Elec Cases 1
Elec Cases 1
5. In compliance with said search warrant no. 95147, an elite composite team of the PNP
Intelligence Command, Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS), and Bulacan Provincial Command,
backed up by the Philippine National Police
Special Action Force, accompanied by mediamen
who witnessed and recorded the search by video
and still cameras, raided the house of respondent
Florentino Blanco at his stated address at Bancal,
Meycauayan, Bulacan.
E. Edgardo Orteza y Asuncion 1. Paltik Cal. 38 Rev with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.
F. Francisco Libari y Calimag -
2
permission to enter the locked room so they could
withdraw money in a vault inside the locked room
to pay their watchers, and the teachers of
Meycauayan in the 8 May 1995 elections.
12. For reasons not known to petitioner, Mrs.
Florentino Blanco and Mariano Blanco, were
allowed to withdraw ten (10) large plastic bags
from the vault.
13. When the said PNP composite team examined
the ten (10) black plastic bags, they found out
that each bag contained ten (10) shoe
boxes. Each shoe box when examined contained
200 pay envelopes, and each pay envelope when
opened
contained
the
amount
of
P1,000.00. When
questioned,
respondent's
brother Mariano Blanco and respondent's wife,
admitted to the raiding team that the total
amount of money in the ten (10) plastic bags is
P10,000,000.00.
14. The labels found in the envelope shows that
the money were intended as respondent's bribe
money to the teachers of Meycauayan.Attached
as Annex "C" is the cover of one of the shoe
boxes containing the inscription that it is intended
to the teachers of Brgy. Lawa, Meycauayan,
Bulacan.
15. On election day 8 May 1995, respondent
perpetrated the most massive vote-buying
activity ever in the history of Meycauayan
politics. Attached as Annex "D" is the envelope
where this P10,000,000.00 was placed in 100
peso denominations totalling one thousand pesos
per envelope with the inscription `VOTE!!! TINOY.'
This massive vote-buying activity was engineered
by the respondent through his organization called
`MTB' or `MOVEMENT FOR TINOY BLANCO
VOLUNTEERS.' The chairman of this movement is
respondent's brother, Mariano P. Blanco, who
admitted to the police during the raid that these
money were for the teachers and watchers of
Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Attached as Annex "E" hereof is an MTB ID issued
to one Armando Bulan of Precinct 77-A, Brgy.
Jasmin, Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan. You will
note that the ID is perforated in the middle. The
purpose is for the voter to tear the office copy
and return it to respondent's headquarters to
receive the balance of the P500.00 of the bribe
money after voting for respondent during the
elections. The voter will initially be given a downpayment of P500.00.
16.
This
massive
vote-buying
was
also
perpetrated by respondent thru the familiar use
of flying voters. Attached as Annex "F" hereof is a
copy of the Police Blotter dated 8 May 1995
showing that six (6) flying voters were caught in
different precincts of Meycauayan, Bulacan, who
admitted after being caught and arrested that
they were paid P200.00 to P300.00 by respondent
and his followers, to vote for other voters in the
voter's list.
17. Not satisfied, and with his overflowing supply
of money, respondent used another scheme as
follows. Respondent's paid voter will identify his
target from the list of voter and will impersonate
said voter in the list and falsify his signature.
Attached as Annex "G" hereof is the Minutes of
Voting and Counting of Votes in Precinct No. 26,
Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan.Annex "G-1"
is the statement of one Ma. Luisa de los Reyes
Cruz stating that when she went to her precinct
to vote, her name was already voted upon by
another person. This entry was noted by Leticia T.
Villanco, Poll Chairman; Estelita Artajo, - Poll
Clerk; and Nelson John Nito - Poll Member.
18. Earlier before the election, respondent used
his tremendous money to get in the good graces
of the local Comelec Registrar, who was replaced
by this Office upon the petition of the people of
Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "H" hereof is an
article in the 3 May 1995 issue of Abante entitled
`1 M Suhol sa Comelec Registrar.'
19. The second search warrant on respondent's
residence yielded to more firearms and thousands
of rounds of ammunition. These guns were used
by respondent to terrorize the population and
make the people afraid to complain against
respondent's massive vote buying and cheating
in today's elections. Respondent's bribery of the
teachers ensured the implementation of his votebuying ballot box switching, impersonations, and
other cheating schemes.
Attached as Annexes `I-1' to I-2' are the pertinent
Receipts of the guns and ammunitions seized
from respondent. Attached as Annex "J" is a
Certification to the same effect.
20. The above acts committed by respondent are
clear grounds for disqualification under Sec. 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code for giving money to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing election functions; for
committing acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; and for spending in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by
3
the Election Code. There are only 97,000
registered
voters
in
Meycauayan
versus
respondent's expenses of at least P10,000,000.00
as admitted above. (Emphasis supplied).
