Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Filed: Patrick Fisher
Filed: Patrick Fisher
JUL 27 2000
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
GERARDO VALDEZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
RON WARD, Warden, Oklahoma State
Penitentiary; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
No. 99-6147
Respondents-Appellees,
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. CIV-97-347-L)
Robert A. Nance of Riggs, Abney, Neal, Turpen, Orbison & Lewis, Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, for Petitioner-Appellant
Robert L. Whittaker, Assistant Attorney General (W.A. Drew Edmondson,
Attorney General of Oklahoma, with him on the brief), State of Oklahoma,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondents-Appellees.
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, PORFILIO and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
SEYMOUR, Chief Judge.
castration, and continued to hit and slap him. When Mr. Barron started to fight
back, Mr. Valdez shot him twice in the forehead and then hit him in the head with
the gun. While Mr. Barron lay on the couch, Mr. Valdez retrieved a knife and cut
his throat, finally killing him. Mr. Valdez threatened to kill Mr. Orduna if he told
anyone about the murder, and demanded Mr. Ordunas assistance in disposing of
the body. The two men carried Mr. Barron, the couch, and the surrounding rug to
the backyard, where they set them on fire.
Three months later, the police began investigating Mr. Barrons
disappearance. On July 25, officers executed a search warrant for Mr. Valdezs
home. Upon entering the house, Deputy Terry Cunningham administered Miranda
warnings to Mr. Valdez in English. Mr. Valdez conversed in English with the
officers, who believed he understood his rights. Because the officers had already
questioned Mr. Orduna, they knew to look for Mr. Barrons remains in the
backyard barbecue pit. There they found what appeared to be a bone fragment.
Mr. Valdez agreed to accompany the officers to the local police station.
Officer Dan Benson administered another Miranda warning to Mr. Valdez upon
their arrival. Throughout the interrogation, Mr. Valdez spoke in English, without
the aid of an interpreter, and denied any involvement in Mr. Barrons death. The
officers escorted Mr. Valdez back to his home late that evening. While driving
back, Deputy Cunningham told Mr. Valdez that he would feel better if he told
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them the truth. Officer Dan Benson asked Mr. Valdez if he would show them
what he had done with the body. When they arrived at Mr. Valdezs home, he
showed them where he had burned Mr. Barrons body. Deputy Cunningham read
Mr. Valdez his Miranda warnings a third time and asked him if he understood his
rights. Mr. Valdez said he did. When Deputy Cunningham asked Mr. Valdez to
sign the waiver of rights form, which was written in English, Mr. Valdez asked to
read it first. Mr. Valdez then signed the waiver and confessed to killing Mr.
Barron. This confession was taped and played for the jury.
Mr. Valdez was arraigned the morning of July 26 and counsel was
appointed for him. Later that day while Mr. Valdez was still in custody, Special
Agent A. J. Irwin of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service interviewed
Mr. Valdez without his counsel present. Agent Irwin had previously interviewed
Mr. Orduna and Alfonso Borjas, a friend of Mr. Valdez who was present at the
bar on the evening of the murder, in an effort to aid the state police in their
investigation. As with these other interviews, Agent Irwins interview with Mr.
Valdez was conducted entirely in Spanish. At the outset, Agent Irwin identified
himself and emphasized he was only there to establish Mr. Valdezs alienage and
immigration status. He then administered the Miranda warnings to Mr. Valdez in
Spanish.
After describing his immigration status to Agent Irwin, Mr. Valdez stated
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risk of death to more than one person during the commission of the crime. The
jury sentenced him to death. The OCCA upheld Mr. Valdezs conviction and
sentence on direct appeal and denied post-conviction relief. See Valdez, 900 P.2d
363 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); Valdez v. State, 933 P.2d 931 (Okla. Crim. App.
1997). Mr. Valdez thereafter filed for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court. The district court denied the writ and Mr. Valdez appeals that denial.
On appeal, Mr. Valdez makes six claims of constitutional error: (1) his
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whether the state courts decision was contrary to clearly established Federal law.
The contrary to clause of subsection (d)(1) is fulfilled where the state court
applied a rule that was diametrically different [from], opposite in character or
nature, or mutually opposed to a maxim of law as stated by the Supreme Court.
Id. The contrary to clause is also satisfied where the state court is confronted
with a set of facts which are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the
Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]
precedent. Id. at 1519-20.
We next ask whether the state courts determination involved an
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law. See id. at 1520. The
unreasonable application clause of subsection (d)(1) applies in two scenarios:
first, where the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the
Supreme] Courts cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular
state prisoners case, id.; second, where the state court either unreasonably
extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where
it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new
context where it should apply, id.
In either scenario the reviewing habeas court must determine whether the
state courts application of Supreme Court precedent to the case at bar was
reasonable. See id. at 1521-22. The Court refrained from defining the term
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factual
findings should be reviewed de novo rather than presumed correct. See id. at
1254. Cf. Smith v. Estelle , 711 F.2d 677, 680-81 (5th Cir. 1983) (state habeas
courts failure to hold evidentiary hearing on petitioners allegation meant that
there were no state findings of fact to which the presumption of correctness could
apply).
