FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

June 22, 2012

PUBLISH

Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

ANN ELAINE CAMPBELL,

Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.

No. 11-6041

CITY OF SPENCER, an Oklahoma

municipality; TOWN OF FOREST
PARK, an Oklahoma municipality,
Defendants - Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. NO. 5:09-CV-00821-HE)

H. Craig Pitts, Rubenstein & Pitts, P.L.L.C., (Daniel G. Couch, Rubenstein &
Pitts, P.L.L.C., and Eugene K. Bertman, McCormick & Bryan, P.L.L.C., with him
on the briefs), Edmond, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff - Appellant.
David W. Lee, Lee Law Center, P.C., (Emily B. Fagan, Lee Law Center, P.C., and
Phillip W. Anderson, Collins, Zorn & Wagner, P.C., with him on the brief),
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants - Appellees.

Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and OBRIEN, Circuit Judges.

HARTZ, Circuit Judge.

Dr. Ann Elaine Campbell put horses out to pasture on land she owns in two
Oklahoma municipalitiesthe City of Spencer (the City) and the Town of Forest
Park (the Town). After an animal-welfare investigation, City and Town
authorities executed search warrants and seized 44 horses from her properties.
The two municipalities successfully petitioned a state court to order forfeiture of
the horses unless the owner posted a security bond to pay for their maintenance
from the date of seizure. See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, 1680.4 (West 2012).
After unsuccessfully appealing the forfeiture and bond determinations in
state court, Dr. Campbell filed an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in federal court
against the City and the Town, alleging that they violated the Fourth Amendment
by unlawfully searching her property and seizing her horses, violated the Fifth
Amendment by depriving her of her horses without due process or just
compensation, and violated the Eighth Amendment by obtaining an excessive fine
through an unreasonable forfeiture bond. The court held that it lacked
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars the lower federal
courts from engaging in appellate review of state-court judgments. See Rooker v.
Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983).
On appeal Dr. Campbell contends that the district court erred in applying
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, we
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. We agree that
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the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Fifth and Eighth Amendment
claims, which are barred by Rooker-Feldman because they challenge the statecourt judgment; but it erred in dismissing the Fourth Amendment claims to the
extent that they concern preforfeiture events.
I.

BACKGROUND
Dr. Campbell maintained horses in both the City and the Town. On July

27, 2007, City police received an animal-cruelty complaint and went to one of her
properties to investigate. The Oklahoma County Sheriffs office was asked to
assist in the investigation. A deputy sheriff observed horses that appeared
malnourished and emaciated. On July 31 officers obtained and executed search
warrants, seized 44 horses, and took them to Blazes Tribute Equine Rescue. 1
On August 6 the City and the Town filed a petition in Oklahoma County
District Court seeking immediate forfeiture of the horses under Okla. Stat. tit. 21,
1680.4(C)(1), which permits forfeiture if the court finds that probable cause
exists that an animal has been abused. The petition also sought a security bond
for the horses maintenance; the owner may pay the bond to prevent permanent
forfeiture. The court held a hearing on August 10. It found probable cause,
ordered immediate forfeiture, and set a $68,305 bond as sufficient to reimburse
all reasonable and anticipated costs incurred by the agencies caring for the 44
1

Blazes Tribute Equine Rescue, Inc. was originally a defendant in this

action. But it was later voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, and it is not a
party to this appeal.
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horses from the date of seizure for a period of 90 days. Id. at 78. Dr. Campbell
appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, arguing that the trial court had
denied her due process by failing to conduct a separate forfeiture and bond
hearing for each horse seized, id., Vol. II at 321; that it had insufficient evidence
to support its finding of probable cause for all the horses; and that it had erred by
refusing to consider her management plan for the horses. The court affirmed and
the Oklahoma Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Dr. Campbell filed her 1983 action in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma. Her complaint alleges that the City and the
Town (1) violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment by unlawfully
searching her property and seizing her horses; (2) violated her Fifth Amendment
rights to due process and just compensation by confiscating the horses; and (3)
violated her Eighth Amendment protection against excessive fines by obtaining an
unreasonable bond. The City and the Town filed motions to dismiss on a number
of grounds, including the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The district court granted the
motions, see Campbell v. City of Spencer, No. CIV-09-0821-HE, 2010 WL
1780304, at *3 (W.D. Okla. May 4, 2010), concluding that her claims were
inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment, thus making RookerFeldman applicable, id. at *2. It reasoned that her claims were all based on a
single injurythe loss of her horses, id., and that the relief sought would

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necessarily undo the Oklahoma [state] courts judgment, id. at *3 (quoting

Kenmen Engg v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 477 (10th Cir. 2002)).
II.

