Explosion and Fire at A Paint Manufacturing Plant
Explosion and Fire at A Paint Manufacturing Plant
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N 13520
The parameters composing these indices and their corresponding rating protocol are available from the following
Website: http://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr.
The overall "Hazardous materials released" index was assigned a "1" score by default, since no information was
provided on the intensity of this explosion (parameter Q2: a TNT equivalent of less than 0.1 tonne).
The "human and social consequences" index remained at "0" given that no injuries were reported.
Due to the lack of information available, the "environmental consequences" index could not be rated.
The overall "economic consequences" index scored a "3", as the level of property damage (parameter 15) rose to 25
million francs, with operating losses reaching 10 million (parameter 16).
ACTIONS TAKEN
Subsequent to this accident, a prefectural decree was issued as an emergency measure (Article 6 of the 1976 Law) to
suspend paint manufacturing activities.
The operator was mandated to: adopt conditions necessary to ensure permanent safety of all damaged installations;
prevent the fire from exerting environmental impacts; and discharge all generated waste and polluted water at
authorised facilities. Along these lines, the stormwater responsible for leaching waste was collected in a retention basin
for eventual disposal at a certified treatment centre.
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N 13520
Prior to repairing the destroyed workshop, a complete permit application had to be filed. The prefectural order
conditioned the resumption of activities in undamaged workshops to the submission of a comprehensive study including
an analysis of the exact causes and circumstances surrounding the accident, along with measures implemented towards
the goal of avoiding a repeat accident and continuing plant operations under adequate safety conditions. The order
moreover requested a safety study of those buildings intended to be reused plus a safety analysis devoted to plant
operations laying out in specific terms the recommended safety features.
In addition to introducing the set of recommendations proposed in the various safety reports:
The use of highly-inflammable liquids was prohibited in the workshop, and the quantity of moderatelyinflammable liquids was limited in this facility to 8 m3;
Prior to manufacturing, the supply of raw materials necessary for the day's production needed to be verified on
a line-by-line basis. Furthermore, a two-stage verification was implemented;
Rotor heads had to be kept in the high position outside of tanks once the pasting-dispersion system was no
longer in use;
Only mobile tanks were to be employed for production runs. These tanks had to be cleaned in a special
outdoor station following the immediate removal of finished products;
Supplies were to be limited to essential raw materials, with products to be identified for technicians in terms of
safety, flammability and reactivity;
Tank cooling was required, with temperature being regularly controlled. Any tank experiencing abnormal
temperature increase was to be cooled and then removed;
Procedures were mandated in order to establish technician qualifications, operating guidelines for forklifts, noninterruption of permanent ventilation, and tank covering during finishing stages;
A minimum ventilation flow rate was to be adopted, along with the compliance of both verified electric
equipment and installed fire extinction resources.
LESSONS LEARNT
This accident was caused by a deficiency in manufacturing process controls that, at first glance, seemed relatively
simple (given a mix of various products), while displaying a number of well-identified risks. A new manufacturing run was
launched and then suspended due to a shortfall in raw materials. The solvent involved also happened to play a key role
in the thermal balance of the mixing operation; this factor was underestimated on the day of the accident.
Heating of the mixer was well detected and even controlled at first by technical staff; however, the monitoring procedure
as defined and communicated to the night shift failed to prevent a repeat mishap while manufacturing was still
suspended.
The operator needs to strengthen site installation safety, in addition to drafting or modifying the instructions and
procedures in effect company-wide.
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