On May 15, 1995, Alarilla filed a Very Urgent
Ex Parte Motion to Suspend Proclamation. The
COMELEC (First Division) granted the motion after
finding that there was a "probable commission of
election offenses which are grounds for
disqualification pursuant to the provisions of
section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP
881), and the evidence in support of
disqualification
is
strong." It
directed
the
Municipal Board of Canvassers "to complete the
canvassing of election returns of the municipality
of Meycauayan, but to suspend proclamation of
respondent Florentino P. Blanco should he obtain
the winning number of votes for the position of
Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan until such time
when the petitions for disqualification against him
shall have been resolved."
On May 25, 1995, Blanco filed a Motion to Lift
or Set Aside the Order suspending his
proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his
Answer to the petition to disqualify him.
On May 30, 1995, the COMELEC (First
Division) heard the petition to disqualify
Blanco. The parties thereafter submitted their
position papers.[2] Blanco even replied to the
position paper of Alarilla on June 9, 1995.
On August 15, 1995, the COMELEC (First
Division) disqualified Blanco on the ground of
vote-buying, viz.:[3]
xxxxxxxxx
"WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
Commission
(First
Division)
RESOLVES
to
DISQUALIFY Respondent Florentino P. Blanco as a
candidate for the Office of Mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan in the May 8, 1995 elections for having
violated Section 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election
Code. The Order suspending the proclamation of
herein Respondent is now made PERMANENT. The
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Meycauayan,
Bulacan shall immediately reconvene and, on the
basis of the completed canvass of the election
returns, determine the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates who shall be
immediately proclaimed.
petition
for
certiorari,[5] Blanco
xxxxxxxxx
18. Respondent COMELEC En Banc committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and acted arbitrarily in
affirming en toto and adopting as its own the
majority decision of the First Division in that:
18.1 It upheld the validity of the May 17, 1995
order suspending proclamation of Petitioner
Blanco herein as the winning candidate for Mayor
of Meycauayan without the benefit of any notice
or hearing in gross and palpable violation of
Blanco's constitutional right to due process of law.
18.2 It violated the provisions of COMELEC Res.
No. 2050 as amended, prescribing the procedure
for disposing of disqualification cases arising out
of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sec. 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which Resolution this
Honorable Tribunal explicitly sanctioned in the
case of Lozano vs. Yorac. Moreover, it (COMELEC)
violated Blanco's right to equal protection of the
laws by setting him apart from other respondents
facing similar disqualification suits whose case
were referred by COMELEC to the Law
Department pursuant to Com. Res. No. 2050 and
ordering their proclamation -- an act which
evidently discriminated against Petitioner Blanco
herein.
SO ORDERED."
4
vote-buying in gross and palpable violation of the
provisions of Section 28, Rep. Act. 6646;
18.5 It ordered the proclamation of a SECOND
PLACER as the duly elected Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, in gross violation and utter
disregard of the doctrine laid down by this
Honorable Supreme Court in the case of LABO vs.
COMELEC which was reiterated only recently in
the case of Aquino vs. Syjuco.
On the other hand, Nolasco contends in his
petition for certiorari[6] that he should be declared
as Mayor in view of the disqualification of
Blanco. He cites section 44 of R.A. No. 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991 and our decision in Labo vs. COMELEC.[7]
We shall first resolve the Blanco petition.
Blanco was not denied due process when the
COMELEC
(First
Division)
suspended
his
proclamation as mayor pending determination of
the
petition
for
disqualification
against
him. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and sections 4
and 5 of the Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure merely require that evidence of guilt
should be strong to justify the COMELEC in
suspending a winning candidate's proclamation. It
ought to be emphasized that the suspension
order is provisional in nature and can be lifted
when the evidence so warrants. It is akin to a
temporary restraining order which a court can
issue ex-parte under exigent circumstances.
In any event, Blanco was given all the
opportunity to prove that the evidence on his
disqualification was not strong. On May 25, 1995,
he filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the Order
suspending his proclamation. On May 29, 1995,
he filed his Answer to the petition to disqualify
him. The COMELEC heard the petition. Blanco
thereafter submitted his position paper and reply
to Alarilla's position paper. The COMELEC
considered the evidence of the parties and their
arguments
and
thereafter
affirmed
his
disqualification. The hoary rule is that due
process does not mean prior hearing but only an
opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC gave
Blanco all the opportunity to be heard. Petitions
for disqualification are subject to summary
hearings.[8]
Blanco also faults the COMELEC for departing
from the procedure laid down in COMELEC
Resolution 2050 as amended, in disqualification
cases. The resolution pertinently provides:
xxxxxxxxx
Where a similar complaint is filed after election
but before proclamation of the respondent
5
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension
of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong."