Mr. Valdezs reliance on Miller is misplaced. The petitioner there had
requested and been denied an evidentiary hearing in both state and federal court.
In a separate order, the district court here denied Mr. Valdezs request for an
evidentiary hearing because he had failed to request one in state court. Rec., vol.
I, doc. 43 at 2. As the district court pointed out, under AEDPA a habeas
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DISCUSSION
I
Mr. Valdez first claims that his July 25 taped confession and his July 26
statements to Agent Irwin were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment
rights. He argues that due to his poor command of the English language he did
not knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights on July 25 as
required by Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). He also contends he
invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel on July 25, making his statements
to Agent Irwin the following day inadmissible under
(10th Cir. 2000), any subsidiary factual findings made by the state court are
entitled to a presumption of correctness under section 2254(e),
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also Trice , 196 F.3d at 1169 (although ultimate question of whether petitioners
confession was voluntary reviewed under section 2254(d), subsidiary factual
findings entitled to section 2254(e)s presumption of correctness).
Whether Mr. Valdez understood his
see Mincey v. Head , 206 F.3d 1106, 1131 (11th Cir. 2000);
8 F.3d 1132, 1141 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc);
Cuppett v. Duckworth ,
823-24 (9th Cir. 1990), which underlies the legal question of whether his waiver
was knowing and intelligent,
, 817 F.2d
448, 451 (7th Cir. 1987). We therefore must presume the OCCAs factual finding
that Mr. Valdez fully comprehended what was being said to and asked of him,
Valdez , 900 P.2d at 371, is correct unless Mr. Valdez convinces us otherwise by
clear and convincing evidence.
See 2254(e)(1).
Mr. Valdez did not offer any additional evidence and merely argues from
the trial record that he did not fully comprehend English and thus did not
knowingly and intelligently waive his
the entire record, we agree with the state court that it establishes Mr. Valdezs
understanding of English.
trial testimony, see Rec., vol. V at 10-103, convince us that while he had some
limitations in his ability to speak English and therefore occasionally referred to an
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255, 260 (2d Cir. 1981) (defendants in-court behavior supported trial courts
finding that defendant understood
language).
In sum, we agree with the OCCAs exhaustive review of the record,
see
Valdez , 900 P.2d at 371-72, and its conclusion based thereon that Valdezs
assurances over the course of the evening that he understood his
Miranda rights,
coupled with his objectively verifiable ability to understand and answer the
questions posed to him during the final interrogation, provide sufficient proof that
he knowingly and intelligently waived his
July 25th, 1989.
Id. at 372. Because Mr. Valdez has not provided any further
evidence, clear and convincing or otherwise, to rebut this finding, we reject his
assertion that he did not understand English. Consequently, we agree with the
OCCA that he knowingly and intelligently waived his rights on July 25.
B. Invocation of Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel
Mr. Valdezs next Fifth Amendment claim is based upon his assertion that
he requested counsel during the interrogation at his home on July 25. In
Edwards
v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the Court held that after an accused clearly
invokes his right to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation, officers
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must cease all questioning and may not reinitiate questioning on any matter until
counsel is provided.
Edwards , Mr. Valdez contends his July 26 interrogation by Agent Irwin without
counsel present violated his Fifth Amendment rights because it occurred after he
invoked his right to counsel the previous day. Therefore, he argues, Agent
Irwins testimony was inadmissible at trial.
On the evening of July 25, after Deputy Cunningham convinced Mr. Valdez
to show him where he disposed of Mr. Barrons body, he presented Mr. Valdez
with a Miranda waiver form which Mr. Valdez signed. The officers then taped
Mr. Valdezs subsequent confession. Investigator Benson concluded the
interrogation by asking Mr. Valdez whether his confession was voluntarily made
and whether he willingly signed the Miranda waiver form. Mr. Valdez replied:
Yes, I understand it a little bit and I sign it because I understand it something
about a lawyer and he want to ask me questions and thats what Im looking for a
lawyer. Rec., Supp. Ex. 1 at 5. Investigator Benson replied, But you are
willingly talking to us? We didnt beat you or anything like that to get you to talk
did we? Id. After a barrage of questions along this line, and without a response
from Mr. Valdez, Investigator Benson asked once more, you talked to us because
you wanted to didnt you? Id. Mr. Valdez responded, Yea. The officers then
ended the taped statement. Mr. Valdez argues that his first response was an
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actually
must make this objective inquiry with the understanding that a statement either is
such an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not.
Cir. 1992), which we review under AEDPA 2254(d) if the state has addressed
the issue on the merits,
determination is both contrary to, and an unreasonable application of, Davis. See
2254(d)(1). The OCCA correctly cited Davis and applied its holding when
reviewing this claim, and Mr. Valdez does not argue otherwise. For this reason,
its determination is not contrary to Davis. See Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1519-20.
