G.R. No. 132601
G.R. No. 132601
penalty law. In light of these developments, the Courts TRO should now be lifted as it
has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.
The instant motion is GRANTED.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; RULE ON FINALITY OF JUDGMENT; CANNOT
DIVEST COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION. The rule on finality of judgment cannot divest
this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice
Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as follows:
x x x the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor
the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend,
modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of
the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.
The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of
enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. x x x
For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which
can render the execution unjust or impossible.
2. ID.; SUPREME COURT; FINALITY OF DECISION IN CRIMINAL CASES;
PARTICULAR OF EXECUTION ITSELF STILL UNDER CONTROL OF JUDICIAL
AUTHORITY. In criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period
for reopening the same has elapsed, the court cannot change or alter its judgment, as
its jurisdiction has terminated. . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been
returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it
performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this
cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause
that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive.
The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the
judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the
judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict
except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon. (Director of Prisons v.
Judge of First Instance, 26 Phil. 267[1915])
3. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; EXECUTION OF SENTENCE; GROUNDS FOR
POSTPONEMENT. Notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature
thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even
in sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement can be ordered in
three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3)
by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render
impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed
in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need
for postponement.
4. ID.; ACTIONS; JURISDICTION; POWER TO CONTROL EXECUTION OF
DECISION, AN ESSENTIAL ASPECT THEREOF. The power to control the execution of
its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial
subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirely of judicial power in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be estabished by law. To be sure, the most important
part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions
where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel
courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is
because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been
conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to
make them conformable to law and justice.
5. ID.; SUPREME COURT; JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT DOES NOT DEPEND
ON CONVENIUENCE OF LITIGANTS. The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada
to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty.
Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his clients right to due process and the
publics right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents,
did not oppose petitioners motion on the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction
over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by
the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of
December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents
and they are now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to
grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of
litigants.
6. ID.; ID.; POWER TO SUSPEND EXECUTION OF CONVICTS DOES NOT VIOLATE
CO-EQUAL AND COORDINATE POWERS OF BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT. The
text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public
respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by
final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however,
cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their
decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final
judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the
appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final
doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and executory,
nothing else is further done except to see to its compliance since for the Court to adopt
otherwise would be to put no end to litigations. The rule notwithstanding, the Court
retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably
with established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the petition
assailing before it the use of lethal injection by the State to carry out the death
sentence. In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final
judgment, the power of the President to grant pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the
prerogative of Congress to repeal or modify the law that could benefit the convicted
accused are not essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally incompatible
and may each be exercised within their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay
of execution issued by the Court would not prevent either the President from exercising
his pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure that may be advantageous
to the adjudged offender.
3. ID.; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT; IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL AND EXECUTORY
JUDGMENTS; EXCEPTIONS. In any event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of
immutability of final and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions. Concededly,
the Court may, for instance, suspend the execution of a final judgment when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.
Certainly, this extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his
station, whose right to life is the issue at stake.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; R.A. NO. 7659 (DEATH PENALTY LAW),
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. R.A. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar
as some parts thereof prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with the
requirements of heinousness and compelling reasons prescribed by the Constitution of
the Philippines.
2. ID.; R.A. NO. 8177 (LETHAL INJECTION LAW), UNCONSTITUTIONAL. R.A. 8177
(the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the
manner in which R.A. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is to be implemented.