DISCUSSION
There appear to be multiple reasons why Dr. Campbells claims cannot

succeed. We limit our review, however, to the merits of the district courts
dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We review that dismissal de
novo. See Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2007).
We agree with the district court that it lacked jurisdiction over
Dr. Campbells due-process and excessive-fine claims. But we disagree with its
ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over her claims challenging the search and
seizure. Resolution of those claims does not require us to review the state-court
judgment. As we stated in Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1139 (10th
Cir. 2006), When the state-court judgment is not itself at issue, the [RookerFeldman] doctrine does not prohibit federal suits regarding the same subject
matter, or even the same claims, as those presented in the state-court action.
A review of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is in order. Rooker-Feldman is a
jurisdictional prohibition on lower federal courts exercising appellate jurisdiction
over state-court judgments. The doctrine originated in Rooker, where the
plaintiffs had lost in a lower state court in Indiana, unsuccessfully appealed to the
Indiana Supreme Court, and been denied review by the Supreme Court. See 263
U.S. at 414. The plaintiffs then filed suit in federal district court, claiming that
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the state-court judgment should be overturned on constitutional grounds. See id.

at 41415. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the Supreme
Court affirmed. See id. at 415. It reasoned that [u]nder the legislation of
Congress, no court of the United States other than this court could entertain a
proceeding to reverse or modify the judgment for errors of that character. Id. at
416 (citing the predecessor to 28 U.S.C. 1257). In other words, the Court held
that when Congress vested the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction over
state-court judgments, it implied that the lower federal courts lacked authority to
review state-court judicial proceedings.
Feldman, the Supreme Courts next articulation of this doctrine, is central
to understanding both the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and much of the confusion
that surrounds it. The two Feldman plaintiffs had submitted unsuccessful
petitions to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to waive its rule requiring
an applicant to the D.C. bar to have graduated from a law school accredited by the
American Bar Association (ABA). See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 46473.
Dissatisfied with the courts decisions, they filed suit in federal district court,
alleging that the D.C. Court of Appeals had violated their due-process rights and
federal antitrust laws by failing to consider their individual qualifications. See id.
at 46869, 47273.
The Supreme Court characterized the denials of the plaintiffs requests as
judicial decisions. Hence, the district court could not review the denials.
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See

