Anthony Ray Jenkins v. Don Scott, County Attorney, Judge Tom Smith and Judge Keith Wilson, 74 F.3d 1249, 10th Cir. (1996)
Anthony Ray Jenkins v. Don Scott, County Attorney, Judge Tom Smith and Judge Keith Wilson, 74 F.3d 1249, 10th Cir. (1996)
Anthony Ray Jenkins v. Don Scott, County Attorney, Judge Tom Smith and Judge Keith Wilson, 74 F.3d 1249, 10th Cir. (1996)
3d 1249
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored,
unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral
argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of
November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.
This matter is before the court on petitioner Anthony Ray Jenkins's application
for a certificate of probable cause and motion to be allowed to proceed on
appeal in forma pauperis. The right of a petitioner convicted of a state crime to
appeal a federal district court's denial of habeas corpus relief is conditioned
upon either the district court or this court granting a certificate of probable
cause. See 28 U.S.C. 2253.
The Supreme Court in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892-93 (1983),
declared that the "primary means of separating meritorious from frivolous
[habeas corpus] appeals should be the decision to grant or withhold a certificate
of probable cause." We will not grant such a certificate unless the petitioner
makes "a substantial showing of the denial of an important federal right by
demonstrating that the issues raised are debatable among jurists, that a court
could resolve the issues differently, or that the questions deserve further
proceedings." Gallagher v. Hannigan, 24 F.3d 68 (10th Cir.1994) (citing
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 & n. 4).
3
Construing petitioner's claim as both a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.1983, the district court correctly analyzed the
case in its order of May 23, 1995, and we can add nothing to that analysis.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3