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Sampson v. Middleton, 10th Cir. (1999)
Sampson v. Middleton, 10th Cir. (1999)
NOV 23 1999
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RODNEY SAMPSON,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
JOHN MIDDLETON,
No. 99-6195
(D.C. No. CV-98-945-T)
(Western District of Oklahoma)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
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(1976); see also Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1265 (10th Cir. 1999).
Sampson does not contend that the proceedings in state court were deficient.
Rather he contends that the Stone bar does not apply because the Oklahoma courts
wilfully refuse[d] to apply the correct and controlling constitutional standards.
Gamble v. Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1978). In particular, he
cites United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983), which held that exposure
of luggage located in a public place to a trained canine is not a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See also United States v. Garcia, 42 F.3d
604, 606 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that a canine sniff of luggage in a train
baggage car does not constitute a search). Contrary to Sampsons assertions,
Place does not require reasonable suspicion prior to a dog sniff in this context.
See United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 204-05 (10th Cir. 1990).
The Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals did not wilfully refuse to apply
Place; it cited the case in its summary opinion. See Sampson v. Oklahoma, No. F96-1185, slip op. at 2 n.1 (Okla. Crim. App. Sept. 11, 1997). Furthermore,
nothing in the record indicates that the court applied Place improperly or in a
manner contrary to controlling constitutional standards in reaching its conclusion.
Therefore, Sampson has failed to demonstrate that he was denied a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in state court and he has
failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
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Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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