McWilliams v. Jefferson County, 463 F.3d 1113, 10th Cir. (2006)

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit
PU BL ISH
September 6, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTIE M CW ILLIA M S,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 05-1081
JEFFER SO N CO U N TY ,
Defendant-Appellee.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR T HE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 03-B-2201 (CBS))
Lee T. Judd of Andrew T. Brake, P.C., Englew ood, Colorado, for A ppellant.
Patricia W . Gilbert, Assistant County Attorney (Frank J. Hutfless, Jefferson
County Attorney, with her on the brief), Jefferson County Attorneys Office,
Golden, Colorado, for Appellee.
Before KELLY, M cKA Y, and O BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
M cK A Y, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff, formerly a computer-support specialist with Jefferson County,

suffers from intermittent depressive episodes w hich make it difficult for her to
sleep, deal with people, and cope with work situations. Order, 3 (D. Colo.
Jan. 13, 2005) (internal quotations omitted). She claims that she let her
supervisors know about her depression and that she asked for their help in the
form of encouragementjust pat me on the back and tell me that itll be better in
a few days. Id. at 4 (internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiff was employed by Jefferson County from September 1995 to
October 16, 2002. During this seven-year period, she received several negative
performance evaluations concerning her interactions with others. She was
criticized for rude and inappropriate behavior and for not being able to keep
her cool. Id. at 2 (internal quotations omitted). M ost recently, in 2002,
Plaintiffs supervisor admonished her both verbally and in writing for her
disrespectful conduct and inappropriate behavior. Evidently, Plaintiff had made
personal charges on a County credit card (which she eventually repaid), had
neglected to notify her supervisors in advance of numerous absences, and had
been inconsiderate to co-w orkers on several occasions.
Plaintiff received an unfavorable evaluation in 2002, although she disputes
the negative characterization of her job performance. Plaintiff attributes her
personal shortcomings to her depression, which she considers a disability. Id.
She has taken medication to combat her depression since 1992 and attended
weekly counseling sessions from 1992 to 1994 (prior to her employment with
Jefferson County).
During her years with the County, Plaintiff was granted several FM LA and
-2-
other leaves of absence. In 1998, she took a family leave of absence. In 1999,
she was granted a seven-week medical leave due to a car accident. She applied
for and was granted additional leave from the C ounty sick leave bank in 1999. In
2000, she took a five-week leave of absence following surgery. In 2002, she took
a six-week leave following her fathers death. Plaintiff also took off work
without advance notice on three occasions in 2002. The only instance in which
the County denied Plaintiff leave followed her request for accommodation to
settle her deceased fathers estate. Plaintiff was informed that the C ountys
employment policy does not grant sick leave for that purpose.
On October 16, 2002, the director of the County computer department
informed Plaintiff of his intention to terminate her employment. During this
meeting, the County maintains that Plaintiff was given two options: (1) to receive
a notice of intent to dismiss (and be terminated) or (2) to resign by signing a
release of all claims against the County and receive a two-month severance
package. Appellee Br. at 4-5. Plaintiff disputes this characterization of her
options; she claims that she w as
informed she was terminated, either with money or without, and she
had to make an immediate decision as to whether she wanted money
or not, despite her requests that she be allowed to consult her
husband, have time to consider the options and to see the paperw ork
for both options.
Appellant Br. at 20.
Plaintiff brought this lawsuit alleging claims of gender discrimination
-3-
under 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., disability discrimination under 42 U.S.C.

12101-12213, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and violation of the
Family and M edical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The district court
granted summary judgment to the County on all claims. Plaintiff appeals that
judgment.
On appeal, we review de novo the propriety of a grant of summary
judgment. EEOC v. Horizon/CM S Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th
Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is only warranted when there exists no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). In
determining whether any genuine issue as to any material fact exists, evidence is
to be liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment. Florom v. Elliott M fg., 867 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir. 1989).
As to Plaintiffs claim of sexual discrimination, we agree with the district
courts grant of summary judgment to Defendant. The County has submitted
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Plaintiffs terminationher inappropriate
behavior with co-workers and her numerous unexcused absences. It is Plaintiffs
burden to articulate how the Countys proffered reasons are unworthy of belief.
See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-49 (2000);
Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff does not
dispute the veracity of these purported reasons; rather, she defends that they were
-4-
the result of her depression. W hile Plaintiffs explanation may be the sad truth, it
does not satisfy her burden of showing that the Countys stated reasons for her
termination were pretextual.
Plaintiff has also failed to produce evidence to establish that she w as a
qualified individual with a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). To w ithstand summary judgment on her ADA claim, Plaintiff must
show that (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) she is able to
perform her essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation,
and (3) [the County] discriminated against her in [its] employment decisions
because of her alleged disability. Croy v. Cobe Laboratories, Inc., 345 F.3d
1199, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 2003). A disability, as defined by the A DA, is (A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment. Id. at 1204 (citing Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478 (1999)). Plaintiff has not produced evidence that
she was substantially impaired or significantly restricted in any major life
activity. Although she attests that her intermittent depressive episodes caused her
difficulty in sleeping and getting along with her co-workers, she has not shown
how these limitations prevented her from performing her job or that she is
unable to perform any of the life activities completely. Croy, 345 F.3d at 1204
(finding plaintiff suffering from multiple sclerosis not disabled under meaning of
-5-
ADA). Consequently, we agree with the district courts grant of summary

