Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Pierce v. Gilchrist, 10th Cir. (2006)
Pierce v. Gilchrist, 10th Cir. (2006)
Clerk of Court
v.
JOYCE A. GILCHRIST,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties request for a decision on the briefs without oral
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Joyce Gilchrist appeals a district court order denying for lack of
jurisdiction her application for indemnification of attorney fees from the City of
Oklahoma City pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 51, 162. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. 1291 and we affirm.
I
In April 2002, plaintiff Jeffrey Pierce, who is not a party to this appeal,
filed a complaint against defendants Joyce Gilchrist, the City of Oklahoma City,
and Robert H. Macy alleging the deprivation of his constitutional rights.
Mr. Pierces first complaint was dismissed in July for failure to state a claim. In
August, he filed his first amended complaint. Ms. Gilchrist then filed a motion to
dismiss the first amended complaint, and an application for indemnification of
attorney fees from the City pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 51, 162. The City filed a
response objecting to Ms. Gilchrists request for indemnification. In October, the
district court denied the motion to dismiss. The district court also denied the
application for indemnification, but with leave to re-file when a final judgment
was entered. Ms. Gilchrist appealed the district courts denial of her motion to
dismiss. This court affirmed the district courts decision on March 2, 2004.
-2-
United States, 311 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2002). We review for abuse of
discretion the district courts decision to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the indemnification application. See Exum v. U.S. Olympic
Comm., 389 F.3d 1130, 1139 (10th Cir. 2004).
II
On appeal, Ms. Gilchrist challenges both of the district courts
jurisdictional grounds for the denial of her application. Because we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the indemnification application, we will not address the district
courts other ground for the denial.
The district courts jurisdiction over this case arose from Mr. Pierces
claims against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Because 1983 is a
federal law, the district court had jurisdiction over the action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. 1331, which states [t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States. After the stipulated dismissal was entered, those federal
claims ceased to exist. Ms. Gilchrist then filed an application for indemnification
of attorney fees pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 51, 162. This claim is solely a
product of state law; it does not arise out of any federal statutes nor does it relate
-4-
to the violation of any federal rights. The district court therefore did not have
original jurisdiction over this claim.
The district court, however, had the ability to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the indemnification application under 28 U.S.C. 1367(a).
That section provides:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which
the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall
include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional
parties.
Id. Section 1367(c) provides, however, that:
[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a claim under subsection (a) if-(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims
over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons
for declining jurisdiction.
In this case, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
under 1367(c)(3) because, after the stipulation of dismissal was entered, it had
dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. Moreover, the
indemnification application statute contemplates that there may be situations
-5-
where the federal trial court cannot hear the action, and it provides an
alternative venue in which to file the application. See Okla. Stat. tit. 51,
162(B)(1). The district court was within its discretion to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the indemnification application after the 1983
claims were dismissed. See, e.g., Exum, 389 F.3d at 1138-39.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
-6-