Despite
these
laws
and
existing
jurisprudence, Blanco contends that COMELEC
must follow the procedure in Resolution No. 2050
as amended. We hold that COMELEC cannot
always be straitjacketed by this procedural
rule. The COMELEC has explained that the
resolution was passed to take care of the
proliferation of disqualification cases at that
time. It deemed it wise to delegate its authority
to its Law Department as partial solution to the
problem. The May 8, 1995 elections, however, did
not result in a surfeit of disqualification cases
which the COMELEC cannot handle. Hence, its
decision to resolve the disqualification case of
Blanco directly and without referring it to its Law
Department is within its authority, a sound
exercise of its discretion. The action of the
COMELEC is in accord with Section 28 of R.A. No.
6646, viz:
"x x x.
"SEC. 28. Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Voteselling. - The presentation of a complaint for
violations of paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 supported by affidavits
of complaining witness attesting to the offer or
promise by or of the voter's acceptance of money
or other consideration from the relatives, leaders
or sympathizers of a candidate, shall be sufficient
basis for an investigation to be immediately
conducted by the Commission, directly or through
its duly authorized legal officers under Section 68
or Section 265 of said Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
(emphasis supplied)
"x x x."
Indeed, even Commissioner Maambong who
dissented from the majority ruling, clings to the
view that "Resolution No. 2050 cannot divest the
Commission of its duty to resolve disqualification
cases under the clear provision of section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646."[10] Clearly too, Blanco's contention
that he was denied equal protection of the law is
off-line. He was not the object of any invidious
discrimination. COMELEC
assumed
direct
jurisdiction over his disqualification case not to
favor anybody but to discharge its constitutional
6
[Annexes "E-2", "E-3", "E-4", "E-5", "E-6", "E-7",
"E-8", "E-9" and "E-10"].
On the day of the elections, two individuals were
apprehended for attempting to vote for
Respondent when they allegedly are not
registered voters of Meycauayan. A criminal
complaint for violation of section 261 [2] of BP
881 was filed by P/Sr. Inspector Alfred S. Corpus
on May 9, 1995 with the Municipal Trial Court of
Bulacan. The same was docketed as Criminal
Case 95-16996 [Exhibit F-2].
Again, similar pay envelopes with money inside
them were found in the possession of the
suspected flying voters.
The incident was corroborated by Adriano
Llorente in his affidavit narrating the same
[Exhibit "F-1"]. Llorente, a poll watcher of
Petitioner, was the one who accosted the two
suspected flying voters when the latter
attempted to vote despite failing to locate their
names in the voter's list.
From this rich backdrop of detail, We are
disappointed by the general denial offered by
Respondent. In People of the Philippines vs.
Navarro, G.R. No. 96251, May 11, 1993, 222 SCRA
684, the Supreme Court noted that "Denial is
the weakest defense' [page 692].
In People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Precioso,
et al., G.R. No. 95890, May 12, 1993, 221 SCRA
1993, the Supreme Court observed that,
`We have consistently ruled that denials if
unsubstantiated
by
clear
and
convincing
evidence are negative and self-serving evidence
which deserves no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary weight over the
testimony of credible witnesses. Ergo, as between
the positive declarations of the prosecution
witness and the negative statements of the
accused,
the
former
deserves
more
credence." [page 754].'
7
consideration for someone's vote constitutes the
offense of vote-buying.
In the case at bar, the acts of offering and
promising money in consideration for the votes of
said affiants is sufficient for a finding of the
commission of the offense of vote-buying."
These factual findings were affirmed by the
COMELEC en banc against the lone dissent of
Commissioner Maambong.
There is an attempt to discredit these
findings. Immediately obvious in the effort is the
resort to our technical rules of evidence. Again,
our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules
of evidence should not be rigorously applied in
administrative proceedings especially where the
law calls for the proceeding to be summary in
character. More importantly, we cannot depart
from the settled norm of reviewing decisions of
the COMELEC, i.e., that "this Court cannot review
the factual findings of the COMELEC absent a
grave abuse of discretion and a showing of
arbitrariness
in
its
decision,
order
or
resolution."[12]
We now come to the petition of Nolasco that
he should be declared as mayor in the event
Blanco is finally disqualified. [13]We sustain the
plea. Section 44, Chapter 2 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) is
unequivocal, thus:
"x x x
"SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of
the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice
Mayor.- (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the
office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor
or vice mayor concerned shall become the
governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the offices of the governor, vice
governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest
ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall become the governor,
vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case
may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office
shall be filled automatically by the other
sanggunian members according to their ranking
as defined herein.