id. at 48687. The Court said that the plaintiffs allegations that the [D.C.]
Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying their petitions for
waiver were barred by Rooker because they would have required the District
Court to review a final judicial decision of the highest court of a jurisdiction in a
particular case. Id. at 486.
On the other hand, the Court held that not every claim in the plaintiffs
complaints was outside the district courts jurisdiction. In addition to challenging
the D.C. courts refusal to allow them to take the bar exam, the plaintiffs also
challenged the D.C. rule that membership in the bar was limited to graduates of
ABA-accredited law schools. See id. at 469 n.3, 47273. The Court held that the
district court could hear that challenge because the rule was promulgated by the
D.C. court in a nonjudicial capacity, id. at 485, and review of the rule did not
necessarily require a United States district court to review a final state-court
judgment in a judicial proceeding, id. at 486; see id. at 48687.
Feldman may seem straightforward enough. But difficulty in interpretation
has arisen because of the Courts use of the term inextricably intertwined in
explicating its decision. The term first appeared in a footnote expressing the
Courts disapproval of the decision in Dasher v. Supreme Court of Texas, 658
F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1981). See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16. That opinion had
held that a federal district court had jurisdiction to consider a constitutional
challenge to the state courts refusal to admit a person to the state bar when that
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challenge had not been raised in state court. See Dasher, 658 F.2d at 1051. The
Court wrote:
If the constitutional claims presented to a United States district court
are inextricably intertwined with the state courts denial in a judicial
proceeding of a particular plaintiffs application for admission to the
state bar, then the district court is in essence being called upon to
review the state-court decision. This the district court may not do.
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16 (emphasis added). What did the words
inextricably intertwined add? The point that the Court was making was that a
district-court challenge to the D.C. courts waiver denial would be barred even if
the challenge was based on a ground not raised in the D.C.-court proceeding. It is
unclear whether a claim could be inextricably intertwined with a judgment other
than by being a challenge to the judgment. The Court certainly did not mean that
a claim is inextricably intertwined with a judgment just because the issues raised
by the claim had been (or could have been) resolved in the proceedings leading to
the judgment. After all, Feldman did not bar the plaintiffs federal-court
challenge to the bar-admission rule, even though the constitutional and antitrust
bases of the challenge had been raised in the D.C.-court proceedings seeking
waivers from the rule. See id. at 46667, 487. Indeed, the plaintiffs success in
the permitted challenge to the rule would establish that the denial of the waiver
had been improper, and would likely lead to a later successful request for a
waiver, thereby relieving the plaintiffs of some of the harm caused by the
judgment denying a waiver. Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar
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an action just because it seeks relief inconsistent with, or even ameliorative of, a
state-court judgment. 2
Apparently the post-Feldman Supreme Court has also been unsure of what
was meant by inextricably intertwined. No later opinion has relied on the term.
Indeed, the term appears in only three later opinions of the Court, twice merely
quoting lower-court opinions that were vacated or reversed and once quoting both
a lower-court opinion and, without explication, the use of the term in Feldman.
See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 462 (2006) (quoting lower-court opinion);
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 286 (2005)
(quoting Feldman), 286 n.1 (quoting Feldman), 291 (quoting lower-court
opinion); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 8 (1987) (quoting lower-court
opinion).
More importantly, the Supreme Court has reformulated the RookerFeldman doctrine, apparently out of concern that the doctrine ha[d] sometimes
been construed to extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman
cases, overriding Congress conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with
jurisdiction exercised by state courts, and superseding the ordinary application of
2

The Supreme Court used the term inextricably intertwined on one other
occasion in Feldman. Summarizing its decision, it wrote that the allegations in
plaintiffs complaints that challenged the denial of the waiver were inextricably
intertwined with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decisions, in judicial
proceedings, to deny the respondents petitions, 460 U.S. at 48687 (emphasis
added). This use of the term provides no additional enlightenment on its
meaning.
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preclusion law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1738. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283.
Eschewing the inextricably-intertwined language, it wrote:
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined to cases of
the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought
by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.
Id. at 284. We think it best to follow the Supreme Courts lead, using the Exxon
Mobil formulation and not trying to untangle the meaning of inextricably
intertwined. The essential point is that barred claims are those complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments. Id. In other words, an element of the
claim must be that the state court wrongfully entered its judgment.
Before turning to the specifics of the case before us, we emphasize a point
stated in Exxon Mobil. Rooker-Feldman does not . . . override or supplant
preclusion doctrine. Id. at 284. This proposition was suggested in Feldman,
which held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar plaintiffs challenge to
the validity of the District of Columbia membership rule, even if the same
arguments had been presented in the D.C.-court proceedings. Thus, a federalcourt claim is not barred by Rooker-Feldman as a complaint of injur[y] caused
by [a] state-court judgment[], Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, just because it
seeks relief inconsistent with that judgment. For example, a plaintiff who lost a
civil-rights claim against a defendant in state court would not be barred by
Rooker-Feldman from bringing an identical civil-rights claim in federal court.
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The defendant would have to rely on preclusion doctrine, not Rooker-Feldman,

for relief from the new claim. As we stated in Bolden:
Appellate reviewthe type of judicial action barred by
Rooker-Feldmanconsists of a review of the proceedings already
conducted by the lower tribunal to determine whether it reached its
result in accordance with law. When, in contrast, the second court
tries a matter anew and reaches a conclusion contrary to a judgment
by the first court, without concerning itself with the bona fides of the
prior judgment (which may or may not have been a lawful judgment
under the evidence and argument presented to the first court), it is
not conducting appellate review, regardless of whether compliance
with the second judgment would make it impossible to comply with
the first judgment. In this latter situation the conflict between the
two judgments is to be resolved under preclusion doctrine, not
Rooker-Feldman.
441 F.3d at 1143.
The district court in this case relied on language from our pre-Exxon Mobil
decision in Kenmen, 314 F.3d 468. It is essential to read that language in the
context of the case. In Kenmen a city had sought and obtained an injunction in
state court that prevented the plaintiffs from storing several tons of magnesium
within the city limits. See id. at 471. After the plaintiffs allegedly had to sell the
magnesium at a discounted price, they sued in federal court, claiming that (1) the
citys actions constituted an unlawful taking of their property without due process
of law and (2) the citys application of a local fire code was preempted by federal
law. See id. at 472. The district court dismissed the claims under RookerFeldman and the plaintiffs appealed.

