James Marquis Hedrick v. United States, 357 F.2d 121, 10th Cir. (1966)
James Marquis Hedrick v. United States, 357 F.2d 121, 10th Cir. (1966)
2d 121
Leslie L. Conner and James M. Little, Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellant.
John P. Burke, Atty., Dept. of Justice (Richard M. Roberts, Acting Asst. Atty.
Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Joseph M. Howard and John P. Burke, Attys., Dept. of
Justice, and B. Andrew Potter, U. S. Atty., with him on the brief), for appellee.
liability, and that the returns prepared by him, irrespective of what the actual
transactions may have been, properly reflected the business records with which
he had to deal in making the returns.
7
The trial court in a general finding, special findings not being requested,2
determined that both defendants were guilty as charged.3 Trosper did not
appeal.
Appellant asserts here as grounds for reversal that the court erred in denying
his motion for a bill of particulars, in receiving allegedly inaccurate
"summaries" of evidence prepared by a government expert which bore a
prejudicial caption, entering judgment upon an "insufficient" indictment,
overruling appellant's motion for new trial, finding the defendant guilty on
evidence insufficient in law to support the finding, and imposing an excessive
sentence, particularly in relation to the sentence of his co-defendant.
This was not a net-worth case. All counts of the indictment reasonably specified
the respective transactions with respect to which income was alleged to have
been understated and the false statements relied upon by the government. There
was no abuse of permissible discretion in the denial of a bill of particulars.
Enlow v. United States, 239 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1957); Rubenstein v. United
States, 214 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1954).
10
11
Conford and prior cases sustained the propriety of receiving summaries in jury
cases under proper instructions concerning their foundation, purpose and
utilization. Such exhibits are no less appropriate in cases tried to the court; and
it may be presumed in the absence of other indication that they will be utilized
and evaluated by judges in harmony with established principles. There is
absolutely no showing here to the contrary.
12
The principal contention of appellant is that the evidence does not sustain his
conviction. He argues that "the deductions for common stock issued to
corporate officers is allowed by law and the taking of such deductions is not per
se a violation", and that "the intercompany entries actually existed and the mere
disallowance of the deductions resulting from intercompany entries is
insufficient to sustain a conviction under Title 26, U.S.C.A., Section 7206(1)
(2)". The difficulty with these propositions as defenses is that they accept as
binding upon the court and jury the records which were demonstrated by the
evidence to have been false or designedly misleading.
13
14
The letter received in evidence from an attorney inferring that the stockpayments of salary would be non-taxable was obviously written on the
assumption that they represented payments actually made in good faith to the
respective employees as stockholders. A legal opinion founded upon such error
known and contrived by a recipient can afford no shield for wrongdoing.
15
16
The appellant contends that his sentence was excessive and in abuse of the trial
court's discretion. He points out that he was sentenced to a total of five years'
imprisonment, while his co-defendant, whom he calls "the principal defendant"
was given a five month sentence with probation thereafter, and a fine.
17
This court has applied the general rule that a sentence within the limits of a
valid statute does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Smith v. United
States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959). Even though it be assumed that, under
extraordinary circumstances, a sentence within statutory limits could constitute
cruel and unusual punishment (cf. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30
S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910)), or might otherwise amount to an abuse of
discretion (cf. United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960)), appellant's
sentence of five years as against the measurably longer term that theoretically
could have been imposed cumulatively for the eighteen counts on which he
stood convicted, was neither cruel nor unusual; nor was it necessarily disparate,
although unequal, in relation to the sentence of the co-defendant. There was
evidence reasonably tending to indicate that appellant, as Trosper's accountant
and advisor, rather than Trosper, primarily was responsible for devising and
executing the plan to evade the taxes, and in any event we cannot say that the
trial court abused its discretion in determining the respective sentences.
18
19
Affirmed.
Notes:
1
Rule 23(c) F.R.Crim.P. "In a case tried without a jury the court shall make a
general finding and shall in addition on request find the facts specially."
Count 26, however, based upon 18 U.S.C. 1001, had been dismissed prior to
trial