judgment to Defendant on this claim.
W e also determine that Plaintiffs claim for retaliation under the FM LA is
without merit. In order to make a prima facie case of reprisal, a plaintiff must
show (1) protected employee action; (2) adverse action by an employer either
after or contemporaneous with the employee's protected action; and (3) a causal
connection between the employee's action and the employer's adverse action.
M organ v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997). A causal connection
between Plaintiffs exercise of FM LA leaves and her eventual termination is not
supported by the record. The Countys stated reason for Plaintiffs
terminationher difficulty in getting along with coworkersis documented
beginning in 1997 (two years prior to Plaintiffs extended FM LA leaves).
Plaintiff has failed to show that this reason was pretextual. See, e.g., Stewart v.
Adolph Coors Co., 217 F.3d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting shift of burden
in race discrimination case).
As to the state cause of action for breach of contract, Plaintiff claims that at
the time of her dismissal the County breached its contract by failing to provide
her w ith the appropriate procedural protections that were stated in its policies.
There is a dispute in the record over whether the County followed its policies at
the time Plaintiff signed her release. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the County
did not inform her that she w ould have the right to file a grievance if she chose
-6-
not to resign. The County maintains that Plaintiff was not only fully informed of
her options but, more importantly, that her signing of a release negates any claims
that Plaintiff may assert against the County. The district court chose not to
address the release, but instead concluded that Plaintiff failed to identify a single
promise that . . . the County failed to perform, notwithstanding Plaintiffs claim
of denial of procedural rights in her discharge. The district court declined to rule
on the validity of the release, apparently concluding that no contractual right had
been breached. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on
Plaintiffs state law claim. It appears from the sparse record before us that the
trial court did not apprehend Plaintiffs breach of contract claim. W e interpret the
gravamen of Plaintiffs state law claim to be duress in the execution of a release,
relying on Wiesen v. Short, 604 P.2d 1191, 1192 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979).
W e note that the pre-trial dismissal of all federal law claims, leaving only a
state law claim, generally prevents a district court from reviewing the merits of
the state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3); see also Thatcher Enters. v.
Cache County Corp., 902 F.2d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1990) (Notions of comity
and federalism demand that a state court try its own lawsuits, absent compelling
reasons to the contrary.); Jones v. Intermountain Power Project, 794 F.2d 546,
549 (10th Cir. 1986) (If a federal claim against a party is dismissed before trial,
the pendent state law claims should often be dismissed as well.), revd on other
grounds, Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990).
-7-
In this case, given the spare attention devoted to the state law claim in the
parties briefs and the district court opinion, it is necessary for us to remand for
further development to decide whether summary judgment is appropriate. W e
cannot say, at this juncture, that it would be an abuse of the district courts
discretion to retain the state law claim, however we commend to the court the
Supreme Courts cautions contained in Carnegie-M ellon University v. Cohill:
[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the
balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction
doctrinejudicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comitywill point toward
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. 484 U.S.
343, 350 n.7 (1988).
Consequently, we A FFIR M the district courts grant of summary judgment
to D efendant on all claims except the state breach of contract claim, which we
R EM A N D to the district court for either clarification of the state law claim or, in
the alternative, dismissal.
-8-

McWilliams v. Jefferson County, 463 F.3d 1113, 10th Cir. (2006)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

McWilliams v. Jefferson County, 463 F.3d 1113, 10th Cir. (2006)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

McWilliams v. Jefferson County, 463 F.3d 1113, 10th Cir. (2006)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS

A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Before KELLY, M cKA Y, and O BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff, formerly a computer-support specialist with Jefferson County,

under 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., disability discrimination under 42 U.S.C.

ADA). Consequently, we agree with the district courts grant of summary

You might also like