Hence, for Mr. Valdez to obtain habeas relief on this claim, he must convince us
the OCCAs determination unreasonably applies [Davis] to the facts of [his]
case. Id. at 1520. We agree with the district court that it did not.
The OCCAs conclusion that Mr. Valdezs reference to an attorney was
insufficient to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel under
unreasonable. At the outset, we agree with the OCCA that a plain reading of Mr.
Valdezs statement is ambiguous, particularly because it was made
after he had
given a taped confession and showed police where he had burned the body,
undermining his need for the aid of counsel during the interrogation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Scurlock, 52 F.3d 531, 537 (5th Cir. 1995) (where accused
confessed, agreed to give a recorded statement, was read Miranda rights and
asked if she was willing to answer questions, accuseds subsequent comment that
she needed a lawyer was insufficient under Davis to invoke her Fifth Amendment
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right to counsel); Lord v. Duckworth, 29 F.3d 1216, 1221 (7th Cir. 1994)
(accuseds statement I cant afford a lawyer but is there anyway I can get one?,
was ambiguous because accused had twice been informed of Miranda rights and
had already confessed in lengthy, tape-recorded statement).
In Davis, the Supreme Court recognize[d] that requiring a clear assertion
of the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects whobecause of . . . [a]
lack of linguistic skills . . . will not clearly articulate their right to counsel
although they actually want to have a lawyer present. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460.
Despite this, the Supreme Court rejected any further prophylactic protections for
an accuseds Fifth Amendment right to counsel, holding instead that the primary
protection is the accuseds comprehension of the Miranda warnings themselves.
Id. As discussed above, Mr. Valdez had been read his rights three times prior to
making this statement, and the record supports the OCCAs determination that he
understood those rights and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right
to counsel. In light of this, and the fact that Mr. Valdezs statement came after he
confessed, the OCCAs determination that Mr. Valdezs statement was an
ambiguous request for counsel is not an objectively unreasonable application of
Davis.
II
Mr. Valdez next claims that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was
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violated by Agent Irwins July 26 interrogation of him without the presence of his
appointed counsel representing him on the murder charge. He argues the
statements he made about the murder during that interrogation were therefore
inadmissible under Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) (applying Edwards
rule to Sixth Amendment and holding a defendants waiver of Sixth Amendment
right to counsel invalid when made during post-arraignment, police-initiated
interrogations).
Mr. Valdez unsuccessfully raised this argument in his direct appeal. The
OCCA first recognized that under McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991),
the Sixth Amendment right is offense-specific. Agent Irwin was therefore free to
question Mr. Valdez on his immigration status without implicating Mr. Valdezs
Sixth Amendment rights because that interrogation did not relate to the murder
charge. See Valdez, 900 P.2d at 374. The OCCA held that Agent Irwin limited
his interrogation to Mr. Valdezs immigration status, and that Mr. Valdez waived
his Sixth Amendment right by initiat[ing] the exchange about the murder
charges and then making spontaneous and unsolicited remarks about the
killing. Id. at 375.
Mr. Valdez contends he is entitled to relief under section 2254(d)(1)
because the OCCAs determination was contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625. Mr. Valdez also maintains the
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for the murder had attached at the time of Agent Irwins July 26 interrogation.
According to the OCCAs recitation of the facts, Agent Irwin confined his
questions to Mr. Valdezs immigration status and did not interrogate Mr. Valdez
regarding the murder. It was Mr. Valdez himself who initiated the discussion
regarding the murder, despite Agent Irwins reminders that he was there regarding
Mr. Valdezs immigration status and that Mr. Valdez did not have to discuss the
murder charges. See Valdez, 900 P.2d at 375. Mr. Valdez did not challenge these
facts at trial and does not challenge them here, thus they are presumed correct.
See 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1).
The OCCAs determination that Mr. Valdez voluntarily waived his Sixth
Amendment rights by initiating discussion about the charged crime is a question
of law, see Cooks , 165 F.3d at 1288, which we review pursuant to AEDPA
2254(d). See Holman v. Kemna , 212 F.3d 413 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying 2254(d)
to review state court determination of whether defendant initiated conversation
with police ). In Jackson, the Supreme Court held the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel could not be waived during post-arraignment, police-initiated
interrogations. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 635-36. In McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501
U.S. 171, the Court clarified this holding by stating that the Sixth Amendment
right is offense-specific, meaning Jacksons holding invalidates only those
waivers made during police-initiated interrogations covering the subject matter of
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the charged offense. See id. at 175. In practice, this means that once the right
attaches (usually at the defendants arraignment), the police may not initiate an
uncounseled interrogation of the defendant on a subject dealing with the offense
for which he is charged, see id. at 176, but may initiate an uncounseled
interrogation on uncharged offenses.