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of
the punong barangay, the highest ranking
sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall become the punong
barangay.
8
Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified. Thus, we
reiterated the rule in the fairly recent case of
Reyes v. COMELEC,[14] viz:
"x x x x x x x x x
"We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the COMELEC in denying petitioner
Julius O. Garcia's petition to be proclaimed mayor
in view of the disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.
"That the candidate who obtains the second
highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified
is
now
settled. The
doctrinal
instability caused by see-sawing rulings has since
been removed. In the latest ruling on the
question, this Court said:
To simplistically assume that the second placer
would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the
voter. The second placer is just that, a second
placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated
by either a majority or plurality of voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the
disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under the circumstances.
"Garcia's plea that the votes cast for Reyes be
invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for
Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the
belief that Reyes was qualified and for that
reason can not be treated as stray, void, or
meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is
disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the
elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for
him."
Consequently,
respondent
COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it
failed to follow the above doctrine, a descendant
of our ruling in Labo v. COMELEC.[15]
A final word. The dispute at bar involves more
than the mayoralty of the municipality of
Meycauyan, Bulacan. It concerns the right of
suffrage
which
is
the
bedrock
of
republicanism. Suffrage is the means by which
our people express their sovereign judgment. Its
free exercise must be protected especially
against the purchasing power of the peso. As we
succinctly held in People v. San Juan, [16] "each
time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to
assert this sovereign will, that abiding credo of
republicanism is translated into living reality. If
9
G.R. No. L-46863
IRINEO
MOYA, petitioner,
vs.
AGRIPINO GA. DEL FIERO, respondent.
Elpidio
Quirino
for
Claro M. Recto for respondent.
petitioner.
LAUREL, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in the above
entitled case declaring the respondent, Agripino
Ga. del Fierro, the candidate-elect for the office of
mayor of the municipality of Paracale, Province of
Camarines Norte, with a majority of three votes
over his rival, Irineo Moya. In the general
elections held on December 14, 1937, the parties
herein were contending candidates for the
aforesaid office. After canvass of the returns the
municipal council of Paracale, acting as board of
canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as the
elected mayor of said municipality with a majority
of 102 votes. On December 27, 1937, the
respondent field a motion of protest in the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Norte, the Court of
Appeals, on July 13, 1939 rendered the judgment
hereinbefore mentioned which is sought by the
petitioner to be reviewed and reversed upon the
errors alleged to have been committed by the
Court of Appeals:
1. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 8 ballots either inadvertently
or contrary to the controlling decisions of
this Honorable Court.
2. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 3 ballots marked "R. del
Fierro."
3. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 7 ballots marked "Rufino del
Firro."
4. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 72 ballots marked "P. del
Fierro."
10
showing that the ballot had been tampered with.
(6) Ballot F-7 in precinct No. 5 is admissible for
the respondent and the Court of Appeals
committed no error in so adjudicating. Although
the name of the respondent is written on the first
space for member of the provincial board, said
name is followed in the next line by "Bice"
Culastico Palma, which latter name is followed in
the next line by word "consehal" and the name of
a candidate for this position. The intention of the
elector to vote for the respondent for the office of
mayor being manifest, the objection of the
petitioner to the admission of this ballot is
overruled. (7) Ballot F-1 in precinct No. 2 is valid
for the respondent. On this ballot the Christian
name of the respondent was written on the
second space for member of the provincial board,
but his surname was written on the proper space
for mayor with no other accompanying name or
names. The intention of the elector being
manifest, the same should be given effect in
favor of the respondent. (8) Ballot F-44 in precinct
No. 2 wherein "Agripino F. Garcia" appears written
on the proper space, is valid for the respondent.
In his certificate of candidacy the respondent
gave his name as "Agripino Ga. del Fierro." The
conclusion of the trial court, upheld by the Court
of Appeals, that the letter "F" stands for "Fierro"
and "Garcia" for the contraction "Ga." is not
without justification and, by liberal construction,
the ballot in question was properly admitted for
the respondent.
The second error assigned by the petitioner refers
to three ballots, namely, Exhibit F-119 in precinct
No. 1 Exhibit F-24 in precinct No. 2, and Exhibit F6 in precinct No. 4. These three ballots appear to
be among the 75 ballots found by the Court of
Appeals as acceptable for the respondent on the
ground that the initial letter "P" stands for "Pino"
in "Pino del Fierro" which is a name mentioned in
the certificate of candidacy of the respondent.
The petitioner contends that the initial "R" and
not "P". Even if we could reverse this finding, we
do not feel justified in doing so after examining
the photostatic copies of these ballots attached to
the herein petition for certiorari. The second
assignment of error is accordingly overruled.
