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United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 12-1571
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JOSU SNCHEZ-MALDONADO,
Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Gustavo A. Gelp, U.S. District Judge]

Before
Howard, Selya and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.

Carlos M. Snchez La Costa on brief for appellant.


Rosa Emilia Rodrguez-Vlez, United States Attorney, Nelson
Prez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate
Division, and Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney,
on brief for appellee.

December 18, 2013

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

The truth of the ancient maxim

that crime does not pay is nowhere more evident than when, as in
this case, the crime involves the theft of government property from
the offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the FBI).

The

tale follows.
On July 13, 2011, a federal grand jury sitting in the
District

of

Puerto

Rico

returned

an

indictment

charging

the

appellant, Josu Snchez-Maldonado, and two confederates with


aiding and abetting the depredation of federal property resulting
in damage in excess of $20,000.

See 18 U.S.C. 2, 1361.

To be

specific, the indictment accused the defendants, who were allegedly


seeking to strip and sell copper, of approaching the local office
of the FBI and causing damage to an air conditioning system.
Within

matter

of

months,

the

government

and

the

appellant advised the district court that plea negotiations had


borne fruit.

Shortly thereafter, they submitted a signed plea


This non-binding agreement, see Fed. R. Crim. P.

agreement.

11(c)(1)(A)-(B), stated in relevant part that the appellant "waives


and surrenders his right to appeal the judgement and sentence in
this case."

That same day, a change-of-plea hearing was held

before a magistrate judge.

The magistrate judge recommended that

the district court accept the tendered plea, and the court did so.
The

probation

department

proceeded

presentence investigation report (the PSI Report).

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to

prepare

The PSI Report

noted, among other things, that an FBI agent had estimated the
property loss at $24,000 and that "[r]estitution in the amount of
$24,000 [was] owed."

The same document recommended that the

district court order restitution in that amount, with the order to


run jointly and severally against the three malefactors.

The

appellant interposed no objection to any portion of the PSI Report.


At the disposition hearing, the district court sentenced
the defendant to serve 30 days in prison, followed by a three-year
term of supervised release. The court then allocated the suggested
restitution

amount

equally

among

the

three

persons

who

were

responsible for the property damage and ordered the appellant to


pay his pro rata share ($8,000) in restitution to the FBI.

The

appellant did not object to the imposition of restitution in that


amount.
This timely appeal followed.

In it, the appellant seeks

belatedly to challenge the restitution order.


The government's first line of defense is that the plea
agreement's
challenge.

waiver-of-appeal

provision

blocks

the

appellant's

The appellant rejoins that he agreed only to waive the

right to appeal his "sentence," a term that, in his estimation,


does not encompass restitution.
We have explained before that no consensus exists as to
whether a waiver-of-appeal provision that explicitly applies to a
sentence but omits any mention of restitution extends to orders for

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restitution. See United States v. Salas-Fernndez, 620 F.3d 45, 47


(1st Cir. 2010).

When the resolution of the underlying appeal

plainly dictates affirmance, we often have elected to avoid the


murky waters surrounding the waiver's scope and proceeded to
consider the merits of the appeal on the arguendo assumption that
the waiver does not apply.

See, e.g., id. at 47-48.

We follow

that prudential path today.1


The appellant protests that the district court's order
for restitution reflects two errors under the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A. Because these claims of
error are proffered for the first time on appeal, we review them
only for plain error.

See Salas-Fernndez, 620 F.3d at 48.

To

show plain error, the appellant must demonstrate: "(1) that an


error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only
(3) affected the defendant's substantial rights, but also (4)
seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings."

United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60

(1st Cir. 2001).

Debates about whether or not a waiver-of-appeal provision


extends to orders for restitution are wasteful and can easily be
avoided. A modicum of careful drafting by the government would
make such debates unnecessary.
A word to the wise should be
sufficient: we urge the government to expend the minimal effort
that this prophylaxis would require.
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The appellant's principal claim of error rests on the


premise that the district court's $8,000 restitution order was not
supported by reliable evidence.

This claim lacks force.

In a property-destruction case like this one, the MVRA


requires a district court to order restitution in the amount of the
value of the affected property.

See 18 U.S.C. 3663A(b)(1)(B).

Where multiple defendants contribute to the property damage, "the


court may make each defendant liable for payment of the full amount
of restitution or may apportion liability among the defendants to
reflect the level of contribution to the victim's loss and economic
circumstances of each defendant."

Id. 3664(h).

A district court's calculation of restitution is not held


to standards of scientific precision.
F.3d at 48.

See Salas-Fernndez, 620

As long as the court's order reasonably responds to

some reliable evidence, no more is exigible.

See id.

In this instance, the district court's order relied on


the $24,000 loss amount quoted in the PSI Report. That information
came straight from the mouth of the victim the FBI.

The

defendant did not object to this portion of the PSI Report,2 and we

The appellant's acquiescence in the loss-amount figure


recounted in the PSI Report also defenestrates his assertion that
the government failed to carry its burden under 18 U.S.C.
3664(e). By the statute's own terms, such a burden emerges only
when a "dispute" arises as to the amount or type of restitution.
Id.; see United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 617 (1st Cir.
1993). Here, the FBI's loss estimate was uncontradicted, and an
uncontradicted loss amount does not give rise to a dispute.
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cannot fault the district court for its acceptance of the lossamount figure. See United States v. Prochner, 417 F.3d 54, 66 (1st
Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Ocasio-Cancel, 727 F.3d 85,
92 (1st Cir. 2013).
The appellant's remaining contention is that the district
court failed to consider his financial resources when imposing the
restitution order.

This contention need not detain us.

The MVRA requires a sentencing court to consider a


defendant's financial circumstances in setting a payment schedule.
See 18 U.S.C. 3664(f)(2).

But this hurdle is not a high one.

"[T]he court need not make explicit findings or even indicate what
it has considered; it suffices if the record contains relevant
information about, say, the defendant's income and assets." SalasFernndez, 620 F.3d at 49.
Given

the

minimalist

nature

of

this

appellant's claim of error is easily dispatched.

standard,

the

The PSI Report

contains a detailed account of the appellant's financial condition.


The district court reviewed that account and, at sentencing,
ordered the appellant to pay only his pro rata share of the $24,000
loss.3 The court acknowledged that the appellant's economic status
would make it "pretty hard for that [sum] to be restituted."

The

court then left it to the probation department to work out an

The court could have ordered the appellant to repay the full
amount.
See 18 U.S.C. 3664(h).
The court chose instead to
allocate the loss among the three miscreants.
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appropriate

payment

schedule.4

Thus,

the

record

evinces

court's keen awareness of the appellant's financial condition.

the
We

discern no error, plain or otherwise.


We need go no further. In the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, the district court was fully entitled to rely upon
the $24,000 loss-amount figure in fashioning its restitution order.
By like token, the appellant's claim that the district court failed
to consider his financial condition is without merit.

Affirmed.

In some circumstances, the propriety of enlisting the


probation department to set a payment schedule might be
problematic. See United States v. Merric, 166 F.3d 406, 409 (1st
Cir. 1999) (explaining that "the judge rather than the probation
officer must have the final authority to determine the payment
schedule" for a fine).
But the appellant has not pursued that
issue on appeal, and we deem it waived.
See United States v.
Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990); cf. United States v.
Sawyer, 521 F.3d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the lack of
a set payment schedule for restitution does not amount to plain
error).
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