This case involves a land dispute between Pedro Servano and Cenona Olego. Pedro filed a complaint claiming ownership of the land and the parties entered a compromise agreement where Cenona admitted Pedro's ownership. The court issued a decision declaring Pedro the owner. Over 10 years later, Pedro filed a contempt petition against Cenona for disturbing his possession, which Cenona sought to dismiss claiming fraud in the compromise. The Supreme Court held that (1) Cenona could not be held in contempt because the decision did not order her to vacate; and (2) the decision could no longer be enforced against Cenona due to prescription and her allegation of fraud vitiating consent to the compromise.
This case involves a land dispute between Pedro Servano and Cenona Olego. Pedro filed a complaint claiming ownership of the land and the parties entered a compromise agreement where Cenona admitted Pedro's ownership. The court issued a decision declaring Pedro the owner. Over 10 years later, Pedro filed a contempt petition against Cenona for disturbing his possession, which Cenona sought to dismiss claiming fraud in the compromise. The Supreme Court held that (1) Cenona could not be held in contempt because the decision did not order her to vacate; and (2) the decision could no longer be enforced against Cenona due to prescription and her allegation of fraud vitiating consent to the compromise.
This case involves a land dispute between Pedro Servano and Cenona Olego. Pedro filed a complaint claiming ownership of the land and the parties entered a compromise agreement where Cenona admitted Pedro's ownership. The court issued a decision declaring Pedro the owner. Over 10 years later, Pedro filed a contempt petition against Cenona for disturbing his possession, which Cenona sought to dismiss claiming fraud in the compromise. The Supreme Court held that (1) Cenona could not be held in contempt because the decision did not order her to vacate; and (2) the decision could no longer be enforced against Cenona due to prescription and her allegation of fraud vitiating consent to the compromise.
CENONA OLEGO, petitioner, vs. HON. ALFREDO REBUENO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch IV and ATTY. PEDRO SERVANO, respondents
Facts:
Pedro D. Servano filed a complaint against
Cenona Olego and asked for a declaration as to the legality of his title to a residential lot. He alleged that he acquired the lot by purchase and that he and his predecessors had possessed it en concepto de dueo since time immemorial and that after he had acquired the lot, his possession was disturbed by Cenona Olego, who claimed to be the owner of the lot. Cenona Olego in her answer denied that Servano owned and possessed any land and pleaded the defense that she was the "absolute owner and lawful possessor" of the land. The parties however submitted a compromise agreement wherein the defendant admits the allegation of the plaintiff's complaint as to his claim of ownership of the land described therein in said complaint and that judgment be rendered declaring the plaintiff the owner. After 10 years, Servano filed in the lower court a "petition for contempt" against Cenona Olego and her children and that Cenona Olego and her
children prevented Servano from having "the
peaceful use and enjoyment" of said land; that they branded the decision as "fake" and "not worthy of respect", and that they occupied a portion of the land and disturbed Servano's "property rights." Servano prayed that Cenona Olego and her children be punished for contempt of court and ordered to pay damages to him. Cenona Olego filed a motion to dismiss the contempt charge. The motion was based on the grounds (a) that the amicable settlement was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation, (b) that the execution of the judgment was barred by the statute of limitations, and (c) that the court had lost jurisdiction over the case. It was pointed out in the motion that the judgment does not require Cenona Olego to vacate the land or deliver its possession to Servano; that, being illiterate, she was unaware that she had signed an amicable settlement; that she was never furnished with copies of both the amicable settlement and the "decision" of January 8, 1964; that she was made to understand that what she was signing was a motion for postponement, and that, being ignorant of the decision, she never vacated the land and she thought that the case was still to be tried.
Issues:
The issues are (a) whether Cenona Olego could
be held in contempt of court for not vacating the land involved in the compromise and (b) whether the lower court's decision should be set aside on the ground of fraud or could be enforced after the expiration of more than ten years from the date of its finality.
Held:
SC holds that Cenona Olego's failure to vacate
the lot could not be the basis of a contempt proceeding against her.
In the compromise agreement and in the
decision approving it, she was not ordered to vacate the lot. It was stipulated in the compromise that she admitted Atty. Servano's ownership of the lot and "that judgment be rendered declaring" him to be the owner thereof. The decision approving the compromise followed the usual pattern of judgments in such cases: ordering the parties to comply with the terms and stipulations of the compromise.
Where there is no decree or order commanding
accused or anyone else to do or refrain from doing or anything, disobedience of it is impossible. Hence, Cenona Olego could not be held guilty of contempt of court.
With respect to the validity or enforceability of
the lower court's judgment approving the compromise, Cenona Olego raised the issue of fraud. A compromise may be annulled on the ground of fraud and mistake. A judicial compromise may be set aside if fraud vitiated the consent of a party thereof. The extrinsic fraud, which nullifies a compromise, likewise invalidates the decision approving it. The general rule is that the adjudication of ownership does not include the possession of the property. The exception is that the adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of his claim of ownership which was rejected. But then in such a case a writ of execution would be required if the defeated party does not surrender the possession of the property. The owner should enforce his right to possess the land by asking for a writ of execution within five years from the finality of the decision. Atty. Servano did not enforce his right to possess the land within the ten-year period. To enforce the judgment in his favor by means of contempt proceeding after the expiration of the ten-year period would be a circumvention of the statute of limitations.
Considering that the judgment against Cenona
Olego is no longer enforceable and talking into account her imputation that the compromise, on which the said judgment was based, was vitiated by fraud and mistake, the said judgment cannot possibly affect her possession of the disputed land. Nor can it destroy the legal
presumption in her favor that as possessor of
the land in the concept of owner she has a just title thereto. Therefore, the lower court's order, citing Cenona Olego for contempt of court, is set aside. The lower court's judgment of January 8, 1964 can no longer be enforced against Cenona Olego because it had already prescribed.
Herminia L. Mendoza, in Her Capacity As Oic of The Register of Deeds of Lucena City, vs. Spouses Armando and Angela Garana and Far East Bank Trust and Co., Inc., G.R. No. 179751, August 5, 2015