Upon the third assignment of error, the petitioner
questions the correctness of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals in adjudicating to the
respondent the seven ballots wherein "Rufino del
11
serve no good and useful purpose for us to
engage in the task of reconciliation or
harmonization of these rules, although this may
perhaps be undertaken, as no two cases will be
found to be exactly the same in factual or legal
environment. It is sufficient to observe, however,
in this connection that whatever might have been
said in cases heretofore decided, no technical rule
or rules should be permitted to defeat the
intention of the voter, if that intention is
discoverable from the ballot itself, not from
evidencealiunde. This rule of interpretation goes
to the very root of the system. Rationally, also,
this must be the justification for the suggested
liberalization of the rules on appreciation of
ballots which are now incorporated in section 144
of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No.
357).
It results that, crediting the petitioner with the
two ballots herein held to have been erroneously
admitted by the Court of Appeals for the
respondent, the latter still wins by one vote. In
view whereof it becomes unnecessary to consider
the counter-assignment of errors of the
respondent.
With the modification of the decision of the Court
of Appeals, the petition for the writ of certiorari is
hereby
dismissed,
without
pronouncement
regarding costs.
and
Apostol
for
respondent
FERNANDO, J.:p
The resolution of respondent Comelec 1 now
assailed in this petition for review, was
undoubtedly motivated by the objective of
insuring free, orderly and honest elections in the
discharge of its constitutional function to enforce
and administer electoral laws. 2 It excluded from
the canvass for the election of delegates for the
lone district of the province of Sulu the returns
from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul,
67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk
for being spurious or manufactured and therefore
no returns at all. Unless set aside then, petitioner
Abdulgafar Pungutan, who otherwise would have
been entitled to the last remaining seat for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, there
being no question as to the election of the other
two delegates, 3 would lose out to respondent
Benjamin Abubakar. Petitioner would thus dispute
the power of respondent Commission to exclude
such returns as a result of oral testimony as well
as the examination of the fingerprints and
signatures of those who allegedly voted as the
basis for the holding that no election in fact did
take place. This contention is, however,
unavailing, in the light of our holding last month
12
in Usman v. Comelec. 4 The other principal
question raised is whether the recognition of such
prerogative
on
the
part
of
respondent
Commission would contravene the constitutional
provision that it cannot pass on the right to vote.
The appropriate answer as will be made clear is
likewise adverse to petitioner. Hence, respondent
Commission must be sustained.
13
record: one each in Precincts 8, 29 and 20-A.
5,300 thumbmarks were found to be not identical
with the corresponding thumbmarks of the
registered voters in their registration records, CE
Form 1. 6,199 thumbmarks, however, could not
be analyzed because they were blurred, smudged
or faint. Of these 6,199 blurred thumbprints from
56 precincts, 4,187 from 31 precincts were
referred to the NBI handwriting experts for
signature examination. The result of said
examination by the NBI of these 4,187 signatures
showed that only 13 were found to be identical
with the signatures of the registered voters in
their registration record, CE Form 1, while 2,897
were those of persons other than the registered
voters. No opinion could be rendered on 1,277
signatures for lack of sufficient basis of
comparison." 9 Further: "It appeared, therefore,
that in the whole town of Tapul out of the 11,575
votes cast only 13 were definitely established as
cast by the registered voters. 8,197 were
definitely established as cast by substitute voters.
No opinion could be rendered with respect to
1,277 for lack of sufficient basis, 2,012 were not
examined anymore since these were in precincts
where the number of substitute voting had been
found to constitute a very high percentage. It has
been also established that on Election Day about
one hundred men armed with long arms were
seen going around from precinct to precinct in
Tapul driving away the voters and instructing the
teachers-inspectors on how to prepare the
election returns. Some of the ballot boxes were
seen to have been brought to the Municipal
Treasurer's office early in the afternoon of
Election Day hours before the closing of voting.