Mr. Valdez asserts that because Agent Irwins interrogation was postarraignment and police-initiated, the OCCA should have held his Sixth
Amendment waiver invalid under Jackson. This argument ignores the fact that
Mr. Valdez retained the ability to waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by
voluntarily reinitiating a discussion with police regarding the crime for which he
was charged without counsel present. See, e.g., Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S.
344, 352 (1990) ([N]othing in the Sixth Amendment prevents a suspect charged
with a crime and represented by counsel from voluntarily choosing, on his own, to
speak with police in the absence of an attorney.); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S.
285, 290-91 (1988) (defendants Sixth Amendment waiver was valid where
confession was self-initiated and voluntary); Clayton v. Gibson, 199 F.3d 1162,
1172-73 (10th Cir. 1999) (post-arraignment Sixth Amendment waiver made while
defendant was being booked on a different charge was valid because defendant
voluntarily reinitiated communication with officers regarding the charged crime),
petition for cert. filed, No. 99-9630 (May 20, 2000); Cooks, 165 F.3d at 1288
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interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him,
unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or
conversations with the police) (emphasis added). This last exception to the
Edwards rule must be read in conjunction with McNeils holding that the police
do not violate the Sixth Amendment by initiating an interrogation of a defendant
about uncharged crimes. Under the AEDPA standard we are required to apply, we
cannot say the OCCAs determination that Mr. Valdez waived his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel when he made spontaneous and unsolicited remarks
about the killing during the police-initiated interrogation rested upon an
objectively unreasonable application of Edwards, Jackson, and McNeil to the new
facts presented here. Mr. Valdez is thus not entitled to habeas relief on this point.
See Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1520.
B. Agent Irwins Interrogation as a Pretext
Mr. Valdez also contends the OCCAs holding was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts, entitling him to habeas relief under
section 2254(d)(2). Pointing out that Agent Irwin interrogated other Spanishspeaking witnesses regarding the murder and was doing so to aid the state police
in their investigation, Mr. Valdez asserts that Agent Irwin was merely using Mr.
Valdezs immigration status as a pretext to elicit admissions from him about the
charged crime. The OCCA rejected this view of the facts, holding that [w]hile
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those conversations were inadmissible). Mr. Valdez maintains this was the
situation here. He analogizes Agent Irwin to the jail-house informant in Henry
who was surreptitiously employed to receive incriminating information regarding
a charged crime, arguing that the government must have known Agent Irwin
would obtain incriminating statements from Mr. Valdez during the interview. In
Henry, however, the Court specifically relied upon the fact that the defendant did
not know he was speaking to a government agent or that his statements could be
used against him. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 273. Mr. Valdezs analogy is therefore
inapposite because he knew he was speaking to a government official and his
statements could be used against him.
Agent Irwin testified that he did not ask Mr. Valdez any questions
regarding the murder during his interrogation. Moreover, he specifically told Mr.
Valdez he did not have to offer information about the homicide when Mr. Valdez
raised the subject. The fact that Agent Irwin may have hoped Mr. Valdez would
volunteer information, by luck or happenstance, does not result in a Sixth
Amendment violation. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176. In light of this evidence, it was
not an unreasonable determination of the facts for the OCCA to conclude no Sixth
Amendment violation occurred.
III
Mr. Valdez next asserts there was insufficient evidence to prove he was
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that God was commanding him to convert Mr. Barron and was thus unable to
appreciate right from wrong. During the States rebuttal, 3 Dr. Mynatt testified the
tests administered by Dr. Murphy could not have assessed Mr. Valdezs mental
condition as it existed at the time of the crime. Dr. Romero testified he agreed
with Dr. Mynatt that Mr. Valdez appreciated the difference between right from
wrong on the night of the murder.
Mr. Valdez undermined Dr. Murphys theory by testifying that God did not
command him to kill Mr. Barron, or to kill homosexuals generally. He also
testified that certain passages of the Bible teach that homosexuals do not deserve
to live. He said he did not really know why he killed Mr. Barron but did so when
Mr. Barron refused to listen to his sermon denouncing homosexuality. Finally,
Mr. Valdez testified he might kill another person who, like Mr. Barron, refused to
listen to his teachings.
The jury also heard testimony from several witnesses who were with Mr.
Valdez in the bar on the night of the murder. None testified that Mr. Valdez
seemed mentally unstable. With the exception of Mr. Orduna, who actually
witnessed the killing, all of these witnesses testified that Mr. Valdez did not
appear to be angry at Mr. Barron.
Both Dr. Mynatt and Dr. Romero heard Mr. Valdezs trial testimony before
they testified on rebuttal.
