United States v. Ronnie Allen Stephens, 940 F.2d 1539, 10th Cir. (1991)

940 F.
2d 1539
Unpublished Disposition
NOTICE: Tenth Circuit Rule 36.3 states that unpublished
opinions and orders and judgments have no precedential value
and shall not be cited except for purposes of establishing the
doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral
estoppel.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Ronnie Allen STEPHENS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 90-5242.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Aug. 5, 1991.*
Before LOGAN, JOHN P. MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT**
JOHN P. MOORE, Circuit Judge.
The premise advocated by the defendant in this case is "ignorance of the law is
a defense." A revolution is at hand!
Defendant Ronnie Allen Stephens was convicted with three other persons of
one count of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1343, and one count of aiding and
abetting, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2. The government's evidence established that the
defendants participated in a scheme to defraud an insurance company by filing
a false claim for the theft of an automobile owned by one of the defendants.
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, stating baldly and

without citation of authority:
The general rule of law in the United States, in any criminal case is that the
individual in some way must be aware he is in violation of the criminal law
before he can become liable for his actions. The fact that an individual is
merely present with a friend or is helping out a friend, without having
knowledge that the friend is doing wrong, is not a breech (sic) of the penal
statutes. To have a rule of law to the contrary would open the door to abuses far
to [sic] extensive to elaborate on in this brief.
5
Counsel then follows this proposition with a jury argument based upon the facts
in a light most favorable to the defendant,1 the essence of which is that the
defendant did not know he was taking part in an insurance fraud.2 On appeal,
however, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
government. United States v. Fingado, 934 F.2d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir.1991). In
so doing, we see substantial evidence to support the verdict.
We have great difficulty understanding the argument of appellant's counsel. His

contention that the evidence is insufficient is based upon quotes from two
headnotes of older cases from the D.C. and Second Circuits.
To support his contention that to be guilty of an offense, a person must know he

is committing a crime, counsel first quotes a part of headnote 1 from United
States v. Lumpkin, 448 F.2d 1085 (D.C.Cir.1971), stating: "[m]ere presence at
the scene of crime is not sufficient to convict one of aiding and abetting."
However, that statement in context reads:
Lumpkin was actually present at the scene of this crime but of course mere
presence alone is not sufficient to convict one of aiding and abetting. What is
required is evidence that the accused knowingly associate himself in some way
with the criminal venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes
to bring about and the he seek by his action to make it succeed.
Id. at 1090. Then, counsel follows with a quote of headnote 2 of United States
v. Terrell, 474 F.2d 872 (2d Cir.1973): "Knowledge that crime was committed
even when coupled with presence at scene is, without more, generally
insufficient to prove aiding and abetting." The text of that quotation, in context,
reads:
10
The question of the sufficiency of the evidence against appellant McDonald is,
however, on a different footing. She was present at the time of the transfer and
by ready inference ... knew that it was taking place. "[K]nowledge that a crime
is being committed, even when coupled with presence at the scene," ... without
more, however, is generally insufficient to prove aiding and abetting.... But in
addition to being present at the scene, McDonald operated the Toronado,
thereby enabling the sale to be effectuated in the relative concealment of a

moving automobile in the early morning hours.
11
Id. at 875 (citations omitted). Neither the headnotes, nor the cases themselves,
have any bearing on whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to convict
the defendant of mail fraud. More importantly, they do not support counsel's
theory that a person must know his actions constitute a crime before he can be
convicted.
12
Nevertheless, we have reviewed the record and find the government's evidence
showed the defendant assisted a friend in disposing of an automobile in a way
that allowed the owner to claim the car had been stolen. As a consequence of
the claim, the owner collected the proceeds of an insurance policy. The
transaction was conducted by telephone and facsimile transmissions made to
representatives of the insurance company in another state.
13
A codefendant, Bobby Lee Martin, testifying for the government, stated his
boss was having financial difficulties and wanted to have "something done with
his car." Martin then told defendant "that my boss needed a car stolen, was he
interested." Martin explained the theft was "an insurance deal." Two days later
defendant called Martin and asked for the keys to the car, saying he would
dispose of it. Defendant subsequently obtained the keys, took another defendant
to a location furnished him by Martin, where the car was obtained by the third
defendant. That person ultimately sold the vehicle to an undercover Tulsa
policeman. This conduct constituted "a scheme or artifice to defraud" within the
ambit of the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1343. Defendant also abetted the
commission of the wire fraud within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2.
14
Counsel next attacks defendant's sentence, arguing: "[T]here is no reason why

the defendant should not have been given the extra two points for acceptance of
responsibility." This argument is made in the face of this statement in the
presentence report: "Stephens has consistently denied having any knowledge
about being a participant in auto insurance fraud activities despite numerous
statements to the contrary by more than one defendant."3 There is at least one
significant reason why the trial court did not give the two-point adjustment, and
that is because at no time did the defendant accept responsibility for his
criminal act.
15
Defendant's argument is specious. He bluntly asserts that the two-point

reduction was "absolutely critical to the Defendant. [It] meant the difference
between the judge being able to put the Defendant on probation or having to
incarcerate him." Nonetheless, counsel fails to indicate where and to whom the
defendant acknowledged his responsibility so the trial court could have granted
the two-point adjustment. Moreover, he asks, "So why was the Defendant
denied the two points? The Defendant would suggest that is [sic] was based
solely on the subjective thoughts of the Probation Office who did the
presentence investigation. Objectively, there is no reason why the Defendant
should have been denied." This rhetoric is offensively fatuous.
16
AFFIRMED.
Neither of the briefs submitted by both sides complies with Fed.R.App.P. 28(a)
(3) and (b). The so-called "statement of facts" filed by both parties is an
abstract of the testimony and not "a statement of the facts relevant to the issues
presented for review." The court has not been aided by these briefs
**
This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not be cited, or
used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of establishing
the doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th
Cir.R. 36.3
The government's brief in response is worthless. Instead of helping the court

with a citation of the evidence supporting the conviction, the government
merely argues the defendant "bears a heavy burden" and he has not "met it in
this case." Such efforts are not worth the time spent in their preparation or our
time spent reading them
His testimony at trial was, in effect, that he acted merely as a middleman in a

transaction between friends, and he did not know a false claim of theft was to be
asserted as a result of that transaction. Obviously, the jury did not believe him
Defendant made no objection to the presentence report

United States v. Ronnie Allen Stephens, 940 F.2d 1539, 10th Cir. (1991)

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940 F.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Before LOGAN, JOHN P. MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, stating baldly and

We have great difficulty understanding the argument of appellant's counsel. His

To support his contention that to be guilty of an offense, a person must know he

thereby enabling the sale to be effectuated in the relative concealment of a

Counsel next attacks defendant's sentence, arguing: "[T]here is no reason why

Defendant's argument is specious. He bluntly asserts that the two-point

The government's brief in response is worthless. Instead of helping the court

His testimony at trial was, in effect, that he acted merely as a middleman in a

Defendant made no objection to the presentence report

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