Nineteen (19) precincts of Tapul reported 100%
voting while the over-all percentage of voting in
the whole municipality was 94.5%." 10
Then came the recital as to Parang: "In Parang,
where there were 11,761 registered voters in 67
precincts, it was made to appear that 11,083
votes were cast. 66 voters who were not
registered in the precinct were able to vote
illegally without even using the names of the
registered voters therein. An examination of the
thumbprints of those who voted appearing in CE
Form 39 or at the back of CE Form 1 compared
with the corresponding thumbprints of the
registered voters appearing in their registration
record in CE Form 1 showed that only 39
thumbprints of the registered voters in his CE
14
such should be excluded from the canvass for the
election of delegates for the lone congressional
district of the province of Sulu; 2. To hold also by
unanimous vote that further hearings on the
petition of [Benjamin Abubakar, et al] for the
rejection or exclusion from the canvass of the
returns from Indanan, Panamao, Pata, Tandubas
South Ubian, Patikul, Bongao and Balimbing
would no longer be necessary, it appearing that
the results of the election would no longer be
affected by the returns from said municipalities
after the rejection of the returns from the four
towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk and,
therefore, for the purpose of the completion of
the canvass, to direct the Board of Canvassers to
include the returns from said municipalities in the
canvass; 3. By majority vote of the members of
the Commission to direct the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sulu to reconvene in Jolo and
complete the canvass excluding from said
canvass the returns from the towns of Siasi,
Parang, Tapul, and Luuk and to proclaim the 3rd
winning candidate at 5:00 P.M. on May 28, 1971,
unless restrained by the Supreme Court." 13 On
May 22, 1971, this petition for the review of the
above resolution of May 14, 1971 of respondent
Commission was filed. Three days later, a
resolution was adopted by this Court requiring
respondents to file an answer not later than June
4, 1971. Both respondent Commission on
Elections and respondent Abubakar duly filed
their answers on said date. Respondent
Commission took pains to explain with even more
detail why such a resolution had to be issued
considering the "massive voting anomalies
ranging from substitute voting to grabbing of
ballots to preparation of election returns and
other election documents at gunpoint" thus
justifying its conclusion that the elections in the
four towns amounted to a sham. The case was
heard on June 8, 1971 with petitioner Pungutan
represented by Attorney Jose W. Diokno.
Respondent Abubakar, represented by Attorney
Jovito R. Salonga, sought permission to submit a
memorandum, which was received by this Court
on June 28, 1971. Petitioner was given the
opportunity to reply thereto, and he did so in his
memorandum filed with this Court on October 18,
1971. The case was deemed submitted on
December 3, 1971. It is the decision of this Court,
as noted at the outset, after a careful study of the
pleadings and in the light of our decision last
month
in Usman
v.
Commission
on
15
prerogative. Clearly, there was care and
circumspection to assure that the constitutional
objective of insuring that an election be "free,
orderly and honest" be realized. If, under the
circumstances disclosed, a different conclusion
were arrived at, then certainly there is a
frustration of such an ideal. Moreover, this Court
has not displayed any reluctance in yielding the
imprimatur of its approval to the action taken by
respondent Commission in the discharge of its
constitutional function of the enforcement of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections. The long
line of decisions especially so since Cauton v.
Commission on Elections, 16 is not susceptible of
any other interpretation. Only thus may there be
an
assurance
that
the
canvassing
and
proclamation reflect with fidelity and accuracy
the true results of an election, in fact actually
held. We do so again. As a matter of fact, such a
sympathetic approach to the results arrived at in
the discharge of its functions started with the
leading case of Sumulong v. Commission on
Elections. 17 As was so well put by Justice, later
Chief Justice, Abad Santos: "The Commission on
Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to
play a distinct and important part in our scheme
of government. In the discharge of its functions, it
should not be hampered with restrictions that
would be fully warranted in the case of a less
responsible organization. The Commission may
err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and
methods that will insure the accomplishment of
the great objective for which it was created -free, orderly and honest elections. We may not
agree fully with its choice of means, but unless
these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse
of
discretion,
this
court
should
not
18
interfere." The same approach is reflected in
the opinion of the Chief Justice in Lucman v.
Dimaporo when as he pointed out if "pursuant to
our Administrative Law, the findings of fact of
administrative organs created by ordinary
legislation will not be disturbed by courts of
justice, except when there is absolutely no
evidence or no substantial evidence in support of
such findings ... there is no reason to believe that
the framers of our Constitution intended to place
the Commission on Elections created and
explicitly made 'independent' by the Constitution
itself on a lower level than said statutory
administrative organs; ... ." 19
16
an election has been held is a question of a
different type. It is properly within the
administrative
jurisdiction
of
respondent
Commission. If, as is our decision, no such voting
did take place, considering the massive
irregularities that attended it in the four towns,
then the exclusion of the alleged returns is not
tainted by infirmity. In that sense, the second
issue raised by petitioner that in so acting the
respondent
Commission
exceeded
its
constitutional power by encroaching on terrain
properly judicial, the right to vote being involved,
is likewise to be resolved against him. At any
rate, what was set forth by Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Diaz
v.
Commission
on
Elections 25 would likewise dispose of such a
contention adverse to petitioner. Thus: "It is
pleaded by respondents that the rejection of the
Sagada
returns
would
result
in
the
disfranchisement of a large number of legitimate
voters. But such disfranchisement would only be
provisional, subject to the final determination of
the validity of the votes at the protest that may
be filed with the Constitutional Convention." 26
3. As to the plea in the prayer of the petition that
in the event that the challenged resolution of May
14, 1971 as to the power of respondent
Commission is sustained, a special election be
called by it in all the 290 precincts in the four
municipalities of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, it
suffices to refer to our ruling in Usman v.