3
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On direct appeal, Mr. Valdez contended Dr. Murphys opinion that he was
not legally sane at the time of the murder was more credible than Drs. Romeros
and Mynatts conclusions because the latter were based upon cursory sanity
evaluations. See Valdez, 900 P.2d at 375. In reviewing this argument, the OCCA
remarked that Mr. Valdezs sanity was a question of fact for the sole
determination of the jury, and that it would not inquire into the credibility of
the witnesses nor weigh conflicting testimony. Id. at 376. The OCCA concluded
the evidence was sufficient to uphold the jurys finding that Mr. Valdez was sane
beyond a reasonable doubt based on the testimony from witnesses who were with
Valdez at the time of the crime, from the doctors who later evaluated Valdezs
mental condition, and from Valdez himself. Id. at 377.
A claim based on sufficiency of the evidence is a mixed question of fact
and law which we reviewed de novo under the pre-AEDPA habeas caselaw. See
Maes v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 979, 988 (10th Cir. 1995). Habeas relief was granted
only if, considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, a rational trier of fact could not have found the defendant was sane
beyond a reasonable doubt at the time of the crime. See id. (citing Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319). Under AEDPA, however, where a habeas petitioners
sufficiency of the evidence challenge has already been decided in state court, we
employ a more limited review under either section 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2). Under
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concluded the evidence was sufficient to support the jurys conclusion that Mr.
Valdez was sane beyond a reasonable doubt, see id. at 376-77 (citing Kiser v.
State, 782 P.2d 405, 407 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989)). Despite Mr. Valdezs
contention that this was an incorrect application of state evidence law, this
standard is the same whether cited from the Jackson opinion or from state
caselaw. The OCCAs application of this standard was thus in accordance with
federal constitutional requirements.
Mr. Valdez also contends the OCCAs determination that the evidence was
sufficient was an objectively unreasonable determination of the facts, entitling
him to habeas relief under section 2254(d)(2). He first maintains the OCCA
should have disregarded the expert witness testimony of Drs. Romero and Mynatt
because it was less credible than the testimony of Dr. Murphy, due to his
extensive testing. As the OCCA recognized, whether Dr. Murphys testimony at
trial was more credible was an issue solely within the province of the jury. 4 See
United States v. Castaneda-Reyes, 703 F.2d 522, 524 (11th Cir. 1983) (whether
testimony of one expert witness is more believable than testimony of another
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expert witness is issue for trier of fact); United States v. Walker, 524 F.2d 1125,
1128 (10th Cir. 1975) (same). Despite the relative strengths of the expert
testimony, only the fact-finder may determine whether the defendant was legally
sane. See, e.g., United States v. Madrid, 673 F.2d 1114, 1123 (10th Cir. 1982)
(evidence of sanity was sufficient to sustain conviction although four of five
experts concluded defendant was not legally sane); Walker, 524 F.2d at 1128-29
(same where defense expert who extensively examined defendant testified
defendant was not legally sane but state expert who conducted limited
examination and did not hear trial testimony testified defendant was); see also
United States v. Shepard, 538 F.2d 107, 110 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Bohle, 475 F.2d 872, 874 (2d Cir. 1973).
Moreover, the OCCA did not rely solely on the expert testimony in holding
the evidence was sufficient; it also considered the testimony from witnesses who
were with Valdez at the time of the crime and the testimony of Mr. Valdez
himself. 5 Valdez, 900 P.2d at 377. Because of the OCCAs deference to the jury
Although Mr. Valdez does not attempt to refute his own testimony, he does
argue that testifying he would kill again if presented with a similar situation was
itself proof he was legally insane, and that the OCCA was unreasonable in failing
to construe the testimony in this light. See Aplt. Reply Br. at 13 (If a man on
trial for his life fully understood the wrongfulness of killing another, and
appreciated the nature and consequences of such conduct, would he tell the
States examiner that he would do the same thing again? The very insanity of that
proposition seems lost on the state court.). While a defense attorney may
(continued...)
5
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on the sufficiency of the evidence issue, see Valdez, 900 P.2d at 376, we cannot
characterize its determination as unreasonable. See, e.g., Billotti v. Legursky, 975
F.2d 113, 118-19 (4th Cir. 1992) (evidence held sufficient to support finding of
sanity where jury heard from lay witnesses regarding defendants conduct at time
of crime even though all experts testified defendant was not legally sane at time
of crime); cf. United States v. Samuels, 801 F.2d 1052, 1056 (8th Cir. 1986)
(evidence held insufficient to prove sanity where defendant had extensive history
of psychiatric problems, governments only evidence on sanity issue was expert
testimony based on limited examination of defendant, and no lay persons could
testify as to defendants mental state at the time of the offense).
Mr. Valdez also argues the testimony at trial shows he was suffering from
paranoid delusions resulting in an avenging angel complex, during which he
enforced what he believed to be biblical requirements without any corresponding
feeling of wrong-doing. The only new evidence he offers in support of his
position is a deposition taken of Dr. Mynatt in December 1997, seven and a half
years after the trial. In this deposition, Dr. Mynatt stated he did not remember
(...continued)
understandably believe his client insane for testifying honestly about his
emotions where such testimony devastates his defense strategy, the inferences to
be made from Mr. Valdezs testimony are purely matters for the jury. See United
States v. Bilson, 648 F.2d 1238, 1239 (9th Cir. 1981) (selection from among the
competing factual inferences arising from the proffered evidence of sanity was for
jury and appellate court is not free to disturb that conclusion).
