Filed: Patrick Fisher
Filed: Patrick Fisher
Filed: Patrick Fisher
DEC 17 1998
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
No. 98-6153
(D.C. No. 97-CV-994)
(W.D. Okla.)
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Paul Wayne Ellis filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983 against defendants City of Lindsay, Police Chief Gene Jones, and Officers
Mike Blair and Jack Holloway, alleging violations of his Fifth, Eighth, and
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff alleged that Officer Blair used excessive
force against him, that Officer Holloway failed to intervene to prevent Officer
Blair from using excessive force, and that the City and Police Chief Jones failed
to train and supervise police officers. The district court granted defendants
motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in their favor. After the
district court denied plaintiffs timely motion to reconsider, plaintiff appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
This action arises from a dispute between two factions of the Lindsay
Christian Fellowship Church. The dispute concerns plaintiffs continued
employment as pastor of the church. The group that did not want plaintiff as
pastor sent him a certified letter to this effect. They then padlocked the church to
keep him out.
In June of 1995, plaintiff and twenty or thirty supporting church members
gathered for a meeting in the church parking lot. At the same time, the opposing
faction was in front of the church. Officers Blair and Holloway were dispatched
to the church to respond to a possible disturbance report made by the opposing
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
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faction. At the time of the officers arrival, there was no actual disturbance.
A member of the opposing faction gave the officers a copy of the letter indicating
that plaintiff had been relieved of his duties as pastor.
Thereafter, Officers Blair and Holloway approached plaintiff with the
letter. At this point, the parties versions of the facts differ.
According to plaintiff, Officer Blair repeatedly shouted at him that he was
fired, that he must leave the property, and that if he refused to leave he would be
jailed. Also, according to plaintiff, Officer Blair raised his forearm to plaintiffs
ribcage and forced him backward into a parked car until his daughter distracted
the officer. At that time, plaintiff stepped away, but Officer Blair again raised his
forearm and elbow to plaintiffs ribcage and forced him against another car.
Plaintiff contends that Officer Blair used this force even though plaintiff never
touched or threatened to touch him and even though plaintiff violated no law.
Plaintiff believes that Officer Holloway could have prevented this use of force,
but instead was yelling at plaintiffs wife. This use of force allegedly caused
emotional injury and a bruise on plaintiffs ribcage, for which he went to the
hospital emergency room the next day. His treatment consisted of x-rays, a rib
brace, and pain pills.
According to defendants, as the officers approached, plaintiff immediately
began yelling that the letter terminating his employment was not legal and that he
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was not leaving the property. He accused Officer Holloway of changing the locks
on the church. During this time, plaintiff allegedly was poking Officer Blair in
the chest with his finger. Officer Blair told plaintiff that he would be arrested if
he did not stop the poking. Defendants deny that Officer Blair used any physical
force against plaintiff. They maintain that Officer Holloway was engaged in a
separate conversation with plaintiffs wife at the time the exchange occurred
between plaintiff and Officer Blair.
Two photographs taken during the incident by a church member supporting
plaintiff do not show any use of force by Officer Blair or any physical contact
between plaintiff and Officer Blair.
was unable to provide any explanation why these photographs failed to show any
force or physical contact.
When Assistant Chief of Police Jim Holley arrived at the church, he
informed the officers that the opposing faction would need to obtain a court order
to have plaintiff removed from the church property. Thereafter, the opposing
faction and the officers left. Plaintiff did not complain to Assistant Chief Holley
about any use of force or that he had sustained any injury.
We note that the record before this court contains only photocopies of the
photographs. See Appellants App. Vol. I at 116. Although the photocopies are
of poor quality, they still do not evidence any use of force or physical contact.
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Investigation also investigated the matter for possible criminal violation of civil
rights statutes. After reviewing the FBIs report, the United States Justice
Department recommended that the matter be closed.
request, plaintiff maintained that he had not had sufficient time to conduct
discovery. Plaintiff also submitted additional evidence not presented at the time
the district court decided the summary judgment motion. The district court denied
the motion to reconsider. Plaintiff appealed.
DISCUSSION
This court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo and applies the
same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
See Kaul v. Stephan , 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is
appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
. . . affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A disputed fact is material if it might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law, and the dispute is genuine if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
v. Muskogee, Okla. , 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing
Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)),
Allen
Anderson v.
See Las
(10th Cir. 1986) (holding motion to amend complaint made two years after case
was filed, after discovery was completed, and after partial summary judgment was
granted was untimely).
Third, to the extent plaintiffs request to amend the complaint was based
on his assertion that he did not have adequate time to conduct discovery, he
previously had failed to file the required affidavit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)
explaining why he could not respond to the summary judgment motion without
discovery. See Committee for First Amend. v. Campbell
(10th Cir. 1992). Because plaintiff failed to take advantage of the shelter
provided by Rule 56(f) by filing an affidavit, there [was] no abuse of discretion in
granting summary judgment since, as is discussed below, summary judgment was
otherwise appropriate.
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, 790 F.2d
Vol. IV at 521. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing permission to amend.
Denver , 998 F.2d 867, 879 (10th Cir. 1993) (denial of motion to amend after final
judgment entered not abuse of discretion).
