Huse v. United States, 222 U.S. 496 (1912)
Huse v. United States, 222 U.S. 496 (1912)
496
32 S.Ct. 119
56 L.Ed. 285
The appellant had a four-year contract, commencing July 1, 1902, for screenwagon mail service between the postoffice and railway mail stations at Omaha,
Nebraska. On May 20, 1903, the Postmaster General canceled the contract and
relet it to other parties. Thereupon appellant brought this suit in the court of
claims, asserting that he had faithfully performed his agreement, but that he had
been required to carry mails to and from three railway companies not included
in his contract. That his equipment was ample for the service he contracted to
render, but that he had been ordered to provide equipment adequate to the
excessive service demanded, and that the cancelation of his contract was
therefore unauthorized. His suit was to recover, first, the balance due under the
contract as construed by the Department; second, the reasonable value of the
excess service he had, under protest, been compelled to render; third, the loss of
profit resulting from the wrongful annulment of his contract; and, finally, the
loss sustained in disposing of equipment which had been bought for the
purpose of carrying out his contract.
As is the case with mail contracts, the manner and means of performance were
carefully prescribed, and power was reserved to the Postmaster General to
require other and further facilities if it should be found necessary for the good
of the service. The power of the Postmaster General to supervise and the duty
of the contractor to conform to his regulations were plainly written down. That
vigilant and prompt service might be enforced, he was given the right to make
deductions, by way of fines, from compensation earned, for defects in
equipment or negligence in the performance of the service. For repeated
failures in performance, or acts of neglect or disobedience to orders, he was
given power to annul the contract without impairing the right of the
government to recover damages for nonperformance.
The findings of the court below as to the repeated failures of the appellant in
the performance of his contract, the inadequacy of his equipment, and his
disobedience to the requirements that he should enlarge and improve his
facilities, make it clear that the Postmaster General did not act arbitrarily, nor
exceed the power reserved, by the inflicting of fines or the final cancelation of
the agreement on May 20, 1903. When the contract was canceled, it was
directed that compensation due should be withheld and the contract relet at the
contractor's expense. This reletting was at a price of some $14,000 in excess of
what the cost would have been if appellant had performed his agreement. The
court below found that when the contract was annulled there was due appellant
$2,984.72. For this a judgment was asked, but denied, the court below finding
that the loss to the government as a result of reletting the contract was greatly in
excess of the amount due to appellant. His petition was therefore dismissed.
If the contract, fairly construed, exacted the amount of service which the
Department claimed, the case of appellant must fail, in view of the facts found
as to his insufficient performance, and the loss resulting to the government
from the necessity of reletting the unfinished term of the agreement.
Coming, then, to the service required by the contract. The proposal for the
Omaha mail-wagon service and its acceptance were according to a printed
official form. This proposal and acceptance, making the contract proper, refer to
and make the public advertisement of the Postmaster General for proposals a
part of the agreement, and from it the service contemplated is discovered. That
advertisement included certain 'instructions to bidders,' of which they were
required to take notice. Among other things, these 'instructions' included the
following provision:
7
Under the heading 'Union Station,' in the schedule referred to, there appear the
names of four railroad companies opposite the words 'Union Station,'
applicable to each of the named companies, thus:
'Union Station:
10
11
12
13
14
It will be noticed that the named railroads bringing mail into the Union Station
do not include the Wabash, the Chicago & Northwestern, or the Chicago,
Milwaukee, & St. Paul. Notwithstanding this omission, appellant was required
to carry to and from the Union Station the mails delivered there by these three
companies, and to be delivered there from the post-office, to be carried by the
same companies. This appellant did under protest, and upon this his suit is
grounded.
15
But the explanation and answer is simple: Originally, the contract routes of
these companies terminated at the Union Pacific transfer at Council Bluffs,
Iowa, where the mail was transferred to the Union Pacific Railway and carried
into Omaha. After the construction of the Union Station, each of these
companies procured the right to carry their mail over the Union Pacific Railway
into the Union Station. This saved delay in transfer. The court below found that
'the trains so performing said service were known and treated by the Postoffice
Department as mail trains of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, route No.
157,001, and were operated under the rules of said Union Pacific Railroad
Company, and payment was made therefor to the said Union Pacific Company.
All weights of mail carried by said three roads were credited to the Union
Pacific Railroad route and weighed thereon. The screen-wagon contractor under
the preceding advertisement and contract, which were similar to the one in this
case, carried mails to and from the the trains of said three roads as part of his
contract, and these facts were known to persons having knowledge of the
service.'
16
This had for many years been the method of handling the mails carried by the
three companies referred to when appellant made his proposal. True, he says he
did not know it; but the advertisement warned him of the necessity of making
himself familiar with the 'terms of the contract, schedule of services and
instruction herein, before they should assume any liabilities as such bidders or
sureties, to prevent misapprehension.' Among the facts found is this:
17
'Prior to submitting said proposal the claimant carefully read the advertisement
and instructions to bidders, and familiarized himself with their terms, and knew
that the trains of the Chicago & Northwestern Railroad, the Chicago,
Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railroad, and the Wabash Railroad entered the Union
Station at Omaha, and to further inform himself as to the amount and character
of the service to be performed he consulted the postmaster and superintendent
of mails at Omaha, who called his attention to the Instructions to Bidders; also
a Mr. Anderson, who had been in charge of the work under a former contract,
who explained to him the three depots, including the Union Station, and the
mail to be taken from them, and the number of wagons it would take to perform
the service.'
18
Knowing of the manner in which the mails carried by the three railroads in
question were handled, acquired after the contract was signed, is not, of course,
fatal to his contention that the contract did not include that mail matter. It does,
however, appear that after his proposal had been accepted, and before the
beginning of performance, he actually took a temporary contract for the
carriage of the identical mails, so that when he entered upon his own regular
contract he was fully aware of the conditions. This must, at least, weaken the
force of his going forward under protest. But aside from this information, the
20
'The petition sets forth, among other things, that the Postmaster General
wrongfully and unlawfully withheld the $12,532.43 out of moneys due
petitioner, whichwas therefore entitled to recover the full amount; and to each
and every allegation of the petition the government interposed a general
traverse. It is now said that a counterclaim or set-off should have been pleaded,
but the record does not disclose that this objection was raised below, while the
findings of fact show that the entire matter was before the court for, and
received, adjudication. Moreover, it which was therefore entitled to recover of
pleading in the court of claims are not of so strict a character as to require
omissions of this kind to be held fatal to the rendition of such judgment as the
facts demand.'
21
Judgment affirmed.