United States v. Charles Crawford, 707 F.2d 447, 10th Cir. (1983)
United States v. Charles Crawford, 707 F.2d 447, 10th Cir. (1983)
2d 447
Charles H. Torres, Asst. U.S. Atty., Denver, Colo. (Robert N. Miller, U.S.
Atty., Denver, Colo., with him on brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Kenneth S. Canfield, Denver, Colo. (Harold A. Haddon, Denver, Colo.,
with him on brief) of Haddon, Morgan & Foreman, Denver, Colo., for
defendant-appellant.
Before BARRETT, McKAY and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.
BARRETT, Circuit Judge.
Charles Crawford (Crawford) appeals his jury conviction of two counts of wire
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1343 and one count of inducing a person
to travel in interstate commerce in furtherance of a scheme to defraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2314. Crawford's co-defendant Dell Burke
(Burke) was also convicted of two counts of wire fraud. However, her motion
for a new trial was granted by the district court on its finding that failure to
sever the co-defendants for trial had been prejudicial to Burke.
During the course of the trial, the Government detailed the $45,700 payment to
Crawford, his repeated assurances that the loans would be funded, his failure to
fund the loans, and his failure to return the advance fees paid to him. The
Government also presented the testimony of three other individuals who had
solicited Crawford's assistance in funding business loans. All three testified that
they had paid Crawford an advance fee in reliance upon his assurances of quick
funding and a return of the advance fee in the event that funding did not
materialize. All three testified that Crawford did not fund their loans and did not
return their advance fees.
Crawford's defense was based on his testimony and that of several witnesses.
Crawford's witnesses delineated his successful loan brokerage activities.
Crawford testified that he did not intend to defraud the three Colorado
businessmen, and that he had been unable to refund the advance fees because of
an embezzlement in his office and difficulty in collecting monies owed to him
by others. Crawford did admit to spending a portion of the $45,700 on personal
business projects.
I.
6a.
7
This contention is based upon the Assistant United States Attorney's notifying
the district court and defense counsel, outside the presence of the jury, that
several of Crawford's witnesses were under investigation in other jurisdictions.
After the Government had rested, but before Crawford presented his case, the
Assistant United States Attorney advised the district court:
With regard to the witnesses that are going to be called by Mr. Moyer, the
With regard to the witnesses that are going to be called by Mr. Moyer, the
names of some of the people he has given me may be people that might be
looked at in other states, I think it's encumbent [sic] if Mr. Moyer won't do this,
the Court might possibly advise them, if they at least have checked with an
attorney before they get up on the stand and give testimony under oath, that
may possibly be used against them later. I don't know what other U.S.
Attorneys are going to do on these other cases. I want to advise the Court that
there are names mentioned to us that may or may not come up in other cases.
10
11
Subsequently, the following colloquy transpired between the district court and
defense counsel:
12
THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Moyer, I take it that you have so advised and
warned all the witnesses you intend to call?
13
MR. MOYER: I have, Your Honor. And I would state for the record that all of
my witnesses have the same feeling, they believe this is a blatant attempt at
harassment and intimidation, and they have asked me to ask that this Court cite
the U.S. Prosecutor's office for misconduct and take such action as is
appropriate.
***
14
***
15
16
17
18
THE COURT: It's my understanding you told them about it, isn't that right?
19
MR. MOYER: I did, Your Honor, but I certainly believe it affects the possible
credibility of their case, of their testimony, and I think they are entitled to tell
that to the jury. I would like a ruling from the Court as to whether or not I am
precluded so I do not commit error.
***
20
***
21
22
THE COURT: Well, your record is made, Mr. Moyer, and your motion, if it is
a motion, is denied. I want the record to reflect clearly that it's my impression
that, very clear impression, that the Assistant United States Attorney is simply
doing his duty as he sees it....
23
[R., Vol. VI at pp. 549-552]. All the defense witnesses testified extensively
relative to their associations with Crawford. At no time during direct or crossexamination did any of the defense witnesses assert their Fifth Amendment
privilege against self incrimination.
24
25
We hold that the actions of the Assistant United States Attorney in informing
the court and defense counsel that several of Crawford's witnesses were targets
of other investigations did not deprive Crawford of a fair trial. We believe the
district court properly assessed the disclosure when the court stated it was of
the "very clear impression that the Assistant United States Attorney is simply
doing his duty as he sees it." The Assistant United States Attorney was the only
party to the proceedings aware of the fact that several of the defense witnesses
were targets of other investigations. As such, he was obligated to disclose this
fact to the court and defense counsel in order to avoid a potential mistrial.
Nothing in the record before us indicates that this disclosure was handled in any
way but a proper and professional manner.
26
The case against Crawford was very strong. In United States v. Blitstein, 626
F.2d 774 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102, 101 S.Ct. 898, 66
L.Ed.2d 828 (1981), we stated:
27
The totality of the Government's evidence was strong. Where the evidence
27
The totality of the Government's evidence was strong. Where the evidence
against the accused is strong, the appellant must show that the prejudice he
claims constitutes plain error. Hall v. United States, 404 F.2d 1367 (10th
Cir.1969). A conviction will not be disturbed on appeal where it is clear, after a
careful review of the whole record, that the alleged errors did not deprive the
appellant of his substantial rights.
28
626 F.2d at p. 784. We have conducted a careful review of the record and hold
that the actions of the Assistant United States Attorney did not deprive
Crawford of a fair trial.
b.
29
30
Crawford contends that the prosecuting attorney repeatedly asked him improper
questions during cross-examination and thereby deprived him of a fair trial.
31
Two witnesses for the Government testified that Crawford represented to them
that he had a substantial financial background and a Ph.D. degree. Crawford did
not testify on direct examination relative to his educational background but he
did state that he intended to pay back the advance fees collected herein through
the assignment of an interest in some of his real estate holdings.
32
33
Crawford did not object to the questions relative to his education, nor did he
move that the testimony be stricken or that he be granted a mistrial. We cannot
and do not condone the Government's action in pursuing this line of crossexamination. Even so, Crawford did not move for a mistrial. Under these
circumstances, we must hold that Crawford cannot now prevail on his claim
that the Government's cross-examination deprived him of a fair trial. In
assessing the significance of the error, in the absence of a motion for mistrial,
we must weigh the prejudicial effect of the cross-examination with the weight
of the evidence pointing to Crawford's guilt. The scales weigh heavily against
Crawford. The improper questions did not result in demonstrated prejudice to
Crawford. On appeal, error is not to be presumed and the burden of
demonstrating prejudicial error is on the appellant. Gardner v. California, 393
U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 580, 21 L.Ed.2d 601 (1969); Fed.R.Cr.P. 52(a). Crawford's
allegations that the Government's cross-examination relative to his real estate
holdings was prejudicial is also without merit, when, as here, Crawford raised
this matter on direct examination.
c.
34
35
Crawford contends that the trial judge made several improper remarks which
deprived him of a fair trial. We have read the entire trial transcript and conclude
that this argument is specious. Nothing in the record supports Crawford's
allegations that the district court acted improperly. This is not a case in which a
conviction must be reversed because the judge's conduct or appearance at the
trial did not comport with the appearance of justice. Berger v. United States,
255 U.S. 22, 41 S.Ct. 230, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921); United States v. Gigax, 605
F.2d 507 (10th Cir.1979).
II.
36
37
AFFIRMED.