II. EXCESSIVE FORCE
Plaintiff argues that the district court improperly analyzed his claims under
a substantive due process standard rather than under the Fourth Amendment
standard of objective reasonableness set forth in
(1989). This argument is without merit. The district court analyzed his claims
under both standards.
Furthermore, plaintiff recognizes that the district court analyzed his claims
under the Fourth Amendment because he argues that the district court erroneously
concluded that no seizure occurred. Plaintiff contends that he was seized because
he was precluded from leaving the church property due to an investigatory stop or
seizure and brief detention.
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at 395 n.10 (quotation omitted). Thus, a person has been seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, considering all of the circumstances,
a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.
See Latta ,
118 F.3d at 698. A mere approach by an officer does not amount to a seizure of
an individual implicating the Fourth Amendment.
See id.
relevant inquiry is how a reasonable citizen in the plaintiffs position would have
understood his situation.
Cir. 1990).
Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude a reasonable citizen
would not believe his liberty had been restrained. Although plaintiff alleges
physical touching and verbal mandates by Officer Blair in a nonpublic place, the
record in this case shows that plaintiff was free to leave at any time during the
encounter with the officers. The fact that he was able to step away from Officer
Blair after Officer Blair had pinned him against the first car suggests that the
alleged force was minimal at most. Officer Blairs request that he leave also
suggests that he was free to leave. Contrary to plaintiffs belief, the facts viewed
in the light most favorable to him do not establish either an investigatory stop or
a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Even assuming that plaintiff was seized, we do not agree with plaintiff that
Officer Blairs use of force--even in light of plaintiffs allegations that he did not
physically threaten or touch either officer and had committed no crime--was
excessive and not objectively reasonable.
Plaintiff argues that by granting summary judgment for the reasons stated in
the defendants briefs, the district court improperly granted summary judgment to
Officer Blair based upon defendants version of the facts. According to plaintiff,
the district court failed to take the record in the light most favorable to him. We
(continued...)
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See id.
The facts and circumstances in this case show that the alleged force was
objectively reasonable. The force was minimal and was not abusive, as indicated
by the minimal physical injury alleged. Under the circumstances, this de minimis
force is not repugnant to the conscience of mankind and therefore is not
constitutionally prohibited.
, 988 F. Supp.
See generally County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1714-16 (1998)
(...continued)
agree that the district court should not have granted summary judgment based on
defendants version of the facts and should have taken the record in the light most
favorable to plaintiff. Even if the district court had done so, as we discuss, the
district court still would have properly granted summary judgment in defendants
favor.
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See id. ; see also Butler v. City of Norman , 992 F.2d 1053,
1054 (10th Cir. 1993) (substantive due process standard is more onerous than
Fourth Amendment standard). The evidence does not present a genuine issue of
material fact whether Officer Blairs conduct shocks the conscience. Although
plaintiff alleged that he offered no force against Officer Blair and was not
committing any crime, Officer Blairs pushing of plaintiff with his forearm and
the bruise to plaintiff are not force sufficient to shock the conscience. Nothing
indicates that the force was substantial. Rather, because plaintiffs injury was
minimal, it is likely that the force also was minimal.
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Lakewood , 907 F.2d 129, 132 (10th Cir. 1990). Plaintiffs deposition testimony,
as well as that of his wife and other supporters, that Officer Blairs words were
hostile, that he shook papers in plaintiffs face, and that he was shouting may be
probative of malice, but alone they do not establish malice.
other evidence in the record indicating that Officer Blair acted with malice toward
plaintiff, and, as we indicated above, Officer Blairs conduct was objectively
reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, we conclude the district court
did not err in granting summary judgment on the substantive due process claim.
We hold that plaintiff has failed to establish that Officer Blair violated his
Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights by using excessive force. The district
court correctly granted summary judgment in Officer Blairs favor on these
issues.
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
We consider whether Officer Blair and Officer Holloway were entitled to
qualified immunity because they violated clearly established law. Plaintiff
believes that it was clearly established at the time of the encounter that Officer
Blair could use force only if plaintiff confronted him with force.
Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity when their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.
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(1991)). If the plaintiff fails to show with particularity the facts and law
establishing an inference that the defendants violated a constitutional right,
see
Walter v. Morton , 33 F.3d 1240, 1242 (10th Cir. 1994), this court need not reach
the issue of whether the law was clearly established.
(10th Cir. 1991) (using excessive force establishes both constitutional violation
and absence of qualified immunity), we need not reach the second issue of
whether the law was clearly established. Accordingly, we conclude that Officer
Blair is entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court correctly granted
summary judgment on this issue.
With respect to Officer Holloway, plaintiff believes that it was clearly
established that his failure to intervene was a constitutional violation. Our
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conclusion that Officer Blair did not use excessive force forecloses any claim that
plaintiff may have that Officer Holloway could be liable for failing to intervene
on plaintiffs behalf.
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Our conclusion that the use of force was not excessive and therefore no
constitutional violation occurred stands. Even if the force was unreasonable or
conscience shocking, plaintiff failed to set forth any facts establishing either a
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Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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