the telegraph company offered a special plea that its only proper and regular
route for transmitting the message was by way of Bluefield, West Virginia, to
Washington, in the District of Columbia, and thence, by relaying, to East
Radford; that it did promptly dispatch the message from Graham to
Washington, but, by mistake, sent it from Washington to Cincinnati, causing a
delay; that the transmission of the message was interstate commerce, and that
therefore the statute of Virginia (act of January 18, 1904, chap. 8, 5), as
applied to the part of the transmission outside of the state, was void. U. S.
Const. art. 1, 8, cl. 3. The conclusion of the plea was that the plaintiff could
not 'recover the penalty in his declaration demanded,' and the defendant prayed
judgment. The court refused to allow the plea to be filed, and the defendant
excepted. A trial followed, at which the plaintiff got a judgment. The errors
assigned are that the court refused to allow the defendant to file the above plea,
and that it rendered judgment for the plaintiff instead of for the defendant.
2
This case comes here from a state court, and, of course, therefore it must appear
that a Federal question necessarily was involved in the decision before this
court can take jurisdiction or undertake to reverse the judgment of a tribunal
over which it has no general power. It is not enough that a right under the
Constitution of the United States was specially set up and claimed. It must be
made manifest either that the right was denied in fact, or that the judgment
could not have been rendered without denying it. DeSaussure v. Gaillard, 127
U. S. 216, 32 L. ed. 125, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1053; Johnson v. Risk, 137 U. S. 300,
34 L. ed. 683, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111; Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U. S. 93, 99, 52 L.
ed. 118, 120, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30. See also Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U. S. 36, 51
L. ed. 357, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 243.
The reasons which led the court to refuse leave to file the plea in this case do
not appear. But it is apparent on the face of the record that there are at least two
grounds on which it is possible that leave may have been denied before the
Federal question was reached. The original demurrer and answer seem to have
been late, as they were filed by leave of court. This plea was not offered until
more than nine months after the declaration, when the case was called for trial.
The circumstances are not disclosed, and it may be that the court, in its
discretion, considered that it was unjust for the plaintiff to be called upon to
meet a new and serious issue at the last moment. Again, the plea, although it
only referred to the section of the statute upon which the first count was based,
went, in terms, to the whole declaration, and prayed judgment. It clearly was
bad as to the second count. In the absence of any action on the part of
Congress, at least, it would not be denied that a state could regulate the conduct
of local messengers when the transit by wire was over. Western U. Teleg. Co.
v. James, 162 U. S. 650, 40 L. ed. 1105, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 934. It cannot be said
that the second count was abandoned, for nothing of the sort appears, and the
plea was offered before trial, so that the evidence was not in. If the plea was not
good for all that it attempted to cover, it was bad altogether. It may be that if
we were dealing with the judgment of a lower court of the United States, we
should think that there were sufficient grounds for looking through the form to
the substance of what the pleader seems to have had most in mind; but, when
we are considering the action of a state court, we cannot say that the local
tribunal did not yield to an argument that Saunders would have deemed
conclusive, and that Gould or Stephen would have regarded as an end of the
case. Manchester v. Vale, 1 Wms. Saund. 28; Gould, Pl. 4th ed. 104.
The first assignment of error falls for the reasons that we have stated, and the
second falls with it. The second is that the court erred in rendering judgment for
the plaintiff. But the delay was proved, and, as the plea was not admitted, there
was nothing to show that the message went outside the state. Moreover, the
judgment was upon both counts. It is impossible to go further, and to pass upon
the delicate question of constitutional law that was argued here.
Writ of error dismissed.
Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice Moody dissent.

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Wilson, 213 U.S. 52 (1909)

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213 U.S.

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

Messrs. Rush Taggart, John F. Dillon, George H. Fearons, and Francis

Writ of error dismissed.

Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice Moody dissent.

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