Commission on Elections, where a similar point
was raised without success. So it should be in this
case. We see no reason to order such a special
election. 27
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the
resolution of the Commission on Elections dated
May 14, 1971 is affirmed. The Commission on
Elections is directed to order the board of
canvassers to convene without delay and
forthwith proceed with and complete the canvass
of the election returns from all the precincts of
Sulu, excluding therefrom all the election returns
from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul,
67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk,
and thereafter proclaim the winning candidate for
the third Constitutional Convention seat allotted
to the said province. This decision is hereby
declared
immediately
executory.
No
pronouncement as to costs.
VITUG, J.:
An event in this decade, which future generations
would likely come to know simply as the "EDSA
People's Power Revolution of 1986," has
dramatically changed the course of our nation's
history. So, too, not a few of our countrymen have
by it been left alone in their own personal lives.
One such case is that of the petitioner in this
special civil action for certiorari.
17
The petitioner is Philip Romualdez, a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, the son of the former
Governor of Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez,
and nephew of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos.
Sometime in the early part of 1980, the
petitioner, in consonance with his decision to
establish his legal residence at Barangay Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte, 1 caused the construction of his
residential house therein. He soon thereafter also
served as Barangay Captain of the place. In the
1984 Batasan Election and 1986 "snap"
Presidential Election, Romualdez acted as the
Campaign Manager of the Kilusang Bagong
Lipunan (KBL) in Leyte where he voted. 2
When the eventful days from the 21st to the 24th
of February, 1986, came or were about to come
to a close, some relatives and associates of the
deposed President, fearing for their personal
safety, whether founded or not, "fled" the
country. Petitioner Romualdez, for one, together
with his immediate family, left the Philippines and
sought "asylum" in the United States which the
United States (U.S.) government granted. 3 While
abroad, he took special studies on the
development of Leyte-Samar and international
business finance. 4
In the early part of 1987, Romualdez attempted
to come back to the Philippines to run for a
congressional seat in Leyte. On 23 March 1987,
he finally decided to book a flight back to the
Philippines but the flight was somehow aborted. 5
On 25 September 1991, Romualdez received a
letter from Mr. Charles Cobb, District Director of
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
informing him that he should depart from the U.S.
at his expense on or before 23 August 1992, thus:
. . . Failure to depart on or before
the specified date may result in the
withdrawal of voluntary departure
and action being taken to effect
your deportation. In accordance
with a decision made to your case,
you are required to depart from the
United States at your expense on
or before 23 August 1992. 6
18
Hence, the instant petition for
exclusion of Philip G. Romualdez
from the list of voter of Precinct No.
9, Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte is hereby
ordered
DENIED
and
petition
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
19
The Solicitor General himself sustains the view of
petitioner Romualdez. Expressing surprise at this
stance given by the Solicitor General, respondent
Advincula posits non sequitur argument 17 in his
comment assailing instead the person of Solicitor
Edgar Chua. If it would have any value, at all, in
disabusing the minds of those concerned, it may
well be to recall what this Court said in Rubio
vs. Sto. Tomas: 18
LACSON,
JR., complainant,
20
RAMON POSADAS, Municipal Judge,
Talisay, Negros Occidental, respondent.
of
ANTONIO, J:
Respondent Municipal Judge Ramon Posadas, of
Talisay Negros Occidental, is charged in a verified
complaint by Salvador Lacson, Jr. with (a)
ignorance of the law, (b) partiality, and (c)
violation of the Election Code of 1971.
The Executive Judge, to whom this case was
referred
for
investigation,
report
and
recommendation, found the charges of ignorance
of the law and partiality to be without factual
basis. He, however, found that respondent Judge
has failed to comply with the requirements of
Section 136 of the Election Code of 1971, which
provides:
Any person who has been refused
registration or whose name has
been stricken out from the
permanent list of voters may at any
time except sixty (60) days before
a regular election or twenty-five
(25) days before a special election,
apply to the proper court for an
order
directing
the
election
registration board or the board of
inspectors as the case may be, to
include or reinstate his name in the
permanent list of voters, attaching
to his application for inclusion the
certificate
of
the
Electron
registration board or the board of
inspectors regarding his case and
proof of service of a copy of his
application and of the notice of
hearing thereof upon a member of
the said board (Emphasis supplied.)
