G.R. No.

195229

October 9, 2012

EFREN RACEL ARA TEA,

vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D.

The Facts:
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates
for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections.
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. 4 On 8 December 2009,
Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanidas certificate of
candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May
2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in
his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for
the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution 5 and Section
43(b) of the Local Government Code6 both prohibit a local elective official from being
elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution cancelling Lonzanidas
certificate of candidacy. Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Banc remained pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea
(Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and
Vice-Mayor.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Judge Raymond C. Viray of Branch 75, Olongapo City on 5 July 2010. On 11 August 2010,
the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution 12 disqualifying Lonzanida from running for
Mayor in the May 2010 elections.
On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Attached Petition-in-Intervention.15 She claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC
Second Division ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking
out of his name from the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in the May 2010 elections.
In his Comment filed on 26 January 2011, Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the
candidate who received the second highest number of votes, could not be proclaimed as
the winning candidate. Since Lonzanidas disqualification was not yet final during election
day, the votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanidas subsequent
disqualification resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the
duly-elected Vice-Mayor, was mandated by Section 44 16 of the Local Government Code to
succeed as Mayor.
COMELEC granted the petition of Antipolo and likewise ordered the immediate
CONSTITUTION of a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to PROCLAIM Intervenor
Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales;
Hence, this petition.
Issue:

Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or
made a false material representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in
his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is determinative of whether Aratea or
Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Held:
We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because
Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a
candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified
candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
Qualifications and Disqualifications
Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code points to the Local Government Code for the
qualifications of elective local officials. Paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 39 and Section 40
of the Local Government Code provide in pertinent part:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province x x x; a resident therein for
at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
xxxx
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities,
component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on
election day.
xxxx
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 12. Disqualification. Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,

insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed
or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within
the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)
The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code are specifically enumerated:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e) violated
any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6 ,
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis
supplied)
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of
prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country." 20 All
the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus
Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the
language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the three-term limit rule, or
conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as
one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,21 this
Court ruled:
[T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated
in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the
ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature. x x x
Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by final
judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not constitute a
ground for a petition under Section 68.
False Material Representation
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be
denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the
certificate of candidacy:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained

therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any
time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of
candidacy:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and
that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to
represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence;
his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign
country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy
are true to the best of his knowledge.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisin
mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being
elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the
finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of
candidacy.
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately
once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty
does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves
his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not
be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his [perpetual special]
disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately
executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction
becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to
run for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida, he became
ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time
the judgment of conviction against him became final. The judgment of conviction
was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, before
Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 . 26
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which
means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement
that Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this
Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,27 the false material representation may
refer to "qualifications or eligibility. One who suffers from perpetual special
disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual
special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible
to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes
afalse material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this
Court explained in Fermin:

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not
based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material
representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the
public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her
CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC,
therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions
on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states
a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law,
is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has
already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section
253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with
the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation,
while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning
candidate.28 (Emphasis supplied)
The Three-Term Limit Rule as a Ground for Ineligibility
Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he
seeks election. Thus, Section 74 states that "the certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing x x x is eligible for said office. The three-term limit rule, enacted
to prevent the establishment of political dynasties and to enhance the electorates freedom
of choice,29 is found both in the Constitution 30 and the law.31 After being elected and serving
for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for
the same office in the next regular election 32 because he is ineligible. One who has an
ineligibility to run for elective public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in
Section 74, the word "eligible"33 means having the right to run for elective public office,
that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public
office.
The distinction between a petition under Section 68 and a petition under Section 78 was
discussed in Loong v. Commission on Elections 40 with respect to the applicable prescriptive
period. Respondent Nur Hussein Ututalum filed a petition under Section 78 to disqualify
petitioner Benjamin Loong for the office of Regional Vice-Governor of the Autonomous
Government of Muslim Mindanao for false representation as to his age. The petition was
filed 16 days after the election, and clearly beyond the prescribed 25 day period from the
last day of filing certificates of candidacy. This Court ruled that Ututalums petition was
one based on false representation under Section 78, and not for disqualification under
Section 68. Hence, the 25-day prescriptive period provided in Section 78 should be strictly
applied. We recognized the possible gap in the law:
It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be
stated in a certificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after
the lapse of the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, through no fault of
the person who discovers such misrepresentations and who would want the
disqualification of the candidate committing the misrepresentations. It would seem,
therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between the time of the discovery of the
misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of
the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the results of the election is
made. During this so-called "gap" the would-be petitioner (who would seek the
disqualification of the candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for the
proclamation of the results, so that he could avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting
candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto against him. Respondent
Commission sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap which, according to it, is
unnecessary and should be remedied.

At the same time, it can not be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the legislative
branch of the government to fix a definite time within which petitions of protests related to
eligibility of candidates for elective offices must be filed, as seen in Sections 78 and 253 of
the Code. Respondent Commission may have seen the need to remedy this so-called
procedural gap", but it is not for it to prescribe what the law does not provide, its function
not being legislative. The question of whether the time to file these petitions or protests is
too short or ineffective is one for the Legislature to decide and remedy. 41
In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify under oath his eligibility, and
thus qualification, to the office he seeks election. Even though the certificate of candidacy
does not specifically ask the candidate for the number of terms elected and served in an
elective position, such fact is material in determining a candidates eligibility, and thus
qualification for the office. Election to and service of the same local elective position for
three consecutive terms renders a candidate ineligible from running for the same position
in the succeeding elections. Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility because he knew full
well that he had been elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for
more than three consecutive terms yet he still certified that he was eligible to run for
mayor for the next succeeding term. Thus, Lonzanidas representation that he was eligible
for the office that he sought election constitutes false material representation as to his
qualification or eligibility for the office.
Legal
Duty
to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification

of

COMELEC

Even without a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is
under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from perpetual
special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction.
The final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification
of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running
for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The
final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other
government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes.
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not
qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after
the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a
candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There
was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 201 0 elections - Anti polo, who
therefore received the highest number of votes.
1wphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The COMELEC En Bane isDIRECTED to