United States v. Williams, 10th Cir. (2010)
United States v. Williams, 10th Cir. (2010)
January 5, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-6053
(W.D. of Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
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543 U.S. 220 (2005), has no bearing on 3582(c)(2) proceedings, the district
court refused to reduce Williamss sentence.
II. Discussion
The district courts determination of its authority to modify a sentence
under 3582(c)(2) is reviewed de novo, see Rhodes, 549 F.3d at 837, as is the
district courts interpretation of a statute or the Sentencing Guidelines, see United
States v. Sharkey, 543 F.3d 1236, 1238 (10th Cir. 2008).
A. Resentencing Under 3582
Our cases have uniformly held that resentencing is unavailable under
3582 where the applicable guideline range has not been lowered. See United
States v. Dryden, 563 F.3d 1168, 1170S71 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 311 (2009); Rhodes, 549 F.3d at 838S41; Sharkey, 543 F.3d at 1238S39. In
particular, we have upheld the force of the Sentencing Commissions policy
determination that a reduction is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2)
if . . . [a]n amendment . . . does not have the effect of lowering the defendants
applicable guideline range. See, e.g., Dryden, 563 F.3d at 1170S71 (discussing
USSG 1B1.10). In this case, Amendment 706 did not reduce the sentencing
range available to Williams. He is not authorized to receive a sentence reduction.
Nor do the discretionary provisions of Booker apply to 3582(c)(2)
proceedings. We rejected that argument in Rhodes. See Rhodes, 549 F.3d at
840S41. In so holding, we stated:
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cannot rely on those sources for authority to modify sentences in ways that
contravene 3582(c)(2) and 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). Finally, as we have expressly
ruled, 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) does not impermissibly interfere with the jurisdiction of
the federal courts, because 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) does no more than reiterate a
statutory limitation on resentencing. Dryden, 563 F.3d at 1170 (emphasis
removed). Thus, district courts cannot ignore the policy statement applicable to
3582(c)(2) on non-delegation grounds and impose reduced terms of
imprisonment where an amendment does not reduce the applicable guideline
range.
Williams suggests that our Rhodes decision, concerning the relationship
between 3582(c)(2), 1B1.10, and district courts resentencing authority, was
incorrectly decided. Williams maintains that the discretion Booker accorded
district courts in imposing original sentences applies to resentencings as well.
Williams also contends that this courts decisions have not adequately taken into
account the Sentencing Reform Acts legislative history or the differences
between guidelines and policy statements.
We have previously noted that, while Booker excised statutory provisions
mandating that judges impose within-guidelines sentences in original sentencings,
it did not touch 3582(c)(2) proceedings. See United States v. Pedraza, 550 F.3d
1218, 1220 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2406 (2009). A
resentencing proceeding is an entirely different animal that does not implicate the
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Sixth Amendment concerns that drove the Booker remedy. Id. Overturning our
prior precedent requires either an intervening en banc decision of this court or a
superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court. See In re Smith, 10 F.3d
723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993). Williams does not identify, and our research does not
reveal, any decision that necessitates a break with our precedent. 2
Williamss reliance on legislative history is similarly misplaced.
[L]egislative history is often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory, and [the
court] should resort to it only when a statutes plain language is unclear. Ford v.
Ford Motor Credit Corp., 574 F.3d 1279, 1293 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Section 3582(c)(2)s language is not
ambiguous with regard to the limiting effect of policy statements. The statute
expressly states that a sentencing reduction is allowed, if such a reduction is
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission. 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). Furthermore, the legislative history of the
Sentencing Reform Act that Williams cites does not discuss 3582(c)(2), let
alone the specific language at issue. In short, the language of the statute is
unambiguous and reference to legislative history is unwarranted; Williamss
The Supreme Court may provide guidance on this issue next year. See
Dillon v. United States, --- S. Ct. --- 2009 WL 2899562 (Dec. 7, 2009) (granting
certiorari).
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legislative-history argument does not support the conclusion that district courts
may resentence absent an amendment that lowers the applicable guideline range.
Williams also points to United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770 (10th Cir. 1992),
and United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2004), to support the
proposition that the policy statement applicable to 3582(c)(2) proceedings
should be considered advisory, rather than mandatory. Both Lee and Tsosie
concerned the revocation of supervised release; they did not involve issues
relating to resentencing. 3 Both cases acknowledge that the policy statements of
Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory in nature.
The Lee court, which provided a more detailed discussion of its ruling with
respect to the advisory/mandatory issue, based its determination that Chapter 7s
policy statements were advisory on its review of the related statute. In reaching
its conclusion, the court in Lee noted that its holding was specifically limited to
Chapter 7 and that [o]ther policy statements in the Sentencing Guidelines must
be examined separately in the context of their statutory basis and their
accompanying commentary. Lee, 957 F.2d at 773. The Lee court also declared
that its ruling with regard to Chapter 7s policy statements did not disturb its prior
holding that USSG 5K1.1, another policy statement, was mandatory. See id.
In United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2004), the court did
not alter the holding of United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770 (10th Cir. 1992), and
relied on the Lee courts reasoning in reaching its conclusion. See Tsosie, 376
F.3d at 1218.
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