In his report of July 17, 1972, the Investigating
Judge stated:
Respondent
disregarded
this
requirement and none of the
petitions for inclusion based on lack
of forms contains the attached
certificate of the Chairman or any
21
Efren
admittedly
informed
respondent of the filing of the
cases right the same morning of
October 20. Hence it is not likely
that the various members of the
Board of Inspectors could have
been notified to appear and testify
that petitioners in fact appeared
before their respective precincts
and were denied registration for
lack of forms. caution dictated that
this requirement or this procedure
be followed as this was one sure
way of Identifying the petitioners
and ascertaining whether in fact
they applied for and were refused
registration for lack of forms. True,
inclusion and exclusion cases are
summary in nature but the
procedure adopted by respondent
Judge
provided
no
safeguard
whatsoever against indiscriminate
inclusion. For he admitted that as
long as the petitioners were
present when he called the
inclusion cases for hearing and the
respondent Election Registration
Board or the members of the Board
of Inspectors of the precincts
concerned were not present he
considered the latter in default and
summarily granted the petition.
This could be the only reason why
practically all the inclusion cases
resulted in the issuance of orders
directing the inclusion of the
petitioners now marked as Exhs 'B',
'B-l' to 'B-54' and, as it turned out,
on appeal most of the petitions
were dismissed either for failure of
the petitioners to appear or, as in
Cases Nos. 136-153, because the
Court found on the basis of the
testimony of the Chairman of
Precinct No, 41 of Talisay that he
even had a surplus of seventeen
(17) application forms. 1
In extenuation the Investigating Judge found also
that respondent, in his aforesaid actuations, did
so without improper motive but in good faith.
22
There is no question that as a consequence of the
general amnesty all persons who violated the
election law on the dates and occasions therein
mentioned are relieved of their criminal
liability. 3 In the case at bar, respondent is
relieved of any criminal liability for his aforecited
infraction; however, in the public interest he
should be admonished.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby admonished
that he should exercise greater care in the
observance of the provisions of existing laws in
the discharge of his judicial duty, and warned that
any subsequent misconduct shall be dealt with
more severely.
SUFFRAGE AS A DUTY
G.R. No. L-47243
CIPRIANO
ABAIL,
ET
AL., petitionersappellees,
vs.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURT OF BACOLOD,
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, ET AL., respondentsappellants.
Vicente J. Francisco, Ramon H. Severino, Abundio
Z.
Arrieta
and
Res.
A.
Sobretodo
for
the
appellants.
Emilio R. Severino, Amado B. Parreo, Vicente T
Remetio and Carlos Hilado for the appellees.
23
evidence was presented by the petitioners in
support of their petition against those who, were
declared in default, the justice of the peace of
Bacolod ordered their exclusion from the list of
voters on the ground that it was the duty of the
challenged voters appear in court in order to be
personally examined in accordance with section
118 (f) of the Election Code, as one of the
grounds for their exclusion from the list of voters
was that they could not prepare their ballots
themselves, that is, that they could not read and
write. The attorneys for the challenged voters
received notice of the decision of the justice of
the peace of Bacolod on November 2, 1938, when
the present petition for certiorari was instituted in
the Court First Instance of Negros Occidental by
the petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of
the other challenged voters for the purpose of
having the judgment of the justice of the peace of
Bacolod in the aforesaid exclusion proceedings
set aside. After hearing, the Honorable Judge
Sotero Rodas of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental rendered judgment setting
aside the decision of the respondent justice of the
peace of Bacolod and ordering the restoration of
the excluded voters in the permanent electoral
census of Talisay, Negros Occidental. From this
judgment the instant appeal was brought, and
the respondents-appellants make an elaborate
assignment of nine errors. In view of the result
hereinbelow reached, we do not consider it
necessary to consider seriatim these errors.
While the present controversy may seem
academic because the 1938 election is over, we
have nevertheless assumed the task of deciding
the same on its merits in view of the imperative
necessity and importance of having a correct
electoral census in the municipality of Talisay,
Negros Occidental, and for that matter in any
municipality or city in the Philippines, for use in
future elections. In the scheme of our present
republican government, the people are allowed to
have a voice therein through the instrumentality
of suffrage to be availed of by those possessing
certain prescribe qualifications (Article V,
Constitution of the Philippines; sections 93 and
94, Election Code). The people in clothing a
citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose
of
securing
a consistent
and
perpetual
administration of the government they ordain,
charge him with the performance of a duty in the
nature of a public trust, and in that respect
constitute him a representative of the whole
people. This duty requires that the privilege thus
bestowed should be exercised, not exclusively for
the benefit of the citizen or class of citizens
professing it, but in good faith and with an
intelligent zeal for the general benefit of the
state. (U.S. vs. Cruikshank, 92 U. S., 588.) In the
24