5
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Mr. Valdez or testifying at his trial, even after seeing a picture of Mr. Valdez.
See Rec., Dep. of Dr. Mynatt at 7, 34. Dr. Mynatt did testify that a person
suffering from an avenging angel complex normally does not appreciate the
difference between right and wrong, and would therefore not be legally sane. Id.
at 26. He also testified that an individual suffering from this disorder might seem
normal in some areas, and that the disorder could be exacerbated by alcohol. Id.
at 23, 25. Significantly, however, Dr. Mynatt did not testify he had changed his
opinion and now believed Mr. Valdez was suffering from this complex at the time
of the murder, nor did he testify that Mr. Valdez was not legally sane at the time
he committed the crime. None of this testimony contradicts or calls into question
his testimony at trial. Moreover, Dr. Mynatt testified that whatever the basis was
for his opinion given at trial, it was much clearer at that time than seven and a
half years later when being deposed. Id. at 36. For these reasons, this evidence
does not undermine the jurys evaluation of Dr. Mynatts trial testimony or the
OCCAs review.
IV
Mr. Valdez appeals the district courts denial of his procedural and
substantive competency claims. A defendant is competent to stand trial if he
has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding [and if] he has a rational as well as a factual
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Supreme Court in Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 369 (1996). Because Mr.
Valdezs direct appeal was decided before Cooper, he raised the standard-ofproof issue in a state post-conviction proceeding. See Valdez, 933 P.2d 931.
Applying the 1995 amendments of Oklahomas post-conviction statute, 6 which
greatly circumscribed the state courts power to apply intervening changes in the
law to capital post-conviction applicants, the OCCA held his claim procedurally
barred due to his failure to raise it on direct appeal.
The district court agreed that the states procedural bar applied to Mr.
Valdezs procedural competency claim and refused to consider it. See Dist. Ct.
Op. at 31 (citing Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1346 (10th Cir. 1997)). The
district court rejected Mr. Valdezs substantive competency claim on the merits.
Both the OCCA and the district court erroneously held Mr. Valdezs
procedural competency claim barred for his failure to raise it during his direct
appeal. We have held that Oklahomas 1995 statutory amendments cannot stand
as a procedural bar to Cooper claims not raised on direct appeal when the direct
appeal pre-dated the effective date of the amendments. See Clayton v. Gibson,
199 F.3d 1162, 1171 (10th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, No. 99-9630 (May
20, 2000); Rogers, 173 F.3d at 1290; Walker, 167 F.3d at 1345. Since Mr.
Valdezs direct appeal was decided March 15, 1995, prior to the November 1,
6
The district court here specifically held that only the expert testimony was
probative on the issue of Mr. Valdezs competence. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 35. We
agree with Mr. Valdez that this holding was erroneous as it foreclosed the district
courts review of Mr. Valdezs own testimony. Upon our de novo review of this
testimony, however, we are persuaded it does not raise doubts regarding Mr.
Valdezs competency at the time of trial.
7
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the court to examine Mr. Valdez. After interviewing Mr. Valdez, Dr. Quinn
concluded he was competent to stand trial. At the post-examination competency
hearing, Dr. Quinn testified that he spent one and a half hours evaluating Mr.
Valdez. He opined that Mr. Valdez was able to participate and assist in his
defense and that he understood the nature and potentially severe consequences of
the charge against him. 8
None of the experts at trial testified Mr. Valdez was incompetent to stand
trial. Indeed, Dr. Mynatt, who had examined Mr. Valdez the previous week,
testified Mr. Valdez was competent. Despite Mr. Valdezs assertions that his
avenging angel complex caused him to be incompetent, none of Dr. Quinns
testimony at the competency hearing or any of the experts testimony at trial
revealed that Mr. Valdezs religious beliefs interfered with his perceptions of
reality. In addition, there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Valdez acted
irrationally or was disruptive during any of the proceedings against him. See,
e.g., Bryson, 187 F.3d at 1204.
Notwithstanding the difficulty of making evaluations of the kind required
Mr. Valdez criticizes Dr. Quinns testimony as only finding Mr. Valdez
had an orientation to time and place and a recollection of events. This ignores his
further testimony that Mr. Valdez regretted his acts, his thought processes were
coherent and consistent, and he was goal oriented towards his religious beliefs,
see Tr. of Competency Hearing at 7-11, all tending to show a rational
understanding of reality.
