United States v. Roy Milton Birmingham, 454 F.2d 706, 10th Cir. (1972)
United States v. Roy Milton Birmingham, 454 F.2d 706, 10th Cir. (1972)
2d 706
The seven appellants in this consolidated appeal, along with four others, were
jointly indicted in count one of a two count indictment with unlawfully
conspiring to receive, conceal, buy, sell and facilitate the distribution of heroin
after such had been imported into the United States contrary to law, with
knowledge on the part of the named defendants of such unlawful importation,
all in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 174. In count two of the indictment the
defendants were charged with unlawfully conspiring to sell, barter, exchange
and give away heroin not in pursuance of a written order written for that
purpose as provided by 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4705(a).
(1969). We agree.
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In McCarthy, it was held that Rule 11 not only requires the trial judge before
accepting a tendered plea of guilty to make inquiry as to the defendant's
understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, but
also requires the trial judge to satisfy himself that there is a factual basis for the
plea. The record discloses that such inquiry was not made by the trial court in
accepting Birmingham's plea of guilty. McCarthy also held that noncompliance
with Rule 11 required that the defendant's plea of guilty be set aside and the
case remanded for another hearing at which he would plead anew.
The other six appellants, namely, Jo Ann Chiles, John Lee Johnson, N. J.
Johnson, Elmer Gene Manuel, Troy Newton, and Charlie Smith, pleaded not
guilty and stood trial. Upon trial each was convicted by the jury on both counts
of the indictment and all now seek reversal of the judgments and sentences
imposed upon the verdicts thus returned. Grounds urged for reversal are: (1)
the trial court's instruction regarding inferences to be drawn from unexplained
possession of heroin was prejudically erroneous; (2) the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the guilty verdicts returned by the jury; and (3) error by
the trial court in denying motions filed by the defendants seeking disclosure of
matters occurring before the grand jury, including an inspection of grand jury
records and proceedings.
Instruction No. 11 given the jury provides that if the jury found from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant did have possession of
heroin, the fact of such possession alone, unless otherwise explained to the
satisfaction of the jury by evidence in the case, would permit the inference that
the heroin in question was imported into the United States contrary to law and
would permit the further inference that the defendant having such possession
had knowledge that the heroin had been imported into the United States
contrary to law. This instruction was based on the following language contained
in 21 U.S.C. Sec. 174:
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"Whenever
on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is shown to have or
to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be deemed
sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the
possession to the satisfaction of the jury."
8
In Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970),
the United States Supreme Court upheld an instruction based on 21 U.S.C. Sec.
174 which permitted the jury to infer knowledge of illegal importation from the
unexplained possession of heroin. The court declared that permitting such an
inference did not violate the defendant's right to be convicted only on a finding
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and did not place impermissible pressure on
him to testify in his own defense. In thus holding, the court noted that since
little, if any, heroin is made in this country and that virtually all heroin
consumed in the United States is illegally imported, Sec. 174 is valid insofar as
it permitted the jury in Turner to infer that the heroin possessed was a smuggled
drug.
Counsel recognizes that Turner upholds the type of instruction given in the
instant case against constitutional attack. However, it is argued that the
instruction should spell out in so many words that the jury is not only
authorized to infer the elements in question, but is also authorized not to infer
such elements, as suggested in United States v. Crespo, 422 F.2d 718 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 914, 90 S.Ct. 1716, 26 L.Ed.2d 77 (1969).
Whether such would be better practice we need not here debate. Our
examination of instruction No. 11, along with the other instructions, leads us to
conclude that the jury understood that while in certain defined circumstances it
was permitted to draw certain inferences, it was at the same time not required to
thus infer. We find no error in instruction No. 11.
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It is next urged that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdicts returned
by the jury. We disagree. Our study of the reporter's transcript convinces us that
there is ample evidence to support the determination that the appellants, and all
of them, did conspire in the manner charged in the indictment. Without
detailing the incriminatory testimony adduced upon trial, we would summarize
that the evidence disclosed that heroin was purchased in California and Texas,
brought to Tulsa, Oklahoma, where it was packaged and then sold to users at a
considerable profit, a $500 purchase of unpackaged heroin retailing for
$12,500. The testimony indicated that each of the appellants was involved to
some extent and in some manner with the overall operation, with N. J. Johnson
being the source of the heroin purchased in California, and Charlie Smith the
source of the heroin purchased in Texas. The other appellants, Jo Ann Chiles,
John Lee Johnson, Elmer Gene Manuel and Troy Newton, were variously
involved in the total operation, primarily in the sale and distribution of the
packaged heroin in Tulsa.
11
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As concerns the attack made by the appellants on the grand jury proceedings
and the indictment returned by the grand jury, Costello v. United States, 350
U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956), would seem to be controlling. In
this regard the real thrust of appellants' argument is that there was no evidence
before the grand jury to support the indictment returned. As a practical matter,
in the instant case no recording was made of the grand jury proceedings to the
end that the Government had no transcribed testimony of witnesses appearing
before the grand jury. In any event, in Costello the United States Supreme
Court declined to establish a rule which would permit a defendant in a criminal
case to challenge the indictment on the ground that it was not supported by
adequate or competent evidence.
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