Cui v. Cui
Cui v. Cui
appellant.
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J :
p
This is a proceeding in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu. The office in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San
Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff,
Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the
intervenor, Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don
Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free
of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It
acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine
Legislative passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties
by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of
donation executed on 2 January 1926.
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly
and, in case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate
or designate, in the order prescribed by them." Section 2 of the deed of donation
provides as follows:
"Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar,
nos sustituyan nuestro legitimo sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de
nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo en la ciudad de
Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho
sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces en la ciudad de
Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitimo
Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO
DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos
administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE
BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad,
que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos
legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que
posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a
falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto o
contribucion. En igualidad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de
mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion
Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de estas cualificaciones, la
administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al seor
Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignitario de la Iglesia Catolica,
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer
the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to
Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931 and the
second, on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of
Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series
of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the position of
administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case,
reference will be made later in this decision.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the
sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa
Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr.
Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio"
entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day,
28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however,
had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the
position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff
wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him;
and on 13 September 1960, the demand not having been complied with, the
plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming
a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the
nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective
qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and
therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred, pursuant to section 2
of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be applied the
deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the
nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero
civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al estado mayor
impuesto o contribucion."
cda
The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado."
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo
Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the
examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a
member of the Bar, and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957
(administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10
February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of
administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the
phrase "titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but
that "as used in the deed of donation and considering the function of purpose of
the administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one,"
and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is
assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by intervenor.
We are of the opinion that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de
abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of
Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for
the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonio o
instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profession" (Diccionario de
la Lengua Espaola, Real Academia Espaola, 1947 ed., p. 1224); and the word
"abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender
en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y
tambien a dar dictamen sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales que se la
consultan." (Id. p. 5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon
completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to
exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or
attorney- at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has
reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts,
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are developed by law as a consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the
authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires
passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate
from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the
profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with
admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirement
that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the
prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the
Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the law degree
itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed course may be shown in
some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code
of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal
education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as
lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say
that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the
foregoing test advisedly, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a
lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist,
in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes
among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No.
3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the
government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject
to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the
institute (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and conditions promulgated for
admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer
properties of considerable value for all of which work, it is to presumed, a
working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be
distinct asset.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against
the defendant, to the office of administrator. But it is argued that although the
latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of
paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the administrator may
be removed, on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his
office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact
that the defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality
and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on
10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of administrator. His
reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than
that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.
"Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent
in the sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend,
generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest
in the orderly and impartial administration of Justice will be conserved
by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and
counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to
the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral character
a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will take into
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Regala,
JJ., concur.