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Filed: Patrick Fisher
Filed: Patrick Fisher
FEB 20 2001
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CARL OLONA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
JOE WILLIAMS, Warden, Central
New Mexico Correctional Facility;
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
No. 00-2167
(D.C. No. CIV-97-573-MV/KBM)
(D. N.M.)
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner Carl Olona appeals the decision of the district court denying his
petition for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. Because
we cannot conclude that reasonable jurists would find the district courts
assessment of the constitutional claims [here] debatable or wrong,
Slack v.
McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), we deny petitioners application for
a certificate of appealability and dismiss this appeal.
Following a 1987 trial to a New Mexico state court, petitioner was
convicted of three counts of second degree criminal sexual penetration, one count
of attempt to commit the same, kidnaping and aggravated burglary. His sentence
was enhanced due to his habitual offender status, and petitioner was sentenced to
thirty-seven years incarceration and two years parole. His conviction was
affirmed by the New Mexico Court of Appeals and became final in 1988 when the
New Mexico Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on the last day of the AEDPA
grace period, April 23, 1997. By then, the records of the state trial had largely
disappeared. The federal district court held a hearing regarding the state of the
record at which petitioners trial attorney, an assistant district attorney who had
worked on the case, petitioners appellate attorney and petitioner all testified.
At the end of the hearing, the court directed the parties to agree to a briefing
schedule. The matter was then referred to a magistrate judge.
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Id. at 484.
At the outset of his brief on appeal, petitioner argues that AEDPA does not
apply to his appeal and advances three challenges to the constitutionality of
AEDPA as applied to him. Because law from the Supreme Court and this court
effectively disposes of petitioners constitutional arguments, we need not pause
long in addressing those issues. Contrary to petitioners contention, AEDPA does
apply to his case because Mr. Olonas federal habeas petition was filed after
AEDPAs effective date.
Lindh v. Murphy ,
521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997)). We have repeatedly held that the AEDPA applies to
cases filed after its effective date, regardless of when state court proceedings
occurred. Trice v. Ward , 196 F.3d 1151, 1158 (1999) (quotation omitted),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 93 (2000). We have similarly rejected a challenge to
AEDPA on the basis of retroactivity.
require the federal courts to cede this authority to the courts of the States would
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be inconsistent with the practice that federal judges have traditionally followed in
discharging their duties under Article III of the Constitution.
Id. at 379.
Petitioner finally argues that denial of his petition under AEDPA would
result in a suspension of the writ. He does not specify how this result would
occur, other than to hypothesize that [i]f AEDPA requires that a federal habeas
court allow a state court decision to stand, even though it is contrary to the United
States Constitution, AEDPA would also violate the suspension of the writ clause.
Opening Br. at 29. Of course, AEDPA does not
requires only that determinations of state courts be tested only against clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States, and second, the prohibition on the issuance of the writ unless the state
courts decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, that
clearly established law.
See also
Felker v. Turpin , 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) (holding that AEDPAs restrictions on
successive petitions do not amount to a suspension of the writ);
Miller v. Marr ,
141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that, under circumstances of the case,
AEDPAs statute of limitations did not result in a suspension of the writ).
Turning now to the merits of this appeal, petitioner argues that the trial
judge denied him his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine the victim about
her prior rape allegation which resulted in an acquittal and that insufficient
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evidence supports his convictions. The New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected
both of these claims on the merits.
Under AEDPA, petitioner will not be entitled to habeas relief unless the
state courts adjudication of the merits of his claims resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Supreme Court precedent or resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d).
Under the contrary to clause, a federal habeas court
may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a
conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]
Court on a question of law or if the state court decides
a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set
of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the
unreasonable application clause, a federal habeas
court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the
correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme]
Petitioner argues that the New Mexico Court of Appeals did not address his
Confrontation Clause argument on the merits. We disagree. While that court did
not use the phrase Confrontation Clause or refer directly to the Sixth
Amendment, the opinion relies on
State v. Johnson , 692 P.2d 35 (N.M. Ct. App.
1984) ( overruled in part by Manlove v. Sullivan
, 775 P.2d 237 (N.M. 1989)), the
leading New Mexico case at the time regarding the operation of the states rape
shield law. Johnson , in turn, is specifically concerned with the constitutional
right to cross-examine (The danger posed by [the rape shield law] is that its
application will prevent the defendant from adequately cross-examining the
complainant to attack her credibility, thus violating the defendants right to
confront the witnesses against him guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth
amendments.). Johnson , 692 P.2d at 42.
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id.
omitted). Trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is
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United States v.
cert. denied,
With respect to
678 (1986). And, indeed, that right can be abridged if the trial court precludes
an entire relevant area of cross-examination.
871 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotations omitted);
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Jackson v.
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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