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We affirmed. We noted that Rooker-Feldman protects state-court

judgments from impermissible appellate review by lower federal courts, id. at
476, and found it significant that absent the Oklahoma state courts injunction,
no forced sale of the magnesium would have occurred and plaintiffs would not be
seeking relief in federal court, id. at 477. In other words, the plaintiffs sought
damages that were attributable to losses they sustained as a result of being
forcedby the state-court orderto remove magnesium from [the city] storage
facility. Id. (emphasis added). Because the injury that the plaintiffs complained
of was caused by the judgment, their lawsuit amounted to an appeal of the
judgment and was therefore barred by Rooker-Feldman. See id. at 47778.
In support of the decision, the opinion pointed out that the relief sought
would necessarily undo the Oklahoma state courts judgment. Id. at 477. We
were not suggesting, however, that just because the requested federal judgment
would be contrary to the state judgment, the federal claim is barred by RookerFeldman. After all, whenever the doctrine of claim preclusion applies, one could
say that the judgment sought in the second litigation would undo the first
judgment because it would be contrary to it. Significantly, in Kenmen the
allegedly wrongful act that caused damage was the state-court order itself. See id.
at 47677. The suit required a determination of the bona fides of the prior statecourt judgment. The claims had merit only if the injunction was unlawful on the

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record before the state court that issued it. Hence, our decision was consistent
with our post-Exxon Mobil opinion in Bolden.
With this doctrine in mind, we can readily resolve this appeal. Properly
understood, Dr. Campbells claim under the Fifth Amendment is a direct attack on
the state courts judgment because an element of the claim is that the judgment
was wrongful. To be sure, the complaint speaks in terms of actions by the
defendants. It alleges that the [City and the Town] deprived [Dr. Campbell] of
her property without due process of law and without just compensation, and that
this constitute[d] an unlawful taking of [her] property. Aplt. App., Vol. I at 18.
Similarly, Dr. Campbell argues on appeal that the defendants deprived her of due
process by unconstitutionally using Oklahomas forfeiture procedures. Aplt.
Br. at 22 (emphasis added). But the deprivation of property that was allegedly
without just compensation or due process was the deprivation ordered by the state
court. Thus, this claim has merit only if the state-court forfeiture order was
unlawful on the record before that court. In the words of Exxon Mobil, the claim
is one brought by [a] state-court loser[] complaining of [an] injur[y] caused by
[a] state-court judgment[]. 544 U.S. at 284. It was therefore properly dismissed
under Rooker-Feldman.
Similarly, the Eighth Amendment claim is that Defendants sought and
obtained an excessive fine by using the seizure statutes to forfeit [her] horses to
Defendants, and sought an excessive fine through the imposition of an
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unreasonable bond. Aplt. App., Vol. I at 1819 (emphasis added). The

imposition of a bond and the forfeiture of the horses were, however, acts of the
state court. Once again, the merits of this claim cannot be stated except in terms
of the state-court judgment. Neither the City nor the Town independently
imposed an excessive fine. The alleged constitutional wrong was the content of
the judgment. It was not, for example, some act by a defendant that led to the
judgment. The claim was barred by Rooker-Feldman.
Dr. Campbells Fourth Amendment claims, however, are not barred. She
could raise the same claims even if there had been no state-court proceedings.
She asserts that officers of the City and the Town improperly searched her
property and seized her horses. The allegedly unconstitutional acts preceded any
judgment by the state court. The state court considered the same issuesthe
lawfulness of the search and seizurebut the decision by the state court is
irrelevant to the merits of the federal-court claims. Although a federal-court
judgment in her favor on the Fourth Amendment claims may be inconsistent with
the state-court judgment, that is a matter of preclusion doctrine, not RookerFeldman.
III.

CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district courts dismissal of Dr. Campbells Fifth and

Eighth Amendment claims as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We

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REVERSE the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claims and REMAND for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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