8
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in these circumstances, Drope, 420 U.S. at 179, our review of Mr. Valdezs own
testimony convinces us he was competent at the time of trial. His behavior on
the stand was neither irrational nor unusual. His testimony was responsive to the
questions asked, logical, and coherent. Foster v. Ward, 182 F.3d 1177, 1191
(10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1438 (2000). Mr. Valdez characterizes
specific parts of his testimony as bizarre and irrational, and strenuously argues
that his incompetence is demonstrated on the record by the fact that he candidly
admitted things that helped the State convict him and that demonstrated his
supposed future dangerousness. 9 However damaging his testimony was, nothing
in it reveals or suggests Mr. Valdez was incompetent to stand trial. Quite the
opposite, his testimony shows a consistency in thought process and an admitted
religious bias toward homosexuals. Such beliefs do not equate with
incompetence, and we disagree with Mr. Valdez that his irrational convictions
precluded him from accurately perceiving reality, cf. Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d
1546, 1554-56 (10th Cir. 1991) (discussing paranoid delusions and their effect on
a defendants rational understanding of the proceedings). After reviewing the
In this regard, Mr. Valdez points to his testimony that he quoted to Mr.
Barron out of the Bible; that he wanted to castrate Mr. Barron; that he wanted to
change Mr. Barron and killed him because he would not listen to his
proselytizing; that he might commit this crime again if presented with the same
circumstances; and that he rolled Mr. Barron up in the carpet like a taco. See
Pet. Br. at 61-62.
9
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record, we conclude the evidence before the trial court did not raise a bona fide
doubt about Mr. Valdezs competency at the time of trial.
With respect to Mr. Valdezs substantive comptency claim, the only new
evidence Mr. Valdez presented on his mental capacity was the deposition of Dr.
Mynatt taken seven and one-half years after trial. This additional evidence has no
probative value with respect to Mr. Valdezs competency to stand trial. See supra
at 32-33. Because Mr. Valdez does not meet the lower standard of review for his
procedural due process claim and does not provide additional evidence of his
incompetency at the time of trial, see Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 134547 (10th Cir. 1997) (considering post-conviction evidence in the context of a
substantive competency claim), he also cannot satisfy the more demanding
standard for a substantive claim. Walker, 167 F.3d at 1347. See also Rogers,
173 F.3d at 1291 n.13. We therefore deny his request for relief on his substantive
competency claim as well.
V
Mr. Valdezs next claim for relief is founded on his assertion that the trial
courts failure to give a jury instruction on second degree murder violated his due
process rights as set forth by the Supreme Court in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625 (1980). The Court held in Beck that in a capital murder trial, failure to give
an instruction on a lesser-included non-capital offense which is supported by the
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evidence violates the defendants due process rights by placing the jury in an allor-nothing position to acquit or find the defendant guilty of a capital crime. See
id. at 633-35. This holding was limited in Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 646
(1991), where the Court held that due process does not require the jury to be
instructed on every non-capital lesser-included offense supported by the evidence,
just that the jury may not be placed in an all-or-nothing position when the
evidence supports a third option. See, e.g., Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197, 1205
(10th Cir. 1999) (Beck requirement satisfied when jury is given option of at least
one lesser-included offense which was supported by evidence).
The jury at Mr. Valdezs trial was instructed on the lesser-included noncapital offense of first degree manslaughter. Mr. Valdez argues the evidence
presented at his trial was insufficient to support this instruction and the jury was,
in effect, in the same all-or-nothing position of central concern in Beck.
Answering this argument on direct appeal, the OCCA determined that the
evidence reasonably supported an instruction on the non-capital offense of first
degree heat of passion manslaughter. . . . Accordingly, the jury in this case was
not faced with the all-or-nothing, capital murder or innocence choice condemned
in Beck v. Alabama. Valdez, 900 P.2d at 379.
Mr. Valdez asserts that the OCCAs holding was an unreasonable
application of Beck, entitling him to habeas relief under section 2254(d)(1). See
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Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1520. The district court disagreed, concluding that the
manslaughter instruction took Mr. Valdezs case outside of the constitutional
concerns at issue in Beck. In so holding, the district court mischaracterized Mr.
Valdezs argument as asserting only an error of state law not implicating
constitutional concerns. Mr. Valdezs argument is not simply that his due process
rights were violated because the court failed to give a second-degree murder
instruction; rather, he argues that because the evidence did not support the only
lesser-included offense instruction given, the jury was in fact left without a third
option in violation of Beck. These circumstances, if present, would amount to a
constitutional deprivation, not merely an error of state law. As the Court stated in
Schad, it was not suggest[ing] that Beck would be satisfied by instructing the
jury on just any lesser included offense, even one without any support in the
evidence. Schad, 501 U.S. at 648. Thus, we must determine whether there was
evidence in the record to support the first degree manslaughter instruction, the
only lesser-included non-capital offense instruction given. See, e.g., Montoya v.
Collins, 955 F.2d 279, 285 (5th Cir. 1992) (non-capital lesser-included offense
instruction must have support in the record for it to be a realistic alternative
verdict for the jury).
