Clayman Clifford Shultz v. United States, 351 F.2d 287, 10th Cir. (1965)
Clayman Clifford Shultz v. United States, 351 F.2d 287, 10th Cir. (1965)
2d 287
The appellant was convicted after trial to a jury upon the second count of an
information charging the unlawful possession of money known to have been
stolen from a bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, a
violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(c). He appeals, alleging that his conviction was
premised upon testimony and evidence received during the trial that flowed
from an unlawful interrogation and search and seizure conducted by agents of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Although the record does not reveal a
pretrial motion to suppress, Rule 41(e), the trial court entertained appellant's
objections and conducted an independent hearing probing the admissibility of
the questioned evidence during the course of the trial. The court found, from
sharply conflicting testimony, that appellant, after being fully advised of his
constitutional rights, freely submitted to the interrogation and voluntarily
consented to the subject searches. We review such findings from the version of
the testimony found to be creditable by the trial court or undisputed by the
appellant.
On November 29, 1964, the Hereford State Bank at Hereford, Colorado was
broken into, the vault was skillfully drilled, and several thousand dollars in coin
were stolen. Five days later, appellant purchased a Buick automobile from a
dealer at Denver for $2,975.00 and paid for the car entirely in silver coin. The
car purchase received newspaper publicity because of general interest in its
oddity and was noted with particular interest by the Colorado parole
authorities-- appellant was then on a parole which was violated by the purchase
of a car without specific permission. Appellant was immediately arrested and
incarcerated for parole violation. And of course the coincidence of the
disappearance and appearance of a large quantity of coins led the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to the subject interview with appellant and ultimately to
the searches now in question.
3
At the time of the subject interviews there can be no doubt but that the
proceedings were accusatory in nature and that appellant had a right to counsel
although not then formally charged. Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
In applying such test to the facts found by the trial court to be creditable, we
can accord no comfort to appellant from Escobedo, supra; Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246, or other authorities cited
by him. Appellant was not affirmatively denied the right to counsel, was not
tricked, threatened or coerced. He was fully informed of his rights, was
questioned reasonably and was a mature man with considerable experience in
law enforcement matters. The record amply supports the trial court's findings
that appellant freely and voluntarily participated in the interviews and granted
the consents to search.
Affirmed.