Because the OCCA determined this issue on the merits, our review of its
decision is prescribed by AEDPA. If we find the OCCAs determination to be an
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10
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535, 546 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (rejecting the states argument that a first
degree heat of passion manslaughter instruction is improper where there is
evidence of intent) (cited in Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1232 (10th Cir.
1999)). See also Hogan, 197 F.3d at 1305 n.5 (under Oklahoma law, evidence of
intent does not render improper the instruction on manslaughter). Mr. Valdezs
admission of intent did not foreclose the jurys consideration of first degree
manslaughter, and the OCCAs determination was therefore reasonable.
VI
Mr. Valdez finally asserts he was denied effective assistance of trial
counsel. In order to warrant habeas relief, a petitioner must establish that his
attorneys representation was deficient, and that he was prejudiced by that
deficient performance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To
establish deficient performance, Mr. Valdez must show that his attorneys
(...continued)
Instruction No. 12 stated:
Heat of passion exists when four requirements are proven. These
requirements are:
First:
adequate provocation;
Second:
a passion or an emotion such as fear, terror, anger,
rage, or resentment existed in defendant;
Third:
the homicide occurred while the passion still
existed, and before there was a reasonable
opportunity for the passion to cool;
Fourth:
there was a casual [sic] connection between the
provocation, the passion, and the homicide.
10
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F.3d at 1343. We agree with the OCCAs conclusion that there is no reasonable
probability the outcome of Mr. Valdezs trial would have been different but for
trial counsels allegedly deficient performance.
B. Failure to Challenge Mr. Valdezs Confessions
Mr. Valdez also claims his trial counsels failure to challenge his
confessions in light of his limited ability to converse in English was both
deficient and prejudicial. The OCCA disagreed, concluding Mr. Valdezs trial
would not have been different had this challenge been raised because there was no
evidence of involuntariness. See Valdez, 900 P.2d at 388. Mr. Valdezs argument
that this was an unreasonable application of Strickland entitling him to habeas
relief, see Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1520, is unconvincing. There was a significant
amount of evidence that Mr. Valdez understood English sufficiently to converse
with officers and understand the three Miranda warnings he received in that
language, see discussion supra Part I.A. More importantly, however, Mr.
Valdezs claim of prejudice is centered around his July 26 confession to Agent
Irwin. Even if Mr. Valdezs July 25 confession had been suppressed, there is no
reasonable probability that his July 26 confession the alleged devastating
testimony would be suppressed because Agent Irwin gave Miranda warnings
and conducted the entire interrogation in Spanish, and that interrogation was not a
violation of Mr. Valdezs Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. See
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discussion supra Parts I and II. This confession would most certainly have
survived a motion to suppress, making Mr. Valdezs claim of prejudice
unpersuasive.
C. Failure to Request Jury Instructions
Mr. Valdez argues that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for
failing to request that the jury be instructed on the defense of voluntary
intoxication and the lesser included offense of second degree murder, alleging
there was sufficient evidence to support both. Both of these claims were raised
and rejected on direct appeal. See Valdez, 900 P.2d at 378, 388. As we
previously noted, it is not clear under our precedent whether we are to review
state determinations of this sort under section 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2). 11 Again, we
need not decide which is the correct approach because we conclude the OCCA
was not unreasonable in either its application of the law or its determination of
the facts.
Mr. Valdez asserts that the evidence he was on one of the worst drunks of
his life supported a voluntary intoxication instruction. His own testimony
undermines this argument. To be entitled to an instruction on the defense of
voluntary intoxication, Mr. Valdez had to present evidence sufficient to raise a
But see, Hogan, 197 F.3d 1306 n.5 (noting panel unanimously agreed the
correct approach is to treat the determination as a question of law reviewable
under section 2254(d)(1)).
11
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reasonable doubt concerning his ability to form the requisite criminal intent. See,
e.g., Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 83 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). However, Mr.
Valdez testified that he knew he was going to kill Mr. Barron beforehand, and in
fact told Mr. Barron so. Moreover, he was able to remember and describe the
evenings events in explicit detail, and his recollections were corroborated by all
of the witnesses who were present on the night of the murder. See Crawford v.
State, 840 P.2d 627, 638 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (defendants detailed
description of the crime and the surrounding circumstances demonstrate[d] that
he was in control of his mental faculties and not in the advanced state of
intoxication he attempt[ed] to assert). The OCCA was therefore not
unreasonable in determining that Mr. Valdez was not so intoxicated as to be
unable to form intent on the night of the murder. Because the requirements for
voluntary intoxication instruction were not met, the OCCA did not unreasonably
apply Strickland in determining that Mr. Valdezs counsel was not ineffective for
failing to request such an instruction.
Mr. Valdez also argues the evidence supported a second degree murder
instruction because the murder occurred during a drunken fight. Under Oklahoma
law, second degree murder requires a lack of intent. See, e.g., Palmer v. State,
871 P.2d 429, 432 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). Once again, his argument is
undermined by his own admission that he intended